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ABSTRACT
This study is about Chinese economic statecraft: what it is, how it works and why it is more or
less effective. The study builds a theory of economic statecraft that provides an explanation of
how states use firms to pursue their strategic goals. This theoretical construct begins with an
understanding of economic statecraft that has its roots in the concept of security externalities.
These externalities are the security consequences that result from the commercial activity of
firms or other entities that conduct international economic transactions. When states seek to
deliberately generate such strategic effects by manipulating the activities of commercial actors,
they are engaging in economic statecraft. Such manipulation rests on the state being able to
direct and control the commercial actors. Five factors account for when the state will be able to
control commercial actors. These factors reflect the business-government conditions under
which economic statecraft will be likely to succeed.
Given the centrality of state-business relations in this account of economic statecraft, China
provides a useful empirical context in which to explore this theory. Chinese economic statecraft
provides useful variation across a number of cases to illustrate the dynamics of the theory.
Specifically, the study examines three important areas of China's grand strategy that feature
economic statecraft prominently: Mainland relations toward Taiwan, China's efforts to secure
access to strategic raw materials, and China's sovereign wealth funds. The study compares cases
of both successful and unsuccessful economic statecraft across each of these empirical contexts.
This study finds that economic statecraft is not an easy lever of national power for states to wield
but when they master it, economic statecraft can have powerful strategic effects. These effects
are reflected in a typology of security externalities. Control of commercial actors is a critical
element enabling states to be able to generate such effects. Alignment of goals between the state
and the commercial actors, unity of the state, a limited number of commercial actors,
bureaucratic resources, and direct reporting relationships all facilitate effective economic
statecraft.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard J. Samuels
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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Chapter One
International Relations and the Study of Economic Statecraft
1. Introduction
This dissertation is about economic statecraft: what is it, how it works and why it is more
or less effective. Economic statecraft can be understood as state manipulation of international
economic activities for strategic purposes. To do this effectively, states must be able to control
the behavior of commercial actors that conduct the vast majority of international economic
activity. I explore economic statecraft in the context of contemporary Chinese grand strategy,
providing a framework that explains both how states use firms to pursue their strategic goals as
well as when economic statecraft is likely to succeed.'
In this introduction, I briefly discuss the theoretical and empirical significance of the
dissertation followed by a more detailed statement of the question. I also define a few of the key
terms used and review the literature on economic statecraft to situate my work in the context of
existing scholarship. My own analytic framework for thinking about economic statecraft is
presented in the next chapter.
This dissertation is an effort to build a middle-range theory of economic statecraft. Merton is often credited with
coining the term "middle range theory": Robert K. Merton, "The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory," The
British Journal of Sociology 8, no. 2 (1957): 106-120. For more on middle-range theories see: Alexander L. George
and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2005); Derek Layder, New Strategies in Social Research : An Introduction and Guide (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge,
MA, USA: Polity Press; Blackwell Publishers, 1993); Raymond Boudon, "What Middle Range Theories are,"
Contemporary Sociology 20, no. 4 (1991): 519-522.; Craig C. Pinder and Larry F. Moore, Middle Range Theory and
the Study of Organizations (Boston: M. Nijhoff Pub., 1980) For a recent discussion of micro-level and macro-level
theorizing in the monetary realm of economic power see: David M. Andrews, International Monetary Power
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).
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1.1 Importance
This work is significant for three reasons. First, in the realm of theory, it contributes to
the literature on economics and security-filling in gaps in the understanding of the relationship
between economics, security, the state, and international commercial actors. Second, from an
empirical perspective, it provides a set of tools for understanding the important role that
economics plays in the real-world application of a nation's grand strategy-how states actually
practice the exercise of their international economic power. Finally, in the context of
contemporary Chinese strategic studies, it offers insight into the economic dimension of China's
international relations.
Despite a long standing recognition among scholars of the importance of the relationship
between economics and national security, the academic study of the economic aspects of grand
strategy is under-developed. 2 In particular, relatively little work has focused on the micro-
foundations of how states might mobilize their economic interaction to further their security
goals. One reason may be found in a division within international relations between the
subfields of security studies and international political economy (IPE).3  Intellectual stove-
2 See for example: Jacob Viner, "Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948), 1-29.; Yuan-li Wu, Economic Warfare (New York: Prentice-
Hall, 1952); Charles Hitch, "National Security Policy as a Field for Economics Research," World Politics 12, no. 3
(April, 1960), 434-452.; Klaus Eugen Knorr, The War Potential ofNations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1956); Michael Mastanduno, "Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship," International Organization 52,
no. 4 (1998), 825-854.; Richard Rosecrance and Peter Thompson, "Trade, Foreign Investment and Security," Annual
Review of Political Science 6, no. 1 (2003), 377-398. Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, "The Study of
Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research," The Journal
of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 6 (2001): 834-859.; Miles Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, "Strategic Uses of Economic
Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait," Journal of Peace
Research 43, no. 5 (2006): 523-541. All of whom stress the significance of the intersection of economics and
secunty.
3Kirshner notes that the minimal likelihood of security threats among advanced western economies during the Cold
War may partly account for the relatively isolated history of development of the distinct subfields of security studies
and international political economy: Jonathan Kirshner, "Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold
War," Review of International Political Economy 5, no. 1 (Jan 1998), 64-91. Michael Mastanduno, on the other
hand, attributes the artificial division of the two fields to the institutionalization that occurred as a result of the two
fields' academic development path during the Cold War. He makes a convincing case for the need to re-integrate
the two fields of IPE and security studies. See: Michael Mastanduno, "Economics and Security in Statecraft and
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piping has resulted in incomplete theoretical treatments of both the economic elements of grand
strategy as well as the strategic aspects of economic interaction.4 Many works in security studies
that concern themselves with questions of grand strategy are almost exclusively focused on its
military aspects with little development of the economic dimension of grand strategy. As a
field, security studies has spent considerable effort developing and honing its understanding of
the exercise of military power: its limits, advantages, mechanisms, strategies, factors determining
its success and failure, etc. We have not developed our theoretical understanding of the exercise
of economic power in the same way. Just as military tools may be used to achieve strategic
national objectives, economic tools may also be used.6 Understanding how this is done
Scholarship," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), 825-854. For more on this topic, see James A. Caporaso,
"False Divisions: Security Studies and Global Political Economy," Mershon International Studies Review vol. 39,
1995, pp. 117-122.
4 Russell Ong explicitly calls for greater synthesis across the subfields of economics and security studies with
specific reference to the Chinese security context: Russell Ong, China's Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2002).
' Much of the leading international relations scholarship on grand strategy focuses on the military dimension of
grand strategy. See for instance: Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin H. Bernstein, The Making
of Strategy : Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge, England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994);
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999); Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1954); William Hardy
McNeill, The Pursuit ofPower : Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982); Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy: From
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); Barry Posen, The Sources of
Military Doctrine : France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
While military aspects play a key role in a country's grand strategy, grand strategy also importantly includes an
economic element. See especially, discussions of the full spectrum of tools available to states in the introduction of
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to
2000, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Random House, 1987) and footnote 2 on page 8 of Barry R. Posen and Andrew L.
Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 5-53.
6 In fact in certain situations, economic power (as opposed to military power) may be a preferable set of tools for
achieving national strategic objectives, given international distributions of military power. For instance, see: Robert
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). The
classical realist E.H. Carr made a seminal contribution to our understanding of economic power when he stated that
"the military and economic weapons are merely different instruments of power." (from Carr, The Twenty Years'
Crisis, 1919-1939; an Introduction to the Study of International Relations, pp. 117-120). This critical insight
provides the basis for my premise that economic power may be studied in much the same way that the field of
security studies examines the nature and application of military power. Jacob Viner elaborated on the relationship
between wealth and power (see Jacob Viner, "Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" World Politics 1,1 pp. 1 -29). Viner argued that wealth and power are not
mutually exclusive goals for states to pursue. Rather, Viner believed that power is complementary to wealth and
vise versa. While I do not directly disagree with Viner, I offer a slightly different approach more in line with Carr's
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constitutes an important element of understanding grand strategy. At the same time that
economics has largely fallen through the cracks of security studies, the field of economics has
generally ignored the strategic security consequences that arise in the course of international
economic activities.! These two gaps result in an under-developed understanding of economic
statecraft: the economic component of grand strategy.8 Specifically, the field suffers from a
relative lack of research on the economic mechanisms states use to pursue their grand strategy
under conditions of modem globalization.9 As a result, contemporary analyses of grand strategy
as well as strategic assessments of economic policy remain incomplete.
Developing a better understanding of how states employ economics in their grand
strategy is important not only as a theoretical exercise designed to fill gaps in the field, but also
serves as a useful tool for understanding the important role that economics plays in the practical
applications of a nation's grand strategy. Practitioners as well as scholars seek a deeper
understanding of the nature, forms, limitations and possibilities of exercising economic power. It
should be stated at the outset that economic power is often a difficult lever of international power
to wield, but when it does occur it can be very important. Economic statecraft featured
prominently in the American post-World War II containment strategy (Marshall Plan, Bretton
Woods, GATT, the rebuilding and economic revitalization of Japan and Germany, etc.). 10 For a
perspective. I would argue that the pursuit of wealth is really little more than the national pursuit of power by other
means.
7 John C. Scharfen, The Dismal Battlefield: Mobilizingfor Economic Conflict (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1995); Author conversations with Martin Feldstein, President Emeritus of National Bureau of Economic
Research.
8 Baldwin also notes that the field's understanding is under-developed. I share his view that Clausewitz's central
insight that war is the continuation of politics by other means, can also be applied to the study of economic statecraft
as simply another means for states to pursue their national interests. See: David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 64-65.
9 A more complete theory of economic statecraft would connect the micro-level behavior of global commercial
actors with the larger, macro-level strategic consequences of that economic interaction.
1 Michael Mastanduno, "Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early
Postwar Period," International Organization 42, no. 1: 121.; China's current grand strategy also features a prominent
role for economics.
Chapter One: International Relations and Economic Statecraft
variety of reasons, states often prefer to use economic rather than military tools of statecraft.
Indeed, at different times throughout history, various countries ranging from Britain (efforts to
support its continental allies in the late 1700s)" to Japan (in the 1980s)12 have displayed a
preference for using economic levers of power to pursue their strategic objectives. Reasons for
pursuing national strategic objectives via economic rather than (or in conjunction with) military
levers of power vary widely." For example, exercising military power may be an unattractive
option because of alliance obligations (Suez Crisis of 1956), a lack of force projection
capabilities (numerous cases of UN sanctions), fear of escalation, etc.14 In other cases, economic
levers of power may be a particularly attractive option because of: asymmetric dependence (pre-
World War II Japanese reliance on US oil), the lulling effects of perceived benefits of economic
ties (nineteenth century railroad investment in the Far East), or relative ease of implementation
(2006 freezing of DPRK assets at Banco Delta in Macao).' 5 Over time and across geographic
spaces, economics has been employed as a tool of national power-understanding exactly how
states employ economics in practice to achieve their grand strategic objectives is a useful
contribution to policy makers' understanding of how states behave in the international system.16
" Sherwig, John M., Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
12 Heginbotham, Eric and Richard J. Samuels "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," International
Security vol. 22, no. 4 (Spring, 1998) pp. 171-203; also see: Pyle, Kenneth B. The Japanese Question (Washington,
D.C.: AEI Press, 1996) and Bienen, Henry, ed., Power, Economic Relations, and Security: An Overview with U.S. -
Japan Cases (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
* See Klaus Eugen Knorr, The Power of Nations : The Political Economy of International Relations (New York:
Basic Books, 1975) pp. 18-19.
14 For additional work on the declining utility of military statecraft, see: Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2 , ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), especially his "Commentary on War since 1942." Also see: Knorr,
The Power ofNations, p. 45 and his Chapter V, "Uses of Military Power," and Klaus Eugen Knorr and Frank N.
Trager, Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: Published for the National Security Education Program
by the Regents Press of Kansas, 1977) p. 116.
15 For more on the attractiveness of economic power, see: Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 218.
16 "A good dissertation asks an important question. The answer should be relevant to real problems facing the real
world." Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodsfor Students ofPolitical Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997) p. 97. In this dissertation I seek to contribute both to the theoretical and the applied understanding of
economic statecraft.
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The case of modem day China is of particular significance; both for the theoretical
analysis of economics and its role in modem grand strategy, as well as for the empirical analysis
of a significant emerging power in the international system. China-a rising power in the
international system-has explicitly sought to develop and incorporate economics into its grand
strategy. Understanding how this is done and what conditions facilitate the effective use of
economic interaction to achieve foreign policy objectives is the third important reason for
developing a theory that links microeconomic, firm-level behavior with the grand strategy of
states. China's rise has attracted considerable scholarly attention,17 but while some of this work
has recognized the increasingly sophisticated nature of China's foreign policy, 18 the scholarship
on Chinese foreign policy has not yet produced an adequate framework for understanding the
economic dimension of China's foreign policy. Although there are a handful of China scholars
that have sought to examine the role of economics in China's foreign policy, most of this work is
still underdeveloped.19
Although this gap in the literature is understandable given that China's sophisticated use
of economics in its foreign policy is still a fairly recent phenomenon, it nevertheless ought to be
addressed. China's economy has recently become the second largest in the world and continues
to grow rapidly. Moreover, China seems intent to use its economic clout to help achieve its
17 For a sample, see: Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge : China's Grand Strategy and International Security
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005); Robert S. Ross and Feng Zhu, China's Ascent : Power, Security,
and the Future ofInternational Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Alastair lain Johnston & Robert S.
Ross, Engaging China: Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999); Kokubun Ryosei &
Wang Jisi, The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (New York: Japan Center for International
Exchange, 2005); Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross, New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2006); the 2003 Ba'ao Forum; David L. Shambaugh, Power Shift:
China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) etc.18 E. S. Medeiros and M. T. Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003), 22-35.
19 These works are reviewed in more detail in the literature review that follows.
12
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strategic objectives. Indeed, as China pursues a "peaceful rise" grand strategy, economic
power seems to provide a more and more attractive alternative lever of power than military force.
In addition, current indications seem to suggest that this economically-oriented "peaceful rise"
strategy is producing favorable results and greatly strengthening China's ties to other countries in
the region and beyond. To what extent is China's rapidly rising economic clout going to be able
to be translated into actual strategic results for China? As a field that examines important real-
world international phenomena, we have an interest in understanding the manner in which
economic interaction is used to pursue states' strategic objectives.
1.2 The Question
How does economics affect national security? More precisely, what is the manner in
which economic interaction may carry ramifications for security? To answer that question, in
Chapter Two I offer a typology of the economics-security interface. This typology does two
things. First, it maps out the range of possible ways economics can affect security-the full
domain of the phenomenon under investigation. Second, the typology specifies the causal chains
that connect the micro-economic behavior of firms with macro-level strategic security effects.
The typology discussion not only outlines the various channels through which economic
interaction generates security consequences but also what states can do about these
consequences.
I also ask why economic statecraft is more or less effective. What are the circumstances
under which economic statecraft is more or less likely to achieve the strategic goals of the state?
As is demonstrated in the literature review below, scholars have not adequately addressed the
20 In the case of China, economics is a critical component of Beijing's "New Security Concept" and economics
seems likely to continue to play an important role in China's pursuit of its strategic objectives. See: C. Fred
Bergsten and others, China: The Balance Sheet (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).
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role of commercial actors in economic statecraft. In particular, state coordination and control of
the commercial actors that carry out the vast majority of economic commerce has received
comparatively little attention. How does a state manipulate commercial actors to behave in
ways that support political goals? Despite their centrality to the exercise of international
economic power, these commercial actors have not been adequately incorporated into a general
theory of economic statecraft.
1.3 Definitions
So how should one think about these commercial actors? Who are they? Commercial
actors are those entities that actually carry out international economic transactions (e.g. buying
and selling commodities, making investments, selling products, building factories, purchasing
assets, employing workers, etc.). They are often (but not always) multinational corporations.2 2
States, strictly speaking, do not actually conduct the vast majority of today's international
economic interaction-firms do. This is an empirical reality that has not been appropriately
accommodated in the study of economic statecraft. Understanding how states use economics to
pursue their strategic objectives requires that we focus on the role of commercial actors-the
entities that actually conduct "economics."
So what is meant by the term "economics?" International economic interaction is the
generic term used to describe the full range of economic activity that can take place across state
2 Of course, control of commercial actors is not the only requirement for successful economic statecraft. I argue
that there are four key determinants of the effectiveness of economic power: the relative importance of the issue area
under contention, the magnitude of the economic interaction, the elasticity of the economic interaction, and the
state's ability to control and mobilize that economic interaction. Each of these-in particular, this last factor-will
be explained in more detail in Chapter Two.
22 In some instances, states themselves may directly engage in economic transactions (foreign aid, procurement, etc.)
but for the most part, states write the rules of the game and define the conditions under which firms operate. Being a
referee or designing the playing field is not the same thing as being a player in the match-although both have an
influence over the outcome of the game.
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borders. This economic interaction may take the form of trade, investment or in some instances
even monetary interaction. Although trade tends to receive the most attention in the international
relations literature on economics and security (as discussed below), it seems reasonable to
believe that not all economic interaction is trade. Moreover, other forms of economic interaction
may have very different security implications than trade.23 Trade encapsulates the exchange of
goods and services across borders and is often measured in terms of exports and imports. The
termfinancial is used to denote economic interaction relating to investment activities and capital
flows. Investments typically come in two forms: foreign direct investment or portfolio
investment.2 4 The term monetary is used to distinguish the class of economic interactions that
involve central bank relations, macro-economic coordination and foreign exchange policy
including such areas as exchange rates, currency unions, interest rates, money supplies, the gold
standard, foreign currency reserves and the like.
Grand strategy is the notion that connects these various forms of economic interaction to
a state's pursuit of its national interests. Specifically, Avery Goldstein defines grand strategy as:
"the distinctive combination of military, political, and economic means by which a state seeks to
23 Trade is only one facet of the complicated economic connections among states and I believe there is much insight
to be gained by not limiting the scope of consideration to trade alone. Indeed there is considerable reason to believe
that investment interactions have very different security implications than trade. Likewise, it seems plausible that
the security implications of monetary interactions are also very different from either investment or trade. Although
this is an intriguing insight to pursue further, it is largely outside the scope of this study and will need to wait until a
future project to more precisely explore how the security externalities of the various types of economic interaction
differ.
2 4Crudely speaking, foreign direct investment is distinguished from portfolio investment by its relative liquidity.
FDI generally involves joint ventures or wholly-owned foreign enterprises operating in the host country. These
ventures tend to involve assets that are relatively fixed. In contrast, portfolio investment is generally a much more
liquid, usually non-controlling, non-operating, equity-based passive ownership investment that can take the form of
stock, debt, or other derivatives that can be fairly easily traded on public exchanges. For an elaboration of the
distinction between portfolio investment and FDI see Richard Rosecrance and Peter Thompson, "Trade, Foreign
Investment and Security," Annual Review of Political Science 6, no. 1 (2003), especially pp. 383-389. For more on
FDI in China see Ying-qi Wei and V. N. Balasubramanyam, Foreign Direct Investment : Six Country Case Studies
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004); and Yasheng Huang, Selling China : Foreign Direct Investment during the
Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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ensure its national interests."25 My approach to grand strategy (and economic statecraft in
particular) is closely tied to the intellectual tradition of neoclassical realist international relations
scholars that make several assumptions regarding the centrality of international anarchy, the
essentially competitive nature of international politics, the importance of power and the pursuit
of national interests, etc. 26 States have a grand strategy that is based on their understanding of
their national interests and states seek to pursue these interests according to the ordering of their
preferences given the constraints states face. Countries are relatively rational actors that seek to
pursue their national interests in the international system according to their capabilities.27 Their
grand strategy can be thought of as a "means-ends chain" as Barry Posen first described:
"A grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state's theory about
how it can best 'cause' security for itself. Ideally, it includes an explanation of why the
theory is expected to work. A grand strategy must identify likely threats to the state's
security and it must devise political, economic, military, and other remedies for those
threats. Priorities must be established among both threats and remedies because given an
anarchical international environment, the number of possible threats is great, and given
the inescapable limits of a national economy, resources are scarce. ... Of course, grand
strategies are almost never stated in such rigorous form, but the analyst may be guided by
this conceptualization in his attempt to ferret out the grand strategy of the state .. ."28
25 [My italics added] Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, p. 17. For an excellent, brief discussion on the nature of
grand strategy see Goldstein pp. 17-20.
26 For a recent synopsis of classical realism in contemporary international relations scholarship see: Steven E.
Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
2 States will try to pursue their preferences in the international environment. See Goldstein's footnote 6 on p. 17:
"...leading states have usually sought to shape, and not just survive in, their international environment, typically in
ways that will further enhance their wealth, power, and status." Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge. Of course such
efforts are constrained by varying levels of permissiveness in the international environment and the limitations of a
state's capabilities. A state with greater capabilities will be able to pursue secondary and even tertiary interests,
while some states with limited international power will have difficulty even pursuing minimal core national
interests. In the same way, a cooperative international environment in which other states are supportive of your
national goals makes pursuit of those goals easier.
28 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine p. 13. Conceptualizing grand strategy as a means-ends chain allows
scholars to study both the tools used to pursue national interests and the content of those national interests
themselves. This project is focused on studying one particular type of tool that states use to pursue their national
interests, namely economic statecraft. As discussed in the literature review below, most of the work that has been
done on the topic of understanding the tools of grand strategy has tended to focus on the military realm. Although
this is an important element of national power, it is not the only (nor is it necessarily the most effective) means of
achieving national objectives. The field's theoretical treatment of economic tools of grand strategy seems to be
under-developed given its practical relevance.
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In China's case, the Communist Party defines China's national interests and implements
China's grand strategy. This imparts a few important characteristics to China's grand strategy. 2 9
For example, Chinese strategic policy is subject to factionalism. However, such factionalism has
a limit given the hierarchy of domestic politics and the relative power of the central leadership.
The result is that China acts (for the most part) like any other unitary, rational actor in pursuing
its national goals in the international system. Many assumptions about China and its grand
strategy are topics of intense debate in the China field today.3 0 I do not pretend to adequately
engage in these debates here, but good scholarship should lay bear its important analytical
assumptions as explicitly as possible.31
The dissertation also draws on a few other simple concepts in economics that deserve to
be briefly defined here. The economic concept of elasticity will be used to refer to how badly
something is needed and how easily this need can be met by some substitute.32 Frequently, in
29 Goldstein offers a terrific synopsis of these characteristics in Rising to the Challenge. Preservation of the
Communist Party's continued grip on power is a primary concern. One of the key legitimating factors that enables
this is continued economic growth. Such growth helps ensure domestic stability. In addition, China's international
economic interaction helps pave the way for its rise to great power status. Economics features prominently in
China's grand strategy. See, for instance, ZE ME [Wang Jisi] "4$ W M [A PI A M! W ILE: Mi' A 0 & iJA" [trans:
"Studying China's International Strategy: Model Reconsideration and Construction,"] W i Mff r 2007 4 % 4
M M 106 YJ1 -8 if. For a good introduction to a variety of perspectives on China's grand strategy, see that
entire dedicated issue of N Pi W 1, [English name: International Politics Quarterly] 2007, issue 4, no. 106.
30 For example, there has been some debate over whether or not China even has a grand strategy. (e.g. Michael D.
Swaine, "Does China have a Grand Strategy?" Current History 99, no. 638 (2000): 274.; Pillsbury, China Debates
the Future Security Environment). However, when these arguments are unpacked, most of this debate is, at its core,
an epistemic debate about whether or not any state has a grand strategy and how coherently any state can pursue its
national interests. Such positions often argue that states are not unitary actors and are too prone to domestic schisms
that effectively prevent a coherent rational pursuit of national interest (or in the extreme, even prevent a meaningful
consensus of what national interests are). Although frequently framed as Chinese exceptionalism, similar debates
can apply to discussions of Russian, Indian, Japanese, European and even American debates over grand strategy.
While this is an interesting academic debate, these questions of whether states have a grand strategy will not be
engaged in this work. My analysis of China's economic power assumes that China, like other nations, has a grand
strategy.
31 These assumptions are not very far removed from mainstream security studies or from the current conventional
wisdom regarding state of the art scholarship on international relations and China. I merely wished to make these
assumptions explicit at the outset.
32 Klaus Knorr's discussions of economic power also include elements of these two qualities. See: Klaus Eugen
Knorr and Frank N. Trager, Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: Published for the National Security
Education Program by the Regents Press of Kansas, 1977) especially pp. 102-105.
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discussions of economic power, the term dependence is used. In this dissertation, dependence
refers to the fraction of the total supply (or the fraction of the total demand) for a given good,
service, etc. coming from a single source. The definition of an externality also originates in
economics. The concept of externalities captures the notion that a given transaction may also
produce effects that are not fully internalized among the parties that are directly conducting the
transaction. The dissertation uses the term security externalities to denote those security effects
that are not fully internalized among the parties directly conducting any given economic
interaction.33 Whether or not states or firms are conscious of these security externalities does
not-strictly speaking-matter. Whether these security effects are intended or not also does not
matter in terms of the security consequences of the economic interaction.34 Neither intentionality
nor awareness matters.
An example may help to illustrate. Air pollution is often an environmental externality
resulting from a factory employing its workers to produce steel. A common consequence of high
levels of air pollution is asthma. Whether or not local citizens are aware of the presence of (or
cause of) air pollution does not-strictly speaking-matter in terms of the incidence of asthma in
the general population. Nor does it matter that the factory owners are aware that their economic
activity of employing workers to produce steel is producing an environmental externality. The
likelihood of developing asthma would be the same whether or not owners or citizens were
3 Of course not all security externalities are a consequence of economic activity. There may be security
externalities that stem from environmental activities, social changes, demographic trends, or any other number of
factors. This dissertation, however, will be limited to those security externalities resulting from economic activity.
When the term "security externalities" is used, it is used to denote the security consequences arising as a by-product
of economic interaction.
34 Intentionality is merely likely to impact the degree to which manipulation of the externality occurs-such
manipulation is defined as economic statecraft and is conceptually distinct from the notion of security externalities
(see my definition of "Economic Statecraft" below). What really matters from the point of view of the strategic
outcomes are the security externalities themselves-whether or not they were deliberately generated or simply the
unintended by-product of normal commercial behavior does not really affect the security consequences per se.
Whether or not intended, the casual logic of security externalities holds; that is, commercial actors can and do
generate security consequences as a result of economic interaction. When states seek to deliberately manipulate that
economic interaction they are engaging in economic statecraft.
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conscious of the environmental externality. In the same way, whether the factory intended to
cause asthma is unrelated to the fact that asthma was caused. An externality was produced
because there were effects generated that were exogenous to the transacting parties. This
exogeneity is what makes these effects externalities, irrespective of the intentions or awareness
of the transacting parties. Just as environmental externalities may result from economic activity,
security externalities may be thought of as the security consequences stemming from economic
activity. Some examples of types of security externalities arising from economic interaction
include: sensitive technology transfer, loss of strategic industries, concentrated supply or demand
dependence (in areas of trade, investment and monetary relations), the forging of common
interests resulting from currency unions, joint ventures, macroeconomic coordination or even
simple trade complementarity.3 5 The final definition builds on this concept of security
externality.
I define economic statecraft as the state manipulation of economic interaction to
capitalize on or to reduce the associated security externalities. In this way, economic statecraft is
conceptually distinct from the security externalities that result from the activities of commercial
actors. States are, to varying degrees, aware of these security externalities. Some externalities
may be beneficial while others may be detrimental. Since the externalities are generated by
commercial actors that are subject to incentive structures at least partly determined by states,
states can seek to influence the behavior of commercial actors in an effort to promote the state's
strategic objectives. When states seek to manage security externalities they are engaging in what
is known as economic statecraft. This is where intentionality plays a role. Security externalities
3 In an effort to systematically analyze the various ways economic interaction may generate security externalities, in
the next chapter, the dissertation provides a typology organizing security externalities according to their effects.
Security externalities are categorized according to those whose effects are primarily economic and those whose
effects are primarily military. For more detail on the various types of security externalities, see the section in the
next chapter entitled: "Typology of Security Externalities."
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may simply result from the autonomous activities of commercial actors pursuing profits (without
any direction by the state). However, economic statecraft is the intentional attempt of the state to
deliberately incentivize commercial actors to act in a manner that generates security externalities
that are conducive to the state's strategic interests.36 Economic statecraft often occurs as part of
a state's grand strategy.37 Such manipulation of commercial actors-and the economic
interaction they conduct-occurs through a range of state policies including sanctions, taxation,
embargoes, trade agreements, asset freezing, engagement policies, currency manipulation,
subsidies, tariffs, trade agreements, etc. Economic statecraft encompasses the scope of state
actions taken to manipulate economic interaction and the security externalities associated with
that economic interaction. In this manner, states may use commercial actors to achieve foreign
policy objectives by creating incentives for commercial actors to behave in a way that carries
with it security externalities that are conducive to a state's strategic interests.
As this definition of economic statecraft differs from the one most common in the
literature, it provides a convenient starting point for a larger examination of the limitations and
gaps found in the existing literature on economic statecraft.
36 Note that economic statecraft (the attempt on the part of the state to manipulate economic interaction to capitalize
on the security externalities that result) is analytically distinct from the security externalities themselves. Security
externalities may be (inadvertently) generated by commercial actors engaging in various types of economic
interaction simply for their narrow commercial rationales. With economic statecraft, there is an element of
intentionality present. When engaging in economic statecraft, the state seeks to direct and manipulate the economic
activity so as to deliberately generate the associated security externalities.
3 Broadly speaking, states have four objectives when they employ economic statecraft to achieve their strategic
objectives: 1.) Limit the good done to rivals/enemies, 2.) Maximize the bad done to rivals/enemies (including
transformation) 3.) Limit the bad done to themselves/allies 4.) Maximize the good done to themselves/allies.
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1.4 Literature Review
The existing literature on the causes, nature and exercise of international economic power
suffers from a lack of precision regarding how states actually use economics to pursue their
strategic objectives. In particular, the literature has not adequately incorporated the role of
commercial actors in its understanding of states' strategic use of economics to pursue national
foreign policy objectives. This gap is mainly attributable to the field's tendency for state-centric
analysis that often fails to pay adequate attention to the role of commercial actors. Addressing
this shortcoming requires that we examine the role of these actors in economic statecraft. Doing
so will provide a much richer understanding of exactly how a state uses economics to pursue its
strategic foreign policy goals.
David Baldwin's Economic Statecraft is one of our field's best efforts to understand the
wide range of economic tools states could call upon to achieve their national interests. His work
attempts to systematically catalogue and evaluate the various types of economic statecraft that
states can use to achieve their strategic objectives. By calling attention to the political rather
than economic effects of using economic tools, he seeks to challenge the view that economic
statecraft is not a very effective tool of international relations. The early chapters wrestle with
the conceptual elements of how to analyze economic statecraft, while the later chapters discuss
particular cases of economic statecraft. The work is often cited as the seminal modern text on
economic statecraft and provides a useful reference for students seeking to understand the
economic tools of international power.
In particular, three aspects of this work form the basis for my own project. First, his
work builds on Lasswell's four-part classification scheme of national power in seeking to
develop and expound the economic set of tools available to states to pursue their national
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objectives. 38 This is a useful starting point. Second, Baldwin makes a compelling case that
"foreign policy is generally viewed as purposive behavior, i.e., activity oriented toward some
end, goal, objective, or aim."39 Finally, Baldwin seeks to illuminate both "positive" and
"negative" consequences from economic statecraft-he points out that scholarship on economic
statecraft often fails to adequately appreciate the strategically beneficial aspects of economic
interaction. His insight that economic interaction can have both constructive and destructive
effects on the target also informs my own typology.
One area of Baldwin's work that can be improved is his definition of "economic
statecraft" itself. In particular, Baldwin's concept is poorly specified and ill-suited to developing
a deeper understanding of how states actually exercise their economic power. Baldwin focuses
his scholarship on the phenomenon of "economic statecraft" which he defines as "influence
attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in
terms of money."40 Essentially, Baldwin's definition begins by saying that statecraft defines the
range of tools, policies, etc. that a state has at its disposal to pursue its interests in the
international system.41 This definition is straightforward. He goes on to define economic as
those transactions, goods, etc. which can be measured and priced in terms of money.4 This logic
leads Baldwin to conclude that economic statecraft defines the activities, policies, etc. of a state
that rely on resources that have a price tag. The purpose in constructing such a definition seems
to be to emphasize that the term "economic" merely defines the means employed (rather than the
38 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How. (New York: Meridian Books, 1958). Lasswell's
postscript suggests that states can exercise their power across four dimensions: information, diplomacy, economics
and force. My work, like Baldwin's, is concerned with the economic tools of statecraft.39 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985) p. 16.
40 Ibid. p. 30. Baldwin actually introduces this definition on page 13-14 of Chapter 2, but develops it more fully in
his Chapter 3 "What is Economic Statecraft?". The framework I present in Chapter Two provides a much more
detailed discussion of how these types of "influence attempts" actually work. By elucidating specific causal
mechanisms and the micro-economic foundations of economic statecraft, I provide a more powerful explanatory
framework for exploring how states use economics in their grand strategy.
4' See ibid. pp. 8-9 in which he borrows from Harold and Margaret Sprout and K.J. Holsti.
42 Ibid. pp. 31-32.
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end-state goals that are sought-which may be purely political). Although this perspective is not
incorrect and in the practice of international relations, states do seem to frequently seek to
achieve non-economic ends by way of using economic means, this does not seem to be a
particularly innovative nor analytically helpful insight. It would be more interesting if we could
say something about exactly how it is that states use such tools. What is different about state use
of economic tools as opposed to other means of international influence? What are their limits?
Are there any patterns that we can explore regarding conditions that are likely to result in
"success?" If so what are those conditions? In what manner, exactly, do state applications of
economic instruments produce the strategic consequences that states seek? These are the
questions that drive my project. Baldwin's definition of economic statecraft is too vague to
provide useful analytical leverage on such questions. In the section on "Definitions" above, I
offered a more specific, analytically precise definition of economic statecraft that moves away
from Baldwin's "intentionally broad" definition in favor of an understanding of economic
statecraft that frames the strategic outcomes as security externalities that result as a consequence
of the economic activities of commercial actors. Defining economic statecraft in this way allows
us to be more precise about the conditions under which and the manner in which states seek to
use economic interaction to promote their strategic goals.
By focusing the analytical lens on the consequences of various patterns of economic
interaction, my work is also able to move beyond another limitation of Baldwin's formulation:
namely, that specific policy tools are categorized simply as "positive" or "negative." On pages
41 and 42, he provides a table of policy tools that states may use to pursue their national
objectives. These tools are categorized as either "negative" (having a harmful effect on the
target) or "positive" (having a beneficial effect on the target) and as having to do with either
"trade" or "capital" (by which he means financial flows). His definition of economic statecraft as
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essentially the economic means to realize foreign policy objectives may be partly responsible for
this narrow, binomial categorization. The outcome of economic statecraft (i.e. the end it is
designed to achieve) is largely exogenous for Baldwin. He is primarily concerned with
identifying the economic set of tools that states can use to pursue a range of foreign policy
goals. By framing economic statecraft as an issue of security externalities, my approach shifts
the focus to the security effects of economic interaction and thus is better able to illuminate and
distinguish the specific types of security concerns arising out of various patterns of economic
interaction. Rather than merely categorizing the various policy tools that states can use to
engage in economic statecraft (which, as Baldwin admits, may be an almost infinite list of policy
tools), I organize the space on a different basis.44 I put forward a comprehensive typology that
distinguishes the specific security effects that state policies may seek to bring about. By framing
the conceptual space in this way, I am better able to distinguish and specify the causal pathways
that link the economic behavior of commercial actors to the ultimate security consequences for
states. This conceptual approach also places a state's policy tools in their proper context: namely
as levers that states can pull to influence the commercial actors that actually conduct
international economic interaction. In some circumstances, these levers are very powerful. In
other conditions they may be less effective at influencing the behavior of commercial actors.
Such an approach provides a much clearer view of the inner workings of economic statecraft-
exactly how states use economics to pursue their foreign policy objectives. This higher
resolution on the actual conduct of economic statecraft permits a richer categorization of the
conceptual domain of economic statecraft than a positive/negative framework.
4 On pp. 40-41 he provides a long list of the "wide variety of foreign policy goals."ibid.
"These tables are intended to illustrate the wide variety of economic techniques and do not purport to be
exhaustive." ibid. p. 40. One can imagine a dizzying array of policy options available for the state to influence
economic conduct: laws, conditionalities, regulations, tariffs, taxes, licensing, quotas, bilateral and multilateral
regimes, fiscal measures, subsidies, etc.
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Of course Baldwin's is not the only seminal work on this important topic. There is a long
history of scholarly efforts to examine how states could use their economic relations to pursue
security goals. In fact, unlike much of the more recent scholarship on the topic, many of the
earliest works were empirically-driven analyses that gave considerable attention to understanding
the role of commercial actors in states' foreign policy. Eugene Staley premised his 1935 work,
War and the Private Investor, on the notion that the economic behavior of private sector actors
cannot be fully understood without also considering the political and military contexts that
frequently influenced ultimate economic outcomes. 45 His work drove home the importance of
considering the commercial actors when examining how states wield their international
economic power. In particular, Staley's framing of his cases reflected the heart of the business-
government challenge inherent in economic statecraft: namely whether the commercial actor or
the state is ultimately driving the strategic outcome. One of the best known classics, is Albert
Hirschman's study of Germany's trade relations with its weaker Eastern European neighbors. 46
Hirschman depicted the German state policies designed to establish, deepen and exploit
asymmetric structural economic dependence on the part of Eastern European states on Germany
before World War II. By the time that Hirschman wrote his well-known book, Herbert Feis had
already discussed how pre-World War I powers used investment and finance to facilitate their
own security policies.4 7 Each of these works helped to frame how states could use various types
of economic interaction to pursue their strategic goals.
45 Eugene Staley, War and the Private Investor; a Study in the Relations of International Politics and International
Private Investment (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., inc., 1935). This work was an early attempt to
systematically examine cases in which commercial actors behaved in ways that were conducive to states' strategic
objectives. Staley was also keen to note that his research often found governments doing the bidding of their
commercial actors as well.
46 Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure ofForeign Trade (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California press, 1945).
47 See: Herbert Feis, Europe the World's Banker, 1870-1914 (New Haven; London: Yale university press; H.
Milford, Oxford university press, 1931). Feis would later also document the American and British efforts to support
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Although some of these early works in the field of economics and security examined
ways states may seek to further their strategic goals through private sector or quasi-private sector
actors,48 most of this literature was largely framed in mercantilistic terms that do not account for
the complex relations between the state and the firm in a more modem, liberalized economic
context. Although the broad, general concepts pertaining to the role of the state in managing its
economic affairs may still provide insightful conceptual leverage, much of the specific empirical
relevance of these early works are naturally rather limited in a contemporary Twenty-First
Century context.
Later works did seek to explore how states could use economic power to achieve their
interests in a more modem, globalized and interdependent environment. Authors in this spirit
include Klaus Knorr, Robert Gilpin, Robert 0. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye whose work on the
nature and exercise of modem transnational economic power was both insightful and path
breaking.49 Knorr's work carried E. H. Carr's initial insight-that economic power and military
power are merely two sides of the same coin-into a more modem multinational context. Knorr
sought to provide a theoretical framework for understanding how modem states harness,
aggregate and utilize the economic tool in international relations. Knorr applied economic
concepts and principles to parse out the nature, mechanics and consequences of economic
China's currency against Japanese attempts to undermine the currency as part of Japan's strategy to fracture China
into more easily conquered autonomous regions. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor; the Coming of the War
between the United States and Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).
48 See especially Staley's War and the Private Investor and Hirschman p. 170.
49See Klaus Eugen Knorr, Power and Wealth; the Political Economy of International Power (New York: Basic
Books, 1973), Knorr, The Power of Nations : The Political Economy of International Relations, Klaus Eugen Knorr
and Frank N. Trager, Economic Issues and National Security, Vol. 7 (Lawrence: Published for the National Security
Education Program by the Regents Press of Kansas, 1977). Also see Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the
Multinational Corporation : The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975);
Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1984); and Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World
Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
Chapter One: International Relations and Economic Statecraft
power.50 In many respects, this dissertation is an extension of Knorr's efforts to analyze the
economic dimensions of the strategic international power dynamics between states in the
international system.5 Although Knorr provided an intriguing foundation for the study of
economic power, his enumeration of the various uses of economic leverage lacked a unifying
logic as well as a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categorization. In the next
chapter, I present a typology of the various security effects that may stem from a variety of
economic interactions. By building a framework based on understanding the relationship
between economics and security to be one of "security externalities," I bring a unifying
conceptual organization to many of the "uses" of economic power that Knorr first itemized.
While Knorr's work is an important contribution, he focused on the macro-level strategic
aspects of economic power: "Our focus on government policy excludes from major consideration
those kinds of international relations that occur between private groups and individuals across
national boundaries."52 As a result, he was not able to fully explore the tactical dimensions of
the actual exercise of economic power. One area in particular that seems to be lacking in
Knorr's work is the role of commercial actors.5 3 Even though "many of these interactions are
fostered by governments (e.g., international trade conducted by private business), and their
regulation often raises issues of foreign policy" Knorr was not able to go into any significant
level of detail regarding the operational role of commercial actors in the exercise of economic
' See especially Chapter 4 "International Economic Leverage and Its Uses," of Knorr and Trager, Economic Issues
and National Security, and Chapter I "International Power and Influence" of Knorr, The Power ofNations.
5 Indeed, many of the examples of various types of economic power that Knorr discusses (like those on pp. 82-84
ibid. and those on pp. 99-102 of Knorr and Trager, Economic Issues and National Security,) may be mapped onto
the typology I present in Chapter 2.
52 Knorr, The Power of Nations, p. 28.
5 In The Power ofNations, Knorr discusses multinational corporations chiefly in the context of a brief refutation of
neo-Marxism. See: Chapter IX "Imperialism and Neocolonialism," in ibid. pp. 239-309.
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statecraft. 4 By developing a commercial actor-based approach to economic power, I extend
some of Knorr's principles and examine how they actually play out in modem practice.55
Other important authors that contributed to the development of this economic power
literature, while providing important theoretical insights, likewise tended to loose sight of the
commercial actors. Susan Strange made a significant contribution with her depiction of the
structural dimension of economic power.s5 Although mainly concerned with national
macroeconomic goals, Richard Cooper was among the first to elucidate the constraining nature
of modem interdependence on states' use of economic tools to achieve their objectives in the
international system.57 Keohane and Nye explicitly sought to examine the various ways in which
states were made vulnerable to economic pressures from other states in this interdependent
world.58 Their notions of asymmetry and dependence exploitation inform many of the concepts
and ideas put forward in this dissertation. Although these works blazed important new paths in
the study of international economic power, they often sacrificed specificity in their efforts to
build a general theoretical foundation for the exercise of economic power. In so doing, they
drifted further and further away from an analytical framework that integrated commercial actors
into a larger strategic understanding of economic statecraft.
5 Ibid. p. 28.
ss Also, as is generally the case with seminal works in any field, this early literature has theoretical gaps around the
precise mechanisms involved. Part of this dissertation's contribution is to specify and disaggregate some of the
effects and causal logic that Knorr highlights in his work.
56 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988). Although the systemic architectural
designs of the international regime do clearly confer a significant source of power to the hegemon, like other works
in the hegemonic theory literature, Strange's focus on the third level of analysis prevents her from directly engaging
the role of commercial actors. Cheryl Christensen also discusses the importance of structural power in the context of
economics and security in her Chapter 5 "Structural Power and National Security," in Knorr and Trager, Economic
Issues and National Security, pp. 127-159.
57 See Richard N. Cooper and Council on Foreign Relations, The Economics ofInterdependence; Economic Policy
in the Atlantic Community, 1st ed. (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill,
1968) especially Chapter 6 "National Economic Policy in an Interdependent World."
58 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1977).
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One portion of the literature that has sought to lend precision to the discussion of the
tools of economic statecraft is the literature on sanctions. Unfortunately, much of this prolific
body of literature focuses rather narrowly on the effectiveness of sanctions. 59 The quantitative
nature of much of this work makes it difficult to gain insight into the actual causal mechanisms
behind states' use of economics in pursuit of their objectives. The quantitative approach used by
a good deal of the sanctions literature precludes a deep exploration of the causal logics
underpinning the contending schools of thought. In addition, as is often the case in social
science research, much of this work tends to focus rather narrowly on a phenomenon that is
relatively easily measured, namely sanctions imposed by states or other intergovernmental
bodies. By not paying sufficient attention to other (albeit perhaps less easily measured) causal
mechanisms, this narrow approach focused on sanctions may be missing a wide range of security
consequences associated with various other more subtle mechanisms of economic statecraft like
a strategic policy of foreign aid that is designed to alter the national interests of the recipient
state. Finally, almost all of these works have been limited to trade sanctions-thus missing the
empirical richness of the full panoply of economic interaction and the security externalities
related to non-trade based economic interaction like financial and monetary relations.60
590n the effectiveness of sanctions refer to Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott,
Economic Sanctions in Support ofForeign Policy Goals, Vol. 6 (Washington, DC; Cambridge: Institute for
International Economics; Distributed by MIT Press, 1983); and their updated: Gary Clyde Hufbauer, et al.,
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd , Expand ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International
Economics, 2007) as well as: Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation : Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Economic Sanctions:
Panacea Or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Richard N. Haass,
"Sanctioning Madness," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (11 //Nov/Dec97, 1997), 74-85; Richard Haass and Council on
Foreign Relations, Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998);
Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge England
; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Richard Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar:
Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); David Cortright et
al., Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 2002); and for
work on smart sanctions see: David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Smart Sanctions : Targeting Economic
Statecraft (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).
6 0 See for example David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985);
Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions ReconsideredK. Barbieri and G. Schneider, "Globalization and Peace: Assessing
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Although Baldwin set out to cast a wide net encompassing all the various positive and negative
mechanisms states could pursue across all types of economic interaction-trade as well as
financial relations-in the end, most of his book focused on sanctions. However, Jonathan
Kirshner's Currency and Coercion helped address the lack of systemic scholarship on the use of
monetary tools of economic statecraft. 61 Each of these works made important contributions to
the study of economic statecraft, but in seeking to develop the theoretical context for the exercise
of contemporary economic power, these works tended to focus almost exclusively on the state
and drifted away from the commercial actor-driven approach that characterized the earlier
generation of scholarship (e.g. Staley).
One notable exception is Robert Gilpin's US Power and the Multinational Corporation.
Gilpin argued that multinational corporations thrive because the international system's hegemon
creates and maintains an international environment in which private sector actors can benefit and
succeed.62 At the abstract level, Gilpin's work seeks to directly account for the role of
commercial actors in international strategic relations. However, Gilpin was mainly motivated by
an effort to explain the long-term rise and decline of hegemons in the international system. The
New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999) 387-404.
Frequently, the most readily available data is trade data. Partly as a result, foreign direct investment and cross-
border capital flows as well as monetary interaction have received far less attention in the literature. Important
exceptions are Janet Kelly's Chapter 9 "International Monetary Systems and National Security," in Knorr and
Trager, Economic Issues and National Security,; Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion : The Political
Economy ofInternational Monetary Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Erik Gartzke and
others, "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict," International Organization
55, no. 2 (2001), 391-438; Rosecrance and Thompson, "Trade, Foreign Investment and Security," Annual Review of
Political Science 6, no. 1 (2003) 377-398; Benn Steil and Robert E. Litan, Financial Statecraft : The Role of
Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) and Andrews,
International Monetary Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
61 See Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion. In 2006, David Andrews edited a very good volume that builds
on earlier work relating to the use of monetary power: Andrews, International Monetary Power.
62 "...[T]his book argues that the international political order created by dominant powers primarily in their security
interests has provided the favorable environment for economic interdependence and corporate expansionism."
Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 19.
Chapter One: International Relations and Economic Statecraft
field is still lacking a middle-range theory that bridges the levels of abstract theory and the more
concrete applications of exactly how commercial actors do the strategic bidding of the hegemon.
Although Gilpin's work is largely compatible with the theory put forward in this
dissertation, there are inevitably, some areas of friction: First, Gilpin's book emphasized the
unique role of the hegemon in the international system and the benefits accruing to the
hegemon's multinational corporations (MNCs). This perspective stands in contrast to my work
that argues that any state is more or less theoretically capable of using commercial actors to
further its national strategic interests. Moreover, there does not seem to be any a priori reason to
assume that the MNCs of non-hegemonic states would not also accrue benefits in a modern,
liberalized global regime (e.g. WTO). Second, Gilpin's normative position highlighting the
danger of national over-reliance on investment returns also seems not to have been borne out by
the facts in the American case as it has developed since the time of his writing. Elsewhere, I
have addressed some of Gilpin's normative concerns in my discussion of the security externality
called "Hollowing Out."63
Finally, Gilpin's work left many questions unanswered-is it only the hegemon's
corporations who can benefit or can all commercial actors? If all commercial actors benefit, then
can other non-hegemonic states also pursue their strategic goals through the use of commercial
actors? How? What are the processes through which such strategic alignment of interests
between the commercial actors and the national strategic interests actually take place? To what
degree can states shape and influence the behavior of their multinational firms? In what way
does the behavior of MNCs affect national security? Gilpin's work was an important step
forward in considering the inter-relationship of modern multinational corporations and US
63 See: William Norris, "A Theoretical Framework for Analyzing the Relationship Between Economics and
Security" Paper presented-at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the New England Political Science Association, Portland,
Maine.
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national interests. His book frames a discussion of how the behavior of MNCs served that
interest. As with Knorr, my work will attempt to build on elements of Gilpin's theoretical
foundation and examine the resulting theory in the empirical context of contemporary Chinese
interests.
Many of the other works in the literature on globalization that did seek to explore the role
of commercial actors have tended to overstate the autonomy of multinational corporations and
the erosion of the nation state as the dominant actor in international relations.64 This
dissertation's empirical research will demonstrate that even if the direct, classical mercantilist
power of the state to dictate policy to its private sector actors has diminished under a more
liberalized system, sufficient power remains for the state to influence and generate incentives for
the private sector to behave in ways that are conducive to state interests. Although many of the
exaggerated claims of a "vanishing state"65 have since been largely corrected,66 the field has yet
to develop a middle range theory that would connect the micro-level behavior of commercial
actors who possess some degree of autonomous agency to the macro-level strategic outcome of
how modern sovereign states actually mobilize their economic interaction to further national
64 Examples of works making the case for a significantly diminished national state in the era of globalization
abound. See for instance: The Retreat ofthe State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy by Susan Strange
(Cambridge University Press, 1996); Global Order and Global Disorder: Globalization and the Nation-State by
Keith Suter (Praeger, 2003); Martin Wolf, "Will the Nation State Survive Globalization?" Foreign Affairs January-
February 2001; Twilight of Soveriengty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World by Walter B.
Wriston (Scribner Book Company, 1992). In response to a frequent assumption in this literature on globalization
that the state has become irrelevant in the face of multinational corporations, my work argues that the mechanisms
of state influence may have changed over time, but states remain powerful international actors. For a somewhat
similar theoretical perspective see: Sean Kay, "Globalization, Power, and Security," Security Dialogue 35, no. 1(2004): 9-25. Contemporary conditions of complex, interdependent global economic interaction require that we
understand the ways in which states continue to exert their influence.
65 Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State : Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New
York: Basic Books, 1986).
66 See for example: Suzanne Berger and Ronald Philip Dore, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Maria Gritsch, "The Nation-State and Economic Globalization: Soft Geo-
Politics and Increased State Autonomy?" Review of International Political Economy 12, no. 1 (2005): 1-25; and
Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," World Politics 50, no.
1, Fiftieth Anniversary Special Issue (1997): 62-87. Norrin Ripsman and T.V. Paul's Globalization and the
National Security State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) also addresses some of these claims that the
nation state and national security have been fundamentally altered as a result of globalization.
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security goals. It is not enough to simply "bring the state back in" to our analyses-as scholars,
we should also illuminate how states interact with their commercial actors in a strategic context.
So if the English language literature does not get economic statecraft right, perhaps
Chinese language sources do a better job. After all, if China is a productive case setting in which
to study the phenomenon, it seems reasonable that Chinese scholars of international relations
may offer a more sophisticated theoretical treatment of how states exercise their international
economic power. Alas, a survey of Chinese language scholarship on economic statecraft
indicates that this literature is prone to many of the same shortcomings already discussed in the
context of the English language literature. Perhaps this is not so surprising.
A good deal of the leading Chinese scholarship on international relations reflects a strong
influence from Western international relations theory. 67 In fact, most Chinese language work in
international relations is derivative of Western international relations: many of the leading
scholars were trained in American doctoral programs, many of the theoretical assumptions stem
from Western international relations theory, and basic lines of reasoning often parallel those
found in Western scholarship. It should not be surprising, then, to discover that Chinese
language work that has been done at the intersection of economics and security maps fairly
neatly onto the English language scholarship-and suffers from many of the same shortcomings.
So, how does Chinese scholarship treat the subject? Broadly speaking, Chinese scholars
think about the relationship between economics and security in three ways. First, is the view that
argues stable foreign economic relations are instrumental for China's longer-term development.
67 Indeed in recent years, there has been an effort to consciously articulate a distinctly "Chinese" school of
international relations that is explicitly non-Western. See for instance: EM.T [Wang Jisi], "H- - LH
31iff V"[trans: "International Relations Theory and the Study of Chinese Diplomacy"] in A H)] (ed.) Pf#tdO//
h~: @ @ Rk ( iT ) [An Assignment for the New Century: International Relations Studies
in China (Revised Edition)] (ALqY: JLI#k Y h fk&id 2007) pp. 322-340. These attempts have largely failed to
produce a uniquely Chinese theoretical paradigm. See: Gustaaf Geeraerts and Men Jing, "International Relations
Theory in China," Global Society, Volume 15, Number 3, (July 2001) pp. 251 -276.
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Since the opening up and reform period began, the Chinese economy has used an export-oriented
growth model that relied on greater and greater integration into the global economy. Such
relations help fuel China's rise to great power status as this model has delivered near double-digit
annual growth for the last thirty years. This line of reasoning is a fairly constant theme
underpinning much of mainstream contemporary Chinese grand strategy and Chinese language
scholarship on economic statecraft. To the extent that this line of thinking directly addresses
strategic security concerns, it is usually through the notion that beneficial international
engagement helps to fuel China's growing military might.68 Such works often emphasize the
need for China to maintain an international environment that is conducive to further economic
growth.69 Authors in this vein often advocate for further opening up and liberalization of the
Chinese economy since this represents the most efficient path to achieving even greater
economic results.70 Many of these works grow out of Deng Xiaoping's initial strategic logic of
focusing on economic liberalization as a way to increase China's power and frequently continue
to invoke Deng's strategic thought.71
The second way that economics factors into China's grand strategy is as a legitimizing
factor for the regime. According to this line of reasoning, ongoing economic development
68 Such works frequently highlight the intrinsic connections between economic growth and increasing military
capabilities. See for instance: 441- [Lin Xionghui], f# [trans: Research
on Economic Globalization and Army Political Thought Education] (OLi: 1'Mi44*Lhlik 2004).
69 See for example: 0Y n h [Ye Zicheng]'s "Xf + INfnT a)LXj 4 N ' jf " 1 Z gg I
2006 4 M 1 Jj 20-30 A) [trans: "The International Environment's Relationship to China's Peaceful Development:
Some Thoughts" International Politics Research 2006, Issue 1, pp. 20-30.]
70 For example in l1 [Men Honghua] and M-M|X [Hu Angang]'s "ANth : V N id-b f W" 3fIw
9_g 2007 4 2 )1 i 1 #A 0M 130 M 68-73 -aA [trans: "Five Years after Entering the WTO: China Ought to
Further Open to the Outside" The Opening Herald February, 2007, Issue 1, Number 130 pp. 68-73.] the authors
argue that China's entry into the WTO has been a successful extension of China's thirty year reform and opening up
effort. This strategy has produced considerable results for China, prompting the authors to call for further opening
up.
7 For instance, see: 'tjiZ&4 [Yuan Chengzhang], "iP d A N EW Hk -E SiV L " [trans: "A Discussion of
Deng Xiaoping's International Strategic Ideological Disposition: Ten Essential Elements"] in fdl i (ed.) &W
tN: 4-& [ World Politics-Views from China, Volume 3: Strategies of the Great Powers] (ML
: IW ENi 2007) pp. 71-84.
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(internationally, but especially domestically) serves to help secure and legitimize the governing
regime.72 The most important national interest is to maintain the CCP's control over China.7 3
This is closely tied to stability (4@a wending). This stability is both domestically oriented-to
directly limit sources of threat to the regime-and internationally oriented-to provide an
international environment that is conducive to China's continued economic growth.74 Continued
economic growth provides an ongoing reaffirmation of the CCP's ruling mandate by
underscoring the CCP's ability to deliver economic growth to the society. To the extent that
these sources of economic interaction can be diversified, such diversification offers China less
concentrated reliance and thus less vulnerability to potential disruption (which would undermine
the economic foundations upon which so much of China's national interests rest).
Beyond securing the regime's stability, China seeks to shape its international strategic
environment in a way that maximizes China's national interests.75 In particular, China seeks to
ensure that the US is prevented from checking China's efforts to modernize and enhance its
power. A common approach has been to use multilateral institutions to further China's national
72 "One profound consequence of China's reform and opening up is that the Communist ideology has lost its appeal
and economic growth has become the primary legitimizer and stabilizer of the Chinese political system." Bo Kong,
China's International Petroleum Policy (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International, 2010) p. 141. Wang
Zhengyi traced how economic growth became fused with national security and ongoing regime stability in his 2004
piece: "Conceptualizing Economic Security and Governance: China Confronts Globalization," The Pacific Review
Vol. 17 No. 4 pp. 523-545.
73 "As ever, China's current grand strategy first attends to potential threats to vital interests (territorial and political
integrity)." Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge p. 23.
7 For more on this internal/external dichotomy in China's economic security and grand strategy, see: IE& [Wang
Zhengyi], "f4* 2f0 : W d M $U, )Aig VjF-L ffI )it" [trans: "Understanding China's
Transformation: International Strategic Objectives, System Adjustment and International Power"] in AMMO (ed.)
I4N WLfL : 4$#iki4 [World Politics- Views from China, Volume 6: Non-traditional Security] (A
f,: # ±U# T Mit 2007) pp. 41-56.
7 China's specific goals and objectives will be articulated at the outset of each macro-case that follows. For more
on China's broad national interests see: I_ A- [Wang Yizhou] ed., # I// [World
Politics- Views from China, Volume 2: National Interests] (AMY,: MWf J &Ri 2007), especially Part 3 "VP A
WjA Ji #+fr" [China's National Interests Examined] pp. 197-328.
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interests in a relatively nonthreatening manner.76 In addition, increasingly dense economic
interaction promises to reinforce the atmosphere of international partnership and cooperation that
provides China with a peaceful international security environment allowing for the continued
global economic interaction that enables China's rising capabilities. 77 Growing economic clout
plays a key role in enabling China's national power (usually discussed as a component of China's
"Comprehensive National Power"). Economic ties facilitate China's "peaceful rise" both by way
of the liberal notion that economic ties help make conflict less likely and by giving economic
partners a direct stake in China's continuing success. This latter feature helps make China's
rising power look less like a threat and more like an economically attractive growth opportunity.
Mutually beneficial economic interaction is also used to reassure other states in the system that
China's rising power need not be cause for alarm. 78 In many instances, increasing economic
interaction both allays fears of a rising China while providing China with the beneficial
economic interaction to further augment its influence and power capabilities. In more recent
years, as the official term of art in China has shifted from a discussion of China's "peaceful rise"
toward China's "peaceful development" and "harmonious society/world," economics continues to
play a prominent role in furthering Chinese foreign policy.
This last aspect of the Chinese literature on the relationship between economics and
China's grand strategy is the area most closely related to my project. While the literature-like
76 "China's recently more active and positive approach in Asian regional economic, security, and political
organizations seems to reflect the strong recent priority of the Chinese administration to ensure that China's rising
power and influence not be seen by China's neighbors and the region's dominant outside power, the United States,
as a danger." Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) p. 1 13.
77 For an example of this sort of strategic logic, see fl]& [Men Honghua]'s "@YA H W % {4% 9J24" M#4i
113 )K 2008 4l5  5 J 13-20 if [trans: "The Construction of China's National Strategy System" Teaching and
Research 2008, Issue 5 pp. 13-20.] in which he argues for an integration between China's domestic, regional and
global strategy focusing on continued "opening up" efforts that have underpinned China's modern strategic success.
78 This line of reasoning has been a particular feature in China's recent relations with Southeast Asia. See: NT
[Mei Ping], : [trans: China and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: Current
State of Affairs and Future Prospects] (MAY: lit R fit fYki 2008).
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its English language counterpart-still lacks a theory that links the behavior of commercial
actors to the grand strategy of the state, this literature has produced several useful concepts that
my work will seek to build upon. In particular, three terms from the Chinese literature on
economics and security relate closely to the work of this study. Perhaps the concept that is most
germane to my area of research isjingji waiiao [L iN trans: economic diplomacy].79
Chinese scholars use the termjingji waijiao in two ways. 80 One meaning is used to denote the
diplomatic activity concerned with securing economic objectives (e.g. China's membership in the
WTO and other international economic organizations). This can be thought of as using
diplomatic means to realize economic results. 81 The other use of the term (and more interesting
for purposes of this project) is the instrumental use of economic means to achieve national
strategic objectives.82 This use of the term (economics used to pursue foreign objectives) is very
similar to the English language literature's discussion of how states go about exercising their
international economic power. Although this is an important area that deserves better
understanding, the Chinese literature on this topic is even less theoretically developed than its
79 One of the most comprehensive treatments of this idea can be found in )M. *7 [Zhou Yongsheng] fN#3
[Economic Diplomacy], ( FIL3: @1i M -L@ 2004) another good source on the topic is: fn$+J11 [He
Zhongshun], SWZ]| AR M %: ' -., [Research on China's Economic Diplomacy: Theory and
Practice], (MV; f BI$fl1i& 2007).
80 Although both usages can be found in the literature, any given author will normally use it to mean either the use
of diplomacy to further economic goals or the use of economics to further diplomatic goals.
81 For an example of a type of work that uses the term in this way see: A u M * J1 1#JFr94ff i, rM# j
*F -XIY 1K rP [trans: Tsinghua University's Institute of International Studies & Research Center of Economy and
Diplomacy ], qhifdI 2006 [China's Economic Diplomacy 2006], (ALY,: $P AMitW± 2007).
82 Put another way, this use of the term can be thought of as using economic means to achieve diplomatic results.
See MP]A_- [Zhou Yongsheng], " 5 iilni M 4: j, 9FbF lj fW " tid 4idM 2003 4
M 7 AA 39-44 A [trans: "The Opportunities and Challenges Confronting Economic Diplomacy: A Conceptual
Study of Economic Diplomacy" World Economics and International Politics 2007 Issue 7 pp. 39-44.] Perhaps the
best recent example of this type of work is by 9 '1 L [Wu Baiyi] entitled: "4'W04#F Z: H5*1iI [N:
I" iif 2008 * 6 )fJ, 103 M 11-19 iR [trans: "China's Economic Diplomacy: Continually
Transforming External Integration" Foreign Affairs Review June, 2008 no. 103 pp. I1-19.] in which he argues that
China has shifted the emphasis of its foreign policy toward economics and is seeking to maximize China's power
through global economic integration. Interestingly, this piece explicitly makes note of state-firm cooperation to
pursue China's strategic objectives.
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English equivalent. 83 In addition to the methodological, evidentiary, argumentation, and
research design challenges that bedevil a significant number of Chinese language publications,
perhaps not surprisingly, this literature also suffers from many of the same gaps found in the
English language treatment of economic statecraft. Virtually all of the Chinese literature on the
subject examines the state as the unit of analysis-notably absent is an adequate, theoretically-
informed accommodation of commercial actors.
In addition tojingji wajiao, two other concepts concerning economics and its
relationship to security deserve to be highlighted here. The first isjingji anquan [9i14 2
trans: economic security].84 This term is frequently used in the context of discussions of
globalization [t4Mk quanqiuhua] and usually emphasizes China's raw material dependence
vulnerabilities (, "&4)it).85 The literature employing this term seems to be especially
sensitive to natural resource vulnerability-particularly China's dependence on imported sea-
83 This partly due to much of the work being highly empirical in nature. See for example: E49% [Wang Shuchun],
JANkk# -kk [Economic Diplomacy and the Sino-Russian Relationship], (JLT: *WM RII JMi
2007). Scholars of economic diplomacy are also frequently regional experts (e.g. M ]Al [Zhou Yongsheng] is
primarily a Japan specialist). Another example is the recent interest in China's use of economics in its relations with
Southeast Asian states; see for example: KfIv [Zhang Shengjun], "+ M2L I , 1M 1A" [trans:
"East Asian Economic Convergence and Chinese National Interests"] in T-A-A [Wang Yizhou] ed., #X#f#F
: XWYA -# [ World Politics--Views from China, Volume 2: National Interests] (A 1W: #fittL f N l
2007), pp. 295-306; also see: MM RZIMMltEIfr [National Defense University] MiAW@ M OfR 2006-2007
[International Strategic Analysis 2006-2007], (MAY: R4 * ffi4i 2007) especially Chapter 2 : "iVJWMa
M" ["The Southeast Asia Strategic Situation"].
84 For a comprehensive treatment of this concept see the CICIR book by that name Mti$ :9 [National
Economic Security], (MAY: V$ffi&I 2005). Also see: MiAM (ed.) : $#$i4#
[World Politics-Views from China, Volume 6: Non-traditional Security] (Ibi-: IfftHr--W L iLE& 2007)
especially Part Two on economic security pp. 39-84.
8 5 See: #Aff$f [Lin Xionghui], A [trans: Research on Economic
Globalization and Army Political Thought Education] (M Li,: Tr.-VP44tJik 2004). For an example of a
scholar arguing that China's security is threatened by its reliance on an American-dominated globalization regime
see: K-*[Zhang Wenmu], "ifR ELf FP M V 'A [9 brl" V#914 $$A2002 *#3 M 4-9 -,
[trans: "China's National Security Problem from the Perspective of Globalization" World Economics and Politics
2002, Issue 3 pp. 4-9].
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borne petroleum (F1idb J fii ).86 Discussions ofjingji anquan often include the
related concepts of resource security (%if ), energy security ( external
dependence (XP f&fth), sea power (*$), and diversification ($ Tr-L). We will revisit
many of these ideas in the chapters on China's extractive resource strategy.
The second concept is shuangying [5N trans: win-win] and is closely tied to China's
economic and diplomatic engagement strategy and "win-win diplomacy." This concept
emphasizes the economic benefits accruing to China's partners as a result of tapping into China's
economic expansion. Rather than having China's neighbors view China's rise with
apprehension, this strategy stresses how partnering with China can result in mutually beneficial
outcomes. At its core, shuangying is about transforming the interests of China's partners and
represents a very effective use of China's economic statecraft. Discussions of shuangying often
include the related concepts of collective security ( comprehensive national power
(X2 3fJJ), mutual benefit (hXP2), "non-zero sum" ("-* l"), China's multilateralism (JuiZ.
-'L), and the New Security Concept (J)?9A ). Win-win ideas feature prominently in
China's relations with Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, although the basic idea of using
economic benefits to facilitate China's foreign policy has other applications as well. I will return
to these ideas in Chapter Three's discussion of interest transformation.
So, to summarize, the Chinese language work on economic statecraft can be grouped into
three broad types. These types are differentiated by their views of the role of economics vis a vis
86 See: i]M'1P [Men Honghua], "AThrA $0 90fc f @A '" T 2005 M 1 W 33-44 ]L
[trans: "The Strategic Significance of Ensuring China's Energy Security" Asia Pacific Journal 2005, Issue 1 pp. 33-
44]. in which he argues for Chinese sea power projection capabilities to secure China's energy security. For more
on sea power and its relationship to China's national and economic interests, see: Ti- [Wang Lidong], /IT J
/i [trans: A Theory ofNational Maritime Interests], (-MT,: Ni}t-l1U@ii 2007) especially Chapter 6
entitled: "LA@J Li] @JAMi -WiMfJ" [trans: Marine Economic Interests Are the-Primary National
Maritime Interests].
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China's security.87 First, continued economic progress serves to legitimize the regime. Second,
economic success fuels China's military capabilities. Third, economic relations facilitate
China's rise to great power status. In addition to these families of literature, there seem to be
three key concepts from Chinese language scholarship on economics and security that bear
directly on my research. The first isjingji waiiao-in particular, the interpretation of this
concept that stresses the use of economic means to further foreign policy objectives. Second,
jingji anquan encapsulates many of the concerns and ideas surrounding China's ability to secure
its access to raw materials. Third, shuangying reflects the strategy that is designed to alter the
calculus of partner states so as to avoid negative reactions to China's growing power.
Like their Western counterparts, these efforts to explore the intersection of economics
and security often fail to adequately incorporate the role of commercial actors in economic
statecraft. For the most part, Chinese works at the intersection of economics and security tend to
focus on the state as the unit of analysis and make the same basic error found in many Western
works on economic statecraft. Commercial actors, not states, are responsible for conducting the
majority of international economic interaction. A suitable theory of economic statecraft ought to
accommodate this reality.
So if Chinese language scholarship is largely subject to the same shortcomings as the
English language literature on economic statecraft, but China nonetheless still seems to provide a
productive empirical setting for exploring the strategic use of economics, then perhaps the
English language work that has been empirically focused on China's economic statecraft (as
opposed to the more abstract works focusing on a universal, general theory of economic
statecraft) will be a more productive area to survey. Indeed, there is a small but growing body of
87 It should be noted that very few Chinese language works make such a stark distinction between these various
roles, but for our purposes, I offer a somewhat artificially discrete categorization to provide the reader with a more
organized sense of how Chinese scholars think about this topic.
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literature focusing on China's use of economics in its foreign policy. That is the good news.
The bad news is that while these works on China and its strategic use of economics do
occasionally recognize the importance of state-firm interactions, they still lack a robust
theoretical framework for conceptualizing or generalizing these dynamics. These works have
tended to mirror the theoretical shortcomings of the more general literature on economic
statecraft-namely an under-theorized role for commercial actors and their relationship to the
strategic goals of the state.
These western works on China's economic statecraft can be categorized into two types.
The first genre starts from the perspective of analyzing China's grand strategy. For example,
Russell Ong has highlighted the important role economics plays in China's grand strategy. 88
Although Ong's work notes the importance of economics, he also calls for deeper analysis and
theoretical understanding of the largely unexplored economic dimension of grand strategy.
Indeed, economics plays an important part in China's grand strategy and the field currently lacks
a useful theoretical paradigm for analyzing this important tool of statecraft. In another insightful
treatment of China's grand strategy, Phillip Saunders highlights the main motivations behind
China's recent international activism. 89 Saunders does a nice job laying out the strategic
rationale for China's foreign policy actions. Economics features prominently in his analysis.
But Saunders, like many authors on this topic, struggles to adequately accommodate what he
identifies as complexity characterized by the multiple actors and interests that pervade China's
attempts to use commercial activity as part of its grand strategy. In particular, the field seems to
lack a theoretical framework for analyzing the actual practice of economic statecraft. Take for
88 See Russell Ong, China's Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2002) and
Russell Ong, China's Security Interests in the 21st Century (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007).
89 Phillip C. Saunders, "China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools," Institute for National Strategic
Studies Occasional Paper No. 4 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press 2006).
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example, Adam Segal's chapter entitled, "Chinese Economic Statecraft and the Political
Economy of Asian Security," in William Keller and Thomas Rawski's edited volume on China's
rising influence in which Segal argues that China is making increasing use of economic statecraft
in its pursuit of foreign policy objectives.9" Although Segal raises important questions, he fails to
provide a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding China's strategic use of
economics. 91 Segal's more recent work continues to grapple with the question of whether
China's use of economics is effective or not.92 I would argue that framing the issue in this
manner misses the point. Asking whether China's economic power is resulting in increased
influence will necessarily lead to the inconclusive findings that both Segal and Scott Kastner
observe. 93 Although scholars like Segal and Kastner have done commendable work examining
the issue of whether China's use of economics has been translated into strategic results, neither
has engaged in the larger question: not whether China's economic power can be used
strategically, but rather under what circumstances can it be used effectively.
In addition to focusing on questions of grand strategy, the other common approach of this
literature is to focus on a particular regional/empirical context of China's foreign policy in which
economics features prominently. For instance, the Taiwan context is an important empirical
arena for understanding the interplay between economics and strategic considerations. 94 Scott
Kastner has done good work in this area although his focus has largely been on the effects of
90 William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski, China's Rise and the Balance ofInfluence in Asia (Pittsburgh, Pa.:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007).
91 Segal draws on Hirschman's analysis, but limits his considerations of the effects to "influence" and "coercion."
My typology adds four other types of security externalities and identifies specific causal pathways for understanding
how economic statecraft actually works in practice.
92 For example, see his "China's Economic Statecraft: Markets, Trade, Power, and Influence," a paper he presented
at the Assessing China's Rise: Power and Influence in the 21st Century Conference at MIT (February 9, 2009).
93 Both Segal and Kastner conclude that China's growing economic clout sometimes can be leveraged for political
objectives and sometimes such efforts are not successful. For Kastner's quantitative complement to Segal's paper
see: "Buying influence? Assessing the political effects of China's international economic ties," a paper he presented
at the Assessing China's Rise: Power and Influence in the 21st Century Conference at MIT (February 9, 2009).
94 Other such regional approaches have focused on China's relations with ASEAN/Southeast Asia, Africa, Central
Asia, Latin America, etc.
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political conflict on economic ties.95 Equally, if not more importantly, are the effects of
economic ties on the security relationship between Beijing and Taiwan. Scot Tanner did attempt
to examine the ability of Beijing to use its economic power to coerce Taiwan. 96 In what is
probably the most comprehensive treatment of the use of economics to coerce Taiwan, Tanner
concludes that political factors often complicate the use of economics in the cross-Strait
relationship. While I do not disagree with Tanner's analysis, his findings seem idiosyncratic and
his work lacks a comprehensive framework for thinking about the conditions under which
economic statecraft is likely to succeed. In the next chapter, I offer a more theoretically-
grounded treatment of the conditions and business-state relationships that facilitate economic
statecraft. Tung Chen-yuan is another scholar who has looked at the issue of economics in a
cross-Strait context. 97 However, his cost-benefit framework must ultimately rely on inferred
utility functions that are, in reality, dynamic and inherently difficult to specify with a reliable
degree of accuracy. Moreover, Tung's focus on sanctions limits the scope of his analysis. I
argue that sanctions are just one of many mechanisms that states can use in pursuing their
strategic objectives. As discussed in the next chapter, economics can affect strategic security
issues in a number of ways-any one or combination of which may be manipulated to achieve
strategic ends. Exactly how this occurs is the subject of the next chapter.
In summary, the dissertation is situated in a long tradition of scholarly work that has
sought to understand how states use economic power. Inspired by the early Twentieth Century
classical realists who emphasized the importance of both national strategic goals and the role of
95 Scott L. Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence Across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press 2009). See also: Scott L. Kastner. "When Do Conflicting Political Relations Affect
International Trade?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 4 (August 2007): 664-688.
96 Murray Scot Tanner, "Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use," RAND
Monograph (Santa Monica: RAND 2007).
97 See Chen-Yuan Tung, "Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China's Leverage and Taiwan's Vulnerability," Issues &
Studies 39, no. 3 (Sept, 2003), 137-175.
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commercial actors in pursuing those goals, this dissertation seeks to address a number of gaps in
the literature. My own work seeks to extend and tactically operationalize some of the earlier
work done on the nature of economic power and how states actually mobilize commercial actors
to pursue national strategic interests in a contemporary context. Specifically, this work answers
the following questions: In what manner do states seek to use economic interaction to further
their larger strategic goals? What is the role of commercial actors in states' strategic efforts to
wield economic power? Why do these efforts succeed or fail? What factors facilitate or hinder
effective economic statecraft?
When attempting to answer such questions, the existing literature has tended to take too
narrow of an approach. In particular, existing efforts to explore this topic have generally fallen
victim to some combination of three limitations. First, existing literature has focused mainly on
the most readily observable form of economic interaction: a statistical examination of trade-
thus missing the empirical richness of the full panoply of economic interaction and the security
externalities related to non-trade based economic interaction like financial and monetary
relations. This dissertation offers a theory that is consciously designed to accommodate all
forms of economic interaction.
Second, much of the work that has been done on the issue of using economic interaction
to pursue larger strategic goals has been framed in the context of sanctions, missing the wide
range of security consequences associated with various other mechanisms of economic statecraft.
Framing the issue through this sanctions lens may omit more subtle mechanisms that seek not
only compliance, but a deeper transformation of interests themselves. Starting from this
standpoint, the dissertation presents a theoretical approach that is not narrowly limited to
sanctions, but rather encompasses a broad range of economic activities like aid, investment
flows, etc. and their concomitant security effects.
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Finally, much of the literature dealing with the use of economics to pursue strategic goals
tends to take a state-centric approach. By focusing predominantly on states as the unit of
analysis, these perspectives give relatively little consideration to a rigorous treatment of the role
of commercial actors-the agents actually responsible for conducting most of the economic
activities of the modem state. 98 As demonstrated by the empirical work in this dissertation, the
behavior of these commercial actors plays a crucial role in determining economic interaction,
and ultimately, how states may use that economic interaction to pursue their strategic interests
more or less effectively. The dissertation adopts a framework that facilitates a meaningful
exploration of the business-government dynamics that are so important for understanding how
states use economic interaction to further their strategic interests.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter began by introducing the project as a study of economic statecraft, briefly
highlighting its theoretical and empirical significance. Following this introduction, I specified
the main research questions (How does economic statecraft work? and Why is it more or less
effective?). I then defined several terms, including "economic statecraft" and the concept of
"security externalities," before delving into the review of the economic statecraft literature.
The literature on economic statecraft has largely failed to provide enough attention to
how states actually deploy their economic tools of grand strategy. 99 Given that the vast majority
98 Karen M. Sutter, "Business Dynamism Across the Taiwan Strait," Asian Survey 42, no. 3 (May/Jun, 2002), 522.
99 This gap in the literature exists for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, many economists do not concern
themselves with questions of grand strategy. At the same time, many security studies scholars lack the economic
training and familiarity to confidently engage in understanding the economic dimensions of national power.
Academic scholarship in the United States has become increasingly specialized resulting in a siloed approach that
insulates the study of economics from the study of grand strategy. Second, what work has been done on the
relationship between economics and security studies has often focused rather narrowly on trade (which is only one
of several types of economic interaction). In addition, much of this work has used statistical analytical approaches
which are poorly suited to specifying causal mechanisms. Finally, the study of economic power, like most works in
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of international economic activity is actually carried out not by states, but rather by commercial
actors, an appropriate theory of economic statecraft ought to feature an explicit role for these
commercial actors. The literature on economics and security continues to lack an integrated
theory that links microeconomic, firm-level behavior with the grand strategy of states. As a
result, the field continues to struggle with understanding the specific micro-foundations of
economic statecraft as actually practiced in grand strategy. This study seeks to address that gap.
international relations, has focused on states as the unit of analysis. This analytical perspective risks overlooking the
importance of commercial actors and the role that commercial actors play in attempts to realize strategic national
objectives using economic means. To address these gaps in the literature, in Chapter Two I offer an account of how
aggregate economic agents' micro-level incentives and their resulting behavior generate national security effects at
the level of state grand strategy.
Chapter Two
-A Theory of Economic Statecraft
2. Introduction
As shown, most scholarship on economic statecraft fails to explain exactly how states
exercise their economic power. This chapter helps fill that void by providing a typology that
specifies the full range of ways by which economic interaction may be used to generate security
consequences. In addition, it identifies the conditions under which economic statecraft is likely
to succeed. The goal is to provide a more precise understanding of how states use economics to
pursue their grand strategic objectives.
The chapter begins with a typology offering a theoretical framework that captures the
various ways in which economics can affect security. Taken together, the typology answers the
question "In what manner does economics affect security?". This conceptual framework for
thinking about the relationship between the economic activities of commercial actors and the
security of a nation state calls attention to the importance of business-government dynamics;
specifically, the factors that enable a state to effectively control or direct the behavior of
commercial actors such that their activities generate security externalities that are conducive to
national strategic objectives. I operationalize a theoretical model that explains the factors that
enable such control. This theory links microeconomic, firm-level behavior with the macro-level
grand strategy of states. In this chapter, I also examine preconditions that enable attempts to
engage in economic statecraft to be successful. The final portion of this chapter discusses the
case selection, methodology and research design of the project.
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2.1 A Typology of Security Externalities
As presented in Chapter One, framing the relationship between economic interaction and
national security as one of "security externalities" highlights the importance of commercial
actors and calls attention to the strategic ramifications of their activities. States often take an
active interest in these security consequences. When states seek to encourage or discourage
commercial actors to behave in ways that will generate the types of economic patterns that result
in security externalities, states are engaging in what is known as economic statecraft. Economic
statecraft is an important tool that states can use to pursue their strategic objectives. But how
should we think about organizing these security externalities? I categorize security externalities
on the basis of their effects on the target. The resulting typology captures the full range of
security effects that may be generated as a consequence of economic activity.
In this typology, there are six types of security externalities which fall into two broad
categories: those acting through primarily economic channels and those externalities with direct
military effects.' Thus economic interaction may produce a direct effect on a state's military
capabilities or security externalities may be indirect, affecting the state's security through the
channel of its economy.2 Both channels ultimately carry strategic consequences. Each of these
two broad categories of externalities (military and economic channels) can be further specified
into a total of six types of security externalities (four acting through primarily economic channels
Although any given economic interaction may entail security externalities that fall into more than one of these
categories, the categories themselves are designed to be a helpful way of organizing the security effects of economic
interaction. To be useful, this categorization strives to be as mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive as
possible.
2 The strength of a nation's economy carries implications for its military power (since economic power historically
has been the foundation of military power). In fact, assessments of relative power frequently rely on GDP or some
other proxy of underlying economic power. See for example: Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979); William C. Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the
Pre-1914 Balance," World Politics 39, no. 3 (1987): 353-381. or see Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters,
Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 2
(1990): 1 -especially his rationale for the strategic importance (and unimportance) of specific geographies.
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and two with primarily military effects). The logic of this categorization is discussed in greater
detail below.
Figure 2.1: Typology of Security Externalities
The military channel comprises those security externalities that weaken the target state's
military capabilities (this process is referred to as "Hollowing Out") and those that enhance the
target state's relative military capabilities (this process is called "Strategic Transfer").
Hollowing Out is the security externality that results from economic interaction which erodes a
target state's domestic military-industrial complex, resulting in a reduction of military
capabilities that are available to a state. This process occurs when international economic
interaction undermines the continuing commercial viability of firms, sectors, or industries that
directly contribute to a state's military power capabilities. Without a vibrant domestic military-
industrial complex, a state's options to defend itself become limited. The state must either forgo
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specific capabilities in which it lacks expertise or it must rely on external providers for the
necessary equipment. The causal path of this type of security externality is one in which
international economic interaction undermines the health of sectors of the target economy which
are directly involved in the generation of military power.3 Loss or damage to this portion of the
state's economy carries direct consequences for the state's ability to generate military power and
as a result carries significant implications for its security. These security effects fall into the
category of security externalities called Hollowing Out.
Strategic Transfer is the category of security externalities that results from economic
interaction which enhances a target state's war making capabilities through the acquisition of
strategic goods, knowledge, resources or dual-use and/or dedicated military technologies.4
Certain types of economic interaction in strategic goods and services can result in enhancing the
target's military capabilities through the transference of strategically important technologies,
materials, processes, goods, strategic resources, or expertise. This process occurs when
economic interaction engenders a transmission of ideas, expertise, technology, or even raw
3 Examples of Hollowing Out are often discussed in what is typically called "strategic trade theory." See: Marc L.
Busch, Trade Warriors : States, Firms, and Strategic Policy in High Technology (Cambridge England ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security : Multinational Corporations,
Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005) for two
intelligent works that stay well-focused on the security and strategic dimensions. One example of a strategy that
seeks to exploit the Hollowing Out type of externalities is technology licensing like the kind applied by the U.S.
against Taiwan as part of its effort to prevent Taiwan's nuclear weapons development. States may also nationalize
assets, or engage in preclusive buying to prevent target states from accessing strategic goods. "Dumping" is yet
another strategy that may be used to weaken a military-industrial sector, niches or even specific commercial actors.
In a similar vein, subsidies can also be used to undermine a targeted military-industrial base. Subsidies can take a
variety of forms in addition to a classic, straightforward payment including tax incentives, credit financing, and
regulatory discrimination to name a few. In addition, arms embargoes can be particularly harmful to military-
industrial efforts to secure raw materials, talent and/or markets for their goods and services. Famous examples of
this include post-Tiananmen export control lists prohibiting the export of certain goods and technologies to the PRC
to hamstring its military modernization as well as similar efforts to enforce export controls on certain "strategic
goods" to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Over a longer time horizon, foreign arms sales coming into a
target state may have a displacing effect that squeezes out that target state's domestic producers.
4 For interesting work on strategic goods as a potential source of conflict see: Anne Uchitel's chapter,
"Interdependence and Instability," in Jack Synder and Robert Jervis (eds.), Coping with Complexity in the
International System (Boulder: Westview Press 1993). Uchitel deserves credit for recognizing that the strategic
nature of goods being traded is an important consideration when determining whether a given pattern of trade will
be likely to result in conflict. My category of "Strategic Transfer" type of security externalities makes her
distinction explicit.
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materials and components that have military applications. These strategic goods and services
can then be incorporated by the target state to enhance its military capabilities. Encryption
technology exports, Loral satellite launches, and 12-inch semiconductor wafer production
technologies are all fairly recent examples of the transfer of sensitive technologies. States
themselves often define what does or does not constitute "strategic" although their definition
generally involves some combination of the following perceptions: 1.) the relative scarcity of the
good or service 2.) the ease with which the service or good can be converted into military
capabilities and 3.) the ease with which the good or service can be substituted. Strategic goods
or resources have been fairly broadly defined across time and space but at various times and
regions have included saltpeter, fissile material, cod, bauxite, horses, oil, coal, silver, iron ore,
rubber, water, wheat, and gold. When states acquire such goods and services they directly
enhance that state's military capabilities. In this manner, economic interaction that involves
strategic goods and services carries significant security externalities. These types of security
externalities are classified into the category of security externalities called Strategic Transfer.
Chapters Five and Six illustrate instances of Chinese economic statecraft concerning the
Strategic Transfer of raw materials in more detail.
On the other main branch of the typology are those externalities that affect a state's
security by way of primarily economic channels. For this family of externalities, the security
ramifications are often the second-order consequences of the economic interaction. This
distinguishes them from the types of externalities located on the military effects branch of the
typology. In the cases of Strategic Transfer and Hollowing Out, the economic interaction
directly contributes or detracts from military capabilities. For the four types of security
externalities found on the economic branch, firms' activities affect the economy which, in turn,
carries consequences for security. This economic branch is subdivided into two groups: 1.) the
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types of externalities that affect the overall health of the target economy as an ends in itself and
2.) those security externalities in which the economic interaction plays an instrumental rather
than a teleological role. In this first group, there is one category of externalities that weaken the
target's economy and there is another category of externalities that strengthen the target's
economy. Strategies that employ these two security externalities (Corrosion and Bolstering)
may be thought of as strategies that target the health of an economy as an end in itself.
Corrosion is the security externality resulting from a weakened domestic economy.5 Just
as a strong economy provides the bedrock for national strategic power, when economic
interaction results in a weakening of the underlying economy, it carries strategic ramifications.
This group of security externalities fall into the category called Corrosion. The causal pathway
producing Corrosion is one in which economic interaction erodes the health of the target's
economy.6 As a result, the target is less able to defend itself and its strategic interests. There are
several ways in which economic interaction might conceivably weaken an economy. As Adam
Smith pointed out, international competitive dynamics may strangle infant industries before they
have a chance to develop. 7 More recently, some have been concerned that outsourcing may limit
positive spill-over effects from domestically-rooted technology and manufacturing.i The
5 This distinction between "Coercive Leverage" and "Corrosion" may be thought of as similar to the distinction that
Thomas Schelling makes between pure punishment (in which the pain is an end unto itself) and the coercive use of
violence (in which the violence is instrumental). See: Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966). Knorr makes a similar distinction to Schelling in his discussion of applications of
economic power for coercive purposes as opposed to purely for purposes of punishment, see: Klaus Eugen Knorr,
The Power of Nations : The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975) p. 82 and
p. 151.
6 For a good perspective on "economic warfare"-much of which revolves around the strategic elements of
"Corrosion," see: Yuan-li Wu, Economic Warfare (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952).
7 Adam Smith, Thomas Wilson, and Andrew S. Skinner, The Market and the State : Essays in Honour ofAdam
Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Adam Smith and Charles Jesse Bullock, An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth ofNations (New York: P. F. Collier & sons, 1909).
8 For more on the importance of spillover effects and other externalities for security see Richard J. Samuels, "Rich
Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1994); Klaus Eugen Knorr and Frank N. Trager, Economic Issues and National Security
(Lawrence: Published for the National Security Education Program by the Regents Press of Kansas, 1977).
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positive effects of spillover may also stem from management and organizational expertise as
well as lost synergies among downstream and upstream partners and adjacent industries.9 In
addition, economies in various stages of development may find themselves "locked in" to
particular segments of the value chain preventing further economic progress.
A strategy employing Corrosion simply seeks to undermine the robustness of the target
state's economic health; such efforts are likely to be focused on encouraging patterns of
economic interaction that are likely to weaken the target economy." This weakening of the
target economy may be a direct shrinking of the current GDP or a more qualitative Corrosion
which limits productive national growth capabilities and thus, future growth prospects. Tariffs,
currency subversion (e.g. Germany dropping counterfeit Pound notes over England during World
9 See for instance, Michael Porter's Chapter 13, "Locations, Clusters, and Company Strategy," in Gordon L. Clark,
Maryann P. Feldman, and Meric S. Gertler, The Oxford Handbook ofEconomic Geography (Oxford, England ; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 253-274. There is a large literature on clusters, manufacturing knowledge
dissemination, and other related concepts. See for example: Steven Pinch et al., "From 'Industrial Districts' to
'Knowledge Clusters': A Model of Knowledge Dissemination and Competitive Advantage in Industrial
Agglomerations," Journal of Economic Geography 3, no. 4 (2003): 373-388.; Dominic Power and Mats Lundmark,
"Working through Knowledge Pools: Labour Market Dynamics, the Transference of Knowledge and Ideas, and
Industrial Clusters," Urban Studies 41, no. 5-6 (2004): 1025-1044.; Dieter Ernst and Linsu Kim, "Global Production
Networks, Knowledge Diffusion, and Local Capability Formation," Research Policy 31, no. 8-9 (2002): 1417-1429.
10 The "Dutch Disease" (and other "Resource Curse" theories) are one form of this in which economies fail to
diversify and climb up the value chain. See: Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs, "Energy and Resource Allocation: A
Dynamic Model of the "Dutch Disease"," The Review of Economic Studies 49, no. 5, (1982): 845-859.; W. M.
Corden, "Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation," Oxford Economic Papers 36,
no. 3 (1984): 359-380.; Michael L. Ross, "Review: The Political Economy of the Resource Curse; the Paradox of
Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States; Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth; Winners and Losers:
How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States," World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 297-322. Another
class of "locking-in" are colonial relationships in which colonial economies are oriented around the metropole. This
view is often articulated by the "dependencia" literature. See, for example: Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein,
Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press,
1980); Peter Claus Wolfgang Gutkind and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, The Political Economy of Contemporary
Africa (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976). For an interesting, more nuanced explanation of how
variation in local conditions of inhabitability across colonies prompted Europeans to build very different
institutional architectures which then significantly influenced subsequent colonial and post-colonial economic
growth see: Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation," The American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401.
" Examples of this type of strategy include: the US embargo of Cuba, the Arab League boycott of pre-1948 Israel,
the Cold War exclusion of the Soviet bloc from the beneficial GATT free trade regime, and US economic policy
toward Japan in the period before Pearl Harbor. See: Edward S. Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy : The US.
Financial Siege ofJapan before Pearl Harbor (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007); and Michael A.
Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Searchfor Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1987).
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War II) and boycotts are all tools that states can employ to weaken target economies. Since the
economy provides the foundation for so much of international power, such a weakening of the
economy fundamentally carries strategic consequences for the target state. The security
externalities that result from a weakening of the economy fall into this category of Corrosion.
Bolstering is the security externality resulting from a strengthened domestic economy.
Bolstering may be most easily understood as the other side of the Corrosion coin. If Corrosion
describes the category of security externalities resulting from a weakening of the target state's
economic health, Bolstering is the category of security externalities that result when economic
interaction makes the state's economy stronger. The causal pathway producing Bolstering is one
in which economic interaction improves the health of the target's economy. As its economic
foundations grow stronger, the target state is better able to generate international power.12 This
strategic strengthening is the security externality called Bolstering.13 Historically, states that
consciously chose to pursue such strategies generally used economic interaction to strengthen
and support allies.14 Some of the most famous examples of such strategies include British
support for its Napoleonic Allies, Soviet aid and economic ties to Cuba, the Marshall Plan and
the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). States can employ trade
credits, foreign aid, loans, Most-Favored Nation status, insurance and other sorts of facilitating
guarantees to help promote beneficial economic interaction.
1 The logic of this causal pathway is precisely the same as the causal pathway for Corrosion, only with the effect
heading in the opposite direction.
13 Bolstering is the logical strategic consequence of Ricardo's approach to free trade. For the classic statement of the
gains from trade see: David Ricardo and R. M. Hartwell, On the Principles ofPolitical Economy, and Taxation
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971); David Ricardo and Edward Carter Kersey Gonner, Economic Essays (London: G.
Bell and Sons, ltd., 1923). Because uncoerced economic interaction is predicated on mutual benefit, examples of
absolute strengthening of the target occur in almost every case of economic interaction.
"4 Although, it should be noted that Bolstering can just as easily occur with enemies since-strictly speaking-
Bolstering merely describes the category of security externalities resulting from economic interaction. Whether
intentional or not, commercial actors that are trading with the enemy often strengthen the target's economy thus
generating the corresponding Bolstering security externalities.
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Finally, on the "Economy as Means" branch of the typology, there are two distinct types
of security effects that stem from economic interaction.15 First, the economic interaction may
generate externalities that are designed to provide Coercive Leverage. Coercive Leverage is the
security externality resulting from economic dependence. The causal pathway operates as
follows: economic patterns generate structural dependence as the engaging national economies
accommodate and adapt to the economic interaction. This dependence can later be threatened,
jeopardized and disrupted, causing damage to the national economies involved. Such
vulnerability constitutes the security externality called Coercive Leverage. States can capitalize
on this vulnerability to force targeted states to comply with the more powerful state's wishes.16
A strategy employing Coercive Leverage generally seeks to establish and foster dependence.' 7
The more asymmetric this relationship is, the easier it will be to actually harness the dependence
for strategic purposes. States engage in economic statecraft when they seek to manipulate
specific economic interaction in order to capitalize on the associated security externalities. Some
examples of economic statecraft that often seek to exploit Coercive Leverage are sanctions,
embargoes, blockades, travel bans, withholding payments (as the U.S. did with tolls collected for
the Panama Canal as part of its efforts to oust Noriega), freezing bank accounts, and many of the
types of negative "economic statecraft" that are highlighted in Baldwin's work.' 8  A recent
example of Coercive Leverage was China's 2006 decision to cut off oil flows into North Korea.
" Strategies employing Coercive Leverage and Interest Transformation can be thought of as strategies involving the
instrumental use of the economy to affect state behavior.
16 Drawing on the deterrence literature, coercive leverage can be used to either dissuade a state from changing the
status quo (deterrence) or it can be used to compel a state to pro-actively make a change in its behavior
(compellance).
17 For a seminal treatment of Germany's use of this sort of strategy see: Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and
the Structure ofForeign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press 1945 [1980-reprint]).
18 Baldwin categorizes various economic policy tools according to whether they have beneficial or detrimental
effects on the target. Usually, states use such tools with an eye toward what I call coercive leverage, however,
occasionally these tools can be applied simply to damage the economy (as in "Corrosion" above) or to undermine
military production facilities (as in "Hollowing Out" also discussed above). Baldwin offers two tables of examples
of positive and negative economic statecraft (pp. 41-42). In the notes to these tables, he provides useful definitions
of these various policy tools that states can use to incentivize commercial actors.
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In that instance, North Korea was dependent on Chinese supplies of oil for approximately 90%
of its oil. China cut supplies to force North Korea back to the negotiating table following its
nuclear test on Oct 9, 2006.19
The second type of externalities in the "Economy as Means" group are those that are
designed to actually transform the goals and interests of the target. Whereas Coercive Leverage
is employed to enforce State A's compliance with State B's interests, Interest Transformation
actually seeks to alter State A's goals and objectives to bring them into closer alignment with
State B's interests.2 0 The objective of Interest Transformation is not only to force State A to
behave in a manner that is conducive to State B's interests, but rather to redefine State A's
interests, goals and objectives in such a way that State A then actually wants the same thing as
State B.2 This process occurs when certain types of economic interaction generate integration-
a condition in which the economies of states are closely connected to each other. These ties
often provide both parties with a common stake in the success of the integrated economic entity.
In this manner, the interests of the interacting parties are shaped and influenced by the economic
interaction. For instance, common currency unions are forms of economic interaction that entail
19 Joseph Kahn, "China may be using Oil to Press North Korea," The New York Times, October 31 2006, sec. A;
Foreign Desk, p. 12. Moscow's recalling of technical experts, cutting of trade ties and aid and abrogating a loan
agreement to Yugoslavia in 1948 and the US pressure on the Pound Sterling in response to the 1952 Suez Crisis are
both historical examples of Coercive Leverage.
20 This transformation amounts to a change in state preferences. For more on "preferences" as an analytical concept
in international relations see: Jeffry Frieden's Chapter 2 entitled, "Actors and Preferences in International
Relations," in David A. Lake and Robert Powell, Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1999) pp. 39-76 as well as Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51, no. 04 (1997): 513.; Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism
and World Politics," The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-1169. For an interesting
application of domestic preference transformation and economic interaction see: Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan
Kirshner, "Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests," Security Studies 9, no. 1 (1999):
119. For a view on the relative influence of supranational actors on state preferences see: Andrew Moravcsik, "A
New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation," International Organization 53, no. 02
(1999): 267.
2 A strategy employing transformative leverage seeks actual transformation of State A's interests such that they
become redefined to be in line with those of State B. Rather than merely seeking compliance from the target state,
this strategy seeks to alter the target state's preferences themselves.
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significant economic integration and generate considerable convergence of strategic interests. 22
Other historical cases of interest transformation include US relations with the Kingdom of
Hawaii (1848-1893) and Hirschman's own cases of Germany's relations with pre-war Eastern
Europe in which asymmetric economic relations transformed domestic interests. Externalities
that entail such alteration of the goals of state fall into this category called Interest
Transformation. Chapter Three features a case based on Interest Transformation security
externalities in the context of Taiwan.
By focusing on the terminal nodes of the typology, we are left with six distinct types of
security externalities which cover the full range of possible security externality categories.24 As
was mentioned earlier, the purpose of this effort to create a typology is to provide a useful
theoretic tool for categorizing and specifying the various security-related consequences of
economic interaction. The typology specifies six types of security externalities which fall into
two broad categories: those acting through primarily economic channels and those externalities
with directly military effects. Each of these six types of security externalities functions
according to its own economic logic. 25 Taken together, this typology answers the question "In
what manner does economics affect security?" and maps out the domain of economic statecraft.26
Having answered what economic statecraft is and how it works, the next few sections turn to the
question of why it works.
2 The most famous example of this is the European Union and its efforts to forge common strategic interests.
23 For more on the Hawaii case see: ibid. See especially pp. 123-133.
24 Although this categorization is designed to capture all the various types of security consequences that may stem
from economic interaction in a mutually exclusive manner, any given instance of economic interaction may entail
security consequences that fall into more than one of these six buckets.
25 For more details on the types of security externalities and their causal logics, refer to William Norris, "A
Theoretical Framework for Analyzing the Relationship Between Economics and Security" Paper presented at the
2009 Annual Meeting of the New England Political Science Association, Portland, Maine, in which I present a
detailed description of each specific type of externality that identifies the links between various patterns of economic
behavior and the strategic consequences that result.
26 This typology may be used to more precisely evaluate instances of economic statecraft to provide a specific
vocabulary for precisely describing the economic dynamics at work (or feared to be at work) and their related
security rationales.
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2.3 Theory
As defined earlier, economic statecraft occurs when states deliberately seek to manipulate
economic interaction in order to generate the types of security externalities categorized above.
This dissertation provides an account of how aggregate economic agents' micro-level incentives
and consequent behavior generate national security outcomes at the level of state grand strategy.
Commercial actors, acting on their own interests, engage in various forms of cross-border
economic interaction. This interaction often generates security externalities. States can create
incentives for commercial actors to behave in ways that encourage the creation of security
externalities that are conducive to a state's strategic interests. In this way, states can pursue
strategies that seek to manipulate these externalities by structuring the incentives of the
commercial actors involved. Such manipulation is defined as economic statecraft.
Thus, to understand economic statecraft, one must take a closer look at how the state
manipulates economic interaction-more precisely, how the state controls the commercial actors
responsible for conducting the economic interaction that produces these strategic effects. To
conduct economic statecraft, the government must be able to incentivize commercial actors to
behave in a manner that is conducive to producing security externalities that are in line with the
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state's strategic interests." Thus, the importance of the government's ability to control and
2 My inspiration for the theoretical framework to explore the state's ability to direct its economic interaction came
from the principal-agent literature in economics. Principal-Agent theory offers a useful conceptual framework for
unpacking the dynamics governing the interaction of the state and the private sector. Gill and Reilly have also
suggested the appropriateness of using a principal-agent approach to understanding the challenges China faces in
managing its corporate actors in Africa. See: Bates Gill and James Reilly, "The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in
Africa," The Washington Quarterly Volume 30, Issue 3, pp. 37-52. Although the principal-agent approach is a good
one, Gill and Reilly do not fully develop the idea. Rather, they use a principal-agent framework to argue that
management challenges are difficult and likely to preclude effective coordination from Beijing. In my work, I
elaborate the principal-agent theory and go beyond the question of whether the principal can coordinate the agent(s).
The theory in this chapter identifies the salient conditions that enable state management of commercial actors. This
research focuses on identifying the conditions under which the state can control commercial actors. For the initial
identification of these factors, I have drawn on the principal-agent literature.
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direct the behavior of commercial actors becomes apparent. So what enables a government to
exercise control over commercial actors?
Five factors are responsible for determining the outcome of whether the state is able to
control the commercial actor(s). First is whether the goals of the commercial agent conflict with
the goals of the state. Second is the number of commercial actors in the market-too many and
the government will have a hard time controlling them, but if there are only one or two, these
commercial actors may be powerful enough to resist government efforts to control their
behavior. Third is the degree to which the government is acting with one voice. To the extent
the government itself is divided, it will be more difficult to exercise control over commercial
actors. Fourth is the reporting relationship between the government and the commercial actor. If
the commercial actor is directly owned or managed by the government, it will be easier for the
government to direct the behavior of the firm. Fifth is the relative resource endowments between
the principal and the agent-if the commercial actor has considerably more resources than the
government, it will more difficult for the government to exercise control. Together, these five
factors determine whether the government will be more or less likely able to control or direct the
behavior of commercial actors. The next section formalizes this basic theory.
2.3.1 The Model
The dependent variable of this study is whether the state succeeds or fails to control,
direct or otherwise use commercial actors in the state's pursuit of its strategic goals. This is
called "control" for short. The cases will be coded for whether or not the state has been able to
use commercial actors to pursue its strategic objectives. In practical terms, one can observe
evidence of whether or not the commercial actors do what China wants done strategically vis a
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vis a given foreign policy issue area.28 So the dependent variable (DV) of the dissertation's cases
is control-whether the state succeeds or fails to manipulate, control, direct or otherwise use
commercial actors in the state's pursuit of its strategic goals. The values for this DV range from
high levels of control to absence of state control.
The independent variables (IVs) are the factors that enable the state to bring the behavior
of commercial actors into line with its strategic goals. These IVs highlight the conditions that
explain why a state can use commercial actors to pursue strategic goals. In cases in which the
state is able to control, direct or use commercial actors, these factors will have been responsible
for determining the outcome observed.29
Figure 2.2: Summary of IV-DV Causality
28 Coding for the dependent variable in the cases will require an examination of what China's particular goals are in
a given case context and comparing these objectives with what commercial actors actually did in that case. This sort
of comparison will demonstrate whether the state was or was not able to control the commercial actor(s).
29 For more on dependent and independent variables see John Gerring, Case Study Research : Principles and
Practices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 21; Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodsfor Students
ofPolitical Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005) especially Chapter 1.
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There are five IVs that are responsible for determining the outcome of the DV (whether
or not the state is able to control the commercial actor(s)). The first IV is the intrinsic
compatibility between the state's goals and the goals of the commercial actor (the Goals IV).
How closely are the goals of the commercial actor(s) aligned with those of the principal? If the
basic objectives of the commercial actors are closely compatible with the basic goals of the state,
one would expect to observe less friction. In such cases, the goals that the commercial actors
seek (e.g. profit, market expansion, securing access to basic inputs, improved productivity, etc.)
do not conflict with the goals of the state. This facilitates the ability of the state to achieve its
goals since motivating the commercial actor to pursue goals that are complementary to what the
commercial actor would like to do anyway is fairly easy. Thus, at the simplest level, the key
variation on the Goals IV that matters in terms of affecting the outcome on the DV is whether the
goals of the state and the goals of the commercial actor are conflicting or not. Some indicators to
look at when assessing the intrinsic compatibility of the Goals IV include whether the
commercial actor's goals are defined by the state, the degree to which the commercial actor is
driven by purely profit motives, and whether both the goals of the state and the goals of the
commercial actor can both be successfully realized (as opposed to mutually exclusive). To the
degree the state's goals are compatible with those of the commercial actors, the state will find it
easier to control or direct commercial actors in its pursuit of strategic national goals.
The second IV is Market Structure. If a market in a particular industry or sector is highly
fragmented, it may be more difficult for a state to control the numerous commercial actors.
Monitoring, coordinating, and enforcing compliance all become more challenging as the number
of commercial actors increase. Conversely, a highly concentrated market with a few large firms
may be more easily be directed by the state. However, a monopolistic or duopolistic market
structure produces very large, powerful firms with significant autonomy that are likely to enjoy
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relative bargaining power vis a vis the government. Important firms with considerable influence
are more easily able to resist state attempts to direct commercial actors, even though the limited
number of commercial agents makes the government's monitoring, and enforcement challenges
relatively easier. Being the "only game in town" enables firms to more easily resist state
attempts to unilaterally direct them. Thus, oligopolistic market structures seem to be best suited
to a state being able to control the commercial actors.30 Such situations are concentrated enough
that the firms are easy to monitor, punish, and reward, but not so concentrated that commercial
actors can gain leverage vis a vis the state.
The third IV is the Unity of the State. Whereas the Market Structure IV reflects variation
in the number of commercial actors involved, the Unity ofState IV reflects a similar sort of
variation on the part of the state. In situations where there may be multiple, competing and
conflicting bureaucratic authorities or in situations in which the state is internally divided among
competing factions or groups, it will be more difficult to direct and control commercial actors.
For instance, when the central state must also contend with provincial and municipal authorities,
it may be more difficult to use commercial actors to pursue national strategic goals. Likewise,
when the central state is sharply divided by contending ministries or political factions we can
expect commercial actors to be more easily able to play one set of interests off the other thus
weakening any coherent attempt on the part of the state to control the commercial actors. The
values for this IV range from a highly unified state to a deeply divided state. Such divisions
typically occur in three realms: across various institutional divides (I call this "inter-
bureaucratic" divisions) for example, Ministry of Finance versus National Development and
Resources Council; across various levels of government (called "decentralized" divisions) for
30 "Oligopolistic" market structures are those in which a relatively small number (between two and five or six) of
commercial agents compete.
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example central government versus provincial government; and across factions (factional
divisions) for example rival senior patrons within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The fourth IV is the nature of the Reporting Relationship between the state and the
commercial actor. This relationship generally consists of three attributes: the nature of the
ownership arrangements, the management arrangements and the financing structure. The more
direct any of these relationships are between the government and the commercial actors, the
easier it will be for the state to exercise control over the commercial actor. For example, in
situations of direct state ownership, one would expect higher levels of control. Similarly, a firm
whose managers are directly appointed by the government will be more easily controlled than a
firm whose managers are elected by private shareholders (ceteris paribus). Likewise, a firm that
relies significantly upon state sources for its financing is more likely to respect the wishes of the
government than one beholden to private shareholders. The values for this Reporting
Relationship IV range from a direct, tight relationship that is closely monitored to a more distant,
arms-length regulatory relationship. The determinants of the nature of the relationship (whether
close or more arms-length) typically include three factors: 1.) whether the state has direct
ownership over the commercial actor(s), 2.) whether the state has direct management over the
commercial actor(s), and 3.) whether the financial arrangements of the commercial actor provide
leverage for the state. In situations of direct state ownership, state-appointed managers or state
funding, higher levels of state control would be expected.
The fifth IV is the relative capabilities or Relative Resource endowments between the
state and the commercial actors. This IV reflects the relative capabilities each side enjoys vis a
vis the other. If the state is well endowed with a considerable budget, large staff of experienced
professionals, and a track record of active direction of commercial activities, one would expect
control of commercial actors to be higher. The more advanced the nation's organizational
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capacity to monitor, enforce and regulate commercial actors, the more likely that challenges in
exercising economic statecraft will be overcome. Significant bureaucratic and organizational
capacity (e.g. leadership, resources, experience, scale, talent, etc.) enables states to overcome
problems of information and incentive structure that typically plague business-government
coordination efforts. Likewise, if the commercial actor is comparatively well resourced with a
deep pool of knowledge and significant financial resources, it should be easier for the
commercial actor to exercise its autonomy from the more poorly resourced government entity. If
the government possesses more people, money and knowledge relative to the commercial agent,
control will be that much easier. The Relative Resource IV ranges from being highly skewed in
favor of the commercial agent, to roughly symmetrical resource endowments, to being highly
skewed in favor of the government. Whether the state is able to effectively exercise close
regulation, monitoring and enforcement over the commercial actor is often determined by the
degree of asymmetry present in the resources available to the state versus those resources that are
available to the commercial actor(s).
This section specified the dependent and independent variables of the study.3 1 The ability
of the state to control the commercial actor(s) is a function of five factors: first, the intrinsic
compatibility of the goals of the state and those of the commercial actor(s); second, the number
of commercial actors involved; third, the unity of the state; fourth, the reporting relationship
between the state and the commercial actor(s) and finally, the resource endowments of the state
relative to the commercial actor(s). Each of these independent variables has a fundamental,
hypothesized causal relationship to the dependent variable that determines whether the state can
3 Although the primary purpose of this project is to develop a theory of economic statecraft, to the extent possible,
subsequent chapters will perform initial tests of the theory in the context of a given case. More thorough testing of
the theory requires a different research design than the one I use here which is primarily geared toward developing
and illustrating the theory itself.
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effectively direct commercial actors in pursuit of its strategic objectives. Having specified the
theory, the next task is to more explicitly consider how control over commercial actors relates to
successful economic statecraft. That is the focus of the next section.
2.4 The Effectiveness of Economic Statecraft
Although economic power is often a difficult lever of international power to wield, when
it does occur it can be very important (e.g. Marshall Plan, GATT, Breton Woods, Russian energy
policy, etc.). What accounts for the successful use of economic statecraft? Why do countries
sometimes realize their strategic objectives utilizing economic tools of statecraft and other times
fail? In short, why does economic statecraft work? This section addresses the conditions under
which economic statecraft is more or less likely to be effective.
Although state control of commercial actors is crucial for economic statecraft to occur,
control alone is not enough to guarantee successful strategic results. In addition to being able to
control commercial actors, states must also be able to satisfy three other conditions. Each is a
necessary but not sufficient prerequisite determining the likelihood of success of economic
statecraft.32 The first factor that determines the likelihood of success is the purpose that
economic statecraft is designed to achieve and how that end matches with the target state's own
objectives. As has been noted in the sanctions literature, success of economic statecraft often
depends on the objectives being sought. 3 The ends sought cannot be out of proportion with the
economic means available to realize those ends. A related concept is that certain characteristics
32 These preconditions may be thought of individually insufficient but necessary causes. Together these three
conditions and state control over the commercial actor represent the sufficient and necessary conditions for
successful economic statecraft.
3 For more on when sanctions work and the importance of purpose commensurability see: Gary Clyde Hufbauer,
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd , Expand ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International
Economics, 2007); Richard Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar : Incentives, Sanctions, and
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); -Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation:
Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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of target states' domestic regimes can also be important facilitating or inhibiting factors making
success more or less likely. Ceteris paribus, economic statecraft that has a more modest
objective targeting a less recalcitrant state will meet with success more readily than economic
statecraft with a grandiose goal targeting a state whose domestic political climate is not
conducive to the sought objective. In other words, for economic statecraft to be successful, the
ends must be commensurate with the means. To the extent that the objective sought is out of
proportion to the economic tools available, economic statecraft is unlikely to succeed. The
second factor is the relative magnitude of the economic interaction. 35 For instance, a country
whose trade comprises 80% of its GDP will be much more sensitive to disruptions of that trade
than one for whom trade plays only a minor role in its overall economy.36 The relative
magnitude of the economic interaction ought to be fairly large for economic statecraft to be
effective. The third factor is the elasticity of demand (or, in some cases, supply) for the
3 See: James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," The American
Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577-592.; Martin, Coercive Cooperation : Explaining Multilateral
Economic Sanctions,; Han Dorussen and Jongryn Mo, "Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-
Seeking as Commitment Strategies," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 4 (2001): 395-426.; David Lektzian
and Mark Souva, "The Economic Peace between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions,"
Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 6 (2003): 641-660.; Benjamin N. Judkins, "Economic Statecraft and Regime
Type" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2004); David J. Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher, "Sanctions,
Signals, and Militarized Conflict," American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007): 415-431.; Michael Tomz,
"Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," International Organization 61,
no. 04 (2007): 821. on issues of audience costs, reputation effects, success against autocracies versus democracies,
etc. At a conference on China's rising power at MIT in February, 2009 Adam Segal made the point that an important
consideration of how effective China's economic statecraft will be is the host/target's domestic political context
(Conversations with the Author, February 27, 2009). My sense is that conducive host nation environments will
make it easier for success in much the same way that conducive goals would facilitate a greater likelihood of
success.
35 Knorr also discusses the importance of magnitude in determining the likelihood of success. His discussion,
however centers around the sending state and its vulnerability in (as well as dominance of) a given economic
interaction. See: Klaus Eugen Knorr, The Power of Nations : The Political Economy of International Relations
(New York: Basic Books, 1975) p. 84.
36 Especially if that trade is highly concentrated with one or a few states and there are no other real alternative
trading partners. To illustrate: before the Soviet Union cut its ties with Albania in 1959, 56% of Albania's imports
came from the USSR and 45% of its exports went to the Soviet Union. By the end of 1961 all trade relations with
the USSR had ended. Albania underwent a significant and painful economic re-orientation toward China and the
West, which eventually replaced the USSR as Albania's dominant trading partner.
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economic interaction.37 For economic statecraft to be effective, the nature of the economic
interaction ought to be fairly inelastic. For example, a country whose domestic energy grid is
based on light, sweet crude oil is not easily able to substitute alternative goods in place of this
type of crude oil. Since energy also provides such a fundamental input for the rest of the
economy, this country's demand for light sweet crude would be said to be fairly inelastic. Thus,
economic statecraft that seeks relatively modest objectives and is based on relatively large,
inelastic economic interaction has a greater likelihood of success, ceteris paribus.
The fourth factor determining the likelihood of success is the state's ability to control or
direct its economic interaction. The degree to which a state is able to direct its economic
interaction is largely a function of its domestic economic system-in particular, the nature of its
business-government relations. Various states throughout history (and into the present period)
have chosen to organize their domestic economies using a range of business-government
relations.38 The nature of these relations often determines the degree to which the state has
control over the specific conduct of its economic interaction with other states. Ceteris paribus,
states with a greater degree of control over their domestic economy will be better suited to direct
their economic interaction and thus more likely to realize success in their attempts to engage in
economic statecraft.
So, to be effective at wielding its economic power, a state needs to be able to direct its
economic activities. However, as demonstrated by states with centrally directed economies, the
37 Knorr also puts forward the notion of elasticity, although his use of elasticity is somewhat more narrow than what
is presented here. See: ibid. p. 85. The section entitled "Definitions" noted that elasticity involves both how badly a
state requires a given good as well as how easily this good may be substituted. Knorr tends to focus his analysis on
the sending state and as a result tends to ascribe this latter characteristic to the sending state's market power rather
than to the receiving state's demand elasticity (as I do). This difference in attribution does not greatly impact our
conclusions on the issue-in both cases what matters is how easily a substitute may be found.
38 This factor is somewhat connected to the literature on state-business relations in that differing domestic business-
government paradigms will be pre-disposed to being more or less amenable for the state to actively use economic
power-particularly to direct its commercial actors-in achieving foreign policy goals. For an example of this state-
business relations literature see: Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford England ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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more a government, rather than markets, is in charge of directing the state's economic behavior,
the less efficient the state's economic productivity tends to be.39 Over time, this lower economic
productivity limits the size of a nation's economy. The smaller or less powerful a state's
economy is, the less intrinsic weight the state has to throw around (i.e. the less "economic
gunpowder" the state possesses). 40 So although a state needs to be able to direct its economic
might for economic statecraft to be effective, too much state direction tends to lead to
inefficiency and a less robust economy over time. Likewise an economy in which the state is
relegated to a very small role may grow to exceptional proportions, but the state will find it very
difficult to meaningfully direct this latent economic power in any concerted way. This is the
essence of the paradox inherent in the exercise of national economic power.
In resolving this paradox, states have made fundamental decisions about the nature of
business-government relations which locates themselves somewhere on a continuum ranging
from deep government direction of commercial activities to very little governmental interference
in business. Most modern liberal economies have opted to allow for decentralized, market-based
allocation of scarce economic resources. This system of economic organization allows for a
good deal of flexibility and provides uniquely efficient economic advantages that compound over
39 The debate over the "Washington Consensus" is an important and complicated one. While the paradox presented
here assumes some liberal economic tenets (i.e. that directed economic growth is not as efficient as market-oriented
economic activity)-the debate of whether market economies are more productive than directed economies is not
one that this dissertation will engage. Rather, it is assumed that directed economic growth is not as efficient as
market-oriented economic activity over the long run and focus on developing the implications of this in terms of the
paradox. That said, the underperformance of centrally-planned economies is well documented. Economic
inefficiencies stem not only from the challenge of the complexity involved, but also from the long-term implications
of inefficient capital allocation. See Jinos Kornai, The Socialist System : The Political Economy of Communism
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). Empirically, the USSR and Eastern Block ultimately failed
economically. In Asia, the DPRK's economy seems to be in very bad shape and Chinese liberalization has been the
key to China's economic success. Although intensive, government planned and directed economic growth is
possible (and may even be sustained for some period of time), it does not seem to be the best path for either
economic dominance, or long term sustainability.
40 Of course, if the economy provides a unique, critical good (e.g. something with highly inelastic demand), the state
can also derive considerable influence from the inelasticity (rather than the magnitude) dimension of its international
economic relations.
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time. It has produced very advanced economies that are highly productive and on the whole
fairly efficient. 4 1 Through taxation, the state is able to gain some share of this wealth and
allocate it however it would like, but the majority of the economic productivity lies outside the
direct control of the state-such is the price that must be paid for efficient resource allocation at
the macro-economic level. Since most modem economies have more or less sided on the liberal
side of the paradox to maximize their economic welfare (e.g. butter over guns) they have ceded
much of the direct control over the conduct of economic interaction to the primary economic
actors, namely commercial firms. 42 The result is a decentralized and relatively efficient
allocation of scarce resources by relatively autonomous, profit-maximizing actors. This activity
is conducted largely through markets and freely floating prices-the key to maximizing
economic potential at the national production possibility frontier. However, this business-
government arrangement makes it difficult to fully mobilize the nation's latent economic power
since the state, when it elects to exercise its international economic power, is forced to act largely
through the non-state actors who actually conduct the economic activity-namely the
commercial firms. This situation gives rise to the business-government dynamics that play such
a key role in determining success or failure of economic statecraft.
However, not all states have opted for a minimal role of government in the economy.
Robert Gilpin presents a useful continuum of how deeply the state is involved in a given type of
41 One of the few sources that addresses this important question of the domestic business-government institutional
setting is Stephen Krasner's Chapter 6 "Domestic Constraints on International Economic Leverage," in Klaus Eugen
Knorr and Frank N. Trager, Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: Published for the National Security
Education Program by the Regents Press of Kansas, 1977) pp. 160-181. However, Krasner seems to miss the
important implication of his own analysis, namely the centrality of the principal-agent relationship (between the
state and the commercial firms) for determining the ability of states to effectively wield their economic power.
42 Samuel Huntington lamented the degree to which economic power was largely unwieldy for the US: "Harnessing
economic power to foreign policy goals presents formidable obstacles:... most important, in dramatic contrast to
military power, a pervasive ideology that sanctifies the independence, rather than the subordination, of economic
power to government."Samuel P. Huntington et al., "Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy,"
Foreign Policy , no. 32 (1978): 63-106. p. 71.
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domestic economic exchange system.43 He argues that the most elementary systems were based
on reciprocity characterized by barter and gift-giving, the next most advanced form of economic
exchange is redistribution characteristic of early irrigation and storehouse civilizations. This
form is closely related to what he calls mobilization exchange in which "the economy's primary
function is to advance the security and power of the dominant elite." In the most advanced form
of market economy type of exchange, there is "a market place wherein goods and services are
exchanged to maximize the returns to individual buyers and sellers." From the perspective of this
spectrum, contemporary China presents a particularly interesting case. Although its economy
has been liberalizing for thirty years, the Chinese state today remains deeply involved in many
economic activities. It seems to fit what Robert Gilpin described as a "mercantilist" economic
system: "In terms of our classification of economies above, mercantilism represents a halfway
house between a mobilization and a liberal market economy. In other words, the state attempts
to influence and channel emerging market forces in a direction which will enhance its security
and other national interests."4 This seems to be an apt description of China's current status and
makes China a particularly conducive empirical setting for exploring economic statecraft. As it
continues to liberalize, China will increasingly be subject to many of the business-government
dynamics that lay at the heart of the theory presented above.
2.5 Case Selection, Methodology and Research Design
Up to this point, this chapter has presented a general theory of economic statecraft to
explain both how (as explained by the typology) and why (as explained by the state-commercial
4 Gilpin was writing about the historical development of economic interdependence. See Robert Gilpin's Chapter 2
"Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective," in Knorr and Trager, Economic Issues
and National Security, pp. 19-66.
44Gilpin argues that mercantilist systems are located between mobilization and market based exchange types on his
developmental spectrum. See Robert Gilpin's Chapter 2 "Economic Interdependence and National Security in
Historical Perspective," in ibid. especially pp. 20-31; quote in the text is from p. 27.
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actor dynamics and the three conditional variables) the exercise of economic statecraft works.
The remainder of this chapter explains the criteria used to identify both China as fruitful ground
for exploring the exercise of economic power as well as why the specific cases of contemporary
Chinese foreign policy that have been selected for in-depth research. As mentioned in Chapter 1,
this project is designed to build a general theory of economic statecraft. Although the theory is
developed in such a way that it can apply to any state that seeks to exercise economic power in
the international system, the empirical work in this study is confined only to testing its
plausibility in the case of China-a particular context uniquely suited to studying and developing
a theory of economic power. The first portion of this section explores why this is so. Having
narrowed the focus to China, it is then necessary to articulate what criteria have been used to
select the particular cases of Chinese economic statecraft that make up the empirical chapters. I
take up this task in the second portion of this section. The final portion discusses the
methodology and research design.
2.5.1 Case Selection
China's mixed economy still has a number of characteristics reminiscent of a planned
economy. One would expect that these vestiges should facilitate the state's ability to direct
and/or guide the economic behavior of the commercial sector to an unusual degree. As a result,
China is a relatively unique state in terms of the paradox of economic power discussed earlier.45
China is among that handful of states that possess both considerable "economic gun powder" (by
virtue of its size, population, resources, economic reforms, growth etc.) and because it is still a
4 Other "mixed" regime states may also have these characteristics and would provide good alternative contexts in
which to look for cases of effective economic statecraft. Other states that may make good candidates for studying
economic statecraft include: Russia (especially in the realm of energy security policy since Russian energy exports
carry considerable weight and the industry concentration of the oligarchs allows for state direction) and India (where
the government has a history of active commercial direction).
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reforming, state planned economic system, China also has significant state capabilities to direct
that economic gunpowder. This combination of significant economic power and the ability to
direct that economic might has the potential to be an important enabler of economic statecraft as
we shall see in the cases.
China is also a rising power that leverages its economic clout.46 However, we do not yet
understand how this increasingly powerful player wields its economic power. Does China use
economic power to successfully achieve its strategic objectives? If so, how? Are there patterns
to China's success? Are there also patterns of failure? When does it not work? What
generalizations can we draw from these experiences? Answering such questions demands a
rigorous examination of cases in which China attempted to use economic interaction to pursue its
foreign policy goals. Although states have often used military tools to realize their foreign
policy objectives, it seems that using military power may be somewhat counterproductive for
achieving Chinese strategic interests. Instead, China has consciously and publicly sought to
leverage its "soft power" capabilities, especially economic relations, but also cultural and people-
46 China possesses a large, export-oriented, dynamic economy that has grown at an average rate of around nine
percent per year for the past thirty years. China surpassed Germany in 2007 to become the world's third largest
economy, with a GDP of $3.5 trillion (to Germany's $3.3 trillion) and in 2010 surpassed Japan to become the
second largest economy. See:"China's economy leapfrogs Germany: The Chinese government has increased its
estimate of how much the economy grew during 2007," in BBC News [database online]. 2009/01/14 20:31:56 GMT
[cited 2009]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/I /hi/business/7829230.stin and David Barboza, "China
Passes Japan as Second-largest Economy," New York Times Aug. 15, 2010. Available on-line at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/1 6/business/global/I 6vuan.html The export orientation of China's economic
growth means that a significant portion of China's GDP is connected to international economic activity. Based on a
crude measure of international economic interaction (2007 trade as portion of GDP as reported by the WTO),
China's trade comprises 71% of its GDP. This places China among the top trading countries in the world. In
addition, in the spring of 2009, China's central banker, Zhou Xiaochuan, publicly suggested that the world move
away from using the dollar as the reserve currency. Discussions in China's State Council have entertained the
notion of providing Chinese foreign aid in RMB as part of an effort to increase the international use of China's
currency. Manipulating such ties provides a strong foundation for economic statecraft.
47 China's ongoing military modernization effort has frequently brought to light serious limitations on its power
projection capabilities. Moreover, when matched against many of the other military powers in China's region, the
PLA does not enjoy a decisive operational advantage across several critical areas (air superiority, anti-submarine
warfare, C4ISR, air lift, etc.). This also makes military power a less attractive avenue for pursuing China's interests.
Finally, pursuing its objectives via military means has shown a tendency to spur neighbors toward balancing
behavior in ways that undermine larger Chinese strategic objectives. Because of fears over China's rise and because
of the lessons from China's more bellicose period of foreign policy in the mid 1990's, China has largely moved
away from using military force as a primary tool of its statecraft (Taiwan aside).
Chapter Two: Theory
to-people contact. 4 8 Since, by its own account, China is trying to use economic statecraft, it
makes a good case to look at if one wishes to understand the practice of economic statecraft. 9
Although much of the current scholarship on China's foreign policy recognizes the importance
of economics in China's foreign policy, our understanding of the actual implementation of
economic power is still not well understood. It is not clear why, when or under what conditions
Chinese economic statecraft works. Nor is there consensus over the manner in which economics
is used strategically. In my empirical work, I have selected likely cases of China's economic
statecraft specifically to explore these questions. This sort of selection is needed if we are to
understand how economic statecraft works (and, by extension how/when it does not work).
As stated above, control of commercial actors is likely to result in successful economic
statecraft when three other conditions are met. First, the economic interaction must be large
enough to matter. Second, the economic interaction should be fairly inelastic-meaning the state
cannot do without the economic interaction and it would be very difficult to substitute in
alternatives. Third, the strategic objectives sought ought to be relatively modest in comparison
to the economic tools employed. These criteria describe the necessary (but not sufficient)
conditions for statecraft to succeed. When these conditions are met and the state is able to
48 Michael Glosny, "Heading for a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in China's Policy Toward Southeast
Asia," Asian Security, vol. 2, no. 1, 2006, pp. 24-57.
49 For instance, discussions around the ideas of "comprehensive national power" (Mi W )J) and China's "soft
power" often emphasize economic tools of statecraft. See: Fuquan Tong and Yichang Liu, f t.2WI X
Shjie Quanfangwei Jingji Zhan (The World's all Directional Economic War), (Beijing: Military Science Publishing
House, 1991); Zhou Yongsheng, # Jingji Wajiao (Economic Diplomacy), (Beijing: China Youth
Publishing House, 2004); Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press: 2000) especially Chapter 5, "Geopolitical Power Calculations."
5 Although this sort of research design may seem obvious, there are methodological critiques that do not recognize
this basic point that we cannot hope to study a phenomenon if there is not a high likelihood that the phenomenon is
present in the case in the first place. For a thoughtful treatment of King, Keohane, and Verba's Designing Social
Inquiry and its relation to this point, see David Collier, James Mahoney and Jason Seawright's Chapter 6 entitled
"Claiming too Much: Warnings about Selection Bias," in Henry E. Brady and David Collier, Rethinking Social
Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004) pp. 85-102. King,
Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, is often cited for its discussion of selection bias (pp. 116-130 inter
alia).
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control the activities of commercial actors, economic statecraft will be successful. As such, I
have selected cases of Chinese statecraft that involve relatively large, inelastic economic
interactions that China seeks to use to pursue relatively modest strategic objectives.5 1 By
preselecting cases that meet these three criteria, the empirical analysis can focus on the degree to
which the state is able to control the behavior of commercial actors. If, under these conditions,
the state is able to get the commercial actors to behave in a way that generates security
externalities that are conducive to the state's strategic objectives, then the economic statecraft
will be successful. If, however, these three conditions are met but the state is unable to control
the commercial actor(s), the attempt to engage in economic statecraft will be unsuccessful.5 2
So if China has several characteristics that make it a likely candidate to use economic
statecraft, which episodes of Chinese foreign policy would be most likely to involve such a
strategy? How should the researcher focus his analytical lens?53 The first criteria is that the
foreign policy episode should be one in which economics plays an important role. For example,
some aspects of a state's foreign policy (like free trade agreements, developmental aid, trade
delegations, etc.) have inherently larger economic components than others. Thus, areas of
5 Such episodes fulfill the three preconditions that are required for economic statecraft to be successful. As such,
they also provide valuable guidance for selecting which cases would provide appropriate data for our purposes of
understanding economic statecraft. Cases that meet these conditions would likely be a good place to focus if our
intent is to better understand how economic statecraft works. If one wishes to understand how and why economic
statecraft works, one must begin by looking at probable cases of economic statecraft. For more on theory building
and using cases to study a phenomenon in social science see: George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory
Development in the Social Sciences.
52 Without state manipulation of commercial actors, economic statecraft does not exist. This is not to say that
security externalities may not, in fact, still be present. It may simply be the case that the state is not able to
effectively harness them to coherently pursue its strategic objectives. Refer to the earlier discussion of security
externalities that noted that the activities of commercial actors may still entail strategic consequences even if the
state is unaware or unable to control the behavior of commercial actors. Under such conditions, the state simply
cannot usefully manipulate these security effects (i.e. cannot engage in economic statecraft).
5 Much of this "analytical lens focusing" has been informed by Gary Goertz's Social Science Concepts, in
particular see his discussions of case selection and specification of one's theoretical domain. See: Gary Goertz,
Social Science Concepts : A User's Guide, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). John Gerring's Chapter 5
"Techniques for Choosing cases" Gerring, Case Study Research p. 86 is also very useful as is Evan S. Lieberman,
"Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," The American Political Science Review
99, no. 3 (2005): 435. on "nested cases."
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China's foreign policy in which China is looking to leverage its economic power are particularly
of interest. In some instances, China has already had success in using this form of international
power (e.g. using Coercive Leverage bring North Korea back to the Six Party Talks, Interest
Transformation targeting states that recognize Taiwan, etc.). In other instances, such attempts
have largely failed-or at least not yet generated the desired outcome (e.g. reunification with
Taiwan, Coercive Leverage against France over Tibet, etc.). Cases of both types are useful for
understanding how economic power is exercised. In each of the three areas of China's foreign
policy I have selected for study (China's sovereign investment, China's extractive resources
strategy, and China's cross-Strait economic interaction), economics is a critical tool of China's
statecraft. Moreover, the specific cases discussed in the chapters that follow include elements of
both success and failure. Examining both types of results provides better insight into the
conditions under which economic statecraft is likely to succeed.
In the first case, I examine China's economic statecraft in the context of its cross-Strait
relationship with Taiwan. Examining the role of economics in the cross-Strait relationship
provides a helpful illustration of several of the types of security externalities discussed above.
Since the early 1990s, economics has become a critical feature of the cross-Strait relationship.
During this time, the Mainland has sought to incorporate this economic interaction into its larger
strategy vis a vis Taiwan. Chapters Three and Four will examine the evolution of this effort. In
particular, Chapter Three focuses on one of the most significant developments in the cross-Strait
relationship in recent years-the historic 2005 visit of KMT Chairman Lien Chan to the
Mainland. Although China's approach to Taiwan (and the role of economics within that
strategy) has evolved over time, many of the most recent uses of economics have been designed
to transform the strategic calculus of Taiwan. Chapter Three highlights how a strategy of
economic statecraft seeking to generate Interest Transformation security externalities actually
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works in practice. Chapter Four examines earlier periods of the cross-Strait relationship in
which China's economic statecraft revolved around Coercive Leverage and Bolstering security
externalities.
Chapters Five and Six, turn to another strategically significant area in which China has
sought to pursue its national interests through the use of economics, namely its international
resource extraction strategy. Securing access to raw materials is a critical foundation of China's
continued economic development. Without reliable access to supplies of the basic inputs for
China's economy, China's ongoing economic progress may be jeopardized. Economic growth
has been highlighted as one of the cornerstones of China's grand strategy. Securing access to
key inputs has been defined by China's leadership as a critical dimension of national strategy.
As such, an examination of China's economic statecraft ought to include an investigation of how
the state has sought to secure raw materials. In particular, Chapter Five will look at China's
"going out" strategy (i1 MH - zuo chu qu) and the role of the state vis a vis commercial actors in
the context of China's drive to secure access to petroleum resources. Chapter Six juxtaposes this
experience with a close case study of what was to be China's largest foreign investment ever:
Chinalco's $17 billion bid for Rio Tinto. This type of detailed analysis enables process tracing
that will illustrate and inform the theoretical framework presented above. Both Chapter Five and
Chapter Six examine the role of the state in coordinating China's commercial actors' efforts to
secure strategic raw materials.
The final two empirical chapters examine the potential for China's massive foreign
exchange reserves to be used as instruments of economic statecraft. Specific concerns revolve
around China's ability to direct the investment of these assets. Given the importance of the
state's ability to control commercial actors, no entities are better suited for this task than the
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government owned and operated sovereign wealth funds. China's sovereign wealth funds are
direct arms of the state and thus prompt concern over the degree to which they may be used to
pursue Chinese strategic objectives. Chapters Seven and Eight evaluate the extent to which these
commercial actors present legitimate security concerns. Chapter Seven does this by comparing
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and its role in facilitating China's foreign policy
objectives to the National Social Security Fund and its relatively commercial mandate. Chapter
Eight applies the framework for evaluating security externalities and control over commercial
actors to the China Investment Corporation-China's official sovereign wealth fund.
Although each case has its own intrinsic significance as an important example of how
economics and security intersect in Chinese grand strategy, taken together, the cases allow for
productive testing and refining of the theory. These three empirical contexts collectively provide
good variation in terms of the fundamental nature of the relationship between commercial actors
and the state. The commercial actors in the raw materials context are mainly state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) while the commercial actors in the Taiwan context are private sector
Taiwanese firms (i.e. very distant from the Chinese state). In the case of China's sovereign
wealth funds, the commercial actors are actually extensions of the state itself. These three
empirical contexts provide good cross-case variation in terms of the dynamics of the basic
business-government relationship. Finally, the selection of these three areas for study provides
an example of each of the three forms of economic interaction mentioned earlier: trade in the
case of Taiwan, investment in the resource extraction cases and monetary tools of economic
statecraft in the cases of China's sovereign wealth funds.
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2.5.2 Methodology
Without delving fully into what can be a stand-alone agenda for academic research in its
own right, this section attempts to locate my research in the growing area of rigorous qualitative
research methodology. In this section, I identify both what aspects of the theory the case study
approach will be able to test and what aspects of the theory testing must be left for future work.
My research is anchored in a theory building endeavor whose purpose is to understand
the circumstances and conditions that would allow a state to effectively use its economic power
to achieve strategic goals. As such, I have put forward several ideas that hypothesize various
channels of causality. The empirical chapters that follow will seek to test these hypothesized
causalities. Since this is primarily a theory-building effort, my objective in what follows is more
to refine and develop the theory than to provide a rigorous, large-N test of the theory across
many countries over a span of time.54 This sort of test of how easily this theory can be
transported to other countries outside China will have to wait for future research." Even within
the universe of China's foreign policy, I will not be able to rigorously test how well the theory
holds across all instances of China's foreign relations-this task is much too large for a single
dissertation. Rather, from the entire universe of all cases of China's foreign relations, I have
selected illustrative instances in which economics plays an important role in pursuing strategic
54 "...[I]nferring and testing explanations that define how the independent [variable]causes the dependent variable
are often easier with case-study than large-n methods." Van Evera, Guide to Methods, p.54. For an insightful
discussion of such case-based techniques and how they contrast with quantitative hypothesis testing, see the section
entitled "Beyond Strict Hypothesis Testing: Theory Generation, Reformulation, and the Iterated Assessment of
Hypotheses," in Gerardo Munck's Chapter 7 "Tools for Qualitative Research," in Henry E. Brady and David
Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004)
pp. 119-120.
5 "Whether a causal account that fits one historical circumstance will fit others is an open question. What matters
here is that a causal mechanism has been identified, and the researcher has some framework within which to begin
to investigate the validity of the causal claims. . . The issue of the generalizability of the model can thus be separated
from the question of whether the model is an accurate explanation of cause and effect in the situation in which it has
been putatively identified." From Timothy McKeown's Chapter 9 "Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative
Worldview," in ibid. pp. 163-164. This reflects the methodological tension between testing for internal versus
external validity.
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objectives with the intention that such cases of economic statecraft (or attempted economic
statecraft) will illuminate and provide opportunities to further specify and test various elements
of the theory that tells us something about how and why economic statecraft works.s6
When developing and testing a theory, it is important to test both for internal validity and
external validity. Internal validity may be thought of as testing the internal coherence of the
theory. For example, do the posited causal relationships, in fact play out as the theory would
suggest? If the theory suggests a causal relationship between two phenomena, what evidence
would support or disprove the existence of such a relationship? Such questions guide the
empirical testing of internal validity. As suggested by works in rigorous qualitative
methodology, this sort of testing is usually best done using within-case variation.57 As Stephen
Van Evera puts it, "If case conditions are uniform, we can discount third variable influence as a
cause of observed within-case covariance between values on IV and DV. (The uniform
background conditions of the case create a semi-controlled environment that limits the effects of
third variables by holding them constant.)" 58 One major advantage of within-case variation is
that potentially confounding extra-theoretical factors (like cultural context, historical setting,
etc.) that may be accounting for observed changes in the DV are minimized.59 Such variation
56 Timothy McKeown notes that such an approach "contributes to greater learning from the data. Ex post model-
fitting is a legitimate aspect of a research cycle, which should include the on-going evaluation and (re)formulation of
theory." See his Chapter 9 "Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative Worldview," in ibid. p. 141. For more
on defining a universe of cases and specifying a research concept see: Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A
User's Guide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) and Gerring, Case Study Research.
" "Within-case analysis helps researchers assess to what degree the mechanism hypothesized by a theory was
present among all the cases under study. Researchers can thus make inferences not only about the extent to which
the hypothesized cause was found across cases, but also about the extent to which that cause produced the outcome
for each case." Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, p. 118.
58 Van Evera, Guide to Methods p. 52.
59 This sort of minimization of extra-theoretical influences mimics a control group in a natural science experimental
setting. For more see John Gerring's Chapter 6 entitled, "Internal Validity: An Experimental Template," in Gerring,
Case Study Research, and Evan S. Lieberman, "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative
Research," The American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 435. Goertz, in Social Science Concepts,
confirms that matching cases that are varying in their IVs and the values of the DV but are structurally very similar
in other respects is a highly desirable research design. John Gerring concurs: "Consider for starters, the logic of
cross-case analysis is premised on some degree of cross-unit comparability (unit homogeneity). Cases must be
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typically occurs across two dimensions: spatially-from one physical context to another, and
temporally-in the same physical context but at different periods in time. 60 The important
feature of within-case variation is that it allows us to explore how the various IVs relate to the
DV in detail, in a given context. This sort of case work has been shown to be well-suited to
testing causality and mechanisms. 61
Theories can also be tested for external validity. External validity may be thought of as
testing whether a theory that explains a given set of data is also able to explain another set of
data that shares the same salient characteristics. For example, if the theory holds in a given case,
does it do an equally good job explaining another, comparable case? Again, such cases can vary
both over time and across different spatial areas. Unlike within-case variation, cross-case
variation allows for a comparison of similarities and differences across theoretically interesting
dimensions of the empirical material. By looking across a range of mini-cases, such work allows
me to test how well the posited relationships hold up in a variety of similar settings that
nonetheless differ in important respects.62
similar to each other in whatever respects might affect the causal relationship that the investigator is investigating or
such differences must be controlled for." Gerring, Case Study Research, p. 50. These recent works follow others
that have suggested similar methods. See for example: Rose McDermott, "Experimental Methods in Political
Science," Annual Review of Political Science 5, no. 1 (2002): 31; Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Theda Skocpol, Vision and Method in Historical Sociology,
(Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune,
The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970).
60 For more on spatial versus temporal variation see: George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in
the Social Sciencesas well as David Collier, Henry Brady and Jason Seawright's Chapter 13, "Sources of Leverage
in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology," in Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry,
pp. 229-266 and Paul Pierson's Chapter 5 entitled, "Big, Slow-Moving, and ... Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in
the Study of Comparative Politics," in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical
Analysis in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp. 177-207.
61 The case-work oriented approach is suitable for identifying and understanding mechanisms. See: Gerring, Case
Study Research, p.5.
62 Such differences enable me to focus on changes in the values of particular parameters of the theory. In the
empirical portions that follow I conduct both internal and external validity types of tests. Although the primary
purpose is theory development and hence the emphasis is on internal validity testing.
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2.5.3 Research Design
The structure of my research draws on recent advancements in the subfield of qualitative
methodology. My primary objective is development of a theory of economic statecraft and, as is
often the case with most theory development, the central methodological concern is internal
validity-does the real-world data support the hypothesized relationships? As such, much of the
empirical work seeks to test implications and aspects of this theory.63 Although the nested mini-
case design enables some limited cross-case work, the majority of the testing will rely on within-
case variation. 64
The case-work is broadly structured around a pair-wise comparison research design. The
chapters match cases within each of the three empirical contexts (cross-Strait relations, "Going
Out" and sovereign wealth funds) to better understand why economic statecraft might have been
more or less effective at realizing China's strategic objectives. Cases taken from the same
empirical context can be usefully compared when one case shows economic statecraft achieving
China's strategic objectives and another case from the same empirical context does not.
Exploring the differences between these two instances provides helpful insight into explaining
why economic statecraft works. Examining cases within a specific empirical context provides
63 In so doing, the case material will be used to test and refute or refine the theory as necessary. John Gerring notes
that using case studies is a superior way to establish causality when testing theories. See his Case Study Research
pp. 45-48. For an excellent resource on using case material to build, test and refine theory see: Alexander L. George
and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2005).
64 David Collier, James Mahoney and Jason Seawright's Chapter 6 entitled "Claiming too Much: Warnings about
Selection Bias," in Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, pp. 85-102 does an excellent job of specifying
conditions under which it is theoretically productive to select cases on the DV-namely when seeking to understand
causal mechanisms within a given case. At the same time they note that cross-case work ought to be conducted by
selecting only on variations in IVs. This insight informs my research design. For more on nested case design see:
Lieberman, "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," in which he discusses mini-
cases; for an example of using mini-case qualitative analysis see: Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire
Agreements and the Durability ofPeace, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004) for a discussion of the
advantages of within-case variation for forming and testing causal theories see: George and Bennett, Case Studies
and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,; Gerring, Case Study Research; Van Evera, Guide to Methods, for a
discussion conceptually distinguishing cross-case from within case variation see: Brady and Collier, Rethinking
Social Inquiry; Gerring, Case Study Research.
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the advantages of within-case variation discussed above. At the same time, looking
systematically at the factors that seem to account for when the state is able to control its
commercial actors across all three contexts provides a degree of external verification. The case-
work serves two important functions in terms of the development of theory. First, these chapters
provide useful illustrations of how particular security externalities actually work in practice.
Second, the evidence from the cases help to understand why the state was or was not able to
control commercial actor(s) in any given episode. By examining the empirics of these cases, we
can determine the roles that various factors played in explaining the outcome of the case.
Exactly how did China's attempts to use economic statecraft unfold? What were the strategic
results of these activities? Data from these cases will help to further refine the theory.
The empirical work focuses on using process tracing techniques to identify evidence from
the cases that bears on the causal relationships put forward earlier in this chapter. 65 For example,
evidence that shows that the tools, policies, rules, regulations, or laws that are available for the
state to punish or reward commercial actors are limited or non-existent would indicate a
relatively weak bureaucratic capacity to enforce and the Relative Resource IV would be skewed
in favor of commercial actors. The state can also attempt to directly offset the problems of
asymmetric information and enforcement. This can be done by improving monitoring
capabilities, or improving enforcement capabilities. These would help skew the Relative
65 Causal process tracing techniques will be used to analyze the empirical data from the cases. Stephen Van Evera
borrows from Alexander George and Timothy McKeown to define process tracing as the technique in which "the
investigator explores the chains of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are
translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped
and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step." Stephen Van Evera,
Guide to Methodsfor Students ofPolitical Science, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997) p. 64. He cites pp. 34-
41 of Alexander George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision
Making," Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 21-58. He also suggests Gary King,
Robert 0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research,
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994) pp. 226-228 for additional information on process tracing. For
more on process tracing see John Gerring's Chapter 7 in John Gerring, Case Study Research : Principles and
Practices, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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Resource IV back in favor of the state. Based on the indicators presented in the discussion of the
IVs, the case analysis will identify relevant evidence that bears on the theoretical framework
presented earlier.
Another challenge of research design is the issue of establishing a baseline for analysis.
How should the analyst know if the observed economic interaction is actually the result of
strategically-manipulated economic statecraft as opposed to normal economic interaction
performed for purely commercial reasons? How should one distinguish between economic
statecraft and the ordinary course of commercially-motivated interaction? At the heart of this
challenge lies distinguishing between the "normal economic behavior" of commercial actors and
the state's strategically motivated manipulation designed to achieve foreign policy objectives by
instrumentally using commercial actors. The most clear-cut cases are those in which a
commercial actor faces commercially undesirable consequences yet does something in spite of
the commercial costs because the state directs them to. Such cases show a clear victory for state
control. The Rio Tinto case illustrates this quite nicely. Chinalco, a $9 billion market cap
company, loses $10 billion on their foreign investment and is then lauded by the government for
their "success." These facts strongly indicate non-commercial behavior. The clearest cases of
economic statecraft are those instances when commercial forces pull one direction but state
preferences pull in another. The cases of economic statecraft that are examined in the chapters
that follow exhibit these types of non-commercial characteristics.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter put forward three important concepts that offer analytic leverage for
thinking about economic statecraft. First, economic statecraft is properly understood in the
context of security externalities. The behavior of commercial actors generates various patterns
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of economic interaction that carry strategically significant consequences for state security as
reflected by the typology of security externalities.
Second, states must resolve a series of business-government coordination challenges if
they are to be effective at mobilizing and directing their economic power. Specifically, five
independent variables seem to be important determinants of whether a state will be able to
mobilize and direct its economic power: 1.) the intrinsic compatibility of goals between the state
and the commercial actors that carry on the economic activity of the state, 2.) the commercial
market structure, 3.) the unity of the state, 4.) the nature of the reporting relationship between the
commercial firm(s) and the state, and 5.) the relative distribution of resources between the state
and the commercial actor(s). Each of these factors has a posited relationship to the ability of the
state to control or direct the behavior of commercial actors.
Third, for control over commercial actors to translate into successful economic statecraft,
three other preconditions must be met: 1.) the scope and scale of the objective(s) to which
economic statecraft is directed cannot be over-ambitious relative to the economic tools used to
pursue those objectives, 2.) the relative magnitude of the economic interaction ought to be large
enough to be significant, and 3.) the economic interaction ought to be fairly inelastic. These
three preconditions for successful economic statecraft are used as screening criteria for the
selection of empirical cases of Chinese economic statecraft. The empirical chapters that follow
illustrate how specific types of security externalities play out in the context of China's
international resource extraction activities, its deployment of state capital and in the context of
China's strategic use of economics in its relationship with Taiwan. These cases provide useful
material for (primarily internal validity) testing and refinement of the theory.
At this point it may be useful to take a step back and summarize the implications of these
propositions. In so doing, the outline of a general theory of economic statecraft begins to take
84
Chapter Two: Theory
shape. Certain types of economic interactions carry significant strategic implications which
manifest themselves in the form of security externalities. States often take an active interest in
these security consequences. As states seek to manipulate economic interaction (and its
associated security externalities) they are engaging in what is known as economic statecraft. For
economic statecraft to be a useful tool of national power four conditions must be present. One of
these-the state's ability to exercise sufficient control over the conduct of its economic
interaction-has not received adequate attention in the literature and thus provides the focal
point for the dissertation's empirical research. Precisely how states go about manipulating their
economic interaction requires the state to work with, encourage, restrain, or otherwise direct and
control the commercial actors that are ultimately responsible for conducting that economic
interaction. Of course, such efforts to control are bound to face challenges. These challenges are
a function of a given state's business-government dynamics.66
In short, the theory is an account of how aggregate economic actors' micro-level
incentives and consequent behavior generate national security outcomes at the level of state
grand strategy. This middle-range theory provides an integrated explanation of what economic
statecraft is, the manner in which economics effects security, the conditions under which
economic statecraft is likely to be effective, and a theoretical framework of specific challenges a
state must resolve if it is to successfully wield its economic power in pursuit of national strategic
67 The empirical chapters that follow provide detailed illustrations of specific securityobjectives. Teeprclcatr htflo rvd ealdilsrtoso pcfcscrt
66 Of course, business-government relations need not only vary by state. They may also vary over time, or by
region, industry, or even by firm as mentioned earlier.
67 The theory fills a significant gap in the literature by linking microeconomic, firm-level behavior with the macro-
level grand strategy of states to explain how states use firms to pursue their strategic goals. Taken together, these
elements provide an important bridge between vague, general notions of "economic power" and the actual behavior
of firms in a modern, global context. The resulting theory illuminates the micro-foundations of economic statecraft
as it is practiced in grand strategy.
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externalities and apply the theoretical framework to understand and evaluate particular episodes
of China's economic statecraft.
Chapter Three
The Mainland's Economic Statecraft and
Interest Transformation on Taiwan
3.1 Overview of the Taiwan-China Case
Arguably for Beijing, no strategic concern (other than regime survival itself) features
more importantly than that of Taiwan-particularly its potential independence. The China-
Taiwan relationship entails a significant economic dimension. This chapter and the next explore
the strategic role of economics in the cross-Strait relationship. China's strategic use of
economics can be usefully broken into three phases-each of which highlights a different
strategy of economic statecraft based on several of the types of security externalities presented in
the last chapter.I
In the first phase, China was mainly focused on generating the Bolstering security
externalities for the Mainland that would result from Taiwanese capital investment and
management expertise. Both of these valuable contributions were scarce during the early stages
of China's opening up and reform efforts. 2 As China was isolated from the international
community in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, financial and trade ties to
Taiwan continued to be an important source of both financial and human capital for the
I These periods are not really as neat as this conceptual abstraction makes them out to be. In the real world, various
tools of economic statecraft may be in operation throughout each of these historical periods. However, for purposes
of empirical analysis, the periods can be usefully distinguished from each other by the broad underlying strategic
logic and the dominant theory of victory that underpins China's approach to economic statecraft during that
particular phase.
2 "During the relatively early years of cross-strait engagement, when China relied more heavily on Taiwan for
investment, Chinese officials-especially local officials-went out of their way to reassure Taishang investors that
their businesses would be insulated from downturns in Beijing-Taipei relations."Murray Scot Tanner, Chinese
Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to use (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007) p.
113
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Mainland. As the economic interaction expanded and deepened throughout the 1990s, China
began to consider the possibility of using this economic interaction as a coercive lever of power.
This marks the transition to the second phase in which Beijing focused its economic
statecraft on exploiting Coercive Leverage types of security externalities. During this period,
China emerges from the East Asian Financial Crisis relatively unscathed and in a much stronger
position of economic power relative to the Southeast Asian economies and a fading Japan. As
China entered the WTO and the cross-Strait economic interaction was poised to take off, the
increasing asymmetry in the relationship made a coercive strategy appear more attractive.
However, as discussed in the following chapter, efforts to lean on Taiwanese investors and blunt
threats to jeopardize their Mainland investments to achieve political goals have been, for the
most part, crude and relatively ineffective. 3 This generally bellicose approach actually proved to
be counterproductive as the population on Taiwan rallied to the flag during the 1996, 2000 and
2004 presidential elections.4
In the aftermath of the 2004 elections, China revisited its cross-Strait economic statecraft
strategy. With the consolidation of Hu Jintao's leadership, a third phase has emerged. This
period is characterized by a strategy that seeks to exploit Interest Transformation security
externalities that result from the ever-deepening economic interaction across the Strait.
Mainland China's economic statecraft has gotten more sophisticated and now seems capable of
3 Tung Chen-yuan and Scot Tanner have both done very good work highlighting how China's efforts to use coercive
leverage during this period were somewhat clumsy and not very effective. See: ibid. and Chen-yuan Tung, "China's
Economic Leverage and Taiwan's Security Concerns with Respect to Cross-Strait Economic Relations" 2002.
4 Although it should be noted that Mainland China does seem to exhibit some degree of learning across these three
election cycles. In the run up to the 1996 election, China fired missiles alarmingly close to Taiwan as part of a
series of exercises. This did have a crude, destabilizing economic impact (particularly on Taiwan's stock market),
although most analysts would argue that the attempt to intimidate Taiwan resulted in greater public support of Lee
Tung-hui. In the 2000 election, there were broad efforts to punish "Green" businesses (those that supported the
DPP/Taiwanese independence) as well as strongly worded statements by Zhu Rongji. But by 2004, China had
focused its coercive strategies on specific individuals and targeted businesses. Taken together, these three cycles
provide support for the notion that China's use of Coercive Leverage became more sophisticated as lessons from
previous efforts were analyzed and incorporated.
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generating fifth column effects that can shape Taiwan's definition of its interests. Such
dynamics are explored below in the detailed case study of China's elimination of the tariffs on
fruit exported to the Mainland. Tanner and others have provided in-depth analysis on the
coercive approach in China's economic statecraft, but it seems that the most effective form of
China's economic statecraft may involve strategies that leverage Interest Transformation types
of security externalities.5 More research ought to be directed toward this type of security
externality to better understand how economic interaction fits into the strategic political
dynamics of the contemporary cross-Strait relationship. As Tanner noted in his research:
"Virtually every expert consulted for this [Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A
Tricky Weapon to Use] project agreed that Taiwan businesspeople engaged in commerce with
the Mainland-known as Taishang for short-are the most important conduit through which
Beijing hopes to exercise its economic influence." 6 Yet, we know very little about how such
influence actually might transpire.7 To begin to shed some light on this form of economic
statecraft, this chapter focuses on an in-depth examination of a particular episode in which China
sought to employ an economic statecraft strategy designed to exploit Interest Transformation
security externalities.
3.2 Phase 3 (Fall 2004-Present): Seeking Interest Transformation
' China seems to have learned that "Coercive Leverage" forms of economic statecraft may not be as productive as
the more subtle and longer term oriented strategies of "Interest Transformation." Unfortunately, most of the
coercively-oriented analyses (Tung, "China's Economic Leverage and Taiwan's Security Concerns," Tanner,
Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, etc.) miss this more subtle type of economic statecraft. To address
this gap in our understanding, this chapter focuses on one particular episode of this type of economic statecraft,
namely, the 2005 opposition party visits to the Mainland and the subsequent elimination of tariffs on Taiwanese
fruit.
6 ibid. p.111.
7 Abdelal and Kirshner also call attention to what Albert Hirschman called influence effects. Both works note the
need for additional scholarship designed to understand exactly how this sort of economic statecraft works in
practice. For more see: Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner, "Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of
National Interests," Security Studies 9, no. 1 (1999): 119. and Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the
Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California press, 1945).
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The heart of this chapter focuses on the Mainland's use of economics to alter Taiwan's
definition of its own interests. Exactly how does such a strategy work? What are the causal
pathways by which economic interaction can be used to change the way a target perceives and
defines its own strategic objectives? This section examines an episode that helps shed light on
these questions. At the center of this episode lies the spring, 2005 visit of Taiwan's opposition
party to the Mainland and the subsequent elimination of tariffs on Taiwanese fruit.
From April 26 through May 3, 2005, Lien Chan (i4it, Chairman of the Kuomintang
Party-the KMT) paid a visit to Mainland China. This was a monumentally historic visit as it
represented "the first time that Lien personally set foot on the mainland soil since he left in
1945, and also the first-ever visit by a KMT chairman to the mainland in 56 years, ushering in a
new stage for the relations between the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC)."8 In the
course of this trip, Lien visited Nanjing, Beijing, Shanghai and his birthplace in Xian.9 While in
Beijing on April 2 9 th, he met with Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Communist Party. The
significance of this handshake for cross-Strait relations was considerable: it signaled that the then
opposition party KMT was capable of reaching across the Strait and making progress in
reconciling the two sides of one of the most volatile flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific. The visit
was intended to undermine the credibility of the narrowly re-elected President of Taiwan, Chen
Shui-bian whose policy of seeking independence for Taiwan was an anathema to Beijing. The
message was clear: the then-ruling DPP (Chen's party) is not able to meaningfully engage the
Mainland. Driving home this point was a similar visit by the other significant opposition leader,
8 "Taiwan Fruit Arrives in Wake of Lian-Soong Visits to Chinese Mainland," Xinhua General News Service, May
152005.
9 Ghulam Ali, "China's Taiwan Policy," The Nation May 13, 2005.
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James Soong Chu-yu (*Si fiE), two days later.10 But perhaps most interesting from the
standpoint of the study of economic statecraft was the offer made to Lien at the end of his trip in
Shanghai. At the conclusion of that visit, China offered several goodwill "gifts" to Lien (and
explicitly to the people of Taiwan)." Among these were scholarships for students from Taiwan
to study in the Mainland, easing of Mainland restrictions on Mainland tourists that wanted to
visit (and spend their money in) Taiwan, lowering of tariffs on fresh fruit exported from Taiwan
to Mainland China, and two pandas to be given as goodwill ambassadors to Taiwan.12 These
concessions were designed to signal a changed Mainland strategy that emphasized "carrots"
rather than "sticks." The Mainland sought to build bridges directly with the people of Taiwan
rather than work with their elected DPP representatives. This strategy was referred to as
}j" [trans: "public power"] and sought to leverage pressure on the DPP by appealing directly to
the citizens of Taiwan.13
Recall that economic statecraft occurs when the state seeks to generate strategic
consequences (in this case, Interest Transformation-specifically, reversing trends towards
Taiwanese independence under the DPP leadership) by influencing the behavior of commercial
0 Soong was chairman of the People First Party (PFP) in Taiwan-a party that split from the KMT just before the
2000 presidential election. It and the KMT were the two main opposition parties comprising the "pan-Blue" alliance
that opposed Chen's DPP-led "pan-Green" alliance. Soong's delegation visited the Chinese mainland from May 5
though the 13 1h. Like Lien, it was the first time Soong had returned to the Mainland since leaving in 1949. Soong
also met Hu and visited the cities of Xian, Nanjing, Shanghai and Changsha. "Taiwan's Soong due in Beijing Amid
Ray of Hope," Agence France Presse -- English, May 10, 2005.
" "With a Gift of Giant Pandas, Taiwan Opposition Leader Leaves China," Agence France Presse, May 3, 2005.
12 Elizabeth Davies, "China Lowers Bamboo Curtain with Gift of Pandas to Taiwan," The Independent (London),
May 4, 2005, p. 25.; Clarissa Oon and Lawrence Chung, "China Offers 'Gifts' to Taiwan ; it Lifts Curbs on Tourists
to Island, Scraps Tariffs and Offers Two Pandas," The Straits Times (Singapore), May 4, 2005; Bill Savadove, "Lien
Back with 'Gifts' but Taipei is Wary; Beijing Offers Pandas, Plus Concessions on Tourism to Island and Fruit
Imports," South China Morning Post, May 4, 2005, p. 1.
13 For how the lowering of fruit tariffs fit into the broader strategy of RJW see: A KA i Mfl Ni , "II
}r Rjt _A14i44X 15 f -"A 7T: i r A" [trans: PRC Ministry of Commerce, "Ministry of
Commerce Spokesman Announces Implementation of Zero Tariff Handling Measures for 15 Types of Taiwanese
Fruit,"] July 28, 2005 Press Release. Available at: www.imofcom.gov.cn. Also, a senior leader of the Chinese
Communist Party, Jia Qinglin (iK 4t, Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference, and Vice
Chairman of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group) set out China's emerging Taiwan strategy in his January 28,
2005 speech. Available in Chinese at: http://news.sina.com.cn/.c/2005-01-28/20344978641s.shtml
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actors (in this case, Taiwanese fruit farmers). The state (in this case, Mainland China) has a
range of tools at its disposal to incentivize commercial actors to behave in a manner conducive to
the state's strategic objectives (in this case, shifting Taiwanese farmers' support from their
traditional DPP representatives towards the pan-Blue coalition). In this episode of economic
statecraft, China eliminated the tariffs on Taiwanese fruit that was being exported to Mainland
China. This offer was part of a larger set of concessions (like the scholarships for Taiwanese
students to study on the Mainland) strategically targeting groups of Taiwanese that traditionally
supported Chen Shui-bian and the DPP.14 "By rejecting these offers, the ruling Democratic
Progressive Party is putting itself in a difficult position. Almost all these policies benefit
segments of the Taiwanese population. When this adds up, the ruling party is going to face the
consequence of losing the support of these people..."15 By appealing to the fruit producers'
economic self-interests China's move was designed to drive a wedge between the DPP and its
constituents.16 "Since its red-carpet welcome of Taiwanese opposition leaders Lien Chan and
James Soong in late April and early May, the Mainland's strategy has been to try and win the
hearts of the Taiwanese people while isolating the island's pro-independence forces. The farm
benefits target south Taiwan - a key support base for the island's pro-independence government
14 China offered to allow more Taiwan students to study in China and stated that it would recognize Taiwan-issued
degrees for purposes of Mainland employment. Beijing also pledged to grant scholarships to Taiwanese students as
well as extending to Taiwanese students the privilege of paying similar (i.e. reduced) tuition fees-equivalent to
those that Mainland Chinese students were charged. See Chua Chin Hon, "Taiwan Gets More Sweeteners from
China," The Straits Times (Singapore), May 14, 2005. In addition to the educational concessions, China also
permitted a greater number of Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan (although the Taiwanese government still had its
own restrictions on the number of Mainland visitors it would permit to enter). It also offered to establish direct air
cargo links to help facilitate the transportation of perishable fruit. Finally, China offered a gift of two pandas to the
Taipei Zoo. This offer was eventually declined by Taiwan on the grounds that international trafficking of
endangered species is not permitted.
15 Professor Emile Sheng of Taiwan's Soochow University as quoted in: ibid.
16-E [Wang Feng], "'i R' i m i r " [trans.: "Lien-Soong" Land, Seek New Cross-Strait
Economic/Trade Breakthrough"] ((Mf4)) 2005 4-: 05 1 16 H.
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and a major fruit-growing area.17 The strategy was designed to weaken the DPP's electoral clout
on Taiwan. Since China has implemented this Interest Transformation strategy, the DPP has
failed to win another major election.' 8 In addition, Taiwan's independence movement has largely
withered. 19
The offer to eliminate the fruit tariffs is of particular interest from the perspective of
economic statecraft. By providing a unilateral concession designed to facilitate Taiwanese
exports of fruit to Mainland China, China was attempting to undermine a key support base for
Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. This strategy provides a useful illustration of the Interest
Transformation security externality. So how did China execute this strategy of Interest
Transformation? An in-depth examination of this episode will provide an opportunity to explore
the specific causal mechanisms underpinning this type of economic statecraft. Before charging
into the specifics of the case, let us briefly examine the backdrop against which this episode
unfolded. I then examine the key actors involved and the specific events of the episode. This is
followed by a discussion of the results and evaluation of this episode of economic statecraft.
3.2.1 Context of the Case
There are three important factors that shaped and provide background context for this
episode. The first was the DPP's pattern of electoral successes and Taiwan's growing
independence movement of the 1990s and early 2000s. The second factor concerned Taiwan's
electoral geography-who votes how and where. The third contextual factor that set the stage for
"7 Clarissa Oon, "China Scraps Import Tariffs on Taiwan Fruits ; Beijing Acts on Pledges made during Taipei
Opposition Visits," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 2, 2005.
18 Of course, many factors account for voter behavior and I do not mean to claim that China's economic statecraft
was the only driver of the KMT's return to power. Indeed, economic performance more broadly is often cited as an
important indicator of electoral success and, during this period, Taiwan's economy was not doing well. However, I
would argue that this made Beijing's targeted economic enticements all the more compelling.
19 For a convincing treatment of this perspective see: Robert S. Ross, "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement,"
Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 141.
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this episode involved Mainland China's response to these events and the evolution of China's
approach to leveraging domestic political dynamics on Taiwan.
DPP's Electoral Successes
In this episode, Mainland China was seeking to alter the domestic political landscape on
Taiwan. A thorough analysis of this episode of economic statecraft ought to place the events of
the spring and summer of 2005 in the context of Taiwan's recent electoral history. Of particular
importance was the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)'s pattern of increasingly successful
electoral victories that can be traced from the origins of Taiwan's democratization in the late
1980s right up to the eve of this episode.20 Since its founding, the DPP had displayed a
disquieting ability to consistently demonstrate its growing popularity among the Taiwanese
electorate. Mainland China sought to stem the DPP's track record of increasingly significant
electoral successes. In particular, Mainland China would be seeking to reverse what it perceived
as increasingly bold efforts to move toward independence under the leadership of President Chen
Shui-bian and the DPP.
The DPP and its pro-independence electoral agenda grew more and more politically
viable through the 1990s. Having first contested in the Legislative Yuan (LY) Election of 1986
as an illegal party, in the 1989 Legislative Yuan Election, the DPP won 21 seats.21 This figure
was significant because it crossed the legal threshold of a party needing to hold at least 20 seats
in the legislature to be able to propose legislation. In the 1992 LY Election, the DPP won 50
20 The DPP's origins are intertwined with the story of Taiwan's democratization. Charles Chi-hsiang Chang and
Hung-mao Tien, Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition : Riding the Third Wave (Armonk, N.Y.:
M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
21 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Emerson M. S. Niou, "Issue Voting in the Republic of China on Taiwan's 1992
Legislative Yuan Election," International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 17,
no. 1 (1996): 13-27 especially p. 21.
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seats. 22 The DPP would continue building electoral momentum through the 1995 and 1998 LY
Elections. In the run up to the 1996 Presidential Election, the Mainland conducted a series of
provocative military exercises (including missile launches) in the vicinity of Taiwan.2 ' This
bullying led to a popular backlash against Beijing that expressed itself as a high level of public
support for Lee Tung-hui who was elected with 54% of the vote.24 Although Lee was the KMT
candidate, his pro-Taiwan/anti-unification sentiments were fairly well-known. 25 During Lee's
Presidency, "Localization" (*-tft) efforts picked up steam. The DPP (and its independence
agenda) also gained more and more popularity.
As the century turned, the DPP finally took the reins of power. In the March 18, 2000
Presidential Election, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian benefitted from a split in the KMT party.26
The popular James Soong Chu-yu (54%$) was not given the KMT nomination and chose to run
as an independent while Lien Chan ran as the KMT's candidate. As a result, Chen received
39.3% of the votes beating out Soong (with 36.8%) and Lien (with only 23.1%) to become the
first non-KMT president of Taiwan.27 The DPP was widely viewed as having moderated its
radical independence position to enhance its "electability" for this election. With the 2001 LY
Election, the DPP also became the largest political party in the legislature. 28
22 Andrew J. Nathan, "The Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Consequences of the Electoral System," Asian
Survey 33, no. 4 (1993): 424-438, figures taken from p. 425.
23 For more on these events see: Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The U.S.--Taiwan--China Crisis (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Suisheng Zhao, Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and
1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999); Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions,"
Asian Surveyv36, no. 11 (1996): 1055.
24 Tun-jen Cheng, "Taiwan in 1996: From Euphoria to Melodrama," Asian Survey 37, no. 1, A Survey of Asia in
1996: Part I (1997): 43-51, figures taken from p. 44.
25 Eventually Lee would form his own pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) party and leave the KMT.
The TSU would later join with the DPP to anchor what would become known as the "Pan-Green Alliance."
26 Yu-shan Wu, "Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer," Asian Survey 41, no. 1, A
Survey of Asia in 2000 (2001): 40-48 especially p. 41.
27 Figures taken from footnote 14 on p. 733 of E. Niou and P. Paolino, "The Rise of the Opposition Party in Taiwan:
Explaining Chen Shui-bian's Victory in the 2000 Presidential Election," Electoral Studies 22, no. 4 (2003): 721-740.
28 In response, the KMT forged a "Pan-Blue" alliance with Soong's People First Party (PFP) and the pro-China New
Party (NP) in a desperate move to maintain control of the Legislative Yuan. This coalition stood in opposition to the
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The DPP's growing electoral momentum was further solidified with the March 20, 2004
re-election of President Chen Shui-bian and his outspoken independence-oriented vice president,
Annette Lu Xiu-lian ( In a tight race, Chen and Lu took 50.11% of the vote narrowly
beating the Lien-Soong Pan-Blue ticket who garnered 49.89% of the vote.29 Although the final
result was likely tipped in the DPP's favor as a result of the assassination attempt on Chen and
Lu the day before the election, the result was seen as a watershed for the DPP. The DPP had
demonstrated its ability to defeat a unified Pan-Blue ticket (unlike in the 2000 election, there was
no KMT-PFP split that divided the competition). Despite such united opposition from the long-
time ruling party, the DPP presidential ticket still managed to win re-election.
Throughout the early 2000s, the KMT sought to stem the DPP's momentum and regain
its control over Taiwan's domestic politics. Much of the DPP's popularity eminates from its
position as the anti-KMT party. Perhaps most controversially, the DPP has been a long time
supporter of an independent Taiwanese identity. This is often manifested as efforts to move
Taiwan toward formal dejure independence. This constituted a red line for Mainland China and
was the primary reason that the DPP's success also frustrated Beijing. The issue of opposing
Taiwan's independence provided the initial common cause between Taiwan's opposition parties
and the Chinese Communist Party.30 Chen's re-election in 2004 coincided with Hu Jintao's
consolidation of Mainland China's top leadership posts and seems to have prompted a re-
"Pan-Green" alliance between the DPP and the TSU. The best the KMT could do was to create a blocking coalition
to deadlock the legislature and block President Chen's DPP agenda.
29 Figures are from Table I on p. I 10 of Ching-hsin Yu, "The Evolving Party System in Taiwan, 1995-2004,"
Journal of Asian and African Studies 40, no. 1-2 (2005): 105-123.
30 During his visit, James Soong signed an agreement with Hu Jintao opposing Taiwanese independence. See: "No
Taiwan Independence, no Military Conflicts: Communique," Xinhua General News Service, May 12, 2005.
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examination of Mainland China's strategy toward Taiwan.3' This strategic shift constitutes the
second background factor to which we now turn.
Recent Developments in Mainland China
The offer to drop the tariffs on fruit was not the first attempt by the Mainland to use
economic tools to undermine the DPP's support base. As discussed later in Chapter Four,
Mainland China had earlier used economic statecraft to threaten Taiwanese investors over their
support for Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. Previously, Beijing had also engaged in some limited
and rather heavy-handed efforts to mobilize "pro-pan-Blue and anti-pan-Green" Taishang on the
Mainland. Support included efforts to organize meetings and to facilitate charter flights for pro-
Beijing Taishang to return home to vote in elections.32 However, these efforts were largely
ineffective. Many fewer actually went home to vote than had been hoped. In addition, China's
coercive leverage with the Taishang seems to have been rather limited. Anti-DPP harassment of
Taishang on the Mainland was publicized domestically in the Taiwanese press and served to
underscore the DPP's pro-Taiwan credentials among the electorate." In 2004, Chen Shui-bian
narrowly won re-election. Frustrated, the Mainland initially lashed out once again to punish
prominent Taishang that had supported the pan-Green efforts. Despite the tough talk, Scot
Tanner has noted that these efforts had only limited real bite.3 4
31 "In Beijing, Chen Shui-bian's reelection touched off a bitter internal debate over how much political leverage
Beijing is getting from its economic ties with Taiwan." Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, p.
126.
32 "China Employs New Wrecking Tactics," Taipei Times February 12, 2004 p. 8.
3 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, pp. 119-120. This result provides a good illustration of
how policies designed to achieve Coercive Leverage (harassment of the DPP-Leaning Taishang) can often
undermine Interest Transformation strategies.
4 ibid. Especially pp. 113-126. For more on China's efforts to use coercive leverage see the section on Phase 2
below.
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By the Fall of 2004, the Mainland, having largely failed to derail the DPP's electoral
success using coercive strategies, had begun to shift its economic statecraft strategy.35 This shift
was designed to prevent independence by engaging in a long-term strategy that sought Interest
Transformation on Taiwan rather than engaging in Coercive Leverage to enforce compliance
with Beijing's wishes. 36 This shift in strategy seems to have reflected Hu Jintao's broader
emphasis on stability in China's grand strategy.37 Seen from this perspective, coercion tends to
be counterproductive and force falls a bit out of fashion as both represent destabilizing dynamics.
Under this line of reasoning, Beijing needed to influence the whole relationship (particularly
since brute force and coercion seemed to generate effects that ran opposite to China's goals of
encouraging reunification).38 China's reassessment of the utility of coercive leverage was an
important backdrop to the opposition party visits and the fruit tariff discussed below. In
particular, there was a renewed emphasis placed on preventing Taiwan's independence as
opposed to forcing reunification on Taiwan.39 On January 28, 2005, Jia Qinglin (M)Ft*,
Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference and Vice-Chairman of the Taiwan
Affairs Leading Small Group, gave a speech entitled, "M 5 J 'A$' R M *jIP 4*
1 f Th M2 d@Rih#91$) T fi i fiJH a " [trans: "Resolutely Contain
3 The election result that saw Chen Shui-bian re-elected president in 2004 seems to have been the catalyst
prompting this strategic re-evaluation of China's approach to Taiwan. Chow Chung-yan and Josephine Ma in
Beijing, "Beijing 'to Rethink its Cross-Strait Strategy'," South China Morning Post, March 22 2004, p. 4.
36 Chong-Pin Lin, "More Carrot than Stick: Beijing's Emerging Taiwan Policy," China Security 4, no. 1 (2008): 1-
27. Lin was formerly Taiwan's deputy minister of national defense and previously served as the first vice chairman
of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council.
* With the assumption of chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, Hu completed his consolidation of
leadership around this time. This consolidation of China's leadership provided Hu with greater latitude to establish
guiding principles for China's strategic direction. "On Sept. 24, 2004, five days after Hu took over the chairmanship
of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission, he reportedly approved at an internal meeting a
new guideline on Taiwan Policy which reflected his patience: 'strive for negotiation, prepare for war, and fear not
Taiwan's procrastination' (zhengqu tan, zhunbei da, bupa duo)." ibid: p. 25, endnote 9.
38 Cary Huang, "Taiwan Tactics Aim to Win Hearts and Minds," South China Morning Post, May 10, 2005, p. 1.
For an example of China's previous efforts to push for reunification sooner rather than later see: "-4QqIfJJJ
SH" r'ii19~ [trans: "One Country Principle and the Taiwan Question" White Paper] in the People's Daily
Feb. 22, 2000, p. 1 available on-line at: http:// ,www.people.com.cn/GB/channel/14/20000522/72540.htm. Before
that, Jiang Zemin articulated his Eight Points in a January 30, 1995 speech.
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'Taiwan Independence' Separatist Activities; Safeguard Peace and Stability in the Taiwan Strait
Region; Continue the Endeavour To Ensure That Cross-Strait Relations Develop Towards
Peaceful Reunification,"] in which he laid the foundation for a strategy that emphasized the
prevention of Taiwanese independence. 40 Also, when Hu Jintao took over the CMC, he
apparently made clear that the PRC had no reason to fear Taiwan's procrastination when it came
to the issue of reunification. 41 "...[T]he timetable for cross-Strait unification, constantly
discussed under Jiang's Tenure, has been shelved under Hu." 42 This perspective was also
articulated in Hu's March 4, 2005 speech on China's Taiwan policy. In that speech, Hu noted
that the current status quo is one in which Taiwan is a part of China.43 China came to realize that
it could afford to play the long game with Taiwan.44
The reassessment of China's Taiwan strategy seems to have eventually culminated in the
legal codification of China's new strategy: the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) which was passed on
March 14, 2005. Although this law was initially viewed as aggressive and providing the legal
pretext for China's military resolution of the Taiwan question, it has since been interpreted in a
40 He gave the speech in the context of "updating" the Mainland's commitment toward Taiwan. See: M AAIM-i"f
"I}jMfj]? 9 14 'I'0 T1+if ihJ Speech at the Meeting
Marking the 10th Anniversary of the Issue of Comrade Jiang Zemin's Important Speech, "Continue the Struggle To
Promote the Accomplishment of the Great Cause of Reunification of Our Motherland" Available in Chinese at:
http://news. sina.con.cn/c./2005-0 1-28/20344978641s.shtml For an indication its significance, see: "Chen Calls Jia's
Speech Important Guide on Taiwan Issue," Xinhua General News Service January 29, 2005.
4' Suisheng Zhao noted this on p. 92 of Suisheng Zhao, "Conflict Prevention Across the Taiwan Strait and the
Making of China's Anti-Secession Law," Asian Perspective 30, no. 1 (2006): 79-94. It comes from a personal
interview that he conducted in Beijing in October of 2005. It also seems to be corroborated by my footnote 37
above.
42 Lin goes on to note: "A number of dates for unification, to be achieved with force if necessary, were considered at
different stages including 2002, 2005, 2007, 2010, and 2020, although Jiang never publicly ruled a final decision on
it." Lin, "More Carrot than Stick: Beijing's Emerging Taiwan Policy", p. 3. Lin notes that these dates were not
reported officially via Xinhua or Renmin Ribao but rather through Hong Kong media outlets.
43 See: "Four-Point Guideline on Cross-Straits Relations Set Forth by President Hu," Xinhua General News Service,
March 4, 2005; "Do Best to Seek Peaceful Reunification, but Never Tolerate Taiwan Independence : President,"
Xinhua General News Service, March 4, 2005.
44 This contrasts with the previous policy that stressed the need for reunification. For a useful overview of Hu
Jintao's "new thinking" in China's Taiwan policy see: ®r@, (ed.) iAi iM Pi9 Ei4 [trans: Hu Jintao
and New Thinking on Cross-Strait Relations] (t&: i ik@ tl±ftik 2005) [trans: Hong Kong: China
Review Academic Press 2005].
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more favorable light.45 The ASL formally shifted China's strategic perspective on Taiwan.
Previously, the Beijing authorities were driven by a perceived need for a short timeline for
reunification.46 They felt that they were racing against a closing window of opportunity in which
a democratic Taiwan was growing further and further apart from the Mainland. Under this
paradigm, time was not on China's side and the cross-Strait dynamics were moving rapidly
toward independence. However, by early 2005, Beijing had changed its strategic view to one in
which deepening economic and improving cultural ties worked in China's favor. Over time,
Taiwan would become increasingly connected to the Mainland. According to this new strategic
view, time was, in fact, on China's side. The ASL codified a new strategic perspective that held
that since Taiwan was actually already a part of China, there was no need to force "unification"
but rather the imperative ought to be to prevent independence. 47 It is significant that the law was
named the "Anti-Secession Law" and not the "Pro-Unification Law." Instead of trying to push
for speedy reunification, China had reoriented itself toward maintaining the status quo. This
reorientation argued that moves toward formal independence would not be tolerated.4 8 The
change is an important one. Rather than merely providing justification for impending military
4 See, for instance: J. Adamset al, "Taiwan: The Cold Shoulder; Beijing is Setting Up Legal Cover for an Attack on
the Island, and Unnerving Leaders in Taipei," Newsweek (2005): 32. On the more favorable interpretation see John
Q. Tian, Government, Business, and the Politics of Interdependence and Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait, (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 52. "...[R]ather than intimidate the Taiwanese, the ASL was meant more to
unshackle the hands of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs officials to promote cross-Strait engagement from internal hawkish
opposition . . ." Lin, "More Carrot than Stick: Beijing's Emerging Taiwan Policy," p. 5.
46 For instance, the 2000 Taiwan White Paper added the stipulation that military force would be used by Beijing if
Taiwan failed to resolve the question of reunification indefinitely. See: "A_ g M ~i" i i
[trans: "One Country Principle and the Taiwan Question" White Paper ] available in the People's Daily Feb. 22,
2000, p. 1. On-line at: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channell /14/20000522/72540.htm. The timing of the white
paper's release seems to have been designed to influence the March 18, 2000 Taiwanese Presidential election. On
the eve of that election, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji once again reiterated Beijing's intolerance of an indefinite
resolution of the issue of reunification.
47 See: -1J$ 0, (Guo Weifeng, ed.) iAt$r [trans: Hu Jintao and New Thinking on Cross-Strait
Relations] (W-: *PWT' z*iVf i 2005) [trans: Hong Kong: China Review Academic Press 2005] especially
part two on the Anti-Secession Law as the product of this "new thinking."
48 In the event that Taiwan attempted to declare independence, then the ASL would provide a legal pretext for
military options.
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action, the ASL was designed to reinforce the existing status quo and to reposition China as a
defender of the status quo situation (in which Taiwan is a part of China).49 This shift would also
carry important implications for the effectiveness of economic statecraft. By seeking to reinforce
the status quo rather than attempting to use economic statecraft to impose reunification on a short
time horizon, Beijing brought its strategic objectives more into line with what economic
statecraft could feasibly hope to achieve in the cross-Strait context-i.e. maintenance of the
status quo. In international relations, preserving the status quo is much easier than proactively
forcing a target to make a difficult change. 50 As noted in Chapter Two, this sort of "Purpose
Commensurability" is one of the prerequisites of effective economic statecraft.
With the ASL, China reoriented away from a short time horizon paradigm that sought to
pressure Taiwan into re-unification. In its place, Hu Jintao installed an emphasis on stability and
stressed the need to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. 51 Both of these favored a
longer-term perspective. This shift in strategic perspective in Mainland China was the second
important contextual factor that would shape the Mainland's use of economic statecraft in this
episode.
Taiwan's Electoral Geography
The final contextual factor for this episode concerns Taiwan's electoral geography and
the historical concentration of the DPP's support base in the southern areas of the island.
Popular political support in Taiwan is very regionally-oriented. Just as there are "Blue" and
"Red" states in the US domestic political landscape, Taiwan has "Blue" and "Green" counties
49 Zhao, "Conflict Prevention Across the Taiwan Strait and the Making of China's Anti-Secession Law," especially
pp. 92-93 in which Zhao discusses Hu Jintao's new Taiwan policy.
so Recall Schelling's deterrence versus compellence logic in Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966).
51 Edward Friedman, "China's Changing Taiwan Policy," American Journal of Chinese Studies 14:2 (October
2007), pp. 119-34; and Lin, "More Carrot than Stick: Beijing's Emerging Taiwan Policy."
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which have tended to trend toward specific parties from one election to the next. Although there
is some variation from one election to the next, the DPP's bastion of political support has
remained concentrated in these southern portions of the island. These counties were the
crucible of the early democratization movement on Taiwan (while under the single-party KMT
rule) and were the regional basis for the dangwai (kL*) movement and the DPP's consolidation
of several disparate opposition groups under the collective political banner of the nascent
opposition Democratic Progressive Party.5 2 This area continues to be the strongest region of
DPP support. It is also the area of the country most closely identified with pro-independence
sentiments.5 3 It also happens to be Taiwan's fruit basket-the geographic area most conducive
to the production of many of the tropical fruits that Taiwan produces. That confluence of
economics and politics provides the basic ingredients for this episode of economic statecraft.
Appendix A contains maps that provide a useful graphical indictor of Taiwan's electoral
geography. As is apparent, the strongest DPP support has tended to be located in the south.
Although little in Taiwanese politics is static, this pattern of southern support has largely held
true from one election to the next. In particular, the following counties have generally tended to
vote DPP: Pingtung (#A), Kaohsiung (iAik), Tainan (M'ii), Chia-I (4- Z) and Yun-lin (iZ4t
).5 As will be discussed in more detail below, these areas have traditionally been very
supportive of the DPP and its independence agenda. They are also the primary growing regions
for much of Taiwan's tropical fruit production that became the economic vehicle for this
particular episode of economic statecraft.
52 Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan : Votingfor Democracy (London ; New York: Routledge, 1999).
5 J. Lay, K. Yap, and Y. Chen, "The Transition of Taiwan's Political Geography," Asian Survey 48, no. 5 (2008):
773.
1 Memories of KMT abuse run deep in this part of Taiwan. See for example: Ray Cheung, "Where the Kuomintang
is Despised; in Pingtung, Elderly Voters Remember the Party's Brutal Rule," South China Morning Post, December
8, 2004, p. 6.
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To review, three background conditions are important for contextualizing this episode of
economic statecraft. First, in the lead up to the spring 2005 opposition party visits to the
Mainland, the DPP had been enjoying an increasing electoral momentum. The DPP's electoral
success grew from when they first entered the political scene as an illegal party in 1986 to the
legislative elections of the 1990s and culminated in the presidential election and then re-election
of Chen Shui-bian in 2004. Second, in the aftermath of Chen's 2004 re-election, the Mainland
revised its strategic approach toward Taiwan and began focusing on using economics as a tool of
an Interest Transformation strategy (rather than for Coercive Leverage). Finally, the DPP
support base has been geographically concentrated in the South. The tools of economic
statecraft that were used in this episode sought to leverage this fact. The next section introduces
the key actors in this episode and discusses their chief objectives.
3.3 The Key Players
In economic statecraft, the self-interests of the key actors are the linchpin for generating
economic behavior that will produce the desired security externalities. In this case, the Mainland
Communist Party eventually learned how to exploit KMT/PFP interests to undermine Chen and
the ruling DPP. This strategy honed in on one of the DPP's key constituencies and sought to
demonstrate how shifting their political support away from the DPP and toward the opposition
parties would benefit the commercial actors' own narrow economic self-interests. In so doing,
the Mainland was able to affect the selection of leadership on Taiwan and thus helped derail
what had been an increasing momentum toward independence. Instead, today's cross-Strait
dynamics are moving toward deeper and deeper economic integration under the KMT's
103
Norris, Economic Statecraft
President Ma Ying-jeou. 55 This section identifies the major groups involved in this episode and
their relative priorities.
The over-arching goal of Mainland China in this episode is to, at a minimum, prevent
independence.56 China's maximal goal is to foster re-unification with Taiwan.57 Because of
Beijing's strategic shift to preserve the status quo, China had set a much lower bar for what it
sought to achieve. This made success more likely in this episode of economic statecraft. With
regard to the Taiwanese business community specifically, China's main objectives were to create
"a politically irresistible domestic lobby."58 The strategy was to create a set of vested domestic
interests that would lobby in favor of closer cross-Strait ties. 59 To do this, Mainland China
sought to "further deepen cross-strait economic relations as a source of greater future leverage
for Beijing."60 The opposition party visits and the subsequent concessions signaled that the
KMT (not the DPP) was able to deliver progress on cross-Strait issues. These activities were
designed to diminish the electoral prospects for the DPP.61 Scot Tanner concurs that "Beijing's
most fundamental and enduring tactical goal . . .has been encouraging a subtle form of 'regime
change' in Taiwan." 62 Although Tanner notes that Beijing has "sought to exploit the growing
cross-strait relationship to undermine the domestic political power of Taiwan officials whom it
" A prominent example of Ma's efforts is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (the ECFA) which will
lower the tariffs and permit market access for about 500 Taiwanese goods into the Mainland.
56 Formal independence has been a red line for China for quite some time. See for example: Lin, "More Carrot than
Stick: Beijing's Emerging Taiwan Policy"; Emerson M. S. Niou, "Understanding Taiwan Independence and its
Policy Implications," Asian Survey 44, no. 4 (2004): 555-567.
57 As Tanner puts it: "But Beijing's predominant tactical concern remains trying to reshape the political mainstream
in Taiwan's emerging democracy, so that Beijing's anti-independence demands and pro-reunification overtures to
Taipei will be greeted with increasing political acceptance." Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against
Taiwan,p. 105.
58 ibid. p.111
59 For an illustrative description of such dynamics see: Abdelal and Kirshner, "Strategy, Economic Relations, and
the Definition of National Interests." Their discussion of the Hawaii case is particularly useful.
6 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, p.111.
61 Lillian Lin and P. C. Tang, "Beijing Trying to Isolate Chen by Wooing His Foes: Newsweek," Central News
Agency - Taiwan, April 25 2005.
6 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, p.105.
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regards as pro-independence and build support (or at least acceptance) for reunification among
Taiwan's citizenry and elite," he does not spend much time exploring exactly how this is
occurring.63 The mechanics of this transformative process is exactly the type of dynamic that this
episode sheds more light on. Although Tanner touches on Interest Transformation briefly in his
analysis of cross-Strait economic statecraft, his work is almost exclusively focused on the
security externality of Coercive Leverage. He finds (correctly I think) that this tool of economic
statecraft was not very effective for Beijing during the late 1990s and early 2000s (during the
period called "Phase 2" that is covered in the next chapter). What is more interesting is exactly
how the Mainland seeks to transform Taiwan's domestic interests via this longer term strategy of
Interest Transformation.
It seems that the State acted in a unified way to achieve its objectives. In this episode,
there is no evidence of bureaucratic divides. The Ministry of Commerce followed the cue of
China's senior leadership."4 The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council also seems to have
been onboard with the strategy put in place.6s There was also no public evidence of factional
divides among senior patrons within the Chinese Communist Party. The policy shift seems to
have come after Hu had completed his consolidation of power. 66 Finally, in this episode, there
were no incentives driving a wedge between the central government and local municipalities.
Provinces did not contradict or seek to undermine the center's policies. This was largely because
63Ibid. p.105
64 MofCom frequently made reference to China's larger strategic approach to Taiwan in its policy statements see for
example: $$A SJD DilN Mn, "A-*} NA ' 1 7 ' i4i ' [trans:
PRC Ministry of Commerce, "Ministry of Commerce Spokesman Announces Implementation of Zero Tariff
Handling Measures for 15 Types of Taiwanese Fruit,"] July 28, 2005 Press Release.
65 Chen Yunlin, minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office reportedly referred to the "tariff-free entry of Taiwanese fruit"
as "a concrete effort by the Mainland to promote the fundamental interests of Taiwan compatriots." From:
"Mainland Drops Taiwan Fruit Tax" China Daily July 29, 2005. This is very similar to the language used in Hu's
March 3, 2005 speech.
66 Jiang had already handed over chairmanship of the Central Military Commission in Mid-September, 2004 (earlier
than anticipated) to Hu Jintao.
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the provinces most directly concerned by the strategy (e.g. Fujian) already had good ties to
Taiwanese businesses. 67 In addition, these provinces were generally in favor of increased
economic interaction especially given that their consumer markets were getting more and more
wealthy and local officials sought to enhance consumer access to fruit and other luxury items. 68
Given the absence of center-local tensions, factional divisions and bureaucratic frictions in
Beijing, the state can be classified as having acted in a unified manner during this episode.
The second major player in this episode is the KMT. At the time of the visits, the KMT
was Taiwan's opposition party. The KMT sought to undermine public support for the ruling
DPP.69 By targeting one of the DPP's important electoral constituencies that stood to personally
benefit from policies that the DPP was ideologically opposed to, the KMT calculated that the
KMT's electoral prospects would be improved. They wanted to do this by showing that the
KMT was able to deliver on issues of political rapprochement with the Mainland.70 Such
rapprochement would better position the KMT to build beneficial economic relations across the
Strait. "The tactical considerations behind the visit are simple. Mr. Lien wants to send the
message to [the] Taiwanese that he and his party can manage cross-strait relations better than
President Chen and his DPP, a message Beijing is happy to reinforce." 7'
67 For example, Fujian had already attracted some $1.9 billion of Taiwanese investment in the agricultural sector. In
the wake of this episode, there were plans to create "cross-strait agricultural co-operation experiment zones"
between the cities of Fuzhou and Zhangzhou. Lillian Yang, "Gates Open for Island's Produce," South China
Morning Post, July 19, 2005, p. 4; "Cross-Straits Exchanges Expand with Growing Business," China Daily July 15,
2005.
68 See: Bill Savadove, "Consumers Bemused at New Varieties of Taiwanese Fruit," South China Morning Post, May
21, 2005, p. 6. and Lilian Wu, "Taiwan Fruits could be Exported to Fujian Via Kinmen and Matsu," Central News
Agency - Taiwan, June 18, 2005.
69 Gob Sui Noi, "KMT Win a Victory for Ties with Beijing," The Straits Times (Singapore) December 5, 2005;
"KMT Spokesman: Development of Cross-Straits Relations Trend of Times," Xinhua General News Service, May 2,
2005.
70 Ibid. ; Lilian Wu, "KMT Will Monitor Fruit Exports to China to Protect Farmers' Interests," Central News Agency
- Taiwan, July 29, 2005; Goh Sui Noi, "KMT Chief Lien Chan Invited to Visit China," The Straits Times
(Singapore), April 1, 2005 and Lilian Wu, "Coa to Step Up Educational Campaign on Fruit Exports to China,"
Central News Agency - Taiwan, August 13, 2005.
"A Historic Visit to China," The Japan Times, May 5, 2005.
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Lining up on the other side of this fight was the national government of Taiwan under the
leadership of Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. The government wanted to conduct any cross-Strait
negotiations that might occur as a result of the unofficial, political party visits strictly through
official channels. 72 In particular, the Chen government sought to channel talks on the fruit issue
through the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA, + * K N n *JTF RA
b) and to a lesser degree through the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC, -dihj v) and the
Council of Agriculture (CoA,'AK M )--Taiwan's senior level, executive branch
government body charged with administration and oversight in agriculture.7 3 The administration
sought to leverage the situation by conducting negotiations in the framework of the WTO and
worked to frame the discussion as being one of external trade.7 4 By internationalizing the talks,
the administration apparently sought to use the episode to reinforce the international autonomy
of Taiwan. Throughout this episode, the Taiwan government sought to prevent the private sector
actors from getting out ahead of the government.
The commercial actors themselves-Taiwan's fruit farmers-sought to secure access to
the Mainland consumer market. This market was attractive both for its future growth potential
and, in the near term, as a market capable of absorbing that particular year's bumper fruit crop.76
To facilitate access to the Mainland market, the farmers also sought to build up the supporting
trade infrastructure for perishable goods including direct transportation links, quarantine and
72 Sofia Wu, "MAC to Take Action on Local Groups Undermining Government Authority," Central News Agency -
Taiwan, July 03, 2005.
7 Wu, "CoA to Step Up Educational Campaign on Fruit Exports to China,"and Elisa Kao, "Taitra Chief: Media is
Spoiling Government's Plan on Fruit Exports," Central News Agency - Taiwan, August 13, 2005.
74 Deborah Kuo, "BoFT to Work to Boost Taiwan Fruit Exports to China Via WTO," Central News Agency -
Taiwan April 08, 2005 and Flor Wang, "Use WTO Framework for Cross-Strait Produce Trade: Tainan Magistrate,"
Central News Agency - Taiwan, March 18, 2005.
75 "In the case of commerce across the Taiwan Strait, China has deliberately reached out to select groups or sectors
in Taiwan, such as fruit farmers, airline companies, petrochemical firms, and the tourist industry, that have a
particular interest in gaining or maintaining access to the mainland market." Steve Chan, "The Politics of Economic
Exchange: Carrots and Sticks in Taiwan-China-U.S. Relations," Issues & Studies 42, no. 2 (2006): p. 4.
76 "KMT Defends Farmers Delegation," China Post, June 24, 2005.
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inspection protocols, expedited customs clearing procedures, etc.77 The farmers worked through
industry associations when interacting with the Mainland-in particular, the Taiwan Provincial
Farmers Association ( led by its KMT-affiliated executive secretary, Chang Yung-
cheng (3ikAA). Farming on Taiwan is still a very fragmented industry (in 2004, there were
more than three hundred farmers associations in Taiwan). As a result, the marketplace is fairly
competitive making Taiwan's farmers quick to seize upon any competitive advantage. The
farmers are also very unlikely to want to give up or jeopardize such advantages like access to a
new export market once they get it.78
The next section examines how the Taiwanese farmers were largely responsive to
Beijing's efforts to manipulate their own narrow self-interests. Beijing sought to use the
farmers' self-interests to shift their support toward the opposition parties and thus undermine
their support of Chen Shui-bian's DPP.79 The Chen government (like Lee's before it) was not
able to rein in Taiwan's cross-Strait economic engagement with the Mainland. The economic
activity of these commercial actors generated the security externality of Interest Transformation
on Taiwan. To explore this important business-government dynamic, the next section analyzes
the events of 2005 in more detail.
77 1Imports of Taiwan Fruits into Guangdong Will Speed Up" in IPR Strategic Business Information Database, June
21, 2005 and Bill Savadove, "Cross-Strait Trade Starts to Bear Fruit; Importers Hope for Direct Links to Follow
Tariff-Free Access," South China Morning Post, June 20, 2005, p. 6.
78 "Significantly, once commercial ties are entrenched, these exchanges create vested domestic interests in favor of
further expanding these ties." From Chan, "The Politics of Economic Exchange" p. 14.
79 See: "Chen Warns of Sour Fruit Trade Ties with China," China Post June 16, 2005; Jacky Hsu, "Tariffs Lifted on
15 Fruits from Taiwan; Farmers Welcome Move but Taipei is More Cautious," South China Morning Post, July 29,
2005, p. 8; Luis Huang, "China's Duty Free Entry of Taiwan Fruits a Political Need: President," Central News
Agency - Taiwan, May 11, 2005; Flor Wang, "China Said using Fruit Export Issue as Gambit to Sway Taiwan
Voters," Central News Agency - Taiwan, August 1, 2005; and Deborah Kuo, "China Importing Taiwan Fruit a
Conspiracy: Vice President," Central News Agency - Taiwan, October 30, 2005.
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3.4 Chinese Manipulation of Fruit Exports
Before 2005, Taiwanese exports of fresh fruit to the Mainland were fairly limited. The
majority of trade with the Mainland was indirect-shipments had to pass through a third party
port. Most cross-Strait trade would first pass through Hong Kong. This added costly shipping
time to perishable products like tropical fruit, thus restricting the amount of trade. In addition
to the logistical constraints on cross-Strait trade, the Mainland Chinese government had import
barriers in place that also limited access to China's market. Initially, China only permitted entry
for five types of fruits from Taiwan.
Following China's shift to an economic statecraft strategy based on Interest
Transformation externalities, China began to target Taiwan's fruit exports for further expansion.
In November 2004, Hsu Hsin-liang (4il ft-a former DPP Chairman who had left the DPP and
favored closer ties to China) visited the Mainland. Following this visit, China added seven more
types of fruit to the list of permissible imports to the Mainland. This brought the total types of
Taiwanese fruit that were permitted access to the Mainland market to twelve. At the conclusion
of Lien's April 2005 visit, China would offer to further reduce barriers to access by lifting the
tariffs on ten types of fruit. In the following months, the list of permitted fruits would be further
expanded from twelve to eighteen and tariffs were completely eliminated on another five types
of fruit.8 ' By the time these measures took effect on August 1, 2005, China had granted tariff-
80 Although a limited direct trade link had been established between Fujian Province and Taiwan in July 2003, this
route was only authorized for shipments weighing under 100 tons and with a value of less than USD $100,000.
These were fairly small amounts by international shipping standards.
fijVh "M*-R*" [trans: PRC Ministry of Commerce, "Association for Cross-Strait Economic Exchange: We
By No Means Unilaterally Appointed Taiwan's Consultative Representative to the Talks on Implementation of the -
Zero-Tariff Measures for Taiwanese Fruit,") July 28, 2005 Press Release. Available at: www.mofcom.gov.cn
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free market access to fifteen of the eighteen types of fruit now permitted to be imported from
Taiwan.82
The production of this fruit on Taiwan was concentrated in areas that had historically
supported the DPP. The earlier discussion of Taiwan's electoral geography showed that
Pingtung, Kaohsiung, Tainan, and Chiayi all had a track record of voting heavily for the DPP.
As indicated in the table, the permitted fruit with the largest export figures were all concentrated
in traditionally DPP-leaning areas.
Table 3.1: Taiwanese Fruit Granted Tariff-free Market Access83
Type of Fruit Major Production Area Peak Harvest Export Growth (to
Season China 2004 vs. 2005)
Mango84 Pingtung County, Kaohsiung Summer 11 times
County and Tainan County ($31,068 vs. $335,921)
Pineapple"' Chiayi County Year-Round 89 times greater
($1,740 vs. $154,590)
Custard Apple (a.k.a. Kaohsiung, Pingtung Taitung July to 110 times greater
Wax Apple)86  Counties. (Taitung is the February ($1,399 vs. $154,263)
largest production area)
Star Fruit (a.k.a. Changhua Year Round Doubled
Carambola) ($69,138 vs. $155,214)
Papaya Tainan County, Pingtung August to 5 times greater
County and Kaohsiung October ($10,937 vs. $57,298)
County
Guava Throughout Taiwan November to 24 times
February ($6,088 vs. $144,807)
8 2 fWJA , " 8) 1 H iEI 15 *A [trans: PRC Ministry of
Commerce, "Effective August First: Mainland to Formally Implement Zero Import Tariff for 15 Types of Taiwanese
Fruit,"] July 28, 2005 Press Release. Available at: www.mofcom.eov.cn
83 This table shows the top six types of fruit with the largest export volumes. In addition to the six listed in the table,
China also granted the following types of fruit tariff-free treatment: pomelo, coconut, plum, jujube/date, betel nut,
persimmon, bell fruit, loquat, and peach. Information on specific types of fruit grown in various regions of Taiwan
is drawn from information on the Taiwan Council of Agriculture website: http://wwv.coa.gov.tw/show index.php
or in English at: http://ein.coa.gov.tw/list.php?catid=8796 Export data comes from Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign
Trade.
84 Mangoes are exported mainly to Hong Kong, Singapore, Mainland China, and Japan.
85 The primary export destinations of pineapples are: Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Canada.
86 Taiwan has become the largest custard apple cultivating country in the world.
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Mainland China seems to have designed and implemented its strategy of Interest
Transformation in a fairly unified, coordinated manner. The Taiwan Affairs Office, the Ministry
of Commerce, the General Secretary and the State Council all seemed to be playing from the
same sheet of music. Hu Jintao, himself, seems to have provided the strategic guidance for the
Mainland's strategy vis a vis Taiwan. For example, in his March 4, 2005 address, Hu
"unequivocally" (H)R) ) proposed that the Mainland ought to "earnestly resolve" (tIJJ # ) the
problem of Taiwanese produce having a small market share in the Mainland. 87 Wen Jiabao also
voiced his support. "He declared that Beijing 'will take measures to boost sales on the Mainland
of farm produce from Taiwan, particularly from southern Taiwan. We will do whatever benefits
the Taiwan people,' he emphasized."88 In addition, the provinces like Fujian stood to benefit
from enhanced economic ties with Taiwan. 89 So there was very little center-local tensions within
the state. The state was unified in its pursuit of economic statecraft that sought to employ an
Interest Transformation strategy vis a vis the Taiwan farmers. China's Ministry of Commerce
led the implementation of the larger national strategic effort to woo the Taiwanese populace
directly. Most of the initial contact was between local Taiwanese farmers associations and the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 90
87 See: "Do Best to Seek Peaceful Reunification, but Never Tolerate Taiwan Independence: President," Xinhua
General News Service March 4, 2005 for excerpts of his speech. Hu's quote was frequently cited both in official
Mainland press releases covering the fruit tariff developments and in policy statements from the Ministry of
Commerce. See for instance: $ A * K 1 H ] M4, "A E fil fiiA Af 15 # V 71W. ii V
)MA A" [trans: PRC Ministry of Commerce, "Ministry of Commerce Spokesman Announces Implementation
of Zero Tariff Handling Measures for 15 Types of Taiwanese Fruit,"] July 28, 2005 Press Release. For the full text
of the English version of the speech see the Taiwan Affairs Office website:
http://www.gwvtb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=OneCP&title=One-China%20Principle&m id=27
88 Ting-I Tsai, "Taipei: Yes, we have no Bananas," Asia Times Oct 28, 2006.
89 "Agricultural Exchange Conforms to Aspiration of People Across Taiwan Straits," Xinhua Economic News
Service, September 9, 2005.
90 Although MofCom was important (especially with regard to implementation and execution), it does seem that the
Mainland's strategy was clearly coordinated from the top, specifically via the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State
Council. "Mainland Association Invites Taiwan Counterparts to Talk about Fruit Sale," Xinhua General News
Service, June 1 2005; "Chinese Mainland Hopes Taiwan Authorities to Push Fruit Exports to Mainland," Xinhua
General News Service, July 8, 2005.
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The Chen administration was largely cut out of the loop given its strategy of pre-
conditions and attempts to make the issue one of international trade. By trying to treat the issue
as a foreign trade issue (even going so far as to seek to conduct negotiations in the WTO forum),
the DPP sought to assert the island's sovereignty and international status. 91 Indeed, since March
of 2005, senior Chinese MofCom officials had been claiming that the DPP Administration was
dragging its feet and was opposed to Taiwan farmers selling produce to China.92 Following the
Lien visit, MofCom wanted to negotiate the terms of fast-track customs clearing and quarantine.
In response, Chen designated the semi-official Taiwan External Trade Development Council
(TAITRA) to work with the Mainland officials on matters of certificates of origin, and other
bureaucratic matters. 93 However, working through TAITRA would make the matter seem like
any other of Taiwan's international trade negotiations. 94 China refused to talk with TAITRA
and instead insisted on talking with the Taiwan Provincial Farmer's Association "in a bid to
downgrade Taiwan's status." 95 Beijing was unwilling to treat the matter as an international one.
The result was a diplomatic impasse. From this rhetoric, it is apparent that the issue area of
Taiwan's fruit exports to Mainland China was already highly politicized before the original
KMT visit even took place. Being able to enter into this highly-charged political environment
and deliver favorable results to the farmers in Taiwan further reinforced the KMT's claim that it
was more effective at managing the tricky cross-Strait dynamics.
91 Lilian Wu, "Taiwan Not Restricting Fruit Exports, Wants Cross-Strait Talks," Central News Agency - Taiwan,
July 22, 2005.
92 "DPP's Ideology Hinders Fruit Trade," Business Daily Update, July 28, 2005, p. 27.; "DPP Plays Politics with
People's Interests," China Daily June 28, 2005.
93 See Mainland Affairs Council's daily briefings for June 17, 2005 and July 8, 2005 available at:
http://wwv.mac. gov.twN/ct.asp'?xItem=47565&ctNode=6462&mp=3 and:
http://wvw.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xlten 47561&ctNode=6462&mp=-3 respecitvely.
94 "The most important reason for this is that TAITRA has rich experience in the international arena and is
specialized in assisting negotiations with foreign countries," MAC vice chairman as quoted in "Mac, Coa Decline
Opposition's Invitation" China Post July 7, 2005.
95 Joseph Wu, DPP-appointed Chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council as quoted in Taiwan news, "PRC
Scraps Tariffs on 15 Taiwan Fruits" also see: "China using Fruit Trade to Downgrade Taiwan : Official," Asia
Pulse, July 27, 2005.
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In the wake of the Lien visit, the KMT skillfully used the regionally-oriented Taiwan
Provincial Farmers Association (TPFA) as the point of contact to represent the farmers'
interests.96 The Taiwanese fruit farming industry structure is very fragmented consisting of
mainly small to medium-scale independent farms. These farmers will often sell their produce
through intermediary brokers who distribute the fruit internationally for export. As a result, the
industry does not often coordinate its activities very closely (as was evidenced by the over
planting and consequent surplus of citrus crops in the late 1990s/early 2000s). To the extent that
the industry is organized, it relies on associations like the Taiwan Provincial Farmers Association
to represent its interests. In 2005, the head of the TPFA was Chang Yung-cheng, a KMT-
affiliated official. 97 By conducting contact through the channel of the TPFA, the KMT was able
to achieve three objectives at the same time. First, it could ensure political consistency by
routing the liaison through a KMT-controlled body. It could also ensure that credit for any
success would rest with the KMT rather than allowing the government to step in and claim credit
for the DPP administration. Finally, the non-official, sub-state nature of the TPFA allowed
Beijing to make the case that it was not negotiating terms at the national level, but rather with a
regional trade association.
Naturally, the DPP wanted to re-assert its control of the negotiations.98 Most of the
cross-Strait contact had been between Taiwanese farmers associations and the MofCom.
However, working out matters of inspection and quarantine was clearly a governmental realm.99
The DPP-appointed Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, Joseph Wu Chao-hsieh (%Ji
96 "Taiwan Farmers Group to Send Team to China for Talks on Fruit Exports - Report," AFX - Asia, June 19, 2005;
"Farmers' Group to Visit China, Discuss Exporting Fruits," China Post June 19, 2005
97 "Farmers Interested in Exports to China," China Post May 13, 2005.
98 "Premier to Barnstorm Across Taiwan on Fruit Exports to China," Asia Pulse, July 28, 2005; "Hsieh Cautions
Farmers on Fruit Sales to China," China Post July 30, 2005; and "Mac to Review all China Trade and Investment
Projects," China Post July 28, 2005.
99 "Chen Insists on Gov't-to-Gov't Talks regarding Farm Exports to China," China Post July 15, 2005 and "Taiwan
Farmers' Assoc. Not Authorized to Negotiate with China," Asia Pulse, June 23, 2005.
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), met with the farmers associations in Kaoshiung in an attempt to persuade them to move more
slowly and work more directly through the government in this matter.1 00 However, he was
unsuccessful. On the eve of the Taiwan Provincial Farmers Association's follow-up visit to
discuss trade clearing logistics, the DPP threatened that non-designated groups that negotiated
terms with the Mainland were potentially conducting illegal operations. "If any civic group
takes any actions [sic] that violates the law, the government must take appropriate action." 101
Although this stern warning did result in delaying the delegation's trip by a week, it did not
prevent the momentum from building.'o2 Eventually, China would opt to unilaterally adjust its
own tariff policy without any real engagement of officially-designated Taiwanese government
channels.
In this case study, the Chen administration seems to have been caught flat-footed. They
wanted to negotiate the terms of any trade agreement only through their designated semi-official
body, TAITRA. However, the administration was never able to wrest control of the momentum.
Instead, it seemed to be struggling to catch up with the local commercial producers who were
eager to secure a market to for their bumper crop before the peak harvest time of late summer.
As is often the case in Taiwanese cross-Strait business-government dynamics, the Taiwanese
state was unable to effectively control its commercial actors. The state actor in this case, the
government in Beijing, also did not have any direct authority over the commercial actors,
however, it was able to exercise some degree of control since it managed the regulatory
100 Sofia Wu, "Mac to Take Action on Local Groups Undermining Government Authority," Central News Agency -
Taiwan, July 3, 2005.
101 Straits Exchange Foundation vice-chairman You Ying-lung (91'& 9) as quoted in "Mac, Coa Decline
Opposition's Invitation" China Post July 7, 2005. According to the government's official position, "civic groups
were free to visit the mainland provided they did not make any unauthorized deals. He [You] said violators would be
punished by law..
102 "Hsieh Cautions Farmers on Fruit Sales to China," China Post July 30, 2005; "Taiwan Farmers' Assoc. Not
Authorized to Negotiate with China," Asia Pulse, June 23, 2005; Lilian Wu, "Farmers' Association Rethinks
Strategy on Trip to China," Central News Agency - Taiwan, June 20, 2005; Y. F. Low, "Mac Urges Farmers'
Association to Respect Government Authority," Central News Agency - Taiwan, June 24, 2005.
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mechanisms that permitted Taiwan's fruit to gain access to the Mainland Chinese market. In this
episode, we observe the Mainland government using state policy to structure the incentives that
the Taiwanese commercial actors faced. By manipulating these incentives (i.e. by demonstrating
that the Mainland was willing to grant beneficial concessions to economic interests represented
by the KMT-but not the DPP-authorities), Beijing hoped to undermine Chen Shui-bian's
support base by building up the credibility of his main political rival, the opposition party
KMT.103 Mainland efforts to move forward by working with the KMT placed the DPP in a
difficult domestic political position. Any attempt by the DPP to re-assert its regulatory or
governing authority was berated as politicizing the issue or as blocking progress that would
directly benefit Taiwanese farmers. 104
In the end, the Mainland did not wait for a government-sanctioned interlocutor, but rather
unilaterally eliminated the tariffs. 105 On July 28, 2005 China's Ministry of Commerce
announced that it was unilaterally lifting tariffs on the fifteen fruits listed in the table above.1 06
The new preferential regulations were to take effect on August 1, 2005-just was Taiwan
103 "Taiwan Opposition Delegates Push for Closer Economic Links with China," Agence France Presse, March 31,
2005.
104 In meetings on the issue with farmers at the time, there was "...a call from opposition Kuomintang (KMT)
Chairman Lien Chan and some legislators who said that the government should put aside its anti-China ideology for
the benefit of Taiwan's farmers. Lien said the government should respond quickly to China's offer to allow 18
categories of Taiwan fruits into the mainland duty free without politicizing or complicating the issue so that
Taiwan's farmers can reap the benefits." From: "Farmers Interested in Exports to China," China Post May 13, 2005.
N.B.: Although China did offer access for 18 categories of fruit, only 15 of these were given tariff-free treatment.
On the issue of politicization, also see: "KMT Defends Farmers Delegation," China Post, June 24, 2005; Wu, "KMT
Will Monitor Fruit Exports to China to Protect Farmers' Interests,"; Jacky Hsu, "Taipei Tries to Soothe Angry
Farmers," South China Morning Post, July 28, 2005, sec. NEWS, p. 6.; "DPP's Ideology Hinders Fruit Trade,"
Business Daily Update July 28, 2005, p. 27.
105 "The announcement marks a unilateral Chinese move to dismantle trade barriers. We welcome any free trade
measures that would benefit our farmers." Taiwan News, "PRC Scraps Tariffs on 15 Taiwan Fruits" Available at:
http://taiwansecuritv.org/TSR-Strait-2005.htm.
1P@$ 'Vi M]M "MQM( H A Edi 4 X 15 M),7]G EJ9 r- 4-IM " [trans: PRC
Ministry of Commerce, "Ministry of Commerce Spokesman Announces Implementation of Zero Tariff Handling
Measures for 15 Types of Taiwanese Fruit,"] July 28, 2005 Press Release.
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entered the peak of its major harvesting season.'07 The measures also included fast-track
provisions to facilitate rapid customs and quarantine measures. The elimination of the tariff
reduced consumer prices paid for Taiwanese fruit in the Mainland by fifteen to twenty percent.' 08
Taiwan's Mainland fruit sales were estimated to have gone up 30-50% in the months following
the implementation of the tariff reduction. In addition to eliminating the fruit tariff, the
Mainland launched an aggressive marketing and promotional campaign touting Taiwan's fruit.109
This expedited access to the China market was made even more significant as a source of
relief to Taiwanese farmers given the recent drop in their business revenues. With the
introduction of new farming techniques and improvements in agricultural technology, supply of
high-quality fresh fruit on Taiwan had increased dramatically. In the early 2000s, the domestic
market for all of this produce was saturated. Since 2002, prices of Taiwanese fruit had fallen by
thirty to forty percent." 0 The effect of this over-production was passed on directly to the
farmers. On the eve of this episode, Taiwan's fruit producers were anxiously searching for new
markets in which to off-load their products."'
By eliminating the tariffs on these fifteen types of fruit, China effectively provided access
to just such a large consumer market for Taiwan's fruit exports.n2 Moreover, the Mainland
'
07Ibid. For the peak harvest season of various types of fruit that received the tariff-free treatment, see chart
presented earlier.
10 8A R $ , "M W4ftkA±& M(N0ka " [trans: PRC Ministry of Commerce,
"Cross-Strait Agricultural Produce Trade to Gradually Enter a State of Ecstasy,"] August 1, 2005 Press Release
(Heilongjiang Province Edition).
109 See for instance: "Measures to Help Sell Taiwan Fruits on Mainland Market Effective," Xinhua General News
Service, September 28, 2005; "China Spokesman Says Measures Taken to Aid Taiwan Fruit Market," BBC
Septemeber 28, 2005; and "f0VXR7MVEN 7 Fi1f)," A K H J M4 fd 2005 * 08 f] 12 H
[trans: "Taiwan Tariff-Free Fruit Sales Brisk; Pose No Pressure on Hainan Fruit,"] August 12, 2005 People's Daily
(Overseas ed.). Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.cont/taiwan/2005-08/1 2/content 3342317.htm Also see: "Fruit
Show Adds Market Value to Chinese Farm Produce," Xinhua General News Service November 12, 2005); and
"China's Mainland to Set Up Business Zones for Taiwan Farmers," Xinhua General News Service, June 1, 2005.
'10 "Fruits from Taiwan Embark Mainland with Wider, Easier Access," Xinhua Economic News Service, May 19,
2005.
" "Farmers Interested in Exports to China," China Post May 13, 2005.
112 "Taiwanese Fruits Available to More Mainland Areas," Asia Pulse, June 7, 2005.
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market held out the promise of considerable future growth. The Mainland presented a large,
relatively untapped source of market demand. In terms of the Elasticity dimension of this
episode of economic statecraft, Taiwan had few suitable alternative export markets to turn to for
future growth. Japan (the major developed economy located nearby) already represented around
half of all Taiwanese fresh fruit exports.13 That market seemed fairly well penetrated with little
room for growth. The American and Canadian markets were also large, mature markets but
strict quarantine and food safety requirements constrained access for most growers. In addition,
the distances involved made transportation logistics a deterrent to further expanding these
markets for such perishable goods as tropical fruit. Markets for tropical fruit in Southeast Asia
were already highly competitive given the natural climatic advantages producers there enjoyed.
Mainland China presented a large, growing population of increasingly wealthy consumers with a
common cultural tie in close proximity to Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwanese fruit already enjoyed
strong brand recognition as a premium product that could command higher margins than
domestically-produced Chinese fruit. However, as of 2004, Taiwan's limited access to this
market resulted in exporting only USD $340,000 of fresh fruit to China.'1 4 The Mainland market
was significantly under exploited on the eve of the opposition party visits. The attractive
potential of China's domestic consumer market is a powerful commercial incentive that China
used to good strategic effect in this episode.
Although fruit production may not be a large part of Taiwan's national exports and at
first glance may seem like a relatively insignificant aspect of cross-Strait economic interaction,
its importance derives from the major role it plays in the regional economies of the counties
"3 Taiwan's largest destination market was Japan ($18.2 million) followed by Hong Kong ($8.1 million), the US
($5.7 million), Singapore ($2.5 million), Canada ($1.7 million) and Mainland China ($340 thousand). From: Taiwan
Bureau of Foreign Trade, Statistical Database on Foreign Trade.
"4 In 2004, Taiwan exported some $38 million worth of fresh fruit in total but only $340,000 to the Mainland (an
under-developed market). From: Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade, Statistical Database on Foreign Trade.
117
Norris, Economic Statecraft
comprising the DPP's electoral heartland. Since fruit production is concentrated geographically
in Taiwan across areas that have traditionally been DPP strong-holds, what might otherwise
appear to be nationally insignificant amounts of economic interaction take on much greater
strategic significance. The move to allow market access to Taiwanese fruit stood to benefit a
highly concentrated set of economic interests. Moreover, these beneficiaries made up a strategic
constituency in Taiwanese domestic politics-Chen Shui-bian's support base."' The ability of
the KMT to break the diplomatic impasse and deliver the export outlet to relieve the farmers'
surplus both underscored the inability of the ruling DPP to effectively navigate cross-Strait
relations and served as a prominent reminder of how the KMT's pragmatic orientation might
better suit the farmers' own self-interests.
3.5 Results
What were the effects of China's actions in this episode? This section examines the
consequences of the lowering of fruit tariffs. The data on Taiwan's fresh fruit exports suggest
the economic side of the Mainland's policy has been successful. As mentioned previously, in
2004, Taiwan exported around USD$340,000 worth of fresh fruit to the Mainland. In the
aftermath of this episode, fresh fruit exports to China showed a five-fold increase in 2005.116
The Mainland market has continued to be a source of export growth for Taiwanese fruit farmers.
In 2009, exports of fresh fruit to Mainland China hit $5.3 million-almost 16 times the baseline
115 "In reaching out to Taiwan's business community, Beijing has not only sought to attract the relocation of large
companies such as those in the petrochemical industry or to establish business links with others such as airlines, but
it has also promoted ties with the island's fruit farmers and medium sized firms engaged in labor-intensive
production. The latter groups constitute key supporters for the DPP." From: Chan, "The Politics of Economic
Exchange," p. 17. Also see: Joel Wuthnow, "The Integration of Cooptation and Coercion: China's Taiwan Strategy
since 2001," East Asia 23, no. 3 (2006): p. 2 6 .
116 As is often the case when working with Chinese statistics, I have encountered a number of discrepancies in the
course of my research. The most reliable, consistent and complete figures seem to be those provided by the
Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign Trade. The figures I use are drawn from their Statistical Database on Foreign Trade
available in English at: http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLIS1/FSCE/. Fresh fruit exports fall into "Chapter 8" CCC
codes, covering edible fruits and nuts.
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2004 figure. The first link in the causal chain of Interest Transformation seems to have been
borne out: economic interaction grew considerably as a result of the Mainland's policy. But did
this interaction entail strategically significant consequences?
The answer lies in the electoral performance of the DPP in the aftermath of this episode.
This is not to claim that China's use of economic statecraft is the sole determinant of the KMT's
success. 17 However, since undermining the DPP's electoral performance was the strategic goal
of the Mainland in this episode, it is only right to examine the subsequent electoral results. The
elections are the ultimate indicator of whether such a strategy worked. That said, of course
elections are affected by a wide range of factors, economics being only one of many. The
outcome of this episode, namely the DPP's electoral defeats in subsequent elections, may be
over-determined in this case since voter behavior is always a complicated outcome to explain.
Nevertheless, there was a change in voter preferences in the regions that were targeted and this
change corresponded to the elimination of the fruit tariff.
The election most immediately following the opposition party visits was the May 14,
2005 National Assembly election. However, this election is not a reliable indicator for four
reasons. First, this vote was a defacto referendum on the proposed constitutional amendments
that were designed to move Taiwan's political system toward favoring large, nation-wide parties
(as opposed to the plethora of smaller, largely single issue or locally-driven political parties).
The vote was largely treated as a technical matter related to consolidation of Taiwan's
democratization. Unlike most elections in Taiwan, this vote was not really about cross-Strait ties
or even about explicit public policies, rather it was a largely procedural referendum. Second, the
election was not campaigned along traditional coalition lines (i.e. Pan-Blue versus Pan-Green).
Rather, the election fissures were between large parties (the KMT and the DPP) on one side and
17 Voter behavior is obviously driven by a wide range of factors and considerations.
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the smaller parties (e.g. TSU, PFP, and a host of other even smaller parties) on the other. The
proposed reorganization of the government would consolidate power in the hands of the larger,
national parties and make it more difficult for smaller parties to play an influential role in
national politics. As a result, the smaller parties unsurprisingly aligned against the two (normally
opposing) largest parties. Third, most politicians, parties, and the general public treated the vote
as a relatively unimportant matter of institutional housekeeping. In comparison to most
Taiwanese elections, the political parties and candidates did not spend very much money on the
election. Finally, record low turnout makes this election an inappropriate indicator. Only about
23% of an otherwise historically participatory Taiwanese electorate voted in this election.'18 Bad
weather in the Northern portions of the island also likely kept voters at home further skewing any
meaningful results beyond the constitutional amendments. For these reasons, this election will
not be considered when assessing the results of this episode of economic statecraft.
The May 2005 National Assembly election was followed by two locally-oriented
elections: the December, 2005 1 [trans: Three-in-One Election] for county
magistrates, councilmen and township governors and the December 9, 2006 municipal elections
for Mayor of Taipei and Kaohsiung." 9 Unfortunately, these two sets of elections are also a bit
problematic to use as indicators since they are largely local level (as opposed to national)
contests. However, to the extent that they can be taken as a bellwether of political sentiment on
Taiwan, the KMT outperformed the DPP in both sets of elections.12 0
In the December 2005 elections, the KMT won control of fourteen of Taiwan's twenty-
three counties (with the PFP and the New Party each also winning one county-bringing the
118 Taiwanese voter participation is regularly well over 50%. It is not unheard-of to see voter turnout of greater than
80%.
119 These two largest of Taiwan's municipalities are administered directly under the central government and hold
elections on their own independent schedule.
12 Noi, "KMT Win a Victory for Ties with Beijing."
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total Pan-Blue counties to sixteen).121 The DPP won only six counties.122 Particularly
significant was the loss of Chia-yi-a long-time bastion of the DPP and its predecessor
democracy movement the dangwai. "It was like losing the locomotive of southern Taiwan,
where people have been strongly backing the DPP for years."123 In terms of the popular vote, the
KMT garnered 50.96% of the vote while the DPP won only 41.95% of the total.124 "Observers
said the outcomes demonstrated voters' disappointment at the DPP, who has failed to break the
cross-strait deadlock or revive the economy."125 Chen's popularity hit an all-time low of 21%
following the election.126 Using the previous "Three-in-One" election of 2001 as the baseline for
comparison, the DPP's share of the popular vote fell from 2001's 45.27% while the KMT's share
gained substantially from its 2001's 35.06% figure.' 27
In the December 2006 elections, the KMT also handed the DPP significant losses. The
KMT won in Taipei (both the position of Mayor and a majority of the City Councilors). This is
not all that unusual since Taipei has historically been a KMT stronghold. However, a more
anomalous result is that the KMT also came close to winning the Kaohsiung mayor election. In
this normally DPP strong hold, the KMT received 49.27% which was not enough to beat the
DPP's 49.41%. Still the difference was only a little more than a thousand votes, indicating that
121See: "KMT Victory a Turning Point for Taiwan," South China Morning Post, December 7, 2005, p. 16 and
Lawrence Chung, "Opposition KMT Sweeps to Victory in Local Elections," South China Morning Post, December
4, 2005, sec. NEWS, p. 1.
122 Lawrence Chung, "Stunned DPP Loses Traditional Stronghold," South China Morning Post, December 4, 2005,
sec. NEWS, p. 6. The DPP had held ten counties from the 2001 election.
123 Quote is from Lin Hung-chan (*A)), spokesman for defeated DPP candidate, Chen Li-chen (E rA) at
Chen's election headquarters admitting that losing Chia-yi was a significant defeat for the DPP. Hsiu-chuan Shih,
"KMT Makes History in Chiayi City," Taipei Times, Dec 4, 2005, p. 2.
124 Staff, "KMT Wins in a Landslide," China Post, Dec 4, 2005.
125 ibid.
126 Lawrence Chung, "Chen's Popularity at an all-Time Low; More than Half the Public Say the Taiwanese President
should Step Down After His Party's Defeat in Weekend Elections," South China Morning Post, December 6, 2005,
sec. NEWS, p. 8.
127 It should be noted that the KMT's 2001 figure is not a very good baseline for comparison since the PFP-KMT
split was near its height in 2001 and a significant portion of the "pan-Blue" vote was likely siphoned off from the
KMT's share of the popular vote in 2001.
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the KMT had made significant headway in one of the DPP's key districts. Moreover, the KMT
did actually win a majority of the Kaohsiung City Councilors seats (17 compared to the DPP's
15 seats). To the extent that the 2006 Municipal Elections can be used as an indicator, the results
in Kaohsiung seem to suggest that the Spring 2005 visits were effective in undermining support
in the region for the DPP. In previous municipal elections, the DPP had won the Kaohsiung
mayoral election in 2002 (with a comfortable 50.04% of the vote vs. the KMT's 46.82%) and in
1998 when it wrested control of the city from the KMT (with 48.71% of the vote vs. the KMT's
48.13%).128
Although these the elections in December of 2005 and 2006 may be indicative of an
eroding DPP grip on power, confirmation of the DPP's electoral downfall really comes in
2008-the next cycle of national-level elections in Taiwan. The results of these two elections
(the January 12, 2008 Legislative Yuan Election and the March 22, 2008 Presidential Election)
show a clear defeat for the DPP and a validation for the KMT's cross-Strait policies. The
electoral maps below depict the erosion of support for the DPP. Of particular significance is the
loss of regional areas of traditional Pan-Green support in the counties targeted in this episode of
economic statecraft. The twenty-three counties are shaded to indicate the popular vote: darker
shades of either green or blue represent a larger margin of support for either the pan-Green or
pan-Blue in that county. As expected, the pan-Blue win by the largest majorities in their
traditional strongholds of the north. However, what is most striking is the weakness of pan-
Green support among their traditional base in the south.
128 Hwee Hwee Ong, "Battle for Taiwan's Two Top Cities," The Straits Times (Singapore) December 6, 2006.
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In the Legislative Yuan Election, the pan-Greens fared poorly. Even among the counties
in which the pan-Green won a plurality, in only two counties did they manage to win more than
50% of the vote. This stands in striking comparison to the pan-Blue margin of victory which
garnered greater than 60% of the popular vote across six counties and swept up a total of
eighteen of the twenty-three total counties. This equated to a supermajority-86 of the total 113
legislative seats-that went to the pan-Blue alliance. The remaining 27 seats went to the DPP.129
The DPP's major pan-Green partner, the independence-issue driven TSU, won no seats in this
election.
A similar story is told by the presidential contest between the pan-Blue candidate Ma
Ying-jeou (i4UL) and the pan-Green candidate Frank Hsieh Chang-ting (i41tH). In this
election, the pan-Blue candidate took home 58.45% of the popular vote, providing Ma Ying-jeou
129 T. Gold, "Taiwan in 2008: My Kingdom for a Horse," Asian Survey 49, no. 1 (2009): 89.
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with a landslide victory. Frank Hsieh would garner only 41.55% of the vote. 130 Taiwan's
presidential elections have historically been very closely fought elections making this margin of
victory unusual. As was the case in the Legislative Yuan election, the pan-Blue carried more
regions with a greater margin of victory than the pan-Green. Even in the areas that make up the
pan-Green base of support, the races were much more closely fought with the pan-Green
winning by more than 55% in only one county. 131 The shift away from the pan-Green agenda is
striking when the 2008 elections are juxtaposed with the comparable 2004 LY and Presidential
elections.
3.5.1 Baselining the Results
These strategic results ought to be considered in reference to some baseline for economic
statecraft in this context. In particular, rigorous analysis would seek to establish a baseline along
three aspects of the episode. First, were the results meaningful? Second, how do we know that
economic statecraft generated these strategic results? Finally, how do we know that this episode
constituted economic statecraft as opposed to simple commercial calculations? In other words,
to examine economic statecraft, one must be able to distinguish what constitutes economic
statecraft from simple, straightforward "normal" commercial activity.
On the first issue of whether the economic statecraft in question generated strategic
results, the evidence shows that there was clearly an electoral shift that took place on Taiwan.
Using the previous electoral patterns as a baseline, there is a significant swing away from the
DPP and in favor of the KMT. This change was major and it does seem to suggest that China's
economic statecraft undermined one of the DPP's key support bases. Second, how much of that
130 Alexander C. Tan, "The 2008 Taiwan Elections: Forward to the Past?" Electoral Studies 28, no. 3 (2009): 505.
m31 Ibid.: especially pp. 505-506.
124
Chapter Three: Interest Transformation on Taiwan
change can be attributed to the economic statecraft? Although the results of this episode are
clearly evidenced in the subsequent electoral behavior, it is difficult to establish how large of an
impact the issue of fruit tariffs per se had in determining voter behavior. I do not want to over
state the importance of this episode. Voters were likely already getting unhappy with Chen
(especially regarding corruption issues and his administration's economic management) and that
certainly lowered the DPP's popularity going into the 2008 elections. However, it is interesting
to note that wider economic dissatisfaction might have actually increased the saliency of the fruit
tariff since the affected parties would have been that much more sensitive to any source of
economic relief. Fruit exports also constitute only a very small portion of Taiwan's overall
exports (with fruit exports to China being smaller still). However, the concentrated nature of the
beneficiaries in Taiwan and the growth potential of the Chinese market do seem to suggest
strategic importance in this episode. 32
One helpful indicator is that the highest-ranking leaders in both China and Taiwan
seemed to have accorded the issue a substantial degree of public attention. For example, we
observe Hu Jintao specifically outlining the strategic significance of relieving Taiwanese
farmers. 33 Wen Jiabao also echoed these points. 34 Of course, leading KMT officials sought to
score political points throughout this episode. But perhaps most tellingly, Taiwan President
Chen Shui-bian, himself, seemed to indicate that this matter of granting Taiwan fruit tariff-free
status was an important one: "China's recent announcement of duty free treatment for exports of
certain fruits by Taiwan's farmers to the Chinese market is just a decision unilaterally taken by
132 It is also important not to underestimate the significance of signaling in this episode. Improved cross-Strait
economic ties were import to sectors of Taiwan's economy well-beyond fruit or even agriculture more broadly.
13 "When talking about the marketing of Taiwan's farm produce in the mainland, Hu said the issue 'involves the
fundamental interests of the broad masses of the Taiwan farmers,"' as quoted in "Do Best to Seek Peaceful
Reunification, but Never Tolerate Taiwan Independence : President," Xinhua General News Service, March 4, 2005.
134 "He declared that Beijing 'will take measures to boost sales on the mainland of farm produce from Taiwan,
particularly from southern Taiwan. We will do whatever benefits the Taiwan people,' he emphasized." From: Tsai,
"Taipei: Yes, we have no Bananas."
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Beijing based on political needs. "135 To the extent that national leaders must prioritize their
limited time and attention, we can interpret the attention they afforded to this episode as
indicative of its causal significance.
So if the effect was strategically important and it seems that the economic statecraft was a
major contributor to generating that result, how should the reader know if the observed economic
interaction is actually the result of strategically-manipulated economic statecraft as opposed to
normal economic interaction performed for purely commercial reasons? How should one
distinguish between economic statecraft and the ordinary course of commercially-motivated
interaction? At the heart of this challenge lies distinguishing between the "normal economic
behavior" of commercial actors and the state's strategically motivated manipulation designed to
achieve foreign policy objectives by instrumentally using commercial actors.
In this episode, the evidence suggests that the decision to lower tariffs on the fifteen types
of fruit was a strategically-motivated one designed to influence the political outcome in Taiwan
rather than a purely commercially-driven desire to improve the terms of trade. Perhaps most
importantly from the point of view of distinguishing between politically manipulated versus
commercially-oriented policy, the tariffs that were lowered did not include bananas. This is
important because bananas are by far, Taiwan's single largest type of fruit export.136 If this
episode were a purely commercial endeavor, why would the largest type of fruit be excluded?
Any commercially-driven effort to expand Taiwan's fruit exports should have included its largest
type of exported fruit. Lychees, Taiwan's third largest type of fruit export, were also excluded
135 President Chen made these comments during a meeting with board members of the Outstanding Farmers
Association of the ROC. His speech was perceived as defensive in response to what he clearly viewed as
strategically threatening overtures from the Mainland. See: Luis Huang, "China's Duty Free Entry of Taiwan Fruits
a Political Need: President," Central News Agency - Taiwan, May 11, 2005.
136 Ting-I Tsai, "The Beijing-Taipei Fruit Fracas," Asia Times, Aug 26, 2005. Taiwan exports more bananas than
any other type of fruit. According to Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign Trade, banana exports in 2004 were more than
double the next largest type of exported fruit (mango-which was afforded tariff-free treatment from Beijing).
126
Chapter Three: Interest Transformation on Taiwan
while mangoes (occupying the number two position behind bananas) were included.m' The
reason for the selective targeting of specific types of fruit can be found in the confluence of
Taiwan's electoral geography and where certain types of (mainly tropical) fruit are produced in
Taiwan. For example, the production of mangoes is (not coincidentally) concentrated in
Pingtung, Tainan and Kaohsiung Counties-all DPP strongholds. Consequently mangoes were
slated for tariff elimination while bananas and lychee (both of which lacked this sort of strategic
geographic concentration) were not.
Another indicator of the strategic rather than commercial orientation of this policy was
that Mainland China did not seek to gain access to Taiwanese markets for its own fruit
producers. If the tariff reduction were part of a larger commercially-oriented effort to remove
barriers to trade, one might have expected to see tariff reduction on China's side as part of a
more comprehensive bargain to increase cross-Strait trade. As it was, the tariff-reduction
targeted specific types of fruit and was not part of a broader free trade discussion. Moreover, the
lowering of trade barriers was a unilateral concession on China's part.
Finally, oranges-one of the types of fruit most prone to overproduction in Taiwan-
were not even permitted entry into China.138 If the purpose of the lowering of the tariffs on
certain types of fruit were actually commercial (i.e. to help relieve over-production), one would
have expected to see oranges, the type of fruit that was arguably most prone to over-production,
included in the relief effort as well. The evidence suggests that the intent in this episode was not
simply to help relieve all Taiwanese farmers, but rather to relieve strategically signficant
137 According to Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign Trade, in 2004, Taiwan exported about USD$4.5 million worth of
Lychee.
138 Because of improvements in fertilizers and pesticides as well as the long lead time for growing oranges and the
high sunk costs of up-rooting planted trees, this type of fruit has been particularly prone to overproduction in
Taiwan. Lilian Wu, "Taitra Lending Hand in Selling Oranges," Central News Agency - Taiwan, November 27,
2004; Deborah Kuo, "Parties Play Orange' Card as Citrus Prices Nosedive," Central News Agency - Taiwan,
November 24, 2004.
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farmers. By demonstrating the benefits that the targeted farmers stood to gain from a KMT-led
cross-Strait relationship, the Mainland sought to undermine the DPP's support.
Each of these elements seems to indicate that Mainland China's move to grant access to
some types of fruit had non-commercial, strategic motives. This operation was not really about a
commercially-motivated move to provide market access for Taiwan's fruit on a commercial
basis. Rather the evidence seems to suggest that the lowering of tariffs was a deliberate policy of
economic statecraft specifically calculated to alter the domestic electoral interests of a key
support base for Chen Shui-bian. By undermining Chen's support, the Mainland hoped to curb
Taiwan's proclivity toward independence. This strategic objective was one of Beijing's
paramount goals vis a vis Taiwan. In this episode, Mainland China pursued that goal by
instrumentally using commercial actors to help achieve its strategic objectives.
3.6 Evaluating the Case
This section evaluates this episode of China's economic statecraft in light of the
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. First, this section reviews how this episode stacks
up across the three conditions for effective economic statecraft (size, elasticity and purpose
commensurability). This case seems to meet all three conditions. Arguably, the size of the
economic interaction (Taiwan's fruit exports to Mainland China) is fairly insignificant in
absolute terms. However, the concentration of this economic interaction among a strategically
significant constituency in Taiwan's domestic politics seems to have made up for what might be
otherwise low levels of economic interaction. In terms of purpose commensurability, China's
shift toward using economic statecraft to reinforce the status quo in which Taiwan did not move
further toward independence is much easier realized than trying to force reunification with the
Mainland. In addition, using economic statecraft to undermine support for Chen Shui-bian was
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made even easier by public disillusionment with Chen's handling of the Taiwanese economy.
The elasticity dimension of this episode was discussed earlier. Essentially, the Mainland China
export market presented a unique, promising source of demand for Taiwan's fruit. This demand
could not easily be substituted and was important to Taiwan's fruit farmers (particularly given
their bumper harvest that year).
Second, this section reviews the coding of this episode in terms of the independent
variables that account for the Mainland's ability to motivate the commercial actors to behave in a
manner that generated the strategic effects it sought. These values are summarized in the chart
on the next page. In terms of the overall effectiveness, China's use of economic statecraft in this
episode seems to have been effective at destabilizing the Chen administration and undermining
the public support for the DPP in some of its key support bases. 139 The most important factor
accounting for China's success seems to have been the Mainland's ability to pursue a unified
approach to implementing a strategy that made the most of political divisions within Taiwan.
Mainland China identified a vulnerability in Taiwan's ruling party and instituted trade policies
that sought to drive a wedge between the Taiwanese government and some of its key supporters.
By providing economic benefits to an influential domestic constituency and by working through
the opposition party to deliver these benefits, the Mainland was able to pursue a strategy that
sought to alter Taiwan's definition of its interests. Although a strategy based on exploiting this
type of security externality is generally a long-term one (national interests do not turn on a
dime), this episode offers a concrete illustration of exactly how this sort of transformation takes
place over a fairly condensed time scale. By focusing on this sort of in-depth treatment of one
139 "If this strategy is intended to divide and confuse, it seems to be working. Taiwan's independence-leaning
president, Chen Shui-bian, has appeared far less assured in dealing with the goodwill gestures than he did shrugging
off the earlier verbal and legal attacks. His ratings have fallen and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party has
never looked more divided." Jonathan Watts, "Beijing's Panda Hug Divides and Confuses Taiwan," Manchester
Guardian Weekly, May 13, 2005 - May 19, 2005, sec. 172, p. 10.
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particular series of events, we can better understand exactly how economic statecraft actually
works in practice.
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Table 3.2: Taiwan Case Summary Table
IV Coding Evidence
Goals
Market Structure
Unity of State
Reporting
Relationship
Relative Resources
Compatible for near
term; Mutually
exclusive re: Taiwan
independence
Competitive
Unified
Indirect; Only able to
exercise regulatory
control at point of
entry
Skewed in favor of
Mainland
China wants to minimally prevent Taiwan independence,
maximally promote reunification; Taiwan farmers want
an export market, and also seem to prefer Taiwan
independence. Both farmers and China's goals can be
achieved on the economic front-e.g. China can open
market and farmers can gain access, but mutually
exclusive re: larger issue of Taiwan independence.
Many small-scale Taiwanese fruit farmers; over 300
professional associations
Effort was coordinated and led from top with no
competing bureaucratic arguments from ministries; Hu
Jintao's consolidation of power limits potential for
competing personal factions to undermine;
Municipal/provincial centers of authority also want to see
improved Taiwan economic ties.
Government Ownership: None; Private sector actors
Management: None; Private sector actors with no
funding or investment from Mainland. Only required
reporting is regulatory compliance with
customs/quarantine/inspection regime
Mainland had most relevant expertise since market
access granted by Mainland government/customs;
Mainland government had larger budget and personnel
resources given scale of MofCom and difficulties
coordinating among the many disparate Taiwan farmers
Control likely (especially for matters related to
economic access); Observe erosion of support for
independence-oriented DPP stemming from
disillusionment with DPP governance especially
cross-Strait policies that do not deliver the benefits
that the KMT demonstrate capacity to deliver to
farmers.
Control can be achieved by leveraging the
competitive dynamics among fruit producers (e.g. no
one can afford to be shut out of Chinese market).
However, monitoring farmer behavior (e.g. whether
they vote for KMT instead in next election) not
feasible.
Control likely based on coordinated policy.
Control likely to be blunt (e.g. allow market access
or not) since minimal points for calibration.
Control likely since relative resources between the
Chinese state and the Taiwanese farmers almost
completely favored the Chinese state; it was the only
one in a position to eliminate the tariffs. That said,
relative resources did not seem to be a very
important factor in this episode
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Examining the goals of China and the goals of the commercial actors in this episode is
very interesting because they seem to be compatible in the short term (both seek to enhance the
farmers' access to the China market) but their longer term goals (farmers' desire for Taiwanese
independence and China's desire for reunification) are mutually exclusive. Indeed, with
instances of Interest Transformation types of economic statecraft, altering the commercial
actors' goals lies at the heart of this type of security externality. It is the tactical objective of the
economic statecraft itself. The hope is that these commercial actors then influence the very
definitions of the target state's interests.
In this episode, there are many small fruit farmers. The market would be characterized as
highly fragmented. As expected, this does pose some challenges for the state when it comes to
coordinating the commercial actors. It is particularly difficult for the Taiwanese state to monitor
and enforce its preferences on the fruit farmers. For example, efforts on the part of the ruling
DPP to re-assert its leadership over the cross-Strait negotiations were unsuccessful. This is a
theme that one observes over and over when examining Taiwan's efforts to rein in its
commercial actors. Because the commercial actors are numerous and agile and because the
commercial attraction of the Mainland is such a strong draw, they often find ways to circumvent
the Taiwanese state's efforts to direct or control their behavior. However, the Mainland is able
to exert a certain amount of control over these actors since the Mainland is able to influence the
commercial actors' commercial operating environment. By targeting the commercial incentives
and influencing the conditions under which the private Taiwanese firms operate, the Mainland is
able to channel the firms' behavior (to a degree). As implied by the theory, the cross-Strait
activities of these firms often generate strategic externalities whether or not the state on either
side of the Strait is able to control or direct the behavior of firms.
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One of the main factors that accounts for the ability of the Chinese state to effectively
manipulate the commercial actors in this episode is that the state acted in a unified manner. The
strategic orientation for China was articulated at the highest levels of national leadership. This
vision was echoed throughout the implementation of the strategy. Finally, unlike in previous
attempts to utilize a Coercive Leverage approach to managing cross-Strait commercial actors,
there were no countervailing incentives for local municipalities to undermine the central
government's objectives.
Since the commercial actors in this episode of economic statecraft were farmers on
Taiwan and since Mainland China does not really have any jurisdiction over them beyond the
customs and tariff regulatory regime, the reporting relationship between the commercial actors
and the state in this episode is indirect. The relationship can be characterized as a light
regulatory relationship that takes place mainly at the point of import entry into Mainland China.
The state in this case study has the ability to regulate customs requirements and not much else.
Unsurprisingly, this is exactly where we see the state using its policy tools (to drop the tariff and
expedite the processing of Taiwanese fruit). Taiwanese farmers are not Chinese state-owned
enterprises like those examined in later chapters, nor are they extensions of the Chinese
government as is the case for the sovereign wealth funds. The Taiwanese farmers are privately
managed, privately capitalized and privately owned enterprises. For the Chinese state to control
their behavior requires that the state manipulate the commercial conditions under which they
conduct their normal pursuit of profit. The reporting relationship between the Mainland Chinese
state and Taiwanese farmers seems to be just about as indirect as possible. From the perspective
of the reporting relationship independent variable, this episode should be a hard case for
economic statecraft to have worked. Because these business-government dynamics are so
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fundamentally different from those examined in later chapters, this case is an instructive one to
explore from a theory-building perspective.
Finally, the relative resources in this episode seem to have been slightly skewed toward
the Mainland. In terms of expertise, it determined the conditions under which the fruit would or
would not be granted access to the Chinese market. The state had a larger budget and more
personnel than the Taiwanese farmers did. In addition, the large number of farmers complicated
effective coordination beyond their common interests that were represented by the various
professional associations. That said, the evidence does not suggest that this IV was particularly
salient in this episode.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter examined China's efforts to employ an Interest Transformation strategy.
Operationally, China pursued this strategy by hosting Taiwan's opposition party visits to the
Mainland in the Spring of 2005. Subsequently, China eliminated tariffs on specific fruits
exported from Taiwan to the Mainland. By altering the self-interest calculus of Taiwan's fruit
farmers, Beijing sought to undermine the key support base for independence-minded President
Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. This case identified a discreet instance of economic statecraft that
sought to leverage a strategy based on Interest Transformation security externalities, thus
demonstrating how this type of economic statecraft actually works in practice. Through process-
tracing focused on micro-level empirics, this case demonstrated exactly how states conduct such
a strategy, the mechanisms by which particular instances of economic interaction may be
converted into strategic consequences, and the conditions under which such efforts are more or
less likely to succeed in realizing their strategic objectives.
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Through a detailed examination of the events and circumstances surrounding the spring
2005 opposition party visits and the subsequent elimination of tariffs on Taiwan's export of fruit
to the Mainland, this case showed how the Taiwanese farmers that were targeted by this strategy
shifted their support away from Chen Shui-bian and their traditional backing of the DPP.
Leading up to this episode, Taiwan had been on a path of increasingly more aggressive moves
toward independence led by President Chen Shui-bian and the independence-oriented DPP. The
opposition KMT was able to demonstrate its ability to work constructively with the Mainland to
benefit the narrow commercial interests of Taiwan's fruit farmers. Taiwan's political opposition
(not the ruling DPP) was thus credited with opening up the Mainland market as an export
destination. The actions were part of a KMT effort to steal votes from the DPP base. The
Mainland also sought to undermine the DPP and shift the Taiwanese electorate toward a less
independence-oriented footing. Like most commercial actors, the Taiwanese farmers had a
strong profit motive. Their narrow economic interests prompted them to shift support toward the
KMT and away from the DPP. As a result, DPP support among one of its core constituencies
was eroded. By undermining the DPP while strengthening the opposition KMT, the Mainland
was able to help bring a new leadership to power in Taiwan. While probably not the only factor
contributing to the electoral demise of the DPP, these policies certainly did not help boost DPP
popularity in its regional center of gravity on Taiwan. In this episode, Mainland China used its
economic interaction to pursue its primary strategic objective vis a vis Taiwan, namely
decreasing the likelihood of Taiwanese independence.
Before settling on this advanced form of economic statecraft that seeks to redefine
Taiwan's interests, China experienced an extended period of learning in its attempt to use
economic statecraft to realize its strategic objectives vis a vis Taiwan. The next chapter briefly
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traces this learning process and identifies the key junctures along the path that led China to its
current strategy of Interest Transformation.
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Coercive Leverage and Bolstering Across the Strait
4.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the two phases of the cross-Strait relationship that preceded China's
efforts to produce Interest Transformation security externalities. Before embarking on the
transformation strategy discussed in the last chapter, China attempted to leverage Taiwan's
growing economic dependence in a coercive manner. During this phase of the cross-Strait
relationship, economics-to the extent that it was used strategically-was mainly employed as a
tool of Coercive Leverage. Such efforts often came across as heavy-handed and clumsy.
Frequently, such measures were not only ineffective, but they often were counter-productive as
efforts to impose Beijing's will led to a nationalist backlash on the part of the Taiwanese
electorate. Because this type of security externality (and the logic of a strategy of economic
statecraft used to exploit such externalities) is different from the strategic logic highlighted by
the episode discussed above, it is useful to juxtapose the two here against the common
background conditions of the cross-Strait relationship as part of an effort to understand exactly
how various forms of economic statecraft work.
To provide a holistic treatment of the strategic role of economics in the cross-Strait
relationship, the latter portion of this chapter will also examine the earliest phase of the cross-
Strait relationship. During Phase 1, China's strategic use of economics sought to engender the
Bolstering type of security externalities. During this phase, China mainly sought the natural,
economic benefits accruing from the cross-Strait economic interaction. Studying all three phases
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allows for an understanding of how China's economic statecraft strategies have matured and
developed over time.
4.2 Phase 2 (1996-Summer 2004): Using Economics as a Tool of Coercive Leverage
Whereas Phase 3 began with the growing recognition that the Mainland's efforts to use
coercive means to achieve its strategic objectives were not effective, Phase 2 begins with the
growing realization that the asymmetry in the cross-Strait economic relationship was
increasingly favoring the Mainland. Although the Mainland largely felt that it was more
dependent on Taiwan during Phase 1 of the economic relationship, Phase 2 began as the
Mainland had emerged from the economic isolation imposed in the aftermath of Tiananmen. By
virtue of its size and rapid pace of development, the Mainland was increasingly becoming the
dominant player in the cross-Strait economic relationship. This asymmetry would only increase
as China emerged in a stronger relative position following the East Asian Financial Crisis and
the bursting of the internet bubble. The level of economic interaction further accelerated when
both Taiwan and China entered the WTO. With this realization came the temptation to leverage
Taiwan's increasing dependence on the Mainland. In particular, Mainland China sought to
pressure Taiwanese firms that had invested in Mainland China in an effort to influence the
outcome of presidential elections in Taiwan. In the work that follows, I focus on several
examples of Mainland China's attempts to coerce Taiwanese businesses that have ties to the
Mainland. Before delving into specific instances of coercive leverage, it is useful to examine the
strategic calculus underpinning China's economic statecraft during this phase of the cross-Strait
relationship.
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4.2.1 Mainland's Strategic Logic
The strategic logic that underpinned Mainland China's economic statecraft during this
period is not complicated. It is the same basic logic that guides any Coercive Leverage attempt:
economic dependence can be jeopardized and this ability to threaten generates coercive
capabilities. In Taiwan's case, it is a trading nation whose economy is oriented around
international trade. Increasingly during this phase of the cross-Strait relationship, Taiwan's
economic dependence on China in particular begins to loom larger and larger. Since Taiwan's
international businesses are the commercial actors that are conducting Taiwan's international
commerce, they are a critical element driving Taiwan's economic success. As these firms
become more deeply invested in Mainland China, their success increasingly depends on the
success of their Mainland operations. By threatening to adversely affect the ability of these firms
to operate in the Mainland, China reasoned it could gain coercive leverage over them. To avoid
punishment, China might demand that these firms act in a manner that is conducive to China's
larger strategic interests. This is the basic logic driving Chinese economic statecraft during this
phase.
In the mid/late-1990s, China had reason to believe that a cross-Strait strategy predicated
on exploiting Coercive Leverage security externalities would work. Beijing had employed a
similar strategy to derail democratic reforms in Hong Kong.' Also, Beijing thought that its
impending entry into the WTO would provide it with additional economic leverage. 2 Finally,
China's perception of its coercive military power was also rising during this time. In the early
1990s, China engaged in confrontational behavior in the South China Sea and in 1995-1996, in
'"Similarly, Beijing gained the support of Hong Kong's business community in opposing democratic reforms by the
last British governor, Chris Patten, with threats to ruin their businesses after 1997."Bruce Gilley and Julian Baum,
"Crude Tactics," Far Eastern Economic Review 163, no. 26 (2000): 25.
2 "The implicit threat is to close Taiwan out while the rest of the world is rushing in," Bob Ross as quoted in ibid.
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response to Lee Tung-hui's provocations, China conducted missile exercises off Taiwan's coast.
Given these conditions, it is somewhat unsurprising that China's economic power would also be
conceptualized in coercive terms. As China increasingly came to see itself as a rising power in
the Asia-Pacific, it is unsurprising that China viewed its growing economic clout as yet another
instrument of coercive capacity through which it ought to have been able to pursue its strategic
objectives. Efforts based on such Coercive Leverage strategies characterize Phase 2. This phase
spans the period of cross-Strait relations roughly from the 1995/1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis to
shortly after the 2004 Presidential Election. The next two sections will briefly examine the
presidential elections of 1996, 2000, and 2004 as three episodes that allow interesting
comparisons on how China's strategic use of economics developed during this phase.
4.2.2 China's Coercive Leverage
In the 1996 election, Mainland China refrained from using coercive economic leverage
against Taiwanese investors per se. In fact, during the 1995-1996 Missile Crisis, when China
was explicitly using military tools of national power to pursue its strategic objectives, the
Mainland authorities went to great pains to reassure Taiwanese investors that their economic
activities on the Mainland would be insulated from any cross-Strait political friction. 3 The cross-
Strait economic interaction had been growing rapidly until the mid- 1 990s instability dampened
enthusiasm. Even at this low point in cross-Strait relations, the Mainland went to great pains to
reassure Taiwanese investors that their investments would be insulated from broader cross-Strait
frictions. "'The cross-straits economic and trade co-operation and other exchanges are in the
3 "During the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 Taiwan Strait incidents, the localities-particularly in the coastal areas-
reiterated their pledge to protect the interests of TIE [Taiwan Invested Enterprises]. . ."Chen-Yuan Tung, "Cross-
Strait Economic Relations: China's Leverage and Taiwan's Vulnerability," Issues & Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 137-
175. p. 169. Although to be fair, Tung is correct to note that it is uncertain to what degree these local preferences
determined (or at least constrained) Beijing's behavior.
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fundamental interests of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and have an important
bearing on the development and prosperity of the Chinese nation. Therefore they are not to be
affected by political disparities across the Taiwan Straits,' said Chen Yunlin, Deputy Director of
the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, at a meeting with Taiwan investors in Fujian, a
province facing Taiwan. 'No matter what happens, the rights and interests of Taiwan business
people investing in the mainland will always be protected and will not be harmed .. .China's
mainland 'is committed to provide better investment environment for Taiwan business peoplefor
the prosperity of the Chinese nation in the 21st Century,' Chen said."4
Contrary to Coercive Leverage, this reassurance was explicitly designed to offset any
trepidation Taiwanese firms might have had regarding Beijing's intentions. This effort to
reassure Taiwanese firms was largely driven by the fact that the Mainland still felt dependent
upon Taiwanese capital and management expertise for its own economic development., It
sought to reassure investors and calm jittery capital markets. During the missile crisis, the
Mainland sought to restrict its use of coercive power to the military realm in a heavy-handed
attempt to intimidate Taiwanese voters and dissuade them from electing Lee Tung-hui as
president. The heavy-handed effort backfired and Lee Tung-hui was elected by a wide margin.
Following the 1996 election, China sought to apply greater pressure on Taiwan to prevent further
moves toward independence.
4 "Political Disparities Won't Affect Taiwan Investors: Official," Xinhua News Agency, August 7 1995 [My italics
added.} For evidence of additional reassurances, also see speeches of other senior Mainland officials and
government media coverage at the time: "Wang Daohan Pledges to Protect Legitimate Rights of Taiwan Investors,"
Xinhua News Agency, October 29 1995; "Taiwan Investors' Interests on Mainland Reassured," Xinhua News
Agency, September 7 1995; "Wang Daohan : Situation Across Straits Will Not Affect Investment," Xinhua News
Agency October 16 1995; and "Taiwan Investors' Interests Well Protected," Xinhua News Agency, September 26
1995; "China's Pledge to Taiwan Investors," Xinhua News Agency, March 25 1996.
5 China's coastal economic engines of growth, particularly Fujian, was still highly reliant on Taiwanese capital and
management expertise. This perspective will be discussed in more detail in the section on Phase I below.
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However, the modality of China's coercion shifted from the military to the economic
realm. This shift was largely driven by the counter-productive backlash that China experienced
when attempting to use military tools of national power. For instance, China's aggressive
posture in the South China Sea prompted a renewal of ASEAN's ties to the U.S. and a
strengthening of cooperation among Southeast Asian nations largely directed against China. The
Missile Crisis prompted the U.S. Seventh Fleet to intervene in the Taiwan Strait and the U.S.-
Japan Alliance (which had been under re-evaluation in a post-Cold War context) was
strengthened-largely driven by insecurity in the region.
Having learned through these recent experiences that military force was strategically
ineffective, China sought to employ economic tools of coercion to pursue its objectives vis a vis
Taiwan. Using this economic power involved targeting, threatening and "leaning" on Taiwanese
businesses that were invested in the Mainland. Such firms are often called taishang (t P).
China's efforts would be directed at targeting specific firms and their leaderships to dissuade
them from supporting a pro-independence agenda.
The next two elections provided multiple instances of China attempting to use coercive
leverage against Taiwanese firms that were invested in the Mainland. In 2000 and again in the
2004 election there were reported instances of coercion, intimidation or threat against Taiwanese
firms. In the run-up to and aftermath of the 2000 election, Chinese attempts to "lean" on
Taiwanese firms were scattered, blunt and poorly implemented. Unsurprisingly, they seem to
have had little effect. However, during the 2004 election, it appears that Beijing refined its
implementation tactics and honed in on specific firms and individuals. This more sophisticated
approach seemed to have generated somewhat better results. As noted in the last chapter, in the
aftermath of the 2004 election, China embarked on a reconsideration of how it had been using
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economic statecraft. This would eventually produce the strategy based not on Coercive
Leverage, but rather on Interest Transformation. The evolution of China's cross-Strait economic
statecraft would eventually mature into the long-term oriented Interest Transformation strategy
that we observe today.
4.2.3 Leaning on Taiwanese Investors
The general practice of economic statecraft at this stage was broad and heavy-handed.
China targeted many firms and sought to influence how they and their employees voted.
Economic statecraft during these early days of Coercive Leverage can be roughly characterized
as a direct application of the strategic mindset of intimidation and bluster that lay behind China's
military coercion transposed into the economic realm. Still, using economic rather than military
power represents an improvement over China's techniques of 1996. Before delving into the
specifics of this case, it is useful to note two characteristics of the 2000 election.
First, as Taiwan democratized throughout the 1990s, its businesses also grew more and
more politically active. As is the case in many democracies, political campaign contributions
became an important factor of electoral success. In addition, Taiwanese businesses would
provide candidates with endorsements. The support of large employers carried substantial
weight for political candidates. Many of Taiwan's most successful multinational firms were
viewed as thought leaders and widely admired in Taiwanese society. In addition, Taiwanese
firms, like many businesses around the world, often sought to cultivate helpful political
connections via active participation in the political process. On the eve of the 2000 election,
many of Taiwan's most important firms were playing an advisory role for President Lee Tung-
hui (the incumbent president who would retire in 2000). Although Lee was a member of the
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KMT, his strong sentiments toward Taiwanese independence and efforts to "Localize" (it)
Taiwan made him distrusted by Beijing. Mainland China viewed Taiwanese firms that
cooperated with Lee suspiciously.
Second, the 2000 Taiwan Presidential Election was a very tight three-way electoral race
and Mainland China sought to influence the outcome. The establishment KMT had been split by
Soong's independent run. During the election campaigning, it was widely suspected that
outgoing President Lee's real endorsement was for the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian and not
for the official KMT candidate Lien Chan. The Mainland Chinese government was quite clear
regarding its own preferences on who should be the next president of Taiwan. A few days before
the Taiwanese electorate went to the polls, Zhu Rongji issued stern comments to the effect that
Taiwanese voters were not allowed to choose a candidate that will seek independence for
Taiwan. This was a thinly veiled attack on Chen Shui-bian whose DPP had long called for
Taiwanese independence. Predictably, these comments angered Taiwanese voters and helped tip
the scales in favor of Chen Shui-bian who had already begun to pull ahead in a tight race.
Soong's split from the KMT party (Lien) divided what would have otherwise been the leading
block. In the end, the DPP's Chen inched out Soong and won the election.
The Mainland was predictably displeased with this result and issued a very public
statement criticizing the taishang. On April 8, 2000 Li Bingcai (4)t), deputy director of
China 's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, issued a sternly-worded statement chastising
taishang for "scrambling for profit" while "openly clamor[ing] for Taiwan independence and
advocate[ing] the 'Lee Tung-hui Line,' which preaches the breakup of the motherland. It has
exerted a bad influence."6 His comments implied further pressure against taishang that did not
6 "China Will Not Yield on Matter of Principle - Official," Xinhua General News Service, 8 April 2000.
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uphold the "One China" principle. His condemnation was echoed by Tang Shubei ()t4if),
executive vice-president of China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
(ARATS). 7
Even before the election, several prominent taishang came under scrutiny during this
period. For instance, Stan Shih Chen-jung ( Chairman of Taiwan's largest personal
computer maker, Acer Group) had been a national policy adviser to Lee Tung-hui and seemed to
have close ties to Chen Sui-bian. Shih had attracted attention for a DPP campaign advertisement
that was using his image.8 He had to issue a public statement declaring that he would not be
present in Taiwan during the elections and that he wished to remain neutral. After Chen's
victory, Acer products were removed from Mainland shelves and Shih had to make a special trip
to the Mainland to publicly pledge his support for reunification.9 Shih, who had normally
enjoyed good access to officials and industry leaders was snubbed during an April, 2000
technology conference in Beijing. In responding to this pressure, an Acer executive was quoted
as saying, "we definitely consider this is very serious for Acer business group in China... We
have to be careful and sensitive in our response."' 0 Acer had invested US$150 million in the
Mainland and planned to expand its facilities there. In the end, Shih tried to distance himself
from politics like many other taishang.
Acer was not the only Taiwanese business with political links. Continental Engineering
Corporation, China Motor Corporation, I-Mei Foods Company, Ltd and E. Sun Bank all agreed
to join Chen's national policy advisory group. The CEO of Taiwan High-speed Rail, Nita Ing (
7 Tang alluded that taishang did little to promote reunification while reaping profits. Chung-yan Chow, "Business
Leaders Warned on Independence," South China Morning Post, 10 April 2000.
8 Dermot Doherty, "Taiwan's Business Leaders Take Sides before Vote " Dow Jones Newswire, 16 March 2000.
9 Mure Dickie and James Kynge, "Business in Taiwan Heeds Warning on Independence," Financial Times, Apr 11
2000, p. 12.1 ibid.
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PQTA), and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Chairman, Morris Chang (9K]WE), also
served as policy advisors to Chen Shui-bian." The CEO of Evergreen Shipping, Chang Yung-fa
was another strong Chen supporter and long-time advocate of Taiwanese
independence. Chang provided an important endorsement of Chen in the lead-up to the election
and agreed to serve on Chen's policy making committee. China's liaison in Hong Kong, He
Zhiming (1i )B), reportedly warned Hong Kong businesses to be wary of choosing Taiwanese
partners since pro-independence businesses would "face serious consequences."1 2 This pressure
was significant because a good deal of Evergreen's shipping was routed through Hong Kong
(much of Taiwan's Mainland shipping moved through Hong Kong because of the lack of direct
trade links). After the election, Evergreen retrenched and said it wanted closer economic links
with the Mainland and that it did not support Taiwanese independence.13 Evergreen's Mainland
operations did not seem to be materially impacted by Chang's political activities although he too
seemed to lower his political profile in the aftermath of the 2000 election.
One of the most high-profile supporters of Chen Shui-bian was the petrochemicals and
plastics company Chi Mei ('iP ) founder and CEO, Hsu Wen-lung (iFjC-2). Like Shih, Hsu
had been an advisor to Lee Tung-hui and was known for his outspoken support for Taiwanese
independence. Hsu provided a crucial endorsement to Chen about two weeks before the polls.
In his endorsement, Hsu noted that Chen was the heir of Lee Tung-hui and was "the candidate
" Doherty, Taiwan's Business Leaders Take Sides before Vote
2 "'Individual leading business figures have, on the one hand, openly supported Taiwan independence on the island,
and on the other, obtained advantages from their economic activities in the mainland,' the official, He Zhiming, told
a group of pro-Beijing businessmen. 'This is absolutely not permitted. I believe all of you, on listening to these
remarks, will know how to choose when seeking Taiwan trading partners."' From: John Pomfret, "China Warns
Taiwan Firms Not to Back Sovereignty; Beijing Says Businesses Risk Losing its Trade " The Washington Post, 3
June 2000, sec. A, p. 9. The Hong Kong government denied this position "but the damage was already done." See
the June 5, 2000 editorial in The Asian Wall Street Journal entitled: "China's Threats --- Withholding economic
opportunities to influence Taiwan will backfire," p. 8. Also see: J.R. Wu, "Taiwan Businesses Can Still Seek the
Good Earth but Wary," June 25, 2000. Dow Jones International News.
" Dickie and Kynge, Business in Taiwan Heeds Warning on Independence,
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best able to follow the departing president's 'line.'" 14 Hsu also agree to serve as a policy advisor
to the new Chen administration. Such blatant support infuriated Beijing. After the election, Chi
Mei's Mainland factories and operations were subjected to surprise inspections, environmental
regulations, tax, customs, and labor investigations.1 5 "Starting in mid-May, teams of about 40
Chinese investigators descended on three factories run by Chi Mei in China's Jiangsu province
and investigated them for a week . .. they [the investigators] intimated strongly that they had
been dispatched to the factories because of Hsu's support for Chen. . .The Chinese officials
'were very blunt,' he said. 'They said our president had supported Chen. They had labeled him a
Taiwan independence activist."'16
Although Chi-Mei did receive harassing investigations, as Scot Tanner noted in his work
on the taishang, most of these Mainland threats against pro-independence leaning taishang did
not escalate into substantive actions taken against the offending companies. 7 The primary
reason for this was the divergent perspectives between the central government (that sought to
employ coercive leverage against Chen's supporters) and the local municipalities that hosted the
Taiwanese businesses' investments in the Mainland. These local officials were much more pre-
disposed toward ensuring that the taishang continued to provide important jobs and economic
activities in their regions. There were numerous reports of local officials countermanding the
centrally-issued threats.18 In the end, the attempt at coercing these firms met with limited (if
any) success, although China's Coercive Leverage tactics did seem to cause most taishang to
14 Mure Dickie and James Kynge, "China in Warning to Taiwan Businesses," Financial Times, Apr 10 2000, p. 10.
" Gilley and Baum, Crude Tactics,
16 Pomfret, China Warns Taiwan Firms Not to Back Sovereignty; Beiing Says Businesses Risk Losing its Trade
* Murray Scot Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan : A Tricky Weapon to use (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2007).
18 See for instance: "Business Trumps Politics," The Economist (U.S. Edition), July 28, 2001.
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determine that it was more prudent to take a lower political profile, rather than risk attracting
unprofitable attention.
One of the firms that did not buckle and as such continued to receive pressure from the
Mainland was Chi Mei Group, led by its outspoken founder and long-time Chen supporter, Hsu
Wen-long. In 2004, Chi Mei was considering expanding its operations on the Mainland to move
into liquid-crystal display (LCD) distribution and assembly. Specifically, Hsu was planning to
open another Mainland factory in either Shanghai or Ningbo for the Chi Mei TFT/LCD
manufacturing subsidiary. The Mainland threatened that it would impose investment restrictions
and subject any Chi Mei operations to intense regulatory scrutiny if Hsu persisted in his pro-
independence advocacy. The Chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council claims that
Beijing had threatened Hsu with "investment restrictions and nonstop regulatory scrutiny of his
Mainland operations. 'They applied a lot of pressure."' 19 In June 2004, Chinese newspapers
criticized Hsu Wen-lung by name and noted that all "Green" (i.e. pro-independence) businesses
were no longer welcome on the Mainland. Chi Mei's Taipei Stock Exchange-listed TFT/LCD
subsidiary took a 5% hit on the news. In the end, Hsu Wen-long would publish an open letter on
March 26, 2005 criticizing Chen for going too far. In his letter, Hsu admitted that Taiwan's push
for independence was a "recipe for disaster."20
It seemed that the Mainland's decision to focus on one of the most prominent supporters
of Chen's independence stance was designed serve as an example to other taishang. Hsu made a
good candidate to target since he seemed to be among the most unrepentant of the pro-DPP
taishang following the 2000 election. Recognizing that they could not effectively enforce strict
punishment measures on all the taishang, Beijing sought to single-out the most high-profile of
19 Brian Bremmer and Matt Kovac, "China's New Taiwan Tack," BusinessWeek May 16, 2005.
20ibid.
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them and make an example of him. Hsu's response indicated that this more targeted effort to
bring coercive pressure to bear on Chi Mei did have the effect of forcing Hsu to publicly back
down from his previous support for Chen. These events provide a good example of how the
Mainland uses its "king-making" capabilities to encourage or discourage the commercial success
of enterprises in the Mainland. Those entities21 that are not seen as being sufficiently supportive
are excluded from lucrative contracts, are subject to intrusive regulatory oversight or may
become targets of anti-corruption campaigns or any other variety of more subtle discriminatory
measures. For those organizations and individuals that toe the line, Beijing has the ability to
bestow very lucrative rewards, but Beijing also has the capacity to make life difficult for those
entities that are out of favor. Such state favors (or disfavors) are often granted on the basis of
political compatibilities with preferred government policy and objectives. Asymmetry and the
increasing structural centrality of cross-Strait economics to Taiwan make this mechanism of
Coercive Leverage seem more likely to be effectively employed to further Beijing's objectives in
the future. This more sophisticated, targeted strategy-while still seeking to make use of the
Coercive Leverage security externalities-seems to presage China's later efforts to engage in
economic statecraft that was explicitly designed to not only enforce compliance with Beijing's
wishes, but to alter the preferences of the commercial actors such that the commercial actors
actually wanted the same objectives that Beijing sought.
By the time the 2004 election had arrived, the Mainland scaled back its efforts to interfere
in a heavy-handed manner. What efforts did target taishang focused on the most out-spoken
supporters of Chen and brought the full power of the central government to bear. In 2004,
211 use the term "entities" to denote that targets of this type of economic power are not only limited to the Taiwan
case. Local governments, businesses, specific individuals, newspapers, or NGOs are some examples of entities that
may be targets of such practices. The Hong Kong case provides several cases that illustrate how Beijing uses this
sort of economic power.
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Beijing was much more nuanced in its use of economics to pursue its strategic objectives.
"Throughout most of the campaign, moreover, Beijing appeared to demonstrate much greater
sophistication about influencing democratic politics than it had shown in the past ... .Beijing
largely refrained-though not entirely-from the type of finger-wagging public threats against
the Taiwan electorate that had proven disastrously counterproductive in the 1996 and 2000
elections."22 This evolution seems to provide some indication that the regime was learning how
to more effectively use economic statecraft in its efforts to manage cross-Strait dynamics.
Efforts in 2004 were more directed and targeted specific, high-profile measures against the most
blatant pro-independence taishang. This more targeted approach yielded somewhat better results
as Chi Mei's founder, Hsu Wen-lung publicly recanted his support for Taiwan's independence.
However, Coercive Leverage still failed to prevent Chen's winning re-election in 2004. As
mentioned above, in the aftermath of his re-election, the Mainland re-considered its Coercive
Leverage -based approach to economic statecraft. This re-orientation marked the origins of the
Interest Transformation strategy that the Mainland continues to use today.
The next section evaluates China's efforts to employ a strategy of economic statecraft
that sought to exploit the Coercive Leverage type of security externalities. China's strategy is
evaluated in terms of the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2.
4.2.4 Evaluating the Coercive Leverage Strategy
So did China's economic statecraft in this phase work? China's objectives were to
influence Taiwan's elections-specifically to prevent the more independence-oriented candidate
from winning. To achieve this objective, China sought to target key business supporters. In
1996, 2000, and 2004 the independence-oriented candidate won. These results suggest that no,
2 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, p.118.
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strictly speaking, China's efforts to lean on the taishang did not succeed. That said, China was
mildly effective at making life difficult for these firms. In the end, there is evidence that the
taishang will be less likely to actively support contentious political positions going forward.
Eventually, after blunt pressure from China several of the taishang seemed to back down or at
least take a lower political profile and attempt to "fly below the radar." However overall, this
coercive approach was strategically not successful because it generated a public backlash among
the Taiwanese electorate. China's bullying validated the DPP's independence credentials and
triggered nationalist support among the Taiwanese electorate who did not look favorably on the
Mainland's efforts to intimidate Taiwan. In the end, China's heavy-handed tactics actually
probably helped improve Chen's electoral position. So these attempts at economic statecraft
were not successful for the Mainland. What went wrong?
First, did this instance meet the requirements for successful economic statecraft? In
terms of size of the economic interaction and elasticity, it seems that yes, taishang were big
enough to matter and China represented a unique enough partner for their operations that they
did not have many alternatives to replace China as an operations center. However, when we
examine the commensurability of China's goal (preventing Chen and the pro-independence DPP
from holding power) with the tools of economic statecraft that China sought to employ (coercive
leverage), it seems that the objective may have been outsized relative to the economic means
available. Coercive Leverage may be useful for forcing compliance on a target, but for
influencing Taiwan's election, a strategy based on Interest Transformation would have been
more potent as China eventually learned during Phase 3 (as discussed above).
In terms of the factors that account for whether the state is able to control commercial
actors, the divergent goals of the commercial actors and the state feature prominently in
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explaining where China's efforts may have faltered. The incentives of the commercial actors
(taishang) were not aligned with the goals of the state. In the most successful cases, it seemed
that the state could force taishang to hide below the radar to avoid ruffling feathers on the
Mainland. However, the taishang that China targeted never really wanted to undermine Chen.
Moreover, China had no real strategy to alter these commercial actors' preferences. Pressure
was simply coercive and designed to ensure compliance (rather than redefine the taishang's
political views). This phase shows the limitations of using economic statecraft predicated on a
coercive leverage strategy. Achieving China's goals required a strategy that was designed to
exploit Interest Transformation security externalities. This was the strategic error that China
committed in this instance: using the wrong tool for the strategic objective being sought. States
must be attuned to what commercial actors want to accomplish and how doing what the state
wants to see done might work to the advantage of the firms. In this case, China made it clear that
life on the Mainland would be better if the taishang did what Beijing wanted. But in practice,
many taishang understood that it was really the local and municipal officials who constituted the
"state" that could determine how bad or good the taishang's local Mainland operating
environment would be.
The state's coercive capabilities were not as powerful as they could have been given that
the state was not a unitary actor in this instance. The state suffered from division between the
local municipalities and the central government with regard to their respective willingness to
actually punish the taishang. Many Taiwanese investors had developed deep relationships with
local authorities in Xiamen or Fuzhou to help ensure stability and political support for their
investments. 3 Indeed, increasingly, local authorities' own political advancement hinged on their
23 Such local support is critical in successful investments. According to Taiwanese businessmen, "policies,
negotiations, or agreements signed by Taipei and Beijing help very little; what really controls the daily life is the
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local economic performance. In many instances, this economic growth was heavily reliant on
continued Taiwanese FDI and management human capital. The local cadre faced strong
motivations stemming from their performance evaluation process that was heavily weighted
toward regional economic performance. This gave them strong incentives to keep the Taiwanese
firms happily invested in their region since these Taiwanese employers were a dynamic engine of
regional economic growth. However, this narrow interest created tension and divisions between
the central government in Beijing and the local municipalities where the taishang operated. The
result was that the state did not act in a unified manner. As the theory suggests, the commercial
actors were able to exploit these divisions to avoid serious punishment. This strategy enabled
them to fly below the radar and continue doing business with minimal actual consequences
arising from their political actions.
Although there were many taishang actively invested in the Mainlarid during this phase,
their size and the public nature of their activities helped the state monitor and target firms. When
compared to the large numbers of small and medium sized enterprises that constituted the
commercial actors of Phase 1 and the disparate fruit farmers that were the commercial actors
examined in Phase 3, these large taishang were relatively easier for the state to monitor and
target. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the problem for the state was not so much being able
to identify and monitor the firms, but rather that the internal divisions within the state that served
to undermine efforts to coerce the firms.
It also seems that these internal divisions are to blame for the ineffectiveness of the
state's regulatory capabilities. Although the nature of the relationship between the state and the
commercial actors in this case is indirect, this feature alone should not have precluded effective
local city or county government," Leng cites his interview with Liu An-kuo, a Taiwanese lamp-maker in August of
1994. Tse-Kang Leng, "The State and Taiwan's Mainland Economic Policy," Asian Affairs: An American Review
23, no. I (Spring, 1996), p. 26.
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government action. The regulatory environment had been largely decentralized and was resting
mainly on local enforcement efforts. Since local officials diverged from the central
government's objectives, the disunity of the state undermined the power of the state to leverage
whatever authority it may have been able to wield via the Reporting Relationship IV. This
undermined the effectiveness of state enforcement-a necessary tool for a coercive strategy.
From the perspective of the Relative Resources IV, the taishang had a good deal of local
operating knowledge on the Mainland. Since the state was divided along center-local tensions,
the distribution of the state's enforcement capabilities also played a role. The relative resource
disparity between local enforcement capabilities and the central government's more limited
resources further undermined the ability of the state to control the commercial actors in this
context. The local officials seem to have had more the important bureaucratic resources in terms
of enforcement than the central government in Beijing was able to bring to bear in this episode.
4.2.5 Conclusion
During this phase of the cross-Strait relationship, China attempted to capitalize on what
was becoming an increasingly asymmetrical relationship. China's economic statecraft strategy
sought to make use of Coercive Leverage security externalities by targeting specific large
Taiwanese firms that had significant operations in the Mainland. These firms were targeted
because key leaders of these firms supported Chen Shui-bian, the DPP, or pro-independence
sentiments more generally. China's efforts to prevent independence-oriented candidates from
winning presidential elections on Taiwan during this phase were unsuccessful.
China's economic statecraft seems to have suffered from three shortcomings. First,
China was trying to change the national preferences of Taiwan via coercive leverage. This was
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the wrong strategic tool for such an enormous job. The taishang that China targeted had very
firm views regarding their political preferences, rather than recognizing this and designing an
Interest Transformation strategy to address this, China sought to use Coercive Leverage-a tool
suited to enforcing compliance but not altering preferences. Second, the internally divided
nature of the state during this phase made enforcement difficult to execute. Even if a Coercive
Leverage approach had been appropriate, the central government authorities were seeking
outcomes that were opposed to what the local authorities sought. This friction allowed the
commercial actors to find shelter under the protection of local and provincial officials. Third,
China's actions against the taishang reinforced the belief in Taiwan that China presented a
menacing threat to Taiwan. Castigating the taishang confirmed suspicions of a China that
sought to bully a much smaller Taiwan. Moreover, receiving such pressure seemed to validate
the DPP's (and its supporters') anti-authoritarian credentials. In many ways, these firms were
seen as standing up to China. China's policies stoked Taiwanese nationalism and on more than
one occasion resulted in an electoral lift for the anti-Mainland candidate.
4.3 Phase 1 (1979-1996): Initiating & Deepening Economic Ties
Of course before China was able to attempt to leverage Taiwan's economic dependence
on the Mainland, cross-Strait ties were characterized by the Mainland's efforts to attract
Taiwanese investment, expertise, and trade. During this phase, the Mainland was largely reliant
on Taiwan. To the extent that economic interaction carried strategic ramifications, they were
mainly of the Bolstering variety. It was not until Beijing's post-Tiananmen isolation had begun
to thaw that China felt it could try to employ the Coercive Leverage strategy discussed in Phase
2 above. The remainder of the chapter lays out the foundational phase of the cross-Strait
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economic interaction, from the initial contact through the 1995/1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. This
section begins by briefly highlighting the background conditions that both pulled and pushed
Taiwanese capital toward the Mainland.
4.3.1 Background Conditions
The origins of cross-Strait economic statecraft are rooted in three background conditions
that laid the foundation for economic interaction across the Taiwan Strait. First, domestic
developments in China's political economy, namely in Deng Xiaoping's policy of "Reform and
Opening Up" (2i1JFRi) created significant "pull" for economic engagement with Taiwan.
China's export-oriented development strategy relied heavily on foreign capital. Perhaps more
importantly than capital, China needed Taiwanese management expertise. This often
accompanied foreign investment and was particularly important as China was emerging from a
socialist, planned economic model. Taiwan was an excellent source for such resources.
Taiwanese investment and management expertise both served to bolster the Mainland's economy
during this phase.
Second, rising production costs on Taiwan helped "push" economic activity toward the
Mainland. Rising standards of living meant domestic production costs in Taiwan had risen
considerably making the Taiwanese operating environment less internationally competitive. As
part of an effort to ferret out new low-cost production centers, Taiwanese businesses began to
explore the possibility of transferring some of their production to the much lower cost Mainland.
Three phenomena in particular seem to have encouraged investment in Mainland China: the
rising wage and land costs in Taiwan, stricter environmental regulations (which created pressure
for many of the larger, more capital intensive polluting enterprises to move their dirtier
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operations to the more lenient Mainland) and the surplus of "idle capital" in Taiwan.2 As
capital controls were loosened and wages began to rise concurrent with Taiwanese economic
development levels, the private sector increasingly sought out lower wage labor abroad.2 In
addition, as local communities began to enjoy greater voice and representation under
democratization, environmental regulations tightened. This had the effect of increasing the costs
for some of the heavier polluting Taiwanese industries like petrochemical refineries and
industrial manufacturing. 26 Finally, there was evidence of a surplus of foreign exchange reserves
that had been built up in the late 1980s which would have found a productive home in capital
hungry Mainland China of the early 1990S.27
These two factors (China's "Reform and Opening Up" and Taiwan's rising production
costs) were catalyzed by the third background condition: the liberalization of Taiwan's domestic
political economy. Taiwan was in the process of consolidating its own nascent democratization
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. During Phase 1, as Taiwan democratized, the KMT
loosened its dominant grip on Taiwan's government and economy. As part of the
democratization process, the KMT began to divest many of its large, state owned assets.
Although done as part of the larger move from an authoritarian, single party state to a
democratic, competitively elected form of government, the divestiture had the effect of
privatizing a large portion of Taiwan's economic activity. This privatization meant that the
24 Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 2005) p. 28 also highlights the appreciation of the New Taiwan Dollar in addition to the rising costs of land
and labor in Taiwan, as well as growing domestic demand for stricter environmental regulations.
2 Karen M. Sutter, "Business Dynamism Across the Taiwan Strait," Asian Survey 42, no. 3 (2002): 522 especially
p. 527.
26 For a good case study of such dynamics see Laurids S. Lauridsen's "Policies and Institutions of Industrial
Deepening and Upgrading in Taiwan I -the Basic Industry Strategy in Petrochemicals" Volume 4 (Working paper
no. I 0-produced for the GlobAsia Research Group, International Development Studies, Roskilde University,
Denmark 1999).
27 Tse-Kang Leng, "The State and Taiwan's Mainland Economic Policy," Asian Affairs: An American Review 23,
no. I (Spring, 1996), p. 31.
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interests of Taiwan's large economic actors would no longer be closely dictated by centralized
government plans. "Increased political competition enabled civil society, especially business
interests, to gain greater voice relative to the state than it had during the earlier period of state-
guided export-led industrialization."28 As would be seen in even more stark relief in later years,
the private sector would increasingly base its behavior on a set of incentives that did not
necessarily take into consideration the goals of the government. 29 Another consequence of
Taiwan's democratization was the need for the state (especially the political parties) to curry
favor with business interests.30 Incidentally, this business influence on Taiwan's politics
provided pretext that would later underpin China's attempts to lean on the taishang as part of its
Coercive Leverage strategy during Phase 2.
Thus, the three background factors that set conditions for the initialization of cross-Strait
economic interaction are as follows. First, Taiwan's democratization led to the liberalization of
its state-dominated economic model. This increased the distance between the Taiwanese
government and its commercial actors. As these assets were spun off and privatized, Taiwan's
commercial actors would increasingly respond to commercial incentives rather than
governmental control or direction. Second, the commercial conditions on Taiwan were changing
as production costs were rising. This resulted in pressure for firms to seek out new, low-cost
production centers. Third, China's "Reform and Opening Up" effort created substantial demand
28 Steve Chan, "The Politics of Economic Exchange: Carrots and Sticks in Taiwan-China-U.S. Relations," Issues &
Studies 42, no. 2 (2006): p. 6.
29 This domestic political economy development on Taiwan is an important pre-cursor to the inability of the
Taiwanese State to control its commercial actors-a dynamic observed later in the 1990s & 2000s. This makes it
easier for commercial actors to avoid tight control as opposed to the earlier period of tight state control of the
economy. As the Taiwan state liberalized and the economy became more and more privatized, the state had less
ability to maintain control over its commercial actors whose cross-Strait engagement generated strategic
externalities with which Taiwan's administrations would later have to contend. In Phases 2 and 3, China would seek
to take advantage of these economic ties to further its strategic objectives.
30 Seanon S. Wong, "Economic Statecraft Across the Strait: Business Influence in Taiwan's Mainland Policy," Asian
Perspective 29, no. 2 (2005): 41-72., highlights the need for the DPP to moderate its position and tack to the center,
but what may be more interesting is how winning elections in Taiwan became so dependent on campaign
contributions and the important role of Taiwan's large corporations as a source for these types of contributions.
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for foreign capital and expertise. The confluence of these three conditions enabled the start of
the cross-Strait economic relationship.
4.3.2 The Mainland's strategic logic
The strategic logic behind the Mainland's economic statecraft during this phase is
straightforward. China sought to induce Bolstering security externalities through increased
investment from Taiwan. Recall from Chapter 2, Bolstering security externalities result from the
Ricardian gains from trade or from the natural complementarities and efficiencies resulting from
the efficient allocation of capital. Bolstering externalities are among the most basic of security
consequences that arise from economic interaction. Improvements to one's economy is often the
primary benefit states seek from engaging in trade or international investment in the first place.
In this instance, China's economy suffered from a capital shortage. Also, as a consequence of
thirty years of inefficient state planning and disastrous crash development programs, China
lacked modern managerial expertise. During this first phase of the cross-Strait economic
interaction, Beijing sought to encourage the initiation of economic ties, primarily to access
Taiwanese capital and managerial expertise.
Taiwan provided a uniquely "Chinese" source of both of these key inputs for the
Mainland's developing economy. In addition to having recently undergone a similar transition
from a state-dominated economic system to a more liberalized, dynamic economy, Taiwan's
early investors brought a unique perspective to the Mainland. Moreover, Taiwanese investors
were coming from a similar cultural background. Many still had familial ties in the Mainland,
thus providing valuable networks and sources of partnerships. Building on these elements, the
Mainland sought to encourage Taiwanese investment. The initial cross-Strait ties were driven by
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these dynamics. After Tiananmen, the Mainland was seriously isolated as many countries cut
their economic ties to the regime. Reform efforts ground to a halt. However, China's economic
development needs did not change (even though the political climate had altered considerably).
As a result, during the early 1990s when China was diplomatically isolated, China was
particularly desperate for foreign capital and quality managerial talent. Taiwanese entrepreneurs
stepped into the breach. This led to the first major surge of Taiwanese investment in the
Mainland. During this period, Mainland China came to depend on Taiwanese capital.
To pursue its goals of attracting Taiwanese capital, China engaged in a number of policy
measures and actions that were designed to attract, facilitate, and reassure Taiwanese investors.
At the same time that the Mainland was working to generate Bolstering externalities, the
Taiwanese government was either acquiescent, indifferent, or unable to effectively curtail its
own private sector actors from engaging ever more deeply with the Mainland. As Taiwan's
economy has developed, it has become more and more dependent on the Mainland. However
during this initial phase of the relationship, the asymmetry in the relationship largely favored
Taiwan. As a result, China can be observed going to great lengths during this period to maintain
and increase the investment flows from Taiwan. Even in the face of the missile tests in 1995-
1996 as the rest of China's cross-Strait policy was getting more aggressive, China sought to
reassure Taiwanese investors, demonstrating its desire to maintain economic ties even in the face
of cross-Strait animosity.
4.3.3 China's Bolstering Economic Statecraft
160
Chapter Four: Taiwanese Firms and the Mainland
During this first phase of economic interaction, Beijing sought to encourage the initiation
and development of higher levels of economic interaction with Taiwan.3 1 Although the specific
rationale for how economic ties would serve their interests were not always precisely or
consistently articulated, the Mainland Chinese leadership generally seemed to agree that it was in
Beijing's interests to develop closer economic ties to Taiwan. Specifically, deeper economic ties
would not only further the PRC's economic development (by providing additional capital and
culturally-relevant managerial expertise); it was also hoped that deepening economic links would
lay the foundation for closer political ties sometime in the future. 32
China actively began to reach out to attract Taiwanese capital in Deng's 1979 New Year
"Message to Taiwan Compatriots." Since Chiang Ching-Kuo's 1979 "Three No's Policy" (no
contact, no negotiation, no compromise) in response to the PRC's New Year "Message to
Taiwan Compatriots," Taiwanese investors were officially prohibited from directly engaging in
economic interaction with the Mainland. Despite these prohibitions, limited economic ties began
to form in the early 1980s. These nascent efforts to develop cross-strait economic relations seem
to have originated with Mainland overtures directly to Taiwanese investors.33 As part of
Beijing's export-oriented development strategy, in 1983 the PRC passed the "Guidance on
Taiwanese Investments in Special Economic Zones and Related Favorable Policies." These
initial overtures attracted early small business entrepreneurs who exploited familial and cultural
ties in localized and regional investments on the Mainland. However, the scale and scope of
31 By the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party faced public alienation after four decades of failed economic
policies. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the party turned to economic growth based on liberalization that
required massive amounts of foreign investment. Taiwan business owners were an obvious source because they had
capital and because they were culturally Chinese. Bush, Untying the Knot, p. 28.
1Ibid., p. 28
3 As early as Marshall Ye Jianying's Nine Points speech in 1981, the PRC has been taking specific steps to
facilitate private sector Taiwanese investment in Mainland China. Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The
U.S.--Taiwan--China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) p. 102; also see: Bush, Untying the Knot,
pp. 36-38.
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these activities remained fairly minimal and levels of investment continued to be generally
insignificant.
As the Taiwan government began to allow Taiwan citizens to visit relatives on the
Mainland in late 1987, the PRC's State Council took the opportunity to pass "Regulations for
Encouraging Investment by Taiwan Compatriots," (sometimes called "The 22 Articles") in July
of 1988 to clarify the incentives and provide clearer economic legality governing Taiwanese
Mainland investment.34 Less than a year later, in May of 1989, Xiamen and Fuzhou (both in
Fujian Province-a province with strong historical, cultural and familial ties to Taiwan) were
designated as investment zones for Taiwan firms. T. J. Cheng, in his chapter contribution to
Dangerous Strait, offers a useful observation that Mainland government policy designed to
attract Taiwanese FDI has had two components: protection of Taiwanese investment and the
creation of incentives. Based on these events, it seems that the initial spark of cross-Straits
economic interaction was largely motivated by changes in the Mainland investment environment.
These changes were designed to attract Taiwanese investment which helped bolster the
Mainland's economic development-this was the dominant strategic priority for China under
Deng Xiaoping.
However, investment levels remained at fairly insignificant levels until the events of
Tiananmen in June of 1989 diplomatically isolated Beijing from the rest of the world
community. As part of the sanctions imposed on China in response to its crackdown on student
protestors, the western-based FDI upon which much of China's future development strategy
34 These articles contained all the special inducements offered to foreign investors, but went several steps further by
allowing Taiwanese investors to sell stock in projects, rent government-owned factories, and take over and operate
state enterprises by guaranteeing a certain amount of earnings to the state. See: Leng, "The State and Taiwan's
Mainland Economic Policy," p. 29 and Tucker, Dangerous Strait, p. 102.
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rested was suspended." While most of the rest of the world community suspended economic
ties to China, entrepreneurial Taiwanese investors leapt at the opportunity to fill the void.36 By
the end of 1989, 1,600 Taiwan enterprises had invested $1.2 billion. Indirect trade volume in
1990 would grow to $3.5 billion.37 Taiwanese investment began to grow considerably during
this period as capital hungry China took measures to encourage and facilitate Taiwanese
investment even further. For instance in March of 1990, Wang Yung-ching (Likfk) CEO of
Formosa Plastics signed an agreement of intention to move a multibillion dollar investment to
Haichang. Deng Xiaoping ordered "green-light treatment" and priority development for this
project in Haichang. 38 Although the plan eventually folded under heavy pressure from Taipei,
this effort was illustrative of a notable shift that began to occur in the early 1990s. Increasingly,
larger Taiwanese enterprises were looking to invest in mainland China. The huge growth in
economic activity in the run up to and the aftermath of the Koo-Wang talks illustrates this
point. 39 Contracted FDI levels in 1992 and 1993 show a big jump as the Taiwan and PRC
governments signaled their official sanctioning of this economic interaction.40 The lack of an
established track record and the absence of and/or questionable reliability of Chinese economic
3 Yu-shan Wu notes that during this post-Tiananmen period, the PRC's cross-Strait economic strategic behavior
was driven more out of economic necessity stemming from suspended investment flows rather than by any serious
motivation to use economic interaction to unify Taiwan. See Wu, "Mainland China's Economic Policy Toward
Taiwan: Economic Needs Or Unification Scheme?" Issues and Studies 30, no. 9 (September, 1994), 29-49.
36 Weng notes that Taiwan offered only "half-hearted condemnation" of the Tiananmen crackdown. B. S. J. Weng,
"The Evolution of a Divided China" in The Chinese and their Future: Beiing, Taipei and Hong Kong, ed. Z. Lin
Thomas W.Robinson (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1991), p. 373. Instead of an expected cooling of cross-straits
economic activity, investment activity actually picked up steam during this period as Western capital flows dried up.
The degree of China's isolation should not be too overstated, however. In addition to Taiwanese FDI, Japan was
also fairly quick to re-instate much of its economic aid and loans.
3 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Cheng notes that Deng's South China Tour is also likely to have been responsible for attracting Taiwanese FDI
during this period. See: Tucker, Dangerous Strait, p. 97.
40 It should also be noted that during this time, the Taiwanese government relaxed its position on prohibited
investments in Mainland China. Under this more relaxed atmosphere, a higher level of investment was officially
reported to the government. Thus the unusually high levels of FDI reported in 1993 are in part due to the belated
registration with the Taiwanese Investment Commission (part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs) by firms that
invested surreptitiously in China previously. For more on this see Cheng in Tucker, p. 97.
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infrastructure and supporting legal frameworks gave investors some pause.4' However, by 1994,
the National People's Congress enacted the "Investment Protection Law" whose further
codification of private property rights cleared the way for larger, more complex and more formal
investments. This effort combined with tax incentives and land provisions seem to have been
effective in attracting not only small and medium Taiwanese enterprises during this period but
increasingly larger Taiwanese corporations.4 By this time, cross-strait investment began to
include more and more large and medium sized companies rather than the first wave of cross-
strait investors-the small, entrepreneurial ventures.
In summary, the opening phase of the development of cross-strait economic ties seems to
have been driven by active Chinese government regulations and policies designed to attract
Taiwanese capital. This was part of China's strategy of economic statecraft that was designed to
encourage Bolstering security externalities. The Deng-era reforms and an increased demand for
Taiwanese FDI following the events of Tiananmen made the Mainland investment climate even
more attractive during this phase. At the same time, economic changes on Taiwan like rising
textile wages and stricter environmental regulations seemed to add additional force to private
sector assessments of whether or not to invest in Mainland China. As evidenced above, cross-
Strait economic interaction began and then proceeded to rise rapidly during this period.
During the more than fifteen years that Taiwanese investments had been flowing into
Mainland China, the supporting economic infrastructure had become more and more developed.
Property rights became increasingly better secured and legal protection was passed to facilitate
41 Frequently, supporting legal infrastructure was locally-based and relied on maintaining good relations with local
municipal authorities. Until the Koo-Wang talks and the "Regulations for Encouraging Investment" there was little
nationally-based law to govern the security of private property rights and other issues of ownership and transfer.
42 Tax concessions included two years of corporate tax exemption and three years of 50% reduction. Land
concessions filled out the offering with government-led development of industrial estates to facilitate the synergistic
benefits of larger technology parks.
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investment activities.43 Toward the end of this phase, as the Mainland investment environment
became less risky, larger second-mover investors became active in the Mainland. As the
asymmetry in the relationship began to shift in the mid- 1990s, these taishang would be targeted
when China shifted its economic statecraft strategy from one seeking to create Bolstering
security externalities to one that more aggressively sought to influence the elections in Taiwan
by employing the Coercive Leverage discussed in Phase 2.
4.3.4 Evaluating China's Bolstering Strategy
This section examines the effects that early Taiwanese investment had on China's coastal
development. Phase 1 of the cross-Strait economic interaction included the initial opening of ties
that laid the foundations for future, more active forms of economic statecraft. However, the
dominant security externalities that were generated during this period of the relationship are of
the Bolstering type of security externalities. Strategies for maximizing its strategic effect are
fairly passive and mainly occur as a natural result of Ricardian gains from trade (or investment).
Mainland China's strategic goal during this phase was economic development away from
its rather unproductive state-planned economy. The policies that China developed during this
period to attract Taiwanese investment were largely successful. Taiwanese investment
contributed to the economic growth and development of China (particularly the coastal provinces
like Fujian) as the economic interaction generated Bolstering security externalities. These
effects of the Taiwanese investment often came in the form of productivity and efficiency gains.
4 Defining and ensuring enforcement of private property rights was a key source of uncertainty and insecurity that
Beijing tried to address in its development of a supporting legal and economic infrastructure in Mainland China. For
more on the centrality of property rights in economic development see Douglass Cecil North and Robert Paul
Thomas, The Rise of the Western World; a New Economic History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1973); Douglass Cecil North, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1981); Oliver
E. Williamson, Sidney G. Winter and R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm : Origins, Evolution, and Development
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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In this phase, China's economic statecraft strategy seems to have been largely successful. The
form of economic interaction (namely investment capital) was large and fairly inelastic given
Taiwan's unique cultural affinity, geographic proximity, level of development, and recent
experience of converting from a state-dominated economic model to a more privatized one. Also
the goal (economic development) that China was seeking was commensurate with the
instruments employed to achieve that goal.
China was successful at getting the commercial actors (in this case Taiwanese investors)
to engage in economic activity that generated the strategic externalities that China sought. In
terms of the Unity of the State IV in this phase, both the central government in Beijing and the
regional local authorities sought similar objectives, namely economic development. As a result,
there were no serious divisions within the state. This alignment of goals between the center and
local Chinese government authorities stands in stark contrast to the dynamics observed in the
Coercive Leverage cases in Phase 2. Because the state was acting in a unified manner, it was
more effective. Although there were many small and medium-sized enterprises that initially
made up the commercial actors in question, this large number of relatively small firms did not
seem to pose problems for China to effectively monitor and enforce compliance on these actors
since much of the defacto business-government relations were effectively decentralized to local
authorities. In addition, the Goals the commercial actors sought and what the state wanted of
them were very complementary. The Reporting Relationship between the Chinese state and
these firms was very indirect. It consisted mainly of loose regulatory relationships. The Chinese
state offered several incentives and tax breaks to attract the investments but there was no direct
government financing, management or ownership over these Taiwanese commercial actors. The
Relative Resources IV independent variable did not seem to factor strongly in accounting for why
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the state was able to get these commercial firms to behave in a manner that was conducive to the
state's pursuit of its strategic objectives.
4.3.5 Conclusion
Economics plays an important role in Mainland China's contemporary relationship with
Taiwan. This chapter and the preceding one explored the evolution of that relationship. This
chapter looked at the early phases of economic statecraft in the context of the cross-Strait
relationship. This examination of the development of cross-Strait relations and last chapter's
exploration of recent developments seem to suggest that China has undergone a process of
learning and has employed a gradually more sophisticated approach to economic statecraft. In
particular, these chapters focused on several specific episodes in which the Mainland sought to
use economic statecraft to pursue its strategic objectives vis a vis Taiwan. The development of
Mainland China's economic statecraft in the context of the cross-Strait relationship seems to
have exhibited a pattern of gradually more sophisticated use.
There have been three phases in this learning process: in the first phase, the Mainland
was primarily interested in gaining access to Taiwanese capital and management expertise as
part of its reform and opening up efforts. As economic ties grew and Taiwan became
increasingly dependent on the Mainland, Mainland China attempted to leverage its economic
position as a coercive tool. This constitutes the second phase. This chapter examined
specific attempts to use Coercive Leverage in which Taiwanese investors came under pressure
from the Mainland authorities. In the third phase, Mainland China has become more nuanced in
its employment of economic statecraft. Today, Mainland China is mainly focused on
transforming the interests of Taiwan and using economic ties to deter independence. As
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discussed in Chapter Three, this phase includes the opposition party visits to the Mainland in
early 2005 and the subsequent elimination of tariffs on Taiwanese fruit exported to China.
Today, China continues to strengthen economic ties in an attempt to alter the interests of
Taiwan. The recently ratified Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) promises
to tie Taiwan even more closely to the Mainland economy. Over the long-term, this strategy of
engagement seeks to encourage Taiwan to redefine its own national interests in such a way that
makes dejure independence counterproductive and encourages eventual reunification with the
Mainland. By creating increasingly numerous and powerful vested interests in Taiwan that
minimally seek continued stability (i.e. no moves toward dejure independence) and maximally
seek reunification, China is engaged in a strategy of economic statecraft that is designed to
achieve its long-term strategic goals with respect to Taiwan.
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China's National Oil Companies and "Going Out"
5.1 Introduction
This chapter and the next examine China's efforts to secure strategic resources. As
discussed in Chapter 2, economic interaction that pertains to strategic resources often entail
Strategic Transfer type of security externalities.' How does China secure the transfer of what it
views as strategic raw materials? These chapters highlight the business-government dynamics
that play such an important role in China's economic statecraft. The Chinese government has
largely relied on a strategy that seeks to create internationally competitive corporations over
which the state seeks to maintain control. This strategy seeks to reap the benefits of
commercialization (e.g. efficiency, productivity, innovation, economic strength, etc.) without
losing the stability and sense of security that comes from state control.2
To explore exactly how the state utilizes economic statecraft in the context of strategic
resources, this chapter focuses on China's efforts to secure oil. State planners have identified
petroleum as one of the most important (if not the most important) strategic resources that must
be secured.3 The government's efforts in this area involve the creation and subsequent "Going
Out" of the Chinese national oil corporations (NOCs). These corporations were among the
Bear in mind that although the Strategic Transfer security externality can involve any number of types of strategic
resources being transferred to a country (including dual use technologies, expertise/personnel, weapons sales, etc.),
this chapter will only focus on one type of Strategic Transfer: that concerning strategic resources. Strategic
resources are the raw inputs that the state has defined as strategically significant.
2 Mikael Mattlin, The Chinese Government's New Approach to Ownership and Financial Control of Strategic State-
Owned Enterprises Suomen Pankki (Bank of Finland), 2007 pp. 25-26.
3 The State Council has defined seven industries as "strategic." They are: defense, power generation and
distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, aviation and shipping. See: "ATiTfiii)MWiM
* 1 M f M " [Guiding Opinion on Advancement of State-Owned Capital Restructuring and
Reorganization of State Owned Enterprises) issued by SASAC on Dec 18, 2006 available at:
www.sasac.gov.cn/gzig/xcgz/200612180138.htm Also see: ibid. p. 16 especially Table 1.
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earliest Chinese commercial actors to venture abroad. This chapter highlights these efforts with
a particular focus on Africa-a leading destination for China's resource extractive activities.4
When China's leaders define China's strategic interests in raw materials, Africa features
prominently.5 Exploring this area is useful for illustrating the theory since much of the empirics
demonstrate how Chinese firms can get out from under the state's ability to control them. The
theory provides an analytical framework for understanding what factors enable these dynamics
and provides insight into the conditions under which the state can (or cannot) control the
activities of its commercial actors. Finally, the examination of Chinese oil extraction in Africa
also illustrates how commercial actors can generate undesirable strategic concerns for China.
5.2 China's Security and Strategic Resources
The discussion of China's grand strategy in Chapter One noted the importance of regime
stability. Continued economic growth was a critical component of this regime stability. China
today defines its strategic security interests in terms of maintaining the Communist Party's
control of government. Keeping the regime in power is at the core of many of China's strategic
interests as those are defined by the current leadership. Maintaining the Party's legitimacy
4 "It should be pointed out that although oil is a major and obvious source of Chinese interest in Africa, it is far from
being the only one. China is actively seeking resources of every kind: copper, bauxite, uranium, aluminium,
manganese and iron ore, among others, are all being sought out acquisitively by Beijing."Ian Taylor, "China's Oil
Diplomacy in Africa," International Affairs 82, no. 5 (2006): 938. Although oil is the dominant raw material that
China seeks from Africa, Taylor notes that "South Africa provides iron ore and platinum, while the DRC and
Zambia supply copper and cobalt. Timber is sourced from Gabon, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Liberia,
while various western and central African nations supply raw cotton to Chinese textile factories." Ian Taylor,
China's New Role in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009 p. 162.
' For an insightful treatment of China's Africa policy in light of China's domestic development see: Wenran Jiang,
"Fuelling the Dragon: China's Rise and its Energy and Resources Extraction in Africa," The China Quarterly 199,
no. -1 (2009): 585. For a statement of China's official Africa strategy in English see: People's Republic of China,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "China's African policy," 2006. Available at
http://vww.fnpre.gov.cneng/zxxx/ t230615.htm.
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requires continued economic growth.6 Economic growth, in turn, needs raw inputs. This is
especially true for energy inputs. "...The legitimacy of the CPC's political system is based on its
ability to sustain economic growth in the postmillennial era-one that is hampered by a long-
term decline in domestic oil production."8 This declining production is coupled with a
monumental surge in Chinese demand for energy.9 Much of this energy need is met with coal
(which is viewed as being more reliable given China's huge domestic deposits of the fuel). But
coal cannot supply all of China's energy needs. Much of the rest comes from oil and
increasingly, much of this oil is imported from abroad. China's reliance on international sources
of petroleum subjects the Chinese economy to price shocks.' 0 At a more fundamental level,
China also seems to be concerned about supply risk-its continued ability to gain access to oil."
Thus, China's strategic interests are intimately connected to its ability to secure raw materials.' 2
6 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations : Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2008).
7 China's surging growth has also entailed significant increases in its demand for raw materials. "Though China's
demand for these imports certainly will go up and down with economic cycles, from 1995 to 2003, China accounted
for 68 percent of global demand growth for oil, 82 percent of steel, 100 percent of copper, 100 percent of aluminum,
and 73 percent of nickel." David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) p. 91.
8 From Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, p. 18 citing Taylor, "China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa."
9 Jianhai Bi and David Zweig, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 25.
1 "According to official estimates in China, for every one-percent increase in international petroleum prices that
lasts one year, China's GDP growth rate is likely to drop by 0.01 percentage points." Bo Kong, China's
International Petroleum Policy (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International, 2010 p. 46.
" Many countries are concerned about price risk-that the price of oil will go up and harm their economic growth,
but few today actively look to hedge against supply risk-that the nation will not be able to access oil at all. That
China is concerned about supply risk when many other nations are not is an interesting point and deserves to be
explored further in a separate article.
12 Securing raw materials (including oil) is a dominant theme among China's leadership. See for instance, Premier
Zhu Rongji's March 5, 2001 comments on the draft outline of the Tenth Five Year Plan: "AT_ W kNilit2
It t1 WJ@. " Available at: www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzekbhwb/gijh/W020050614801666916182,pdf
In that plan, China also developed its first "Energy Development Key Special Plan" (W RO VfP7zRM I-A t
as a complement to the Tenth Five Year Plan. Available at:
http://,"www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgh/'hwb/zdgh/t20050714 36295.htm
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5.3 A Brief History of China's Oil Sector
So how has China gone about providing for its oil needs? This section briefly
encapsulates the evolution of China's oil industry. The development of China's oil sector has
been punctuated by three major periods. In the early days of the People's Republic, oil
exploration and production were fully concentrated on China's domestic territory. China was not
yet industrialized and oil production was conducted via localized, mass mobilization programs.
These efforts (when successful) produced many fragmented provincial or even township-level
petroleum enterprises. These integrated oil entities (called petroleum administrative bureaus)
lacked economies of scale and often included exploration, drilling, and refining operations (such
as they were). These localized efforts were eventually organized into a national ministry.'3 The
Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI) owned, managed, and operated all of the petroleum
production capacity of China. China's petroleum activities were conducted according to the
government's economic planning. The oil sector was a fully government controlled entity and
there were no significant issues concerning the state's ability to control the commercial activities
in this sector. Under communism, the commercial actors were the state. The bigger problem
was the host of economic inefficiencies, under-investment, and long-term decline of productivity
that frequently plagues state economic planning efforts.14 For example, the sector suffered from
under-investment which often resulted in low yields from oil fields. Investment levels were
suboptimal because oil producers had no incentive to invest since oil prices were so low. Oil
1 The specific name and scope of the line ministry that was charged with administering China's petroleum (and
often chemical) assets changed a number of times since October 1, 1949 as a result of various reorganizations. The
original ministry was called the Ministry of Fuel Industry. However, what matters for the purposes of this chapter is
that the assets were always managed, owned and operated by directly by the state ministry.
" Such pathologies include the lack of meaningful price signal, under- (or over-) planning estimates, absence of
commercial incentives, shirking, and a host of other deadweight losses. The issues that frequently bedevil planned
economic systems are well depicted in Jinos Kornai, The Socialist System : The Political Economy of Communism
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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prices in the plan were kept low because of fears of inflation and a general desire to stimulate
economic growth.
Beginning in 1981, the Chinese oil industry began to change. In this second phase,
efforts were made to liberalize China's oil sector. In 1981, China introduced a two-tiered pricing
system under which the MPI was obligated to supply the central government with a specific,
contracted amount of oil. Any oil that was produced in excess of this contracted amount could
then be sold directly into the domestic China market at prices that were above those stipulated in
the plan. Excess oil could also be sold on the international market (to buy technology,
equipment, data, etc. for its operations). This was designed to create pricing incentives to
increase oil production. MPI, in turn, subcontracted production agreements with local petroleum
administration bureaus (these were the local, integrated petroleum operations mentioned above).
Any oil that the petroleum administration bureaus produced over contract could, in turn, also be
sold directly into the market at above-plan prices. Again, as was the case with MPI's obligation,
the individual petroleum administration bureaus were allowed to keep the resulting revenues.
In addition to these basic pricing reforms, China's oil industry was reorganized in the
1980s. Up until that point, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (or one of its predecessor
ministries) controlled the exploration, production and refinery assets of China.'s These
government ministries were also responsible for the administration, oversight and planning of
China's petroleum industry. In 1982, MPI's off-shore upstream oil assets and offshore
exploration and production assets were reorganized into the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation ($4' AW E fW & I] CNOOC). CNOOC continued to be wholly owned by and
"5 Virtually all of China's petroleum assets resided in the ministry. The major exception was the China National
Chemicals Import and Export Corp (SinoChem) which was a state owned enterprise created in the 1950s to conduct
international oil trading. Since China's economy was a closed economy, only certain entities were authorized to
conduct international economic activities.
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still reported into MPI. However, the new corporate structure was designed to improve the
productivity of China's oil assets and to begin to split off the government's regulatory and
administrative roles from its commercial activities. The reforms also allowed CNOOC to engage
in cooperation with foreign oil companies as part of an effort to enhance CNOOC's offshore
drilling technology. The head of CNOOC maintained his vice-ministerial rank. In 1983, the
government reorganized the refining and petrochemical operations of MPI. These were
combined with the chemical operations of the Ministry of Chemical Industry and the synthetic
fiber manufacturing assets of the Ministry of Textile Industry to create the China Petroleum and
Chemical Corporation ($±P Mft Sinopec)."6 Like CNOOC, the head of Sinopec maintained his
bureaucratic rank (in this case, Minister). With Sinopec focused on owning and operating
China's downstream refining assets and CNOOC owning and operating China's offshore
upstream production assets, MPI was left with China's natural gas and onshore, upstream oil
production and exploration assets. These assets were grouped into the China National Petroleum
Corporation ( CNPC) in 1988. Interestingly, CNPC also inherited all
of MPI's administrative functions including product quality standards and environmental
regulation.' 7 The head of CNPC also retained his ministerial rank. CNPC and Sinopec
eventually consolidated and rolled up the numerous smaller production and refining entities that
existed at the local and provincial levels to create national oil majors. When the reorganization
dust had settled, China was left with CNOOC which controlled China's offshore, upstream
production assets, Sinopec which was primarily focused on refining assets, and CNPC which
16 Jin Zhang, Catch-Up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry (London ; New
York, N.Y.: Routledge Curzon, 2004).
17 MPI was abolished when the CNPC was created in 1988.
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encompassed the rest of China's petroleum industry (primarily onshore, upstream production
assets). All three state-owned corporations reported directly to the State Council.
In 1994, the system was further liberalized and the central government did away with
plan contracts. Instead, in-plan pricing was integrated with the prevailing above-plan pricing.
Although the government still controlled pricing closely, this was a meaningful step toward
liberalization. Also in 1994, all state-owned enterprises (including those in the oil industry) were
officially permitted to keep profits. This was an important step in China's reform efforts and
instituted a considerable degree of commercialization into SOE operations. By 1998, Chinese oil
companies were permitted to use marker pricing. This form of pricing tied Chinese pump prices
to world crude prices. This pricing reform allowed China's domestic prices to more accurately
reflect world energy prices. However, the pricing still did not really connect to China's domestic
market demand. Eventually, the oil companies were permitted to adjust prices within 5% then
8% bands, but the state continued to keep tight reins on petroleum pricing given its inflationary
potential.
The reforms of China's oil sector mirror the larger Chinese economic reforms of the
1980s and 1990s: a pattern of gradual liberalization and reform of the Chinese economy moving
it towards a more commercial orientation. Although these reforms were initially designed to
improve the productivity of China's oil production efforts, they would also sow the seeds of the
commercialization of China's oil industry. This commercialization would eventually make it
very difficult for the state to maintain control over the behavior of its commercial actors. 1
18 The liberalization of China's oil sector provides a useful illustration of the "paradox of economic statecraft"
presented in Chapter 2. States seeking to exercise economic power need to be able to direct that economic behavior.
However, the more states try to direct the economic activities of commercial actors, the greater the distortion and
eventual erosion of "economic gunpowder" that the state has at its disposal. If states seek to increase their
productivity by giving commercial actors free rein, it becomes that much more difficult for a state to direct its
economic might.
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"Indeed, the more China liberalizes, the less easy it is to control private businesses domestically,
let alone in far-off Africa."' 9 As its commercial actors took on more and more active roles
internationally, China would find that their activities often entailed strategic consequences for
the state.
By 1998, China's oil sector had entered the third phase of its evolution. As China was
increasingly becoming integrated into the global economy, it became evident that the partial
liberalization of China's oil sector was not a stable equilibrium. The new oil companies lacked
integrated petroleum operations. This exposed them to significant shocks from price volatility.
In other words, by concentrating a company only on upstream production and exploration assets,
that company would be heavily exposed to the price of oil. Such companies would have a very
difficult time absorbing price volatility-when the price of oil was high, it would reap windfall
profits, but when the price was low, it would suffer significant shortfalls. The same logic
punished or rewarded companies focused exclusively on downstream refining, processing and
distribution. If the price of oil was high, a refining operation would suffer losses. When oil was
cheap, this sort of enterprise was poised to make significant profits. To help smooth out some of
this instability and to prepare China's NOCs for the global competition that they would face once
China entered the WTO, the State Council swapped some of CNPC's (upstream) and Sinopec's
(downstream) assets with each other. This was done roughly on the basis of geography, giving
CNPC assets concentrated in the North and Sinopec's in the South). This move gave both major
players upstream and downstream assets in their portfolio. The State Council also gave them
trading rights thus enabling the companies to engage in the international trading of petroleum
and petroleum products. This wave of re-organization also took the corporations out of their
'9 Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, p.167 citing his interview with a Chinese trader, in Praia, Cape Verde
November 5, 2007.
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administrative and regulatory roles, moving that to a relatively weak State Petroleum and
Chemical Industry Bureau (under the State Economic and Trade Commission).
The final move toward commercialization occurred with the public listings of the crown
jewel assets of each of these NOCs. The central government sought to conduct public offerings
of China's NOCs in order to tap international capital markets, but also to expose these firms to
market pressures, shareholder obligations, and even corporate governance as a way to improve
their international competiveness. However, when these firms were listed, the government
structured the offerings such that the state would be assured of retaining control of the parent
company. The assets that were attractive to the markets were placed into new shell companies
that would be the actual listed companies that would trade on the exchanges. For CNPC, its
assets were placed in PetroChina which was listed in April 2000 (the state retained 90%
ownership of the company). Sinopec was listed in October 2000 with the state retaining 77% of
the ownership. CNOOC was listed in February 2001 and the state held onto 71% of the
ownership. Creating these publicly-traded companies was another important step toward reform
and liberalization. These moves were designed to improve the NOCs efficiency and create more
effective commercial tools for China to procure oil. "Increasingly, China is relying on its oil
companies to provide the means of securing energy security, linking itself to a market-base form
of energy security."2 However, this commercialization (in particular the growing gap between
20 From the point of view of the Reporting Relationship these bureaus were bureaucratically outranked by the
ministerial level authority held by the heads of CNPC and Sinochem. As discussed in more detail below, this
disparity added to the difficulty faced by the state regulators.
21 Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Yaqing Qin, China's "New" Diplomacy: Tactical Or Fundamental Change?, 1st
ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p. 220.
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the state and the commercial firms) laid the groundwork for future challenges for state control
that characterize the business-government relationship today.22
For example, the reorganization of the MPI created many of the large asymmetries that
can be observed along the Relative Resources dimension of business-government relations in the
petroleum sector. In the wake of the transition, virtually all of the government's institutional
knowledge and resources related to the petroleum sector as well as the state's expert personnel
and even regulatory budgets moved over to take up residence within the new oil corporations
that were formed. The new companies inherited their predecessors' bureaucratic rank,
administrative functions, personnel, and the institutional memory of the state ministries. This
left little by way of resources in government. Regulatory agencies were under-staffed and
operated under large information asymmetries that included gaps in industry knowledge,
expertise, and appropriate personnel.
In addition, indicators for the Reporting Relationship IV suggest that state control of
these commercial actors would not be easy. For example, during the reorganization process, the
ministerial leadership transitioned right over into the leadership posts of the new NOCs. Wang
Tao (IIE ) the then minister of MPI went on to become the head of CNPC. His deputy, Zhou
Yongkang, (ifdi+) became vice-president of CNPC.2  Chen Tonghai (FT, FPi ) went from
being the deputy director of the State Planning Commission to becoming the deputy general
manager of Sinopec in the 1998 reshuffle. He would be promoted to director and vice-chairman
2 Such frictions and state-commercial coordination challenges are fairly typical across all avenues of Chinese
economic statecraft. The hybrid model of government involvement with commercial actors is what makes China
such an interesting case to explore to understand exactly how states actually practice economic statecraft.
23 "As a result, the SPCIB often deferred to the three NOCs over policy problems. Further, SPCIB suffered from an
asymmetry between the amount of personnel it had and the amount of tasks it was assigned. Staffed with only 90
people, the SPCIB was responsible for planning and devising overall development strategies for the oil and
petrochemical industry as well as promoting continued restructuring of the 7,500 SOEs under CNPC and Sinopec."
Kong, China's International Petroleum Policy, p. 16.
24 Zhou is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. He also directs the Public Security
Commission. Leadership of Chinese NOCs is considered a prestigious post for up-and-coming darlings of the CCP.
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in 2000 and became chairman of Sinopec in 2006. Sheng Huaren ( Pt) was formerly the
director of the Planning Bureau of the Ministry of Chemical Industry before becoming the head
of Sinopec. Qin Wencai (2iSC) was formerly vice minister of the MPI before becoming
president of CNOOC. When these leaders transitioned to these new corporations they also
brought over their bureaucratic ranks. Given the relatively lower-ranking supervisory and
administrative bodies that later were created to oversee China's petroleum industry, the
disparities in bureaucratic rank between the regulators and the regulated further complicated state
efforts to control these commercial actors. Finally, although these high-powered leaders at the
helm of China's NOCs made state control over the commercial actors difficult, it did provide for
a certain amount of trust between them and the CCP leadership since the leaders of the state
personally knew and had worked with many of the leaders of these commercial actors.
The reforms discussed in this section empowered commercial actors to take the lead in
China's efforts to secure its access to petroleum. Although these reforms helped address
inefficiencies in China's petroleum management system, they also set the stage for commercial
actors to pursue their own interests (even if that sometimes undermined other national priorities).
The issue of China's state control over its petroleum firms features prominently once these firms
began taking on more active roles as international actors. Their involvement on the international
stage is the subject of the next section.
5.4 China's NOCs "Go Out"
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Current efforts on the part of some of China's largest and most successful corporations to
expand operations internationally are part of China's zouchuqu ( tHt:) strategy.25
Interestingly, in the oil space, forays into the international marketplace were initially led not by
the state but rather by the commercial actors. The state eventually justified the strategy ex post
facto and encouraged other strategic sectors to similarly engage in the global market as way to
enhance China's international competitiveness. In the oil sector, going abroad was driven by
inefficiencies at home and production declines in China's domestic petroleum resources. As
outlined above, the state first created corporations from the government ministries as a way of
addressing inefficiencies in China's domestic oil industry. Recognizing that China's domestic
reserves would be insufficient to meet China's projected energy demand, these companies took
the initiative and went abroad to secure alternative sources of petroleum. Possessing technical
expertise that the state lacked (since most of the state's expertise went over to the commercial
actors as discussed above), the NOCs recognized this situation before the state was focused on it.
Demand from China's booming economy was going to outpace China's domestic supply forcing
China to look abroad to find alternative sources of petroleum to make up the difference. As
such, the impetus to go abroad was driven by the commercial actors. These moves were initially
made without prior government approval.26
2s This phrase is often translated as "Going Out," "Stepping Out," or "Going Global." This policy encourages firms
to move into international markets and compete in the global marketplace. It is part of the Chinese leadership's
effort to improve the quality of Chinese enterprises by stimulating competitive pressure, adoption of international
quality standards, diffusion of technology, and management practices through multinational competition. The goal
is to create world-class, Chinese multinational corporations. For more on the "Going Out" strategy see: Zhibin Gu
and Andre Gunder Frank, China's Global Reach : Markets, Multinationals, and Globalization, Revised and Updated
ed. (Palo Alto, Calif: Fultus Books, 2006); and E. Hong and L. Sun, "Dynamics of Internationalization and Outward
Investment: Chinese Corporations' Strategies," The China Quarterly, no. 187 (2006): 610.
26 The government did eventually give its official imprimatur to these efforts. See Xu Xiaojie, "Chinese NOCs'
Overseas Strategies: Background, Comparison and Remarks," March, 2007 Paper prepared in conjunction with the
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University and Japan Petroleum Energy Center. Available at:
http://www.rice.edu/energv/publications/docs/NOCs/Papers/NOC ChineseNOCs Xu.pdf Xu Xiaojie is the director
of the Institute of Overseas Investment at CNPC Research Academy of Economics and Technology in Beijing.
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State enthusiasm for expanding China's access to oil grew over time. Initially, the
government only officially supported the NOCs efforts to develop China's domestic Western oil
fields in 1991, making this a part of the Eighth Five-Year Plan. Noticeably, the government did
not a give similar endorsement to the NOCs efforts to develop international sources of oil until
the end of 1993 when the state officially embraced the going out policy. The NOCs strategy of
going out to find oil was further supported by Premier Li Peng in 1997.2 State support built
momentum when Jiang Zemin embraced China's need for oil as a matter of strategic importance
in October 2000.28 The "Going Out" strategy was endorsed and extended to other strategic
sectors in the Tenth Five Year Plan. The state had shifted from passive endorsement to proactive
measures to support and encourage "Going Out." By 2001, the state had established four
prerequisites for obtaining government financial support for "Going Out" and China's oil
companies have not looked back.29
Although the initial moves abroad in the oil sector were led by the CNPC, it was not until
the government officially sanctioned and endorsed this strategy that China's NOCs began to
move internationally in a major fashion. That the firms first moved to venture abroad is
indicative of the fact that much of the human capital, talent and technical expertise of the
industry resides within the NOCs. However, that these initial moves were circumscribed until
the state leadership provided its full endorsement of this strategic direction reflects the fact that
the strategic guidance for China's petroleum policy continues to emanate from the central
government authorities. In large matters, the state still calls the shots. However, as discussed in
27 Tai-Wei Lim, Oil and Gas in China : The New Energy Superpower's Relations with its Region (Singapore;
Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2010) p.9 .
28 For more on Jiang's remarks see: PW [Chen Huaij's "R[MW A "____F__I
2001 EM 25 M [trans: "China's Oil Security Strategy Ought to be Based on 'Going Out"' Economic Research
Review 2001, Number 25.].
29 The four objectives of the policy are to provide markets for Chinese products, improve resource security, enable
technology transfer, and promote research and development. China's oil projects overseas often meet more than one
of these objectives and frequently receive state support.
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more detail below, effective use of this power requires the attention of the highest echelons
within the Communist Party to overcome any divisions within the state. In the absence of such
centralized leadership, institutionally powerful commercial actors will take the opportunity to act
on their own interests. CNPC's initial moves internationally (without state endorsement) serve
to illustrate this dynamic.
CNPC's ventures abroad began rather tentatively. Beginning with an April 1991
agreement to cooperate with Alberta in exploring oil sands deposits, CNPC launched its
international efforts on its own initiative. The first major oil field development rights were
acquired in Thailand in March 1993 and the first equity stake was in an oil field in Alberta in
July, 1993 for $5 million. In October of that year, CNPC won a $25 million bid to enhance oil
recovery in Peru. These initial moves abroad were driven largely by the more attractive
commercial opportunities to be found overseas as opposed to China's own aging domestic oil
fields. However, these initial efforts were fairly small since CNPC was forced to jump through
many layers of regulatory red tape to secure approvals for any international investment.30 As
China's energy shortfall became more apparent throughout the 1990s, government support for
the NOCs international activities grew. As the state got behind the "Going Out" strategy,
barriers to international investments gave way to subsidies and inducements. As NOCs sought
out a larger presence overseas, they felt that much of the "low-hanging fruit" had already been
claimed by the large multinational incumbents. As a result, China had little choice but to seek
out untapped opportunities in countries whose petroleum resources were otherwise shunned for
one reason or another.3 1 " 'China confronts foreign competition,' said Chen Fengying, an expert
30 Even relatively small investments would need to secure approvals from SAFE, MofCom, and often the State
Council among other bodies.
3 Bi and Zweig, "China's Global Hunt for Energy." This dynamic also seems to lay behind China's substantial
investments in Iran, limiting its ability to cooperate with the US on other priorities.
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at the China Contemporary International Relations Institute, which is based in Beijing and
affiliated with the state security system. 'Chinese companies must go places for oil where
American [and] European companies are not present. Sudan represents this strategy put into
practice.' "32 Such logic led Chinese NOCs to work with unsavory regimes where reserves were
still available.
5.4.1 Sudan
One of the most notorious destinations to which CNPC ventured was Sudan where
China's presence would result in considerable damage to China's international reputation. In the
1990s, Sudan found a willing partner in China at a time when Western governments were
applying considerable pressure on the regime in Khartoum for its support of terrorism.
Beginning in 1995, CNPC purchased Chevron's concession in Western Kordofan. CNPC then
expanded its role in Sudan when it won an international bid in November 1996. A Canadian
firm (Arakis) sold off its stake in three prospecting blocks. CNPC partnered with Malaysia's
Petronnas, another Canadian firm (Talisman Energy that had taken over Arakis), and Sudan's
Sudapet to create the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) in which CNPC
took a 40% stake.3 3 Although it seems that China's initial involvement in Sudan was driven by
CNPC's desire to secure access to international sources of oil, the Chinese government's amoral
policies of non-interference in domestic affairs and its willingness to engage countries with little
regard to their human rights records set up Beijing for diplomatic failure. Sinopec and CNPC
32 Peter S. Goodman, "China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry; Beijing Supplies Arms used on Villagers,"
The Washington Post, December 23 2004.
3 Kerr, Harris, and Qin, China's "New" Diplomacy: Tactical Or Fundamental Change? p. 222.
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have both remained actively engaged in developing Sudan's oil resources.34 China now imports
around 60% of Sudan's oil output and has invested approximately US$4 billion (as of 2008).35
There have been allegations that these activities in Sudan provide critical support to the Sudanese
government.36
Perhaps even more troubling has been China's complicity in providing arms and military
assistance to regimes like Sudan's that engage in substantial human rights violations against their
people. China has transferred helicopters, strike fighters, trucks, and small arms to Sudan.
"Many of the helicopter gunships in Khartoum's arsenal were obtained from China, often using
projected receipts from oil extractions in the regions where fighting took place."38 Many of these
arms have made their way to Darfur, fueling the conflict there. In addition, the Sudanese
government apparently used military force to clear populations from the oil fields that China was
interested in exploiting:
3 The GNPOC "consortium's Heglig and Unity oil fields now produce 350,000 barrels per day, according to the
U.S. Energy Department. Separately, CNPC owns most of a field in southern Darfur, which began trial production
[in 2004], and 41 percent of a field in the Melut Basin, which is expected to produce as much as 300,000 barrels per
day by the end of 2006. Another Chinese firm, Sinopec Corp., is erecting a pipeline from that complex to Port Sudan
on the Red Sea, where China's Petroleum Engineering Construction Group is building a tanker terminal." Goodman,
"China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry; Beijing Supplies Arms used on Villagers."
35 Taylor, China's New Role in Africap. 50. The precise size of China's involvement is difficult to determine. A
World Bank study "recorded six confirmed oil-related projects" between 2001-2007 "amounting to some $645
million" of confirmed (although not by Chinese sources) commitments. The same study "also has information on
another six unconfirmed oil projects, amounting to an additional $789 million of possible finance commitments."
Vivien Foster, Building Bridges : China's Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa
(Washington, DC: World Bank : Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2009) p. 50.
36 Goodman, "China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry; Beijing Supplies Arms used on Villagers."
37 In particular, AVIC I transferred flight simulators for their K-8s to Sudan. Six of these training jets were
delivered to the Sudanese Air Force in 2006 and another six were to follow soon thereafter. The K-8 is a trainer for
fighterjets. After undergoing basic training on these jets, pilots would progress to the Chinese NAMC Q-5 (A-5 is
the export version) 'Fantan.' At least three A-5 'Fantan' ground attack fighters have been photographed on runways
in Darfur. See May 8, 2007 Amnesty International report entitled: "Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel serious human
rights violations in Darfur," Available at: http://www.ainnesty.orgienilibrary/info/AFR54/019/2007 Especially pp.
7-8 and 12-17. Also see: February, 2006 Amnesty International report entitled: "China: Sustaining conflict and
human rights abuses - the flow of arms accelerates," Available at:
http://www.aimnesty.org/en/librarv/asset/ASA 7/030/2006/en/be25c03a-d42b- I 1 dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/asal7O3O2006en.pdf The Sudanese Air Force has also been supplied with "US$100 million worth of
Shenyang fighter planes, including a dozen supersonic F-7 jets." Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, p. 120.
38 ibid. p. 123.
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"The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) . .. is one of the main
oil concession-holders in Sudan with the largest share (40%) in GNPOC,
which exploited Blocks 1 and 2 (the Heglig and Unity oilfields); and a
concession over the most productive field, Block 4. In July 2006 China started
output from Blocks 3 and 7 (in the Melut basin, northern Upper Nile State in
South Sudan), which will produce an estimated 200,820 barrels a day.
The early exploitation of oil fields Block 1 and 2 in Unity State, in South Sudan,
at the time that China was a member of this consortium, was accompanied
by mass forced displacement and killings of the civilian population living
there. Sudanese planes bombed villages and Southern militias, supported by
Sudanese armed forces, attacked villages, killing people and destroying homes
until the area was depopulated, in an apparent aim to clear the area of people for
oil exploration and extraction.... CNPC also directly benefited from the
"security" provided by the Sudanese army against rebel groups in the oilfields -
the same forces responsible for the massive force displacements of civilians in the
oilfields." 39
China's search for oil in Sudan has entangled it in a web of ties between China's oil
extraction efforts, arms, and human rights concerns. For example, "China is said to have sold the
government of Sudan SCUD missiles at the end of 1996 in a deal underwritten by a $200 million
Malaysian government loan against future oil extraction, according to a high-level Sudanese
defector, who claimed the deal, which he said he witnessed, was arranged by Sudan's state
minister for external relations, Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail."40 Such ties have created a caustic
combination for China.
39 From: "Sudan / China: Appeal by Amnesty International to the Chinese Government on the Occasion of the
China-Africa Summit for Development and Cooperation" Published 1 November, 2006. Available at:
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/072/2006/en
40 See: Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact; Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan (Human Rights
Watch: 1998) Especially Section IV entitled: "Arms Transfers to the Government of Sudan" Concerning the SCUD
transfer, the report references footnote 83: "Human Rights Watch interview with Abdelaziz Ahmed Khattab, The
Hague, November 15, 1997. Khattab also claimed, in a written statement, that the Malaysian national oil company
was used as a cover to ship arms to Sudan: 'Arms deals agreed upon have been shipped by sea in the name of the
Malaysian National Petroleum Company and that of the Chinese National Petroleum Company, under the guise of
petroleum exploration equipment according to an agreement concluded between the government in Khartoum and
these companies in Kuala Lumpur under which they provide weaponry and military equipment in exchange for
being given concessions for oil explorations.' Statement by the Administrative Attachi, Embassy of Sudan, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia: To the People of the Sudan and World Public Opinion, signed by Abdelaziz Ahmed Abdelaziz
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China's provision of military aid is not limited to Sudan. China has also come under fire
for providing military support to Zimbabwe and Congo. Nor is Chinese arms assistance limited
to its partners in Africa. China has also been a key source of military assistance to the military
junta that runs Myanmar (where China has a number of natural gas interests as well as strategic
interests in using Myanmar as a possible energy transportation route to circumvent the Malacca
Straits) and Nepal.
5.4.2 The Consequences of "Going Out"
The activities of China's companies have generated considerable diplomatic
embarrassment for China. "Even when the Chinese leadership may want certain outcomes from
China's engagement in Africa, it may not have all the leverage or control over a fast-expanding
network of state and private actors who have entered these markets following the logic of
globalization and profit maximization." 1 China's inability (or unwillingness) to rein in its
commercial actors has brought it under significant international pressure, undermining some
China's larger strategic objectives. In particular, three major criticisms have been leveled at
China for its involvement in Sudan. First, international activists have pressured most
international investors to divest from Sudan since such investments help fund the regime's
suppressive and genocidal activities. China, however, has stood by its NOCs decisions not to
withdraw from Sudan and had, for a long time, insisted on upholding its commitment to national
sovereignty and non-interference in Sudan's domestic affairs. Second, human rights
Khattab, the Netherlands, September 29, 1997. Human Rights Watch has been unable to independently confirm this
allegation. The Canadian oil company Arakis Energy Corporation is known to have been involved with a number of
partners in an oil-exploration and development scheme in Sudan, the Sudan Petroleum Project, since November
1996. According to news reports, two of Arakis's partners in the project, China National Petroleum Corp. and
Petronas, the Malaysian state oil company, have covered start-up costs, giving credit to Arakis for its spending from
1993 until the formation of the consortium in November 1996. ... " Available at:
http://wwvw.hrw.org/legacv/reports98/sudan/Sudarni988-05.htm#P566 983 12
4 Jiang, "Fuelling the Dragon: China's Rise and its Energy and Resources Extraction in Africa", p. 608.
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organizations have documented that Chinese arms help fuel the ongoing conflict. Allegations
42include transfer of aircraft and small arms that were used on civilian populations in Darfur.
Third, critics have attacked China for doing nothing to stop the genocide. Under the principle of
sovereignty and non-interference, China was not only avoiding condemnation of the Khartoum
regime, but China also obstructed early U.N. efforts to pass resolutions on Sudan. China actively
blocked attempts by the international community to put an end to the killing in Darfur. This
caused some to question China's commitment to international norms and undermined the claim
that a rising China would integrate well into the international system. The ostensibly
commercial activity of China's NOCs was generating negative blowback for the state. The
NOCs "Going Out" strategy and the high degree of freedom that the commercial actors enjoyed
combined to create a situation in which commercial actors were empowered to engage in
activities that generated negative consequences for the Chinese state.4 3 China's international
reputation was significantly damaged by its involvement in Sudan.
To address these concerns, Beijing took a number of steps to repair its international
image. First, it launched a substantial public relations campaign to improve public perceptions
of Beijing's engagement with Africa. At the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, it signed
the "Beijing Declaration," that "calls for halting the illegal production, circulation, and
trafficking of small arms and light weapons to Africa." 44 Beijing also shifted from its stance of
initially opposing the UN peacekeeping force for Darfur that was proposed to augment the weak
42 See May 8, 2007 Amnesty International report entitled: "Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel serious human rights
violations in Darfur," Available at: http://www.ainesty.or/en/library/info/AFR54/0 19/2007
43 Although China sought to have its commercial actors engage in commercial activities that would produce positive
security externalities (namely securing China's access to oil), these activities, in fact, generated diplomatic backlash
that increasingly caused problems for the Chinese state. The state had a difficult time coordinating its strategy
across MoFA and China's energy institutional priorities.
44 Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, p. 175.
187
Norris, Economic Statecraft
African Union force.45 China set about convincing Sudan to go along with the UN plan. In
February 2007 during Hu Jintao's trip to Sudan, China pushed President Bashir to accept the
hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping force. In addition, China has been pushing Sudan's government
towards a more positive policy by playing a more active role in mediation and more openly
criticizing the Sudanese government. 46 Finally, many observers are now highlighting that
China's significant resource demand has been good for the economies of Africa. 7 Chinese
demand has been a particularly important driver behind the recent surge in African exports. 48
African economies have grown considerably on the back of this international demand for raw
materials. The vast majority of these exports have (not surprisingly) been oil exports.49
Although China seems to have made some progress on addressing the concerns stemming
from its commercial actors' involvement in Sudan, China's search for oil draws it into other
prickly situations as well. Indeed, Sudan was not the only place the activities of aggressive
commercial actors in the oil industry have been creating strategic headaches for Beijing. The
presence of Chinese NOCs in dangerous areas naturally also opened up the possibility of threats
to Chinese workers being kidnapped, attacked, or killed. Darfurian rebels targeted Chinese
citizens as part of a strategy to prevent CNPC and Sinopec from operating (and thus indirectly-
or directly-supporting the government). Employing what seems to be a similar strategic logic,
separatist rebels of the Ogaden National Liberation Front killed nine Chinese workers in Ethiopia
45 China would eventually send 435 engineers as peacekeepers into Darfur.
46 See: Mark Turner and Guy Dinmore, "US Defends China Over Darfur Diplomacy," Financial Times, Apr 12
2007, p. 7.; and Richard McGregor, "Beijing's Africa Envoy to Focus on Darfur," Financial Times. May 11 2007, p.
11.
47 "China's Africa Policy Changing for the Better," The Japan Times, September 11 2008.
48 Kevin Carey, Ulrich Jacoby, and Sanjeev Gupta, Sub-Saharan Africa : Forging New Trade Links with Asia
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2007).
49 See: Harry G. Broadman and Gozde Isik, Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007) p. 120 especially Table 2A.4 "Africa's Top 20 Exports to China: Products
and Leading Exporters." For an excellent study of how China's desire for natural resources and Africa's need for
infrastructure development create a very well-suited complementarity between China and Africa, see especially
Section 5 of: Foster, Building Bridges, pp. 29-52. This source has an excellent accounting of Ex-Im Bank's projects
and China's infrastructure financing techniques in Africa.
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in April, 2007.50 In January 2007, five Chinese workers were kidnapped by rebels belonging to
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). This followed a deterioration
of security in the Niger River Delta (where 90% of Nigeria's oil is produced). Following Hu
Jintao's April 2006 visit and pledge to invest $4 billion in Nigeria, MEND warned Chinese
companies to leave the delta or risk being targeted. Nigeria turned to China for coastal patrol
boats and other military supplies to help secure the region. China obliged despite the reputation
of Nigeria's armed forced for corruption, unprofessionalism, and human rights abuses. "China's
reason for supplying Nigeria's military, however dysfunctional, with armament is very
pragmatic: China needs Nigeria's oil."51 Such security considerations will likely continue to
surround the work of China's oil companies as they engage in unstable regions of the world.
The state has come under fire as Chinese NOCs have become more and more deeply
involved with problematic regimes in places like Iran, Burma and Angola. In the early part of
this decade, Angola accounted for roughly half of the Chinese crude oil that was coming from
Africa.5 2 Sinopec invested $3.5 billion in partnership with the Angolan national oil firm,
Sonangol, to pump oil from recently auctioned off-shore blocks. In addition, Sinopec has
pledged to build a $3 billion refinery in Angola.53 It has been suspected that much of this
partnership grew out of a controversial $2 billion tied aid package that China's Ex-Im Bank
provided to Angola.5 4 Angola had been close to signing an IMF-provided aid package that
50 Matthew Green, Richard McGregor, and William Wallis, "Nine Chinese Oil Workers Killed in Attack at Ethiopia
Exploration Site," Financial Times, Apr 25 2007, p. 1.
5 Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, p. 49.
52 Broadman and Isik, Africa's Silk Roadp. 82.
53 Carey, Jacoby, and Gupta, Sub-Saharan Africa : Forging New Trade Links with Asia, p.4. Sinopec reportedly
received a 75% share and Sonangol held a 25% of 3 offshore fields from the 2006 deal. Foster, Building Bridges, p.
49.
54 The terms of this loan were very favorable to Angola: $2 billion at an annual interest rate of 1.5% payable over 17
years. Allegedly, this package convinced Angola to reject Royal Dutch Shell's intention to sell its stake in an
Angolan oil field to the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Ltd. (an Indian firm) in favor of Sinopec.
Apparently, this same aid package was responsible for a separate decision to award a different stake in Angola to
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would have required considerable transparency and disclosure requirements. However, once
Angola discovered that it had a much more forgiving alternative source of financing in the Ex-Im
Bank, it pulled out of the IMF negotiations. Angola is a very corrupt state and China's no-
strings-attached engagement policies undercut Western efforts to improve governance or impose
any sort of transparency on the Angolan regime. Such activities also serve to undermine Chinese
claims that it is a "responsible stakeholder."
The problems that the activities of the commercial actors generate for the central
government are not limited to the oil sector. They bedevil other extractive industries as well.
For instance, China is actively involved in Zambia's copper mining industry. However, poor
working conditions and safety concerns have resulted in anti-Chinese sentiment there. In April
2005, an explosion at the Beijing General Research Institute of Mining and Metallurgy
explosives factory located near the Chambishi copper mine killed more than 50 Zambian
workers." The blast seems to have been the result of unsafe working conditions and Chinese
management was blamed. The runner-up populist presidential candidate in Zambia's 2006
election campaigned on a platform threatening to "kick out the Chinese"56 whom he argued were
exploiting Zambia's resources in a neocolonial fashion. During Hu Jintao's 2007 trip to Africa,
plans to have Hu inaugurate the Chambishi Special Economic Zone had to be cancelled because
of fears of anti-Chinese protests there. In March 2008, workers building a copper smelter at the
Chambishi Mine attacked Chinese management when wage negotiations stalled. Such anti-
Chinese sentiment undermines larger Chinese strategic objectives. Eventually, the Chinese state
Sinopec. See: Peter C. Evans and Erica S. Downs, "Untangling China's Quest for Oil through State-Backed
Financial Deals," Brookings Policy Brief, no. 154 (May 2006): 3.
* Reuters, "Blast Kills 46 at a Copper Mine in Zambia," The New York Times, April 21 2005, sec. A; Foreign
Desk, p. 5.; and Michael Wines, "World Briefing Africa: Zambia: Anger After 50 Die in Chinese Plant," The New
York Times, April 22 2005, sec. A; Foreign Desk, p. 8.
56 Joseph J. Schatz, "Zambian Hopeful Takes a Swing at China; Presidential Challenger Stirs Resentment at Asian
Power's Growing Influence in Africa," The Washington Post, September 25 2006.
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sought to rein in the activities of the commercial actors in an effort to limit their ability to
generate counterproductive results for China.
5.4.3 Tools of State Control
Recognizing that the activities of commercial actors were creating problems for China,
the Chinese authorities sought to re-establish control over the international activities of its
commercial actors in the extractive resources sector. First, China strengthened bureaucratic
control over the commercial actors. This was done by re-organizing the state monitoring,
enforcement and compliance capabilities. With a particular focus on SASAC, the state's
administrative body for oversight and supervision of SOEs, China sought to strengthen the
supervision and bureaucratic control of all SOEs (including the NOCs).57 "While most of the
previous reform efforts resulted in enhanced managerial and/or local government control over
enterprise management and financial decisions, several recent initiatives by SASAC specifically
and central government more generally appear aimed at reestablishing central government
authority over the creme de la creme of SOEs."58 In addition, Chinese policy makers began to
be concerned that limited oversight of commercial actors endangered China's longer-term
interests in Africa. In August 2006, MofCOM re-asserted its own leadership over China's
international commercial activities with a set of policy guidelines that sought "to strengthen
regulations in order to avoid conflicts ... in order to protect the national interest."59 The state
5 See: Bonnie Glaser, "Ensuring the 'Go Abroad' Policy Serves China's Domestic Priorities," China Brief 7, no. 5
(2007): 2-5.
58 Mattlin, The Chinese Government's New Approach to Ownership and Financial Control of Strategic State-Owned
Enterprises, p. 44.
59 People's Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce, "X4 (Nkihn AIR* + M 4URAJ 4 A 6 %, IHPI
I J&)) K~Ji" [trans: "Explanation regarding (Mechanisms for Strengthening Chinese Overseas-Invested
Enterprises' and Guidelines for Worker Safety and Protection)) "], 31 August 2006, Available on-line at:
http://hzs.mofconmgov.cn/aarticle/bk/200608/20060803022750.html.
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also had a powerful tool at its disposal in the form of China's Communist Party. Specifically,
the CCP's promotional career advancement structure provides central authorities with veto
points on the careers of rising stars within the party (many of whom often spend time running
one of China's prestigious SOEs on their way to the top). China's NOCs are among the elite
SOEs for up-and-coming stars of the Communist Party to lead. This creates a strong incentive
for the leadership of China's NOCs to toe the Party line and avoid acting against the wishes of
the state. Finally, as discussed in more detail in the CDB/Chinalco case in the next chapter, the
central government took on a more active role coordinating major overseas acquisitions. 60
Second, the central authorities increased their budgetary control over the commercial
actors. As "Going Out" gathered steam, state-provided financing became a new source of
leverage over increasingly commercially-oriented actors. Although many of China's largest
firms had undergone public offerings, the reality is that China's equity markets are still rather
thin and most major corporate financing (particularly in the extractive resources sector) is done
using debt issuances. Since the state still exercises a good deal of control over China's banking
system, this proved to be another good source of leverage for the state to exercise control over
the commercial actors. The general pattern seems to include a high level state visit (from Hu
Jintao, Wen Jiabao or one of the other senior leaders in China) supported by MoFA and
MofCom. Deals are struck and signed during such visits.61 China's "deal sweeteners" often
include arms and military assistance as well as high profile constructions projects (new stadiums,
ports, government office buildings, transportation infrastructure, etc.). 62 This activity is often
underwritten at concessionary rates by state financial institutions. These deals are then
60 This was also designed to prevent counterproductive competition among Chinese bidders for international assets.
61 It should be noted that China is not unique in this regard. Other states often support their firms' large,
international commercial deals as well.
62 Chris Alden, "China in Africa," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 47, no. 3 (2005): 147.
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implemented by the NDRC and specific companies that will be involved in the ongoing
investment. At several points in this process the state is able to exert influence to help shape the
nature and content of how China's commercial actors will engage the world.
A good example of this type of behavior can be found in China's Export-Import Bank
and its influence in providing state control over Chinese corporations' engagement in Africa. 63
The basic model is to provide below-market rates on credit and loans to Chinese investment
projects that have been struck with the host government. Part of the terms for these projects is
that the work then needs to be awarded to Chinese firms (mainly SOE construction and
engineering firms).64 This arrangement has the added benefit for China of keeping surplus labor
gainfully employed building infrastructure in Africa. Of course, this infrastructure also helps the
recipient countries (particularly in their efforts to bring raw resources to market). Finally such
sweetheart deals also obviously help secure Chinese NOCs favorable treatment from host
governments with regard to new oil assets/deals. Such practices thus enable China's growing
influence. At the same time, the state explicitly controls Ex-Im (which is legally mandated to
fulfill China's political goals) and is thus able to assert control over a good deal of China's
strategic investments in resource-producing states.
Another example of how the state is able to use finance to exert control over efforts to
secure strategic resources is what has become known as the "Angola Model." This approach
uses oil reserves (or some other valuable, generally extractive, resource) as the collateral and
medium for loan repayment. In this scheme, loans are granted and repaid on the basis of future
63 Ex-Im is also China's primary foreign aid vehicle. The dual roles of policy banks will be discussed in more detail
later. Suffice it to say that policy banks like Ex-Im often blend China's commercial and political interests.
Broadman and Isik, Africa's Silk Road, especially Box 5.12 on pp. 274-275.
64 ibid. p. 272.
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oil output.6s For example, a loan would be structured to be repaid over 20 years by delivering
20,000 barrels of oil per month. Ex-Im acts as the broker facilitating this deal by providing
credits to the Chinese construction company and to the Chinese refinery. Interestingly, these
deals seem not to be designed to ensure against price risk, but rather against supply risk since the
contracts are for quantities of oil (or whatever other resource is used as collateral). If prices of
the underlying commodity fluctuate, the term of the loan that changes is merely the length of the
payback period. The effect of this sort of structure seems to be to ensure against supply risk
since price risk is effectively transposed into a potentially shorter payment time horizon.66 With
the advent of the global financial crisis in 2008, worldwide demand for oil dropped considerably
as national economies slowed (and anticipated slowing further). This provided cash-rich
Chinese NOCs and banks with very good opportunities to acquire natural resource assets at "fire-
sale prices." As predicted, China did take advantage of the opportunity to secure additional
sources of raw material (particularly oil). 67
The third factor contributing to the Chinese state's ability to control commercial actors
was a periodic unification of the state. Although China is often beset by multiple forces that
create a divided Principal, when the senior leadership focuses on a particular issue area, it is able
to provide very effective state unity. One indicator of such attention has been the frequent
official state visits that China's Politburo has paid to Africa.68 Such attention is necessary to
65 See: Foster, Building Bridges, especially Section 6 entitled: "The Financing Perspective," pp. 52-66.
66 This type of structure strikes me as odd, but it seems consistent with China's general obsession over supply risk in
its petroleum strategy. A similarly unusual logic seems to drive China's desire to secure equity oil and ensure that
Chinese oil is transported via Chinese-flagged tankers.
67 In particular, "loans-for-oil" along the lines of the "Angola Model" have proliferated. For example, CDB
(discussed in more detail in the next chapter) provided $25 billion in exchange for Russian petroleum in February,
2009. That same month, CDB loaned $10 billion to Brazil and $8 billion to Venezuela in two other massive oil-
backed deals. In April, CDB invested another $1 billion in Angolan oil and Ex-Im provided $5 billion to
Kazakhstan. In July, CDB once again invested $1 billion in Ecuador and another $4 billion in Venezuela.
68 Eight of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee (the apex of China's leadership) have travelled to
Africa in the last five years. Hu Jintao has visited 19 African countries since 2004. Source: Chinavitae.org.
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overcome the various other divergent forces that serve to weaken the ability of the state to
control commercial actors. 69 The presence of top-level guidance (for as long as it can be
sustained) tends to overcome divisions within the Chinese state. The resulting unified state is
more effectively able to issue orders, monitor compliance and enforce penalties on the
commercial actors for non-compliance. As mentioned earlier, this unifying quality is limited by
the finite capacity of the senior leadership-both in terms of demands on their time and level of
their engagement on what can be fairly technical issue areas. Although China's government
system supports such powerful, centralized authority, the reality of the dynamic complexity
involved in governing modern China physically limits the volume of activity the senior leaders
can engage on. Many issues never make it to the highest levels of government. In practice,
other factors can easily divide the state and prevent it from effectively controlling the behavior of
China's commercial actors.
5.5 Evaluating China's Efforts to Secure Strategic Materials
Have China's efforts to secure access to strategic raw materials like oil worked?
Narrowly speaking, yes. Through its commercial actors, China has been able to gain access to a
considerable amount of oil and other raw materials and has been able to meet increases in
Chinese demand with little disruption. However, as illustrated by several cases discussed briefly
above, the government's lack of control over its commercial firms has also generated strategic
problems for China.
China's strategy for securing strategic resources has relied on the international
investments, acquisitions and partnerships of its leading corporate actors. Although many of
these firms were formally parts of government ministries or closely managed state owned
69 See: Glaser, "Ensuring the 'Go Abroad' Policy Serves China's Domestic Priorities."
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enterprises under the planned economy, China's international corporate expansion followed
closely on the heels of the more general economic liberalization and reforms in China's domestic
economy that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. These reforms unleashed considerable
economic growth, which in turn, drove China's demand for raw materials. As China became
more and more integrated into the global economy, this demand increased further. At the same
time, the state increasingly relied on commercial actors (over which it held less and less control)
to satisfy one of China's strategic priorities.
As these firms took on a greater commercial orientation, the state found it increasingly
difficult to control their activities. "As the Chinese leadership has pursued its (admittedly
uneven) post-Mao economic liberalization policies, they have encountered increasing difficulties
in controlling--or even keeping abreast of-the diverse activities in which various Chinese
corporations and individual merchants are engaged overseas."70 China found it difficult to
coordinate across MoFA, MofCom and the NOCs. Successful imposition of state control often
required direct State Council involvement. However, at the very top of the Communist Party,
elites tend to be over-tasked. Given the scarce time of China's top leaders (like national leaders
in most great powers), issues only get escalated to that level when they have reached a crisis
threshold.7 ' For instance, Jiang Zemin only focused national attention on China's petroleum
strategy once China was under pressure of a fuel shortage. Thus, in practice, institutional
bureaucracies, ideological factions, patronage loyalties, center-local tensions and other dynamics
often divide the state. Such divisions undermine the state's ability to effectively control its
commercial actors. These divisions within the state allow commercial actors to pursue their own
best interests (often without regard to larger national strategic interests). In the case of China's
70 Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, pp. 178-179.
71 This has the effect of creating a default screening process for issues that warrant the attention of China's top
leadership.
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search for oil, the goals of the commercial firms mirrored those of the state with regard to
securing raw materials. However, the corporate pursuit of those objectives has also frequently
entailed consequences that work against China's other, non-energy strategic interests. Corporate
involvement in Sudan and elsewhere has undermined Chinese efforts to demonstrate its role as a
responsible stakeholder in the international system. The state has had difficulty controlling the
activities of its commercial actors.72 The next section examines what accounts for when the state
has been able to control its commercial actors in the context of China's international resource
extraction efforts.
5.5.1 Explaining Government Control (or lack thereof)
This examination of China's efforts to "Go Out" in search of petroleum has suggested
somewhat mixed results when it comes to China's ability to control its commercial actors. There
have been times when the firms seem to be leading the way and other times when the state seems
to be directing the behavior of firms. This section sheds some light on the factors accounting for
when the state is able to control its commercial actors and when it is less able to do so.
There seem to be three main reasons accounting for the state's inability to control the
NOCs. First, the state has often been beset by bureaucratic struggles for influence among the
many competing centers of power (e.g. NDRC, MofCOM, MoFA, as well as the numerous,
relatively weak successor regulatory bodies for the petroleum industry). Second, the relative
distribution of resources was highly skewed in favor of the commercial actors. When the MPI
was converted into CNOOC, CNPC, and Sinopec, the state transitioned virtually all of its
industry expertise, human capital and administrative capacity into the new NOCs. Finally, the
72 In addition to undermining China's reputation, CNPC and Sinopec frequently competed over the same
international assets, initial Chinese acquisitions seemed prone to overpaying for assets, and the government often
seemed to be running to catch-up with its fast-moving NOCs.
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reporting relationships between the commercial actors and the state were often complicated by
the ministerial rankings held by the heads of the NOCs (or vice-ministerial ranking, in the case
of CNOOC). This meant that the commercial actors often out-ranked whatever arm of the state
that happened to be trying to control the commercial actor's activity (e.g. SASAC). From the
theoretical point of view, these values across the Unity ofState, Relative Resources, and
Reporting Relationship IVs seem to account for the state's inability to control the commercial
actors.
These dynamics have characterized much of the business-government relations during
China's "Going Out" strategy. However, as mentioned above, the state did re-assert its power to
guide its commercial actors. So when the state was successful at being to control its firms, what
tools did the state use to gain greater control over its commercial actors? Three factors in
particular seemed to be key in enabling the state to re-assert its control over the commercial
actors in the oil industry. First was the unification of the state that occurred when China's senior
leadership weighed in on a particular issue. This top-down approach was able to overcome any
bureaucratic turf battles that divided the state. Second was the use of financial purse strings to
coordinate a more organized "Going Out" strategy. By leveraging the state-dominated banking
sector to provide commercially irresistible terms of financing, the state ensured that projects
would be undertaken on its terms. Third, administrative reforms helped consolidate the reporting
and approval authorities of the state over the firms.
Drawing on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 helps to disaggregate the
factors accounting for the (in)ability of the Chinese state to control the commercial actors in this
context. In terms of the Goals IV, the state and firms share largely complementary goals
regarding securing access to petroleum. However, the behavior of the firms and manner in
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which they go about their business often entails blowback for the state-frequently undermining
other national strategic priorities beyond resource extraction. In many instances, the Unity of the
State IV was divided primarily along bureaucratic lines (although when the state did exert control
over the commercial actors, it was often because the state was able to act in a unified manner-
generally under the leadership of senior national figures). The Market Fragmentation IV was
highly concentrated with only three significant commercial firms controlling nearly 100% of
China's oil industry. This gave these firms considerable power vis a vis the state. In addition,
perhaps most significantly, the Relative Resources IV was highly skewed in favor of the firms.
The regulatory bodies formed in the aftermath of the MPI dissolution lacked the bureaucratic
resources to effectively control these firms. The vast majority of the government's expertise,
industry knowledge, and administrative capabilities resided within CNPC. Because of such
asymmetries, the state frequently deferred to the firms. Finally, from the perspective of the
Reporting Relationship IV, these firms are all state-controlled enterprises with publicly listed
arms. On paper, this reporting relationship would seem to facilitate state control. However, the
senior stature of the NOCs within China's central government bureaucracy often afforded these
firms a good deal of bureaucratic weight.
Together, these factors accounted for the business-government dynamics observed in this
case. Generally speaking, the values on these variables indicate that the government would have
a difficult time controlling firms in this context. When the state was able to exercise higher
levels of control over the firms, it was because the state was able to alter the business-
government relationship along one of these dimensions. Primarily, this seems to have occurred
as a result of a unification of the state as high-level leadership occasionally intervened to settle
inter-bureaucratic frictions.
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5.6 Conclusion
China's use of commercial actors to secure strategic resources is one example of
economic statecraft that involves the Strategic Transfer type of security externalities. China has
identified several types of raw materials that it views as crucial to fueling its continued economic
growth. Securing access to these materials is an important strategic priority for China.
Petroleum is arguably among the most important of these raw materials. To secure its access to
oil, China has implemented a strategy that relies on its national oil companies. For the most part,
this strategy seems to have been moderately successful at meeting China's petroleum needs.
Although the goals of the commercial actors are complementary to the goals of the state in this
sense (broadly speaking, both wish to secure access to petroleum), in "Going Out" Chinese firms
have occasionally also undermined China's national interests beyond petroleum. In some
instances, the state has been able to rein in the activities of its firms and in other instances, the
state seems unable to control its massive multinational resource extraction companies.
Evidence of government control in this case seems to be mixed at best. For the most part,
China's NOCs have taken the lead in "Going Out." The NOCs enjoy a disproportionate share of
resources compared to the state. The highly concentrated nature of the petroleum sector in China
makes it fairly easy to monitor the firms operating in that space. But since there are only three
very large firms that dominate the sector, market concentration provides these firms with
considerable leverage vis a vis the state. The commercial actors examined in this case are very
powerful vis a vis what is an often divided state. The state frequently fails to act in a unified
manner to exert its control over the firms. However, the state has shown that it is not completely
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without an ability to unite under the CCP's central leadership and rein in the activities of the
NOCs. 3
Since the evidence from this case suggests that the state has been struggling to be able to
control its commercial actors in the context of China's NOCs "Going Out," it would be useful to
examine an instance in which the state exercised a fairly high degree of control over its
commercial actors. An ideal case would show how the state used commercial actors to achieve a
strategic objective. To provide a useful comparison to illustrate the theory, such a case of
economic statecraft should also be taken from the extractive resources space. The next chapter
examines just such a case in which the state played an important role in controlling and directing
the behavior of its commercial actors to achieve a national strategic objective in the context of
extractive resources.
7 Although this generally only seems to happen when events have already escalated to the point that they warrant
the attention of China's senior leadership.
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Rio Tinto and the (In)visible Hand of the State
6.1 Introduction
The last chapter focused on the petroleum sector and explored the business-government
dynamics of China's "Going Out" strategy. That case highlighted the challenges facing state
efforts to maintain control over its commercial actors as they searched for international supplies
of oil. This chapter focuses on another case of strategic resources, iron ore, another strategic raw
material vital to China's economic growth. Like petroleum, China is highly dependent on
imports to meet its demand for this raw material. China imported 628 million tons of iron ore in
2009, making it the world's largest importer of iron ore. In 2010, China is expected to consume
about 960 million tons of iron ore, importing 610 million tons from abroad or about 64% of its
total demand.'
To get a better understanding of exactly how the Chinese state is able to work through
commercial actors, it is instructive to drill down into a particular episode concerning one of
China's largest efforts to secure a strategic resource and take a closer look at exactly how
China's strategic deployment of state capital functions in practice. The uncharacteristically
public attempt by Chinalco (underwritten by the China Development Bank) to acquire a large
stake in Rio Tinto provides a useful window on how the state can successfully orchestrate
control over commercial actors to achieve a strategic objective.
' From Glenys Sim and Rebecca Keenan, "China Iron Ore Imports to Near Record This Year, Shougang Says,"
Bloomberg Businessweek March 24, 2010 available at: http://www.businessweek.con-news/2010-03-24/china-iron-
ore-imports-to-near-record-this-vear-shougang,-savs.html
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6.2 Chinalco & Rio Tinto
On July 12, 2007 the Canadian aluminum producer, Alcan-then the world's third largest
aluminum producer-announced that it was entertaining a friendly takeover bid from Rio Tinto
for $38.1 billion. Rio Tinto's bid was in response to an earlier hostile takeover attempt by Alcoa
which valued Alcan at $27 billion. The Rio-Alcan deal was officially completed on October 25,
2007 creating the world's largest aluminum company. 2 Unfortunately for Rio Tinto, the Alcan
price tag would quickly become a significant burden as the fallout from the financial crisis
depressed commodity prices. Since the offer for Alcan was all-cash, Rio Tinto had financed a
portion of the deal with debt. When aluminum prices fell in line with the precipitous decline in
global demand (a function of the recession), it seemed that Rio had over reached. Rio's purchase
of Alcan was effectively valuing Alcan using top of market prices. Rio gradually realized that
market conditions were not going to improve soon enough to enable Rio to make its scheduled
debt payments. Bottom of market prices would not enable Rio to adequately service its debt.
Specifically, Rio was left with $19 billion in debt payments coming due in the second half of
2009 and early 2010 but no source of cash to cover them. This put Rio Tinto in play.
In November 2007, Australian mining conglomerate BHP Billiton announced an offer to
merge with cash-strapped Rio Tinto and absorb Rio's debt. Because the offer was to trade three
(later raised to 3.4) BHP shares for every share of Rio, the exact value of the offer fluctuated, but
at one time it was as high as $170 billion. Rio Tinto's CEO, Tom Albanese, felt this
undervalued Rio's assets and was not enthusiastic about the offer. Most importantly for our
purposes, this proposed merger between the world's largest and third largest mining companies
would create "an international commodity juggernaut" with considerable pricing power. BHP-
2 See October 25, 2007 company press release available at:
http ://www.riotintoalcan.con/ENG/media/media releases 1033.asp
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Rio would have controlled a third of the world's iron ore. Another 37% would be in the hands
the Brazilian mining company, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD). Combined, the two
suppliers would control more than 70% of the world's seaborne iron ore. Such a concentration
was unacceptable for the buyers of iron ore. One of those major buyers of iron ore decided to do
something about it.
Sometime during December, 2007 or January, 2008, the Chinese Iron and Steel
Association (CISA FP EAMtt#) led by its executive director, Zou Jian (%R),
approached the government authorities and made the case that the Rio Tinto-BHP deal would
lock up too much of the iron ore pricing power. 3 Something needed to be done. "Concerned
about the potential pricing power of a combined company, China's government hastily called
meetings with several big state-owned enterprises, say people familiar with the events." 4 The
NDRC apparently evaluated various options and a decision was made to try to establish a
blocking stake to the BHP bid.5 The China Development Bank (CDB) was selected as the source
of funds for buying a significant minority stake on the open market via the large state-owned
aluminum giant, Chinalco (4 \jaf)6 As a commercial agent, Chinalco had a recent track
3 The BHP-Rio merger would have combined the world's second and third largest producers of iron ore. "If
Australia's BHP Billiton succeeds in ensnaring Rio Tinto, steelmakers - led by the Chinese - will find themselves
trying to bargain down a miner which produces more than one-third of the world's iron ore. Add in CVRD of Brazil
and the trio would account for almost three-quarters. Faced with such a prospect, it is not difficult to understand why
government-owned China State Development Bank has reportedly started building a stake in Rio Tinto" "Orefull
Realities," Financial Times, Nov 12, 2007, p. 14.
4 See: Shai Oster and Rick Carew, "China Inc.'s Top Deal Maker Provokes a Backlash Abroad," Wall Street Journal.
(Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: Apr 16, 2009. pg. A. 1.
5 Glasson, "Regional Focus to Global Push: The China Syndrome," also see Oster and Carew, "China Inc.'s Top
Deal Maker Provokes a Backlash Abroad." In Caijing's reporting, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi,
explicitly said that Chinalco's purchase was independent of government decision-making: "1i-MWf, NTnlJW$J
A AL fiJ1 UFV " available at: http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-02-05/100047968.html
6 Aluminum Corp of China (Chinalco, also known as Chalco or $fe) was founded in 2001 as a rollup of the state
owned aluminum sector. It has about 200,000 employees and 25 subsidiaries. "As a national champion with more
than 40 per cent of Chinese alumina and aluminium production in 2007, Chinalco was an obvious candidate for the
mission, even if lossmaking companies with-a $9bn equity base don't ordinarily get $20bn loans - in this case from
China Development Bank." "Chinalcrio," Financial Times, Feb 13 2009, p. 12. Chinalco had, in fact recently led a
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record of successful international and domestic acquisitions experience that Baosteel and other
contenders lacked.7 Moreover, the move would satisfy both the government's desire to prevent a
concentration of supply in a strategic resource and Chinalco's own goals of becoming a
diversified multi-metal international conglomerate. Chinalco partnered with CDB as the main
underwriter and sought advice from Lehman Brothers and China International Capital
Corporation (CICC)-which was run by the son of former Premier Zhu Rongji. Chinalco also
formed an acquisition vehicle with Alcoa in a politically savvy move that added a
"multinational" element to what might otherwise be viewed as a wholly Chinese operation.8
After the markets closed on January 31, 2008, Lehman traders at the London desk bought
up as many shares of Rio Tinto as they could find. Xiao Yaqing (i I/ ), the general manager
of Chinalco, was quoted as saying the events surrounding the surreptitious buy "...can be a plot
for a novel." 9 Xiao apparently sat by Lehman's London trading desk as the operation unfolded.
He was too nervous to eat. By the time the dust settled, Chinalco had spent $14 billion to buy
9% of Rio Tinto's total shares in the after hours market-this was China's largest overseas equity
investment ever. Overnight, Chinalco had become Rio Tinto's biggest shareholder.
number of international acquisitions (though none this large). In addition, Chinalco's goals of multi-metal
diversification fit nicely with the needs of the state.
7 Chinalco had a well-respected track record of post-acquisition success domestically in China, having been created
as part of a plan to roll up the fragmented domestic aluminum producers in the early 2000s. In 2004 Chinalco
outbid 10 rivals to make what was at the time, China's largest investment in Australia (a bauxite mine). In May
2007, Chinalco invested in a Saudi joint venture smelter. Chinalco also acquired 49% of Yunnan Copper Industry
Group, China's third largest copper-producer and in June of that year, Chinalco completed the purchase of Canada's
Peru Copper-enabling Chinalco to diversify into other metals. Baosteel, by contrast, had a reputation for
acrimonious and poorly managed consolidation.
8 Alcoa lent $1.2 billion and perhaps more importantly, its name, to the "Shining Prospect" acquisition vehicle-
providing some political cover against an anti-Chinese political backlash to the deal. At the end of February, 2009,
Alcoa formally pulled out of the JV vehicle and received $1.021billion in cash from Chinalco plus its pro-rata share
of dividends paid by Rio while "Shining Prospect" owned the shares. Despite the considerable loss in value of the
Rio shares after BHP withdrew its bid, Alcoa only had to claim a $120 million non-cash, after tax loss on the
venture, given Chinalco's obligation to underwrite Alcoa's stake. That Chinalco afforded Alcoa such a degree of
downside protection is indicative of the political rather than financial value that Alcoa brought to the venture.
9 Xiao described the move as one of "unimaginable complexity" in an interview he had with Caijing three weeks
later. Zhao Jianfei, "Chinalco's General Manager on the Rio Tinto Buy," Caijing March 3, 2008. Available in
English at: http:/english.caijing.com.cn/2008-03-03/100050605.html
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Suspiciously, the official Chinese language Xinhua coverage of the incident included an
entire section that dwelt on the strategic rationale of why China's central government was
involved and why the government chose Chinalco instead of Baosteel or other steel industry
players to conduct this operation.10 None of this discussion made it into the edited English
language version of the report." This evidence corroborates interviews suggesting that the State
Council played an important role in directing the Rio effort (although the Chinese government
12frequently seeks to minimize international awareness of its hand in such matters).
Chinalco has publicly denied that its intent was to block the BHP bid, but bankers
familiar with the operation have said that Chinalco sought to influence the acquisition
especially given the timing of Chinalco's buy.' 3 At the time of Chinalco's "midnight ambush,"
BHP had about one week remaining (February 6) before it had to declare to the British
regulatory authorities its intent regarding an acquisition of Rio Tinto. Despite trying to sweeten
its offer for Rio by increasing its bid from 3 to 3.4 shares for every share of Rio, BHP-Billiton
was not able to match Chinalco's cash offer. In November 2008, BHP formally withdrew its
offer to buy Rio.
Although this was widely viewed as a victory for China, it left Chinalco with an
unrealized loss of as much as $10 billion on its 9% stake at one point. In addition, Rio still had
to find the cash to service the $8.9 billion of debt that was coming due in October 2009.
Chinalco signaled that it was still interested in long-term cooperation with Rio and in December
10 See: ITMOIj (Wang Hengli)'s Xinhua news report entitled, "" FiI1TArT 140 f iNU h $ i
k" (cleverly, this can be translated either as: 'Chinalco & Alcoa' jointly invest US$14 billion in Rio Tinto China's
largest overseas investment" or as: "'China-US'jointly invest..." since Chinalco's and Alcoa's Chinese names both
include the characters for China and the US as their first character. Newspaper headlines often employ such
abbreviations to save space. In this instance, use of the convention also seems to belie the intent of Alcoa's
involvement in the first place.) Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.con/fortune/2008-02/02/content_7548886.htm
" See: Jiang Yuxia, "Chinalco, Alcoa buy 12% of Rio Tinto's UK-listed firm," Available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-02/01 /content_7545423.htm
12 Author's interviews #2008620 and #2008625a, Beijing.
"3 Oster and Carew, "China Inc.'s Top Deal Maker Provokes a Backlash Abroad."
207
Norris, Economic Statecraft
one of Rio's executives expressed an interest in gaining access to financing from China's banks.
He shared this sentiment with his neighbor in Brisbane, Wang Wenfu, the head of Chinalco's
Australian subsidiary. 4 Chinalco proposed to provide a mixture of $7.2 billion in convertible
bonds and a $12.3 billion asset purchase that would provide it with a joint stake in some of Rio
Tinto's most valuable copper and iron mines. At the time the offer was made, the terms seemed
to offer Rio Tinto a favorable way out of its debt burden and Rio's management was
enthusiastic.15 The $19.5 billion package was to be China's largest foreign investment ever-
surpassing the 2005 proposed $18.5 billion CNOOC deal for Unocal.16 In February of 2009, the
Chinalco deal for Rio Tinto was announced. 17 If it went through, it would raise Chinalco's stake
in Rio to 18%. In Beijing, Xiao Yaqing was heralded as a hero and awarded a position on
China's State Council.18
However, as economic events unfolded in 2009, it grew increasingly less likely that the
deal would succeed. It seemed that China's economy was recovering from the recession more
quickly than originally expected, and with China's recovery came renewed global demand for
commodities. This buoyed commodity asset prices and increasingly made Chinalco's offer
* ibid.
" "As a triple-B borrower, Rio has secured debt financing at a size and rate for which it would have otherwise
struggled. The valuation of assets that Chinalco is buying into, meanwhile, is ahead of most analysts'
estimates."ibid. "Rio says it could have raised $1 Obn from a rights issue. But that would have left it needing more,
forcing it to sell prized assets at firesale prices. Chinalco's bid, it argues, is generously priced and offers access to
Chinese cash and minerals," David Pilling, "Do Not Reject Chinalco's Bid for Bogus Reasons," Financial Times,
Feb 26 2009, p. 9.
16 "The deal called for Chinalco to invest $7.2 billion in Rio Tinto in the form of convertible bonds and take $12.3
billion in stakes in a group of its mining assets. It would have given Chinalco two board seats." See: Dana
Cimilluca, Shai Oster and Amy Or "Rio Tinto Scuttles Its Deal With Chinalco" June 5, 2009 page BI.
"7 "Rio, flat on its back with its feet wiggling in the air, is now in the Petri dish of a giant experiment - the biggest
investment China has sanctioned outside its borders. Xiao Yaqing, Chinalco chairman, is funding the deal by
tapping up his old friend Chen Yuan - son of one of the Communist party's Eight Immortals - who is now governor
of CDB." From: "Chinalcrio." Financial Times.
18See: Oster and Carew, "China Inc.'s Top Deal Maker Provokes a Backlash Abroad." Xiao is currently deputy
secretary general of the State Council and an alternative member of the 17th CPC Central Committee.
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appear less and less attractive to Rio Tinto's shareholders.19 In addition, the Australian
government faced mounting pressure domestically to block the "fire sale" of Australia's crown
jewels-its mining assets-to China.
Finally, on June 5, 2009 Rio walked away from what had become a moribund $19.5
billion deal. On the back of renewed commodity prices, Rio had decided to issue new shares and
partnered with BHP-Billiton to co-develop adjacent mines in Australia and share those costs.
These combined efforts would enable Rio to service its debt obligations. Government officials
in Beijing were not pleased. In July, China arrested four of Rio's negotiating team in China on
allegations of spying. The Chinese government contended that they were stealing state secrets
regarding the operations of China's steel producers. Among those arrested was Stern Hu, an
Australian citizen. The team was negotiating prices for iron ore and the arrests were widely
interpreted as an expression of China's anger at Rio Tinto's walking away from the Chinalco
deal.
The case is a useful one because the size of the potential deal meant that it received a
considerable amount of public coverage. It also illustrates how inter-connected the commercial
interests of many of China's leading corporations are with China's national interests. For
purposes of testing the theory, the case is useful because we observe the CDB being directed by
the State Council to underwrite a commercial acquisition that serves China's national interests.
Chinalco's own narrow goals were highly conducive to this path of action and played an
important facilitating role in enabling it act as willing agent.
Essentially this case is the story of commercial actors (Chinalco, backed by CDB
financing) being used to pursue a national objective of securing a strategically important
9Shareholders grew more and more displeased with company management and the Chinalco deal that threatened to
dilute existing shareholders by not adequately providing them with an opportunity to maintain their current equity
stake. See: Pilling, "Do Not Reject Chinalco's Bid for Bogus Reasons."
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resource. This is a case in which China was trying to manage inputs that it views as critical to its
national well being-essentially defining iron ore as a strategic resource. Like oil, this
constitutes an instance of managing a Strategic Transfer type of security externality. In the
meetings that preceded Chinalco's initial purchase of the Rio shares in London, we see a
coordinated effort on the part of the state to use commercial actors to further China's strategic
interests.
To the extent that the strategic consequences of China's outbound capital flows have
been addressed in the public and academic debate, the discussion is often framed as a question of
whether China's largest companies are scouring the globe looking to do the bidding of China's
government or if these commercial actors are simply pursuing their own narrowly commercial
interests. Xiao Yaqing's promotion to the State Council is illustrative of the close personal and
institutional ties between China's commercial and governmental leadership that often spark such
discussions.m "The move by aluminum czar Xiao Yaqing into politics in February raised a
critical question about China's state-owned corporate giants as they step onto the global stage:
Are they driven by profits, or are they pursuing a nationalist agenda for the Chinese government?
A close look at the Rio Tinto deal suggests that the answer is both, as business and politics
intertwine for a new breed of globally savvy Chinese executives."2' I would agree that the
answer is often complex and frequently involves a mix of commercial motives as well as
national interest.
More importantly, however is that this is the wrong way to frame the question. A much
better way to think about this issue is to ask: "Under what circumstances can we expect that the
government will be able to pursue its strategic policy objectives by using commercial actors?" It
20 "As if more evidence were needed that Chinalco was answering to a higher [i.e. non-commercial] cause, days
after it announced the Rio deal, its chairman, Xiao Yaqing, landed a top government job."ibid.
2Oster and Carew, "China Inc.'s Top Deal Maker Provokes a Backlash Abroad."
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should not be a question of "whether", since that is likely to vary from one episode to the next,
but rather a question of "why." This is how I have structured this study and this approach
informs the analysis that follows.
6.3 Mapping the theory onto the Chinalco Episode
The goals of Chinalco were to expand internationally, gain access to non-aluminum
operations, and further enhance Chinalco's prestige within China's domestic political-economic
environment. The goals of CDB were to gain additional international underwriting experience,
enhance its international and domestic prestige, deploy recently infused capital from CIC &
perhaps to assert its ability to act independently of its new CIC owners. The goals of the State
Council were to prevent supplier market consolidation that enhance foreign controlled iron ore
pricing power and would likely result in higher prices that would jeopardize future economic
growth. NDRC shared similar priorities. The goals of the commercial actors and the
government were highly compatible and there was not very much friction. The values on the
Goals IV in this case would suggest state control.
Although evidence suggests that both the State Council and NDRC were involved in this
case, they did not seem to work against each other. Both seemed to share a common vision to
encourage actions designed to secure resources and a desire to coordinate the efforts of various
commercial actors. Although there may have been more than one government principal, the
evidence suggests that the state acted in a fairly unified manner. The value of the Unity ofState
IV in this case suggests state control.
Early in the deliberation process, there were several commercial actors that could have
plausibly played a role in securing Rio Tinto. These included Baosteel, Shenhua Coal, and
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CDB.22 The presence of these alternative commercial agents provided an incentive to "compete"
for the right to represent China's interests abroad. This type of dynamic helped ensure state
control since alternative agents were available in the wings, should the chosen firm prove
unreliable.
Regarding the issue of Relative Resources, this episode represented uncharted territory
for China's international economic activity. This was to be the largest overseas deal ever
conducted by China. As such, there was no true expertise resident in the commercial or
governmental sectors. By virtue of its recent Peru Copper acquisition and its previous familiarity
with investing in Australian assets, Chinalco did seem to have some experience that could be
leveraged. In addition, CDB's recent support of Barclays effort to buy ABN Amro and its
resulting 3% stake in Barclays provided some background experience for CDB to draw on.
Both of these seem to suggest that the commercial actors enjoyed a certain amount of resource
advantage over the state, however, the unknown aspects of the endeavor more than outweighed
any real knowledge advantage that might embolden the commercial actors to avoid the state's
control.
Finally, the status of Chinalco as a SASAC-owned and operated SOE and CDB's position
as a policy bank meant that the value of the Reporting Relationship IV was strongly skewed
toward state control. Given these values across the five IVs in this case, one should not be
surprised to find state control over the commercial actors taking place. In each instance, the
causal arrows point toward state control. The state actively encouraged and supported the
commercial agents to engage in activity to change the status quo. This international commercial
activity was designed to facilitate the realization of the state's strategic interests, namely the
22 ibid.
23 This episode is discussed in more detail below.
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prevention of foreign supplier concentration in a strategic raw material. The Chinese leadership
was interested in blocking the BHP bid to take over Rio Tinto. This was realized when BHP
withdrew its offer to buy Rio in November 2008. As the situation developed, there even seemed
to be the possibility not only of blocking BHP's bid, but of going one step better and taking
advantage of depressed commodity prices to secure an 18% ownership stake in Rio, thus
cementing future reliability of supply. Although that objective failed to materialize, the case
nonetheless still stands as a useful illustration of state control. For purposes of illustrating the
theory, the specific outcome of the case (whether Chinalco was successful in acquiring Rio or
whether Chinalco's actions merely prevented a consolidation of iron ore supply) matters less
than how the dynamics between the state and its commercial agents unfolded.
6.4 Other Examples of CDB's Activities
The Chinalco-Rio case is just a recent example of the CDB's financing activities, but it is
by no means an isolated case of the CDB supporting the Chinese state's goals. This section
briefly highlights some of the CDB's more high-profile recent activities. The 2008 financial
crisis and subsequent decline in asset prices has provided long-term valuation opportunities for
investment and acquisition. Concurrently, China's government has given its commercial actors
the green light to diversify capital holdings that have built up on balance sheets. Expressing a
recurring motif in the deployment of China's state-owned capital, Charles Tang, head of the
Brazil-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry, has said, "Brazil needs the liquidity and
investment, and China now has the finances to buy resources at a discount."24 Although he was
speaking in the context of CDB's loan to Petrobras, the essence of his comment applies more
24 Antonio Regalado, "Corporate News: Beijing Considers Financing Petrobras," Wall Street Journal, Feb 20 2009,
p. B.3.
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broadly to China's overall extractive resources strategy. This section highlights a few of the
CDB's more recent international activities.
One of the largest deals has been a $25 billion long-term loan to Russia's OAO Rosneft
(oil producer) and OAO Transneft (pipeline operator). The loan will enable Rosneft to
recapitalize its relatively undeveloped East Siberian oil fields and build a pipeline to deliver oil
to Chinese refineries. The CDB will supply the loan in exchange for 15 million metric tons of
crude oil a year (about 300,000 barrels a day-10% of China's current volume of oil imports) for
20 years.26 "In 2008, Russia exported 11.64 million tons of crude to China, equivalent to
233,000 barrels a day, down nearly 20% from the previous year." 27 So CDB's deal enables
China to more than double the oil it receives from Russia. This sort of diversifying away from
Middle Eastern sources of petroleum (and the concomitant "Malacca Dilemma") is seen as an
important national energy goal.
Another recent, large deal designed to diversify China's energy supply was the $10
billion financing package that CDB provided to Brazil's state-run oil giant, Petroleo Brasileiro
SA (Petrobras) to explore deep-water oil reserves. Petrobras had been receiving pressure from
the Brazilian government to increase its counter-cyclical spending and CDB was happy to
finance its expanded oil exploration. 2 8 In an ostensibly separate agreement, Petrobras agreed "to
sell to China Petroleum and Chemical Corp. 60,000 to 100,000 barrels of heavy crude oil a day,
2s "China reached a long-term deal to lend $25 billion to two Russian energy companies in exchange for an
expanded supply of Russian oil, highlighting how the world's No. 3 economy is using its financial muscle to lock up
access to natural resources." David Winning, Shai Oster, and Alex Wilson, "World News: China, Russia Strike $25
Billion Oil Pact --- in Third Deal in a Week, Beijing Moves to Lock Up Natural Resources at Bargain Prices to Fuel
its Growth," Wall Street Journal, Feb 18 2009, p. A.8.
26 China imports about half of the oil it uses. See: Winning, Oster, and Wilson, "China, Russia Strike $25 Billion
Oil Pact," This proportion is slated to grow.
27 Ibid.
28 "Brazil's government has pressed the oil giant, the country's largest company, to increase spending ahead of
elections in 2010 and as a tonic against the economic crisis. ...it will spend $28 billion through 2013 exploring and
drilling in the deep-water fields." From: Regalado, "Corporate News: Beijing Considers Financing Petrobras."
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or as much as 5% of total Petrobras production, starting immediately." 29 These announcements
at a recent signing ceremony between Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping and Brazilian President
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva also alluded to a possible memorandum of understanding between
Petrobras and CNPC to sell China another 60,000 barrels per day. Replicating a tried and true
strategy, China sought to leverage the synergies between closer economic cooperation on energy
and minerals and improved diplomatic relations.
As evidenced by the Chinalco/Rio case and these other recent big-ticket deals, the
Chinese state has used state financing as an effective lever of control to guide, encourage, and
influence the international activities of its commercial actors. In the lead-up to Chinalco's
investment in Rio Tinto, the Chinese state brought together potential commercial actors, vetted
them and matched the winning Chinalco with state-sponsored financing to complete its
"Midnight Ambush." By underwriting these types of major transactions, the state is able to
shape the behavior of firms. To better understand exactly how this mechanism of state power is
used, the next few sections examine the CDB-specifically its goals, reporting relationships, and
financing activities. This entity has been responsible for financing a good deal of China's recent
"Going Out" efforts. Such operational details provide insight into exactly how the Chinese state
is able to exercise effective economic statecraft to achieve national strategic objectives.
6.5 The China Development Bank" (il FR4 f): Origins & Mandate
In 1994 China established three policy banks as part of the plan to transition the "Big 4"
national banks to a more commercial footing by hiving off their non-commercial work and
29 Ibid.
30 "f is more accurately translated as "Nation Development Bank" but I have adopted the common
naming convention of "China Development Bank" or "CDB" that more often appears in English language sources.
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moving that over to the policy banks.3' This gradual commercialization of the banking sector
was part of the larger economic reform effort designed to modernize China's economic system.
These three policy banks were the China Development Bank (CDB), the Export-Import Bank
(Ex-Im) and the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC). The mandates of each was
slightly different: the CDB was designed to finance key domestic infrastructure construction
projects and coordinate what was a fairly scattered national investment loan effort; the Ex-Im
Bank was designed to promote the development of foreign trade by providing trade financing;
and the Agricultural Development Bank of China was to provide for capital needs of the
government development plans for the rural areas and agricultural sectors.32
From the start, CDB was saddled with a considerable portfolio of nonperforming loans
and a legacy of loose lending practices. These were the product of government directed lending
to otherwise insolvent state owned enterprises (SOts). In addition to the expected rent-seeking
behavior of such large political institutions, the Party had a strong incentive to maintain these
SOEs on life support since the SOEs substituted for China's under-developed social welfare net.
Under the centrally-planned economy, SOEs often provided healthcare, pension, education and
other public welfare benefits. Suddenly subjecting these largely inefficient enterprises to market
competition would drive many of them out of business and with them would go provision of
important public goods. This had the potential to set off considerable popular discontent and
generate social instability. As a result, the NDRC and its predecessor planning bureaucracy
directed credits and loans be extended to keep the SOEs afloat. While this kept the SOEs
31 The Big 4 are: ICBC (which was primarily engaged in providing industrial and commercial credit), Agricultural
Bank of China (which provided credit primarily to rural areas), Bank of China (which handled foreign currencies)
and China Construction Bank (which specialized in medium to long-term domestic infrastructure project finance).
With the 1994 reforms, these fiscal policy activities began to be transitioned to the policy banks, and the Big 4 were
made ready for public stock listings as commercial-oriented banks.
32 Rick Carew in Hong Kong and James T. Areddy in Shanghai, "Moving the Market: China Fund to Aid State
Bank; Sovereign Investor Uses Cash at Home as Well; A $20 Billion Infusion," Wall Street Journal, Jan 2 2008, p.
C.2.
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running, it left much of China's banking sector with a growing portfolio of non-performing
loans. As a policy bank carved out of what would become the commercial banks, the CDB was
left with a considerable amount of commercially unsustainable loans. In addition, the CDB
continued to operate under the legal mandate of a policy bank, meaning it could expect
additional non-commercial tasking in the future.
In the last few years, CDB has aggressively moved away from just underwriting large
domestic Chinese infrastructure and development project financing. Although still supportive of
state goals, the CDB now engages in international activities on a large scale. For example, the
previously mentioned Russian and Brazilian oil development deals helped secure long-term
supply agreements for China. The CDB has also expanded its scope to underwrite international
development financing and international corporate expansion and acquisitions on the part of
China's leading SOEs. A case in point was the September 9, 2009 announcement that CDB has
provided a $30 billion loan to CNPC to finance CNPC's planned international acquisitions. As
part of the state's "Going Out" mandate, CDB has supported a number of activities closely tied
to both commercial and foreign policy goals. 33
6.5.1 The China Development Bank: Structure, Financing Sources, and Uses
The CDB is fully owned by the state. While the state may still hold a controlling interest
in China's "commercial banks," these entities at least have some portion of their equity publicly-
traded on market exchanges in Shanghai and/or Hong Kong-providing some externally-driven
commercial motivation, governance, and public oversight. The CDB is not yet listed on any
stock exchanges and has only recently begun issuing public disclosures. Yet, the CDB is today
3 Carew and Areddy, "Moving the Market."
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one of the most significant forces in international finance: it has more assets than the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank combined. 4
"At present, CDB functions much like a domestic version of the World Bank, raising
money through bond sales and lending to projects favoured by Communist Party policy."35 The
CDB is financed not by deposits, but rather by bond issuances. 36 These bonds are auctioned off
to raise capital which the CDB then uses to underwrite loans and lines of credit to various
entities (often at favorable, below market terms). Over the course of its existence, the CDB has
issued more than $275 billion of bonds-more than a quarter of all the debt securities
outstanding in China's financial markets. CDB has issued more bonds internationally than any
other Chinese institution.37 As part of the recapitalization and re-organization of China's
domestic banking sector, CDB was placed in Central Huijin-a holding vehicle directly under
the Ministry of Finance. When the CIC was created, the assets of Central Huijin were
transferred to CIC.38 Thus, today the CDB is now technically a holding of the Ministry of
Finance and CIC via the Central Huijin vehicle. At the end of 2007, CIC injected $20 billion
into CDB in part to help it prepare for an eventual public listing.39
34 In 2008 the CDB had assets of $540 billion. The World Bank had approximately $58.8 billion in 2009 (38.2 in
2008) while the Asian Development Bank had only about $52 billion. See:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0OcontentMDK:22233771~,pagePK:34370~]piPK:34424~t
heSitePK:4607,00.html and http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/Financial Profile/default.asp?p=orgfrs
respectively.
3 Jamil Anderlini, "Illegal Lending Scandal Hits China Development Bank," Financial Times, Aug 30 2008, p. 9.
36 Carew and Areddy, "Moving the Market."37Tiid.
38 See Chapter Eight for more on CIC's origins.
39 CDB was re-capitalized at $20 billion. See: Brad Setser, "The Implications of Sovereign Wealth Fund
Investments for National Security," Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
February 7, 2007 p. 9 .; Xin Zhiming, "Huijin to Inject $20b into China Development Bank," China Daily, December
31, 2007. On December 11, 2008 the CDB officially changed its organizational structure to a corporate
stockholding structure similar to the sort the "Big 4" commercial banks have used to go public. As part of this
reorganization, Central Huijin provided RMB 146.1 billion and the Ministry of Finance provided a RMB 153.9
billion registered capital injection-again similar to the efforts to shore up commercial banks balance sheets before
public listing. As a result, the CDB's 2008 Annual Report lists Central Huijin as owning 48.7% of CDB while MoF
holds the remaining 51.3%.
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Most recently, the CDB appears to have become a favored investment financing vehicle
for Chinese SOEs looking to make acquisitions abroad.40 In 2008, CDB reported that it had
$64.5 billion in foreign currency loans outstanding-2/3 of which were directly issued to
underwrite Chinese corporate efforts to "Go Out" (5t M T).41 Typically, Chinese multinational
firms will partner with a state-backed financial entity to underwrite major foreign investments
and acquisitions. Sometimes these activities are instigated by the firm and sometimes by the
state.42 In almost every case, such international economic interaction is now closely coordinated
by the state (although in the early days of the "going out" policy, SOEs were acting much more
independently). The state's re-assertion of control over its commercial actors has deftly relied on
centralized provision of inexpensive capital. Generally, this domestic coordination process
begins early so as to ensure that attractively-priced funds and state support exist before the
Chinese firm moves forward with negotiating deals internationally. 43
One final aspect of the CDB's operations that differs from some of China's other state-
directed financing vehicles is that it often underwrites specific loans or provides direct financing
to Chinese companies for particular purposes. This method of debt financing is different from
the investments made by NSSF, CIC, and SAFE which generally take the form of equity
ownership and provide stakes in specific companies or industries.44 Of the two means of
40 "[The CIC's] subsidiary, the China Development Bank, has become the bank of choice for financing outward
investments. This is not by accident. The bank, along with China's Exim Bank, were created precisely for the
purpose of supporting Chinese companies' push into overseas markets, with the aim of becoming truly global
players in a commercially competitive way." Paul Glasson, "Regional Focus to Global Push: The China Syndrome,"
The Australian March 4, 2009, p. 22.
4' CDB's 2008 Annual Report available in English at: http://wwv%,.cdb.con.cn/English/Column.asp?ColumnId=91
42 "The State Council has become more active in communicating its wishes to key departments and companies of
late... In some instances, the State Council has itself been the driver of investments abroad." Paul Glasson,
"Regional Focus to Global Push: The China Syndrome," The Australian March 4, 2009, p. 22.
43 "Ordinarily, a Chinese SOE will seek approval early in its negotiations with a foreign party, to ensure that the
funds it needs will become available." Paul Glasson, "Regional Focus to Global Push: The China Syndrome," The
Australian March 4 2009, sec. Finance, p. 22.
44 These will be discussed in more detail in Part III.
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financing, it would seem that CDB's project-specific approach provides the financier with more
direct tactical discretion as it can approve or reject activities on a project-by-project basis.
Ceteris paribus, project-specific debt financing should provide the lender with more precise
leverage than a minority equity stake. Direct equity stakes delegate more of the decision-making
to a firm's professional managers. That said, the influence of large equity stakeholders
(particularly on matters of high level, strategic guidance) should not be underestimated.
6.5.2 The China Development Bank: Analyzing the CDB's Activities
CDB is in the process of transitioning from a "policy lender" to a commercial operator.
There still seems to be support for such a transition (despite the onset of the current financial
crisis, which has seen liberalization and reform efforts fall out of favor among senior Chinese
elites). If such a transition were to take place, it would have the effect of shifting the CDB's
operations to a more commercially-driven footing and away from today's policy-driven
dynamics.
Up to this point, however, most of the CDB's activities have exhibited significant non-
commercial dimensions. During China's domestic lending spree in response to the global
financial crisis, the CDB enthusiastically embraced government priorities in doling out its
support.4 5 The CDB's international projects have also been in support of the stated policy goals
41 "China's State Council, the country's cabinet, also announced measures yesterday to stimulate lending and
mitigate the impact of the global slowdown on China's slowing economy. The council said it would work to ensure
there was sufficient liquidity in the banking system and would allow the country's three "policy" banks - China
Development Bank, China Export and Import Bank and China Agricultural Development Bank - to make a further
RmblOObn ($14.5bn, EURI 1.5bn, pound(s)9.9bn) of loans." Jamil Anderlini, Geoff Dyer, and Raphael Minder,
"Western Banks Face Snub from China Fund," Financial Times, Dec 4 2008, p. 3. "China Development Bank
(CDB), a joint-stock commercial lender reformed from policy one, relied on its project reserve advantage to further
expand credit in 2008, in line with the domestic demand expansion policy. 83.3% of its loan was provided for the
nation's coal, electricity, and oil supply, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, telecommunications,
and public infrastructure fields, as well as central, west, and northeast China enjoyed 64.5% of the total money
loaned by CDB. In addition, the Beijing-located bank aggregately lent CNY 83.3 billion to the domestic
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of promoting an outward expansion of China's leading industries. The strategic goals of the state
in encouraging these efforts have been to improve the general efficiency of China's largest
enterprises (and by extension the efficiency of China's economy) largely by gaining access to the
latest technologies and state of the art management practices. This is an example of the
Bolstering type of security externality. The Chinese government has also stated that it views
securing access to reliable supplies of strategic resources to be in the national interest. It has
defined inputs like iron ore, petroleum, copper, etc. to be vital to China's well being, making the
continued security of supply of such materials a key national interest. This logic is reflective of
the Strategic Transfer security externality discussed earlier.
The CDB seems to conduct its financing operations using three general models. The first
is direct investments into companies or projects. This is a pretty straightforward capital infusion
and the CDB becomes the purchaser of the equity. Examples of such activities include the
Citibank deal (which seems to have been stopped by the State Council) and the Barclays equity
stake. In a bold move abroad, CDB paid close to $3 billion to buy a 3.1% stake in Barclays
Bank.46 The British bank, Barclays, was looking to raise capital to fund its attempted acquisition
of the Dutch bank, ABN Amro. CDB seized the opportunity to partner with Barclays as a part of
an effort to move into international finance and learn from the leading players. 4 7 CDB hoped to
learn more about commodities trading and commodities risk hedging-presumably since these
environment protection, energy saving, and emission reduction projects, and around CNY 17 billion was loaned to
disaster areas attacked by the 8.0-magnitude earthquake on May 12, 2008." From: "China Development Bank
Expanded Credit in 08," SinoCast China Business Daily News, Jan 12 2009.
46 "...Barclays strengthened its bidding power for ABN Amro by raising Euros 3.6bn from China Development
Bank and Singapore's Temasek, in return for stakes of 3.1 and 2.1 per cent respectively." From: John Willman,
"Yesterday's Bad Guys Ride to the Rescue," Financial Times, Jan 23 2008, p. 4. CDB invested approximately $2.9
billion.
47 "Earlier this year, state-owned China Development Bank bought a 3.1% stake in Britain's Barclay's Bank. CDB
hopes to tap Barclay's banking expertise while Barclay's hoped to use the cash to bolster its ultimately unsuccessful
bid for ABN Amro." From: "Chinese Bear Hug," Wall Street Journal, Oct 24 2007, p. A.20. See also: Carew and
Areddy, "Moving the Market."
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were areas in which CDB anticipated continuing involvement.4 8 CDB also has the ability to
appoint directors to the board of Barclays.49 Perhaps most significantly, the stake provided CDB
with a potential opportunity to invest in a much larger position had Barclays succeeded in
acquiring ABN Amro. CDB was prepared to fund a considerable portion of the acquisition in
exchange for a sizeable part of the equity of the combined company. This would have catapulted
CDB to the forefront of international banking and would have gone a long way in meeting the
government's desire to place its financial industry on a more globally-competitive footing. In
the end, Barclays did not succeed and CDB's stake in Barclays was limited to 3%. Despite losing
a considerable sum in this investment, CDB has elected to maintain its 3% position by exercising
its right to purchase additional shares in subsequent rights offerings. 50
Although the CDB seems to be a willing supporter of state goals when they align closely
with its own commercial goals, the state is also able to exercise control over the CDB when the
commercial goals conflict with state preferences. For example, in early January of 2008
Citigroup was looking for a capital infusion to shore up its balance sheet. CDB had planned to
provide $5 billion for a stake in the wounded company. However, China's senior leadership was
having second thoughts about the severity of the credit crunch. Although generally supportive of
the efforts of Chinese companies snapping up assets abroad when their prices are down, the
48 "Barclays will train CDB commodities traders and bankers and will become the Chinese bank's preferred provider
of commodity market risk hedging.... The bank also said it will help CDB develop commodity products, focusing
initially on corporate clients rather than investors, trading capabilities and commodities risk management
infrastructure . .. Gao Jian, deputy governor of CDB, said Barclays was the right long-term partner for the bank.
The agreement, which runs to 2012 and could be extended for another five-year period, is part of the banks' alliance
started in July when CDB become one of Barclays' largest shareholders." From: Javier Bias, "Barclays to Form
Alliance with CDB," Financial Times, Oct 10 2007, p. 17.
49 "But Temasek and China Development Bank have the right to appoint directors to the board of Barclays under
their own deal." From: Peter Thal Larsen, "Sovereign Wealth Funds Bag Big Stakes in Banks," Financial Times,
Sep 26 2007, p. 2 1.
50 "China Development Bank (CDB), one of the three policy banks in the nation, has finished buying more shares in
Barclays Bank, one of the largest commercial banks in the UK, said Barclays Bank spokesman Robin Tozer on July
24. . .Mr. Robin did not disclose how many shares the Chinese bank bought in the UK bank but added that the
policy bank is expected to keep an about 3% stake in Barclays Bank after the deal." From: "CDB Said to Finish
Buying More Barclays Bank Shares," SinoCast China Business Daily News, Jul 25 2008.
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government had decided that financial companies had become too unstable and China's previous
experience with strategic stakes in Blackstone, Barclays, Morgan Stanley and Fortis did not
provide reassurance. 51 As a result, the State Council tried to stop the CDB from investing up to
$5 billion in Citigroup.s2 In response, dutiful CDB rebuffed Citigroup's offer. Although the
commercial actor, CDB, seemed to want to partner with Citibank, when the state principal
indicated that it was not in favor of such action, the deal was halted.53 The CDB was forced to
forgo its narrow interests of acquiring international banking skills and building up its
international partnerships which would have made it more commercially competitive in favor of
conforming with state preferences to avoid further exposure to the international financial sector.
This episode demonstrates the state's ability to control the CDB even when commercial forces
pulled against state preferences.
The second general mode of CDB's investment activities is one in which CDB plays a
secondary, enabling role for other companies' activities. In this type, the CDB provides a line of
credit, financing or other financial assistance to another (almost always Chinese) corporation in
order to allow that entity to undertake some project or conduct some activity that the state
supports. Based on my research, this seems to be the CDB's most common type of operation.
Recent examples include the CDB's provision of $30 billion in financing to CNPC to underwrite
51 "The decision to stop CDB from investing up to $5bn in Citi was made in large part because of the perceived
failure of the Barclays investment ... China Investment Corp's stake in US private equity firm Blackstone, CIC's
stake in Morgan Stanley and Ping An Insurance's investment in Fortis. From: Jamil Anderlini, "Beijing Leadership
Will Need Persuading," FT.Com (2008).
52 "A CDB plan to participate in Citigroup's giant capital-raising in January was halted by intervention from Wen
Jiabao, China's premier. . ." ibid.
53 "Losses from the Barclays investment are believed to have led to the intervention of Wen Jiabao, China's premier,
which stopped CDB from investing-up to $5bn in Citigroup." From: Anderlini, "Illegal Lending Scandal Hits China
Development Bank."
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CNPC's international acquisitions and CDB's funding of a 10 year debt facility to underwrite
Huawei's upgrading of a Polish telecom system.54
The third type of operation involves setting up investment funds with specific mandates
or missions. These are often considerably smaller and frequently have a regional or sectoral
focus. The CDB infuses this sort of fund with capital and the fund then looks to invest that
capital according to its mandate. Examples of such funds that the CDB has set up include the
Sino-Swiss Partnership Fund, China-Belgium Direct Equity Investment Fund, ASEAN China
Investment Fund L.P., Sino-Israel Investment Fund, and the China-Africa Development Fund.
Most of the CDB's large-scale international investments have fallen into one of three
sectors: finance, extractive industries (like petroleum, gas, minerals, and metal ores), and
infrastructure. 56 CDB's involvement in infrastructure projects is not difficult to understand. The
roots of CDB were in infrastructure projects domestically in China. Building on this institutional
expertise was a logical way to extend CDB's operations internationally. Activities in the
financial sector are largely driven by a desire to modernize CDB's own banking operations and
risk management practices.57 Strategic partnerships with international banking entities provides
CDB with access to best practices, technology transfer, and financial product innovation.
Another benefit of investment operations in finance are the networking and personal relationship
54 "The Euro 640m ($992m), 10-year debt facility to fund an upgrade at Play, Poland's fourth largest mobile
operator, will mostly benefit Huawei, the Chinese telecoms equipment giant with the contract to do the upgrade, and
fits well into the bank's mandate of helping Chinese champions expand abroad." Jamil Anderlini, Paul Betts, and
Andrew Hill, "Politics could Force Silence on China Development Bank," Financial Times, Jun 19 2008, p. 16.
" "China Development Bank to Launch a Sino-Israel Fund," SinoCast China Business Daily News, Jan 11 2008, p.
1.
56 Since this case is about international deployment of China's state capital, the empirical evidence will focus on
CDB's international activities.
57 "Chinese institutions have been looking at opportunities to take stakes in foreign financial institutions to diversify
their revenue sources. In the case of Western investments, they also hope to gain an inside look at how more-mature
banks tick." From: Rick Carew,Edward Taylor and Dana Cimilluca, "China Bank Seeks Western Investments,"
Wall Street Journal, Aug 6 2008, p. C.3.
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cultivation that are so important for doing successful business in China.ss China's involvement
in extractive industries is largely fueled by its projected needs and a desire to hedge price and
supply risk. As discussed earlier, the government has been explicitly encouraging large Chinese
companies to venture abroad as a way of improving their competitiveness while securing access
to raw materials. Extractive sectors also tend to be least reliant on skilled mergers and
acquisitions management and execution expertise since most commodities are fairly easy to
value. Extractive companies often retain the "hard value" of their underlying assets, regardless
of acquisition skill, unlike tertiary industries which are often reliant on human capital or brand
value that might be destroyed by poor merger execution. Finally, because of the "hard value"
nature of their assets, extractive sectors tend be less reliant on intellectual property or other
political-legal supporting infrastructure-making such industries particularly resilient in
otherwise unstable conditions.
6.5.3 Assessing Evidence from China Development Bank (CDB)
The Chinalco deal indicates that the State Council was able to "encourage" CDB
participation. Evidence from the Chinalco case seems to suggest that as a policy bank, CDB is
subject to control by the state. 59 This high degree of control is the result of values on the IVs that
make CDB a particularly useful agent for achieving state foreign policy goals. As a policy bank,
CDB is in a rather unique position as a commercial actor whose interests are statutorily
constructed to mirror those of the government. This case represents an extreme value on the
Goals Compatibility IV. As expected, state control is strong.
58 Apparently, one of factors that enabled CDB to be tapped to finance the Chinalco-Rio deal was CDB's
relationship with international bankers.
59 CDB's structure as a policy bank entails a statutory obligation to implement state policy rather than operate on
purely commercial terms.
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In many instances, there is often more than one commercial actor available to finance a
given international investment. For instance, several entities could have financed the Chinalco
deal. China Ex-Im is another policy bank with an explicit international mandate that could
provide an alternative source of financing for state-sanctioned international investment activities.
To the degree that alternative agents exist for the state to select from, the Market Fragmentation
IV dynamic suggests that the CDB will be more pliable and accommodating to the state's
60interests. Since there are only three policy banks, the monitoring burden on the part of the state
is tolerable. The CDB/Chinalco case represents a case of oligopolistic market fragmentation and
as hypothesized, results in significant state Control.
From the Unity of State IV perspective, the CDB's major projects (including the Chinalco
case) also result in state control. The State Council exercises supervisory jurisdiction on China's
most significant, high visibility international investment projects. As was the case with state
supervision of Chinese oil companies, such high level attention provides an effective degree of
unified state supervision. This unified state element was reflected in the involvement of China's
state leadership in aspects of the Chinalco, Petrobras, and Rosneft episodes (all CDB financed
deals).
With regard to the Relative Resource IV, the CDB does occasionally seem to enjoy some
latitude in its activities stemming from its financial expertise (e.g. its considerable experience
issuing bonds, structuring large scale project finance, risk management, etc.) and unique foreign
partnership relationships that afford it a relative resource advantage. That said, the empirical
evidence suggests that any independent agency that the CDB might enjoy from this asymmetry is
generally offset by the confluence of goals and the extreme values on the other IVs that favor
60 "But to say there is state involvement is not the same as imagining a monolithic apparatus planning world
domination. ... Chinese companies, even state-owned ones, are as likely to be engaged in cut-throat competition as
in cosy cartels or state-sponsored carve-ups." From: Pilling, "Do Not Reject Chinalco's Bid for Bogus Reasons."
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state control. Interestingly, the high profile nature of several of these cases meant that it would
have been difficult for the CDB to directly undermine the wishes of the State Council. The
public nature of some of these cases seems to have provided the state with additional monitoring
capability.
With respect to the Reporting Relationship IV, almost every dimension indicates that the
state is clearly in charge of the CDB. CDB is a wholly-owned government entity, financed by
the Ministry of Finance and the China Investment Corporation (which as argued in the next
chapter is, itself, largely beholden to the Ministry of Finance). The CDB's management must
answer to the State Council. It was created explicitly to implement government policy priorities
and its legal mandate reflects this mission. Again, the value on this IV is extreme and state
control results as the theory would predict.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter and the last chapter examined China's efforts to secure raw materials. The
last chapter highlighted the government's inability to control commercial actors while this
chapter used the Rio Tinto case and CDB to illustrate state control. Specifically, these chapters
have examined how China secures strategic resources in the form of both petroleum and iron.61
The Chinese state often seeks to work through commercial actors to accomplish its objectives
with regard to securing raw materials it views as strategic. In different times and across different
contexts, the state enjoys varying degrees of control over these commercial actors. Rather than
arguing that the state is categorically "weak" or "strong," it is more helpful to use a theoretical
61 Large transactions often signal important data points for the study of economic statecraft in these sectors. Such
case evidence also generally involves relatively high levels of public visibility providing instructive transparency in
what can otherwise be fairly murky terrain.
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framework for understanding the elements of a state's successful use of commercial actors to
realize its strategic objectives.
The five factors presented in Chapter Two account for when the state is able to control its
commercial actors. In the case of China's NOCs, the state was often divided by internal
bureaucratic coordination difficulties which undermined the Unity of the State. The senior
bureaucratic ranking of the NOCs also meant that the Reporting Relationship between the state
and the commercial actors further limited state control. In addition, the Relative Resources were
highly skewed in favor of the commercial actors. As a result, the Chinese state often had a
difficult time controlling these commercial actors. In contrast, the CDB/Chinalco case provided
evidence that the state was able to very effectively control the behavior of its commercial actors.
In particular, the extreme values across almost all of the independent variables in this case were
skewed in favor of the state. In particular, the complementarity of the state's Goals and the goals
of the commercial actors facilitated state objectives. Also, the Reporting Relationship was
clearly in favor of the state. The CDB/Chinalco case provides a useful illustration of how the
Chinese state may use commercial actors to pursue its strategic objectives. The evidence shows
the CDB being directed by the State Council to underwrite a commercial acquisition that serves
China's national interests. Essentially this case is the story of commercial actors (Chinalco,
backed by CDB financing) being used to pursue a national objective of securing a strategically
important resource. The case is one in which China was trying to manage inputs that it views as
critical to its national well being-defining iron ore as a strategic resource. This constitutes an
instance of managing a Strategic Transfer type of security externality. In the meetings that
preceded Chinalco's initial purchase of the Rio shares in London, there was a coordinated effort
on the part of the state to use commercial actors to further China's strategic interests.
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Particularly striking from this evaluation of China's efforts in both the petroleum and iron
sectors is the prominent role that financing seems to have played. In the Chinalco case, the CDB
acted as a critical element of state coordination. To the extent that the Chinese state was able to
re-assert its control over the "Going Out" activities of the NOCs, state-backed financing also
seems to have provided an important lever of control over major international investments. As
China continues down the path of increasing commercialization of its corporate actors and the
state is removed from day-to-day management of firms, finance is emerging as a key lever of
continuing state control. This is primarily the result of two factors. First, the state still maintains
very close control over China's banking and finance sector, providing the state with ready
institutional mechanisms for enforcing its policy preferences. Second, despite the high-profile
nature of Chinese IPOs, the vast majority of Chinese corporate finance continues to rely on
bonds and bank loans rather than public equity.62 As a result, state-controlled finance holds out
the prospect for continued state control over Chinese firms even as corporations move toward
formal commercialization. Barring further maturation of China's capital markets, firms are
unlikely to be able to finance their international expansion without relying on China's banking
system. Thus, the next chapter will turn to examine China's national financing infrastructure. If
control over the purse strings can provide the state with the ability to practice effective economic
statecraft, then one ought to consider if, how, and when such control might be possible. The
most likely pools of capital that the state would be able to direct for strategic purposes are those
that the state most directly owns and administers: its sovereign wealth funds.
These funds have been a recent cause for concern given the significant role of the state in
managing and directing such large pools of capital. To better understand the strategic
62 Chinese equity markets are rather thinly capitalized and volume movements are often the product of momentum
rather than company findamentals.
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implications of China's sovereign wealth funds, the next chapter will apply of the theory to
analyzing the structure, funding, and activities of these commercial actors. The theory provides
helpful analytical leverage for understanding the conditions under which one might be concerned
that these financial entities may be used for purposes of economic statecraft.
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What Right Looks Like: SAFE and the NSSF
7. 1 Introduction
As evidenced in the last chapter, China's global resource extraction activities often
involve substantial state-backed investments. In this chapter and the next, I examine China's
sovereign wealth funds-namely the government financial entities charged with investing funds
on behalf of the state. Given the unusually high levels of retained earnings on Chinese corporate
balance sheets, its exchange rate regime, and the large amount of national savings more
generally, it seems likely that Chinese outward bound investment is likely to grow.' According
to China's Ministry of Commerce, by 2020 China will be the largest overseas investor in the
world.2 This growth in outward investment activity has been a source of concern to many policy
makers, given the potential or actual security externalities that result from the activities of
commercial actors. Specifically, it seems to be the strategic implications of large flows of
government-directed investment capital that raise the fear of this particular form of economic
interaction being used to further politically-motivated, strategic goals. 3 Of particular concern,
given the prominent role played by the state, are the financial activities of the sovereign wealth
"In the year 2007, China entered into 108 bilateral investment agreements with foreign countries all over the world
and China's foreign investment amounted to USD 20 billion. Most of the money went into the developing countries
in Asia and Latin America." From: "China Foreign Investment Spree to Continue," SinoCast China Business Daily
News, Apr 9 2008. Compare this with the growth in 2008 and 2009, when CDB (in September 2009) just
announced (in a single instance!) a $30 billion loan to CNPC for financing acquisitions abroad.
2 Paul Glasson, "Regional Focus to Global Push: The China Syndrome," The Australian March 4, 2009, p. 22.
3 Angel Gurria, secretary general of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in his March 27,
2008 address to the organization's Global Forum on International Investment stated that "The size of these funds,
and the fact that they are owned by governments have raised many questions regarding their operation and
purpose. Potential host countries fear that SWF investment decisions could be motivated more by political
objectives than by profit considerations, and that the funds could target security-sensitive and other 'strategic'
assets." Remarks available at:
http://www.oecd.org/docunent/13/0.3343,en 2649 34863 40336589 1 1 1 1,00.html
231
Norris, Economic Statecraft
funds and the state-owned banks. To the extent that these state investment decisions are used to
support foreign policy goals, such behavior is an example of the financial form of economic
statecraft. The empirics of this chapter illustrate how these types of economic statecraft do or do
not play out in practice.
An accurate assessment of these potential tools of economic statecraft ought to consider
the full range of entities that are charged with allocating capital internationally on behalf of the
state. To this end, this chapter and the next examine not only China's official sovereign wealth
fund, the China Investment Corporation (FPR H 4 FM I{ IiJ), but also the National Social
Security Fund Council (&M$1N%% OPM 'Z), and the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (H E L J )!). 4 Although each of these entities are responsible for investing
government funds, they differ from each other in important ways. For example, the goals and
missions of these actors vary, as does the degree to which their activities support China's foreign
policy objectives. All share the unifying quality of being non-private, state-owned, managed
and/or funded commercial actors, thus making them a good testing ground for comparatively
analyzing the differences among them to determine how those differences may account for
observed outcomes. To varying degrees, their activities are influenced both by commercial and
strategic foreign policy objectives. Understanding the factors that explain these differences
4 Brief profiles of all six of China's sovereign wealth funds discussed here can be found in Appendix B. The other
commercial actors that are similarly tasked with investing state capital are: two of China's three "policy banks"4
(namely, the China Export-Import Bank-91 P] hi Mr1 VY, and the China Development Bank-- * 4F R fT4 ),
and the China-Africa Development Fund ($:P 4- QlK ]). Although the China Investment Corporation
(the CIC) is widely considered to be China's official sovereign wealth fund, each of these government entities is
charged with investing a portion of the state's wealth. Although the US Treasury officially only recognizes the CIC
as China's sovereign wealth fund, from an analytical point of view, there is a strong case to be made for expanding
the analysis to cover the full range of entities that function as sovereign wealth funds. The Treasury's classification
carries certain obligations and legal stipulations that, for political reasons, may wish to be avoided. Ted Truman
(widely recognized authority on global sovereign wealth funds) suggests a more inclusive definition along the lines
of the one I am using. See: Edwin M. Truman, "Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Impacts on US Foreign Policy
and Economic Interests," Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, May
21, 2008. Available at: http://peterson-institute.org/publications/papers/truman05O8.pdf
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provides us with a better understanding of how the state is able (or not able) to effectively
control the deployment of investment capital to achieve its foreign policy objectives.
Specifically, this chapter examines two Chinese sovereign wealth funds in detail: the
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and the National Social Security Fund
Council (NSSF). These two cases are useful from a theory-building perspective in their ability to
illustrate extreme values.5 The time period covered by these cases runs from China's WTO entry
to the onset of the current financial crisis. China's massive build up of foreign exchange
reserves really begins its dramatic growth when China enters the WTO in 2001. The build-up is
a result of China's trade surplus and its non-convertible currency policy. During this period,
China has built up its "economic gunpowder" to the point that it can now afford the luxury of
using economics to pursue its foreign policy objectives (as opposed to primarily using its foreign
policy to ensure that its economic objectives are met).6 Understanding the limits of that
economic power and how it gets mobilized involves a closer examination of the particular
interface of the Chinese government and its commercial actors. In this chapter, I focus on how
this interaction takes place in the realm of the investment of state capital. In the case of NSSF,
we observe an unambiguously commercial agent with little potential for economic statecraft
while SAFE presents evidence of a commercial actor being used to achieve China's foreign
policy objectives. First, this chapter examines the case of SAFE-an entity that has recently
demonstrated its utility as an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft.
5 Selecting cases that exhibit extreme values on the IVs offers an opportunity to observe how such values cause
outcomes in the DV. Such process tracing enables tests of internal validity-an important basis for theory building.
6 I am indebted to Barry Naughton, Charles Freeman, and Tony Lake for pointing out this distinction in our
conversations. During much of the 1990s and early 2000s, it can be said that China's foreign policy mainly served
its economic interests. There is still some of that going on today, but the growth and progress China has made
economically (and seems likely to continue to make) has sparked concern that China will be able to leverage its
economic power to pursue an expanding set of foreign policy preferences. For more on how expanding capabilities
tend to lead to expanding national aims see: Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration; Essays on International
Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) pp. 89-91.
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7.2 The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
SAFE primarily serves to manage China's foreign exchange reserves. SAFE has had
investment operations dating at least to 1997 when its Hong Kong office was established to
conduct open market operations to defend China's currency peg in the face of the East Asian
Financial Crisis. Today, SAFE still maintains the RMB's peg range. Its primary duties also
include allocating foreign exchange for clearing China's foreign trade and managing China's
capital account liquidity. The history of SAFE's institutional development is really the story of
China's evolution on foreign exchange policy-a gradual and experimental liberalization of its
capital account. 7
Although specific information regarding SAFE's internal reporting structure is not widely
available, it seems that SAFE is "a bureau with vice-ministerial rank under the PBoC."8 It
functioned as an independent entity until 1998 when it was rolled up under PBoC as part of the
larger reorganization of China's financial sector. Even once it reported to PBoC, there seems to
have been a division of labor between SAFE and PBoC that saw SAFE enjoy a substantial
degree of autonomy in its management of China's foreign exchange reserves while the PBoC
focused on domestic macroeconomic management, building up its central bank functions, and
steering China's monetary policy. This functional division of labor and SAFE's history as a
previously autonomous entity partly account for why SAFE may have been accustomed to
operating relatively autonomously under the PBoC.9
7 Annex Table A.I. I1 of the UN World Investment Report 2008, p. 216. Available at:
http://www.tintad.ort/en/docs/wir2008p3 en.pdf
8 Author interview 091001 b, Washington, D.C.
9 With the introduction of CIC, however, SAFE seems to have become more attuned to the wishes of the state. As
mentioned below, this is largely a result of the competitive dynamic that the presence of CIC has introduced.
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SAFE has traditionally been very secretive about its investment activity. This disposition
has valid commercial reasoning: because of SAFE's size, knowledge of its capital allocations
could move markets. Unfortunately, such a shroud of secrecy also makes it easier for the state to
direct such institutions to conduct non-commercial (often political) activities out of the public's
eye. Despite SAFE's secrecy, there is recent evidence that SAFE has begun diversifying away
from US Treasuries-its default investment asset. By 2007, these treasuries had been producing
negative real returns given the anticipated RMB appreciation and China's domestic inflation. As
a result, it seems that SAFE has been diversifying away from USD-denominated assets. These
efforts are directing SAFE's investments both into other currencies and into alternative asset
classes with greater risk/reward profiles (e.g. equities as opposed to fixed income government
bonds). As discussed in more detail in the next chapter, CIC seems to have been created in part
because MOF was critical of PBoC's (and thus SAFE's) foreign exchange management and
investment of what, by 2007, had amounted to a good deal of China's store of its national wealth.
According to available estimates, SAFE apparently manages an investment portfolio of
$311.6 billion-mainly in US Treasuries and Bonds.10 Details of SAFE's portfolio are not
available. However, we do know that it is big; very big. China ended 2009 with approximately
$2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and by mid-2010, these had grown to $2.5 trillion."
Because Chinese banks must clear their foreign exchange and convert all foreign currency to
RMB exclusively through SAFE, SAFE is left holding a very large stockpile of foreign currency.
Generally speaking, most trading countries tend to hold enough foreign exchange reserves to
'O See: Section C of Chapter 1, "FDI by Sovereign Wealth Funds" in the UN World Investment Report 2008.
Available at: http:x/www.unctad.origcn/docs/wir2008p I en.pdf The report was updated in September of 2009,
however the new 2009 edition makes no mention of the size of SAFE. For the relevant section see: Subsection 2 of
Section C of Chapter 1, entitled: "FDI by Sovereign Wealth Funds on the Rise Despite the Crisis" in the UN World
Investment Report 2009. Available at: http://www.unctad.org/cn/docs/wir2009 en.pdf.
"Anonymous, "China's ForEx Reserves Growth Slows in Q2, Total Reaching $2.45 Trillion," July 11, 2010 Xinhua
News. Available in English on-line at: http://news.xinhuanct.com/english2010/business/2010-
07/1 1/c 13394250.htm
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cover about three to four month's worth of trade.' 2 Beginning in 2004 or early 2005, China
found itself with "excess reserves"-an economic condition in which reserves exceed the amount
of foreign currency needed to underwrite and clear about one quarter's worth of trade (plus some
cushion for investments, direct conversion, and capital flows). This fairly quickly seems to have
led to a consensus domestically in China that SAFE now had more reserves on hand than was
needed to underwrite China's international trade and defend its currency peg-even under very
conservative assumptions. This naturally prompted discussions over what China ought to do
with its excess reserves.13 Eventually, it was decided that a portion of the reserves would be
used to recapitalize China's banking sector which, since the late 1990s, had become weighed
down by bad debts.' 4 SAFE also faced increasing pressure to generate a higher return on its
asset base. 15 As a result, China decided to create the CIC.
The creation of CIC was a direct bureaucratic encroachment into SAFE's traditional
arena that prompted SAFE to alter its behavior. Part of SAFE's response was to demonstrate
that it, too, could provide higher returns by moving a portion of its holdings out of low-yielding
treasuries.' 6 One of the consequences of this more aggressive investment stance appears to have
been a series of ill-timed, clandestine stock purchases made on the London exchange in the latter
portion of 2007 and the first half of 2008.17 Shortly after SAFE made these purchases, the
12 This would be about $400-500 billion. Wang Xiangwei, "Fed's 'Printing Presses' Give Wen a Headache," South
China Morning Post, March 23 2009 China Briefing, p. 04.
13 Effectively, these excess reserves constitute a form of national savings.
14 This process will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
15 Moreover, since foreign exchange conversion is mandatory, SAFE has a very low cost of capital. "Beijing Bulls,"
Financial Times, Aug 7 2008, p. 12.
16 "SAFE once aimed to have as much as 5% of its portfolio in equities. That would be $90US billion, the amount of
CIC's initial capital that it plans to invest abroad in equity and fixed income or more than the equity holdings of the
Swiss National bank, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, many pension funds, and probably the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency." From: Rachel Ziemba, "My Say, Where are the SWFs?" The Edge Singapore, September 22,
2008.
17 "The State Administration of Foreign Exchange is believed to have moved 15 per cent of its US $1.8 trillion
reserves into riskier assets in July last year, just when stock markets were beginning to fall."Grace Ng and China
Correspondent, "Shifting Dynamic of US- China Relations," The Straits Times (Singapore), March 18 2009.
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market experienced a precipitous decline. Analysts have estimated that SAFE lost
approximately $80 billion by buying in at the top of the market.'8 Although SAFE does not
disclose its investments, some of its holdings have publicly reported having SAFE as a major
stockholder. Among these are the French petroleum company, Total, some European private
equity funds, and several large cap UK companies including British Petroleum. SAFE has also
been identified as a shareholder in the US private equity group, TPG.19 Apparently, SAFE often
uses intermediaries to conduct its purchases to help conceal SAFE's involvement in the
transactions. For instance, SAFE allegedly used its Hong Kong office which, in turn, directed a
third party manager to conduct many of these transactions on the open market in London.20 Such
a predilection for secrecy, a lack of public accountability and an absence of transparency make
SAFE well-suited to be used to pursue non-commercial activities. At the same time, the
competitive dynamic introduced by the creation of CIC, seems to have prompted SAFE to
become a more pliable agent for the state-willing to pursue national goals that may not be
strictly commercial in nature. To get a better sense of exactly how such economic statecraft
works in practice, the next few sections examine one such episode regarding China's use of
SAFE to pursue China's strategic objectives.
7.2.1 SAFE's purchase of Costa Rica's Bonds
On June 1, 2007 Costa Rica formally ceased to recognize the Republic of China and
announced that it would now recognize the People's Republic of China.2' This represented the
18 Wang, "Fed's 'Printing Presses' Give Wen a Headache."
19 "Beijing Bulls" Financial Times.
20 SAFE seems to have conducted most of its equity investing via its Hong Kong branch office (SAFE Investments
Inc.). Wang Xiangwei, "Fed's 'Printing Presses' Give Wen a Headache," South China Morning Post, March 23
2009, China Briefing, p. 04.
21 Costa Rica established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on June 1, 2007, after more than
six decades of ties with Taiwan. "World Briefing Asia: Taiwan Loses another Friend to China," New York Times,
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culmination of considerable diplomatic efforts on the part of the PRC. The State Administration
of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) played a key role in financing the eventual deal in the form of a
two-stage purchase of $300 million dollars worth of US dollar-denominated Cost Rican
government bonds. The first purchase occurred in January, 2008 for $150 million worth.
The second purchase seems to have occurred in January, 2009 for another $150 million. The
bonds were 12-year notes with a "way below market" interest rate of 2 percent.24 The terms of
these bonds are significant. Such non-commercial terms provide evidence that this episode was
a "hard test" for government control in which SAFE had to engage in commercially unattractive
behavior to achieve the state's foreign policy objectives. 25 In addition to the bond purchase,
China promised $130 million of aid.
The terms of the switch in recognition were apparently made an explicit part of the
agreement that Yang Jiechi, China's foreign minister, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, foreign minister
of Costa Rica, signed on June 1, 2007.26 Although the deal was intended to remain secret
(apparently against the wishes of the Costa Rican diplomats),2 7 documents detailing the
agreement have been subsequently made public as a result of a FOIA-style inquiry by a Costa
Rican journalist. "SAFE doesn't publicly discuss its investments and took steps to ensure this
Jun 7 2007, p. A.17., Daniel Zueras, "Central America: Costa Rica Discusses Free Trade with China," Global
Information Network (2008): 1. and Kathrin Hille, "Island Sees Allies Dwindle," Financial Times, Jun 8 2007, p. 12.
22 "China secretly agreed to use its foreign-exchange reserves to buy $300 million in bonds from Costa Rica as part
of a deal that enticed the Latin American nation to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing from Taiwan, newly
published government documents show."Andrew Batson, "The Buzz: China used Reserves to Sway Costa Rica,"
Wall Street Journal, Sep 13 2008, p. B.3.
23 ibid.
24 Stephen Fidler and Adam Thomson, "Fierce Battle for Diplomatic Supremacy," Financial Times, Sep 12 2008, p.
4; and Batson, "The Buzz: China used Reserves to Sway Costa Rica."
25 A "hard test" for government control occurs when the state is able to direct the commercial actor(s) to engage in
some activity to help further the state's strategic objectives but doing so runs counter to the commercial actor's
economic self-interests. Generally speaking, evidence that commercial actors are engaging in economically
disadvantageous behavior provides a good indicator that something unusual (like economic statecraft) may be
occurring.
26 Anderlini, "Beijing Uses Reserves Fund to Persuade Costa Rica Over Taipei."
27 "Costa Rican diplomats advised against keeping the terms secret, but the Chinese insisted, said people familiar
with the matter." Anderlini, "Beijing Uses Reserves Fund to Persuade Costa Rica Over Taipei."
238
Chapter Seven: SAFE & the NSSF
deal would also be secret. In an English-language letter dated Jan. 2, 2008, a SAFE official
named Fang Shangpu wrote to the Costa Rican finance ministry setting out terms of the bond
deal, including a request that Costa Rica 'shall take necessary measures to prevent the disclosure
of the financial terms of this operation and of SAFE as a purchaser of the bonds.' On Jan. 7,
finance minister Guillermo Zuniga replied in a letter saying 'It is a pleasure for me to confirm
that these suggestions are acceptable to us."' 28 Although the documents have since been
removed, for a time, the Costa Rican Foreign Ministry had posted copies of the June 1, 2007
agreement between the PRC and Costa Rica on its website. 29 In addition to the agreement, the
Foreign Ministry posted "several subsequent letters" that laid out the terms of the deal (e.g. an
additional $130 million of direct foreign aid). The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not
contest the validity of these documents.30
These revelations are significant in two ways. First, as Stephen Van Evera likes to
emphasize, secret government documents that later become public can often provide very good
source material and make for particularly compelling case evidence. Since the contents were not
originally intended to be made public, policy makers are generally more free to reveal true
intentions without regard to public or political costs. Second, the attempt to keep such activities
out of the public eye suggests that similar episodes may be occurring secretly (although secrecy
also implies that "smoking gun" evidence of such activity will generally be thin).
28 "Costa Rica also published a letter by foreign ministry official Edgar Ugalde, confirming that SAFE's first
investment of $150 million took place on Jan. 23, [20081." Batson, "The Buzz: China used Reserves to Sway Costa
Rica."
29 Batson, "The Buzz: China used Reserves to Sway Costa Rica."
30 "In a statement Friday, China's foreign ministry did not contest the validity of the Costa Rican documents. 'China
provides assistance to the Costa Rican government within its means. The goal is to help Costa Rica's economic and
social development,' the statement said." From: Batson, "The Buzz: China used Reserves to Sway Costa Rica."
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Changing recognition in exchange for economic benefits should not be viewed as a
particularly notable event.31 Costa Rica's switch was simply the most recent chapter of what has
been called "checkbook diplomacy" -a strategy through which Beijing and Taipei vie for
international support by providing economic concessions to other nations in exchange for
recipient nations' formal diplomatic recognition. This phenomenon is not new.3 Since the
origins of the Chinese Civil War, both sides have sought international legitimization from third
parties. The significance of the Costa Rican episode lies in the fact that there is clear evidence
that the PRC successfully used SAFE to pursue its foreign policy objectives. This episode
demonstrates a particular situation in which the central government was able to direct the
behavior of the state investment entity to support its foreign policy objectives. In this case, the
state mobilized monetary assets-not fiscal assets-to achieve its foreign policy goals. This case
is important because it represents a clear case of the state's allocation of monetary assets being
used for foreign policy goals. The evidence shows that SAFE was directly used as an agent of
31 Recipients of economic benefits have often changed their formal diplomatic recognition in what has been termed
"checkbook diplomacy." For instance, in October of 2003 Liberia ceased recognizing Taiwan and Dominica
changed its recognition to the PRC in March of 2004. In late 2004, Vanuatu switched recognition from the PRC to
the ROC before the prime minister was ousted and Vanuatu switched back. In January of 2005, Grenada changed its
formal diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC. In May of 2005, Nauru restored its relations with the ROC
following its 2002 decision to suspend relations (it recognized the PRC in the interim). In October of 2005, Senegal
changed its recognition from the ROC to the PRC and in August of 2006, Chad established relations with the PRC
and Taiwan ended relations with Chad. In April of 2007, Saint Lucia restored relations with the ROC. In January of
2008, Malawi switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.
32 "China and Taiwan have for years used aid payments, infrastructure projects and the like as incentives for small
countries like Costa Rica to take their side. But SAFE's international profile is relatively new. In the past year, it has
used a Hong Kong subsidiary to buy small stakes in publicly listed companies including BP, Total of France and at
least three Australian banks."Jamil Anderlini, "Beijing Uses Reserves Fund to Persuade Costa Rica Over Taipei,"
Financial Times, Sep 12 2008, p. 1.
3 "Purchase of US-denominated Costa Rican government bonds by China's State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (Safe) is the clearest proof yet that Beijing regards its $1,800bn in foreign reserves - the world's biggest -
as a tool to advance foreign policy, as well as a potential source of income .... 'This is the first smoking gun that
proves China uses its foreign exchange reserves for political purposes,' said Kerry Brown, senior fellow with the
Asia programme at Chatham House in London." ibid.
3 The distinction between "fiscal" assets and "monetary" assets is helpful here. Fiscal assets are those assets that
belong to the state-usually gained as a result of taxes that have been paid to the government. States are generally
free to spend their fiscal assets in a political manner (e.g. foreign aid, domestic welfare, etc.). Monetary assets are
those for which the state is merely acting as custodian-generally held by an independent central bank or trust.
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the Chinese government to pursue its foreign policy objective vis a vis Costa Rica (and indirectly
vis a vis Taiwan).
In this case, SAFE's goals were to ensure that it maintained a continued monopoly over
China's foreign exchange management. In order to do this, it needed to isolate, marginalize, and
if possible, eliminate the CIC. One of the best ways to accomplish this was to demonstrate how
useful SAFE could be to China's leadership. In this instance, SAFE demonstrated its usefulness
by providing an important element of economic inducement to Costa Rica. In addition, there
does not seem to be a good deal of conflict between the goals of SAFE and the goals of the State
Council. Unlike more transparent, commercially-oriented sovereign wealth funds, SAFE does
not seem to be particularly concerned with appearing to be politically motivated in its allocation
of investment capital. On the contrary, it seems particularly motivated to demonstrate its
usefulness in the face of the creation of an alternative rival institution (CIC) that was challenging
its bureaucratic turf. As a result, there does not seem to be any substantial conflict between the
goals of the state and the goals of the commercial actor in this episode.
So what were the goals of the state in this instance? China sought to limit the number of
countries that provide diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. Limiting Taiwan's diplomatic space has
been a long-standing objective of the PRC's foreign policy. One of the ways that the PRC
pursues this objective is to use economic inducements to woo Taiwan's allies away. Often, there
are multiple avenues of economic engagement (trade, investments, aid, etc.). In the lead up to
the SAFE purchase, Chinese economic ties with Costa Rica had been growing rapidly. Costa
Rica is one of the few countries to run a trade surplus with China. Trade with China in 2007 was
Strictly speaking, when a country has an independent central bank, these assets are not the government's to spend.
Rather, the central bank is statutorily made independent of the political leadership. This arrangement allows the
central bank to manage the macroeconomic levers of the economy-relatively insulated from political pressure. In
the case of China, what we observe is that the government is able to effectively direct the allocation of these foreign
exchange reserves to pursue political objectives.
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up more than 25% while exports were up more than 30% over a year earlier making China Costa
Rica's second largest trading partner. Costa Rica was also China's second biggest trading
partner in Central America.35 China often takes advantage of such deepening economic ties to
improve diplomatic relations. It is important to view the SAFE deal in the larger context of
China's growing economic relationship with Costa Rica. Although economic interaction is
important in its own right, China also leverages its economic relations for strategic ends. In this
case, China sought to convince Costa Rica to switch its official diplomatic recognition from
Taiwan to the PRC. 36 SAFE, China's official custodian of its foreign exchange reserves,
secretly used a portion of those reserves to pursue one of China's core strategic interests. The
result was successful economic statecraft.
7.2.2 Beyond SAFE: Other aspects of the Costa Rica Deal:
The SAFE bond purchase was part of a larger pattern of economic inducements
collectively designed to bring about a change in Costa Rica's foreign policy-namely
3 "Now, China is Costa Rica's strategic partner, and trade between them has climbed from $630 million in 2004 to
$1.7 billion in 2006."Ral Gutirrez, "Central America: Taiwan's President Seeks to Strengthen Ties," Global
Information Network (2007): 1. This figure grew again to $2.87 billion in 2007. For more on Costa Rica's growing
trade ties see: Zueras, "Central America: Costa Rica Discusses Free Trade with China,"; "Costa Rica, China Launch
Free Trade Talks," World Trade 22, no. 2 (2009): 14; and Vanessa . Garnica, "China Proves Tough Negotiator for
Costa Rica," McClatchy - Tribune Business News (2009).
36 "Analysts say this region of the Americas has become a chessboard for the two Asian countries, which are battling
for something more than trade partners: Diplomatic support and recognition is the ultimate aim." Gutirrez, "Central
America: Taiwan's President Seeks to Strengthen Ties." Although both sides generally try to deny their use of
economics to further their diplomatic goals, evidence seems to suggest that both sides make economic benefits
contingent on diplomatic recognition. Wang Baodong (spokesman for China's embassy in Washington) was quoted
as saying, "There are still a few countries that have not established diplomatic relations with China. Even though the
Chinese people and government hold friendly feelings toward these countries, the Taiwan question constitutes the
main obstacle to the development of our relationships." Larry Luxner, "Two Chinas Battle for Influence,"
LatinFinance (2007): 1. For more on "checkbook diplomacy," Taiwan's response and its efforts to shore up support
among other Latin American allies, see: "China/Taiwan: Costa Rica Switches Allegiance to PRC, More may
Follow," Asialaw (2007): 1; and Fidler and Thomson, "Fierce Battle for Diplomatic Supremacy."
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strengthening its ties to the PRC while severing its connection to Taiwan. 37 As is common in
such episodes of Chinese use of economics to strengthen its diplomatic ties, China also financed
the construction of a new, 40,000 seat national sports stadium for San Jose. Estimates of the cost
for the stadium range from $25-83 million.38 China also promised a new science and technology
park.39
As discussed in Chapter Five on China's natural resource extraction-based engagement
strategy, China's economic interaction with would-be partners frequently entails an energy
resource development component. It seems that the Costa Rica deal also involved natural
resource development and exploration. Hu Jintao signed a contract to modernize and expand
Costa Rica's Moin refinery's capacity from 25,000 barrels per day to 60,000 b/d.40 The
financing of this $1 billion project is illustrative of the inter-connectedness of many of the
commercial actors discussed in this dissertation. CNPC and Costa Rica's state-owned refinery,
Recope, will each contribute $150 million to capitalize a $300 million, mixed capital joint
venture entity. The remaining $700 million will be provided to CNPC in the form of credits
37 "Encouraging the handful of countries that still recognise Taipei as the legitimate representative of the Chinese
people to switch allegiance is an important foreign policy goal foi Beijing, which regards Taiwan as a renegade
province." Anderlini, "Beijing Uses Reserves Fund to Persuade Costa Rica Over Taipei."
38 When asked to elaborate on the details of the donation, Marco Vinicio (Costa Rica's foreign trade minister) was
only willing to say "It is part of the co-operation." See: Fidler and Thomson, "Fierce Battle for Diplomatic
Supremacy," also see: Patrick Fitzgerald, "China to Invest in New Technology Park in Costa Rica," McClatchy -
Tribune Business News (2009).
39 Estimated costs for the science and technology park are approximately $65 million, although the Costa Rican
foreign trade minister is reported to have said that "We don't have an exact cost yet because (the project) will be
divided into five phases," he said. "This first (phase) will have a cost of $20 million, and includes biotechnology,
nanotechnology, information technology and mechatronics." ibid.
40 The state in this case was fairly unified as exhibited by the presence of Hu, himself, and the foreign policy
coordination under MOFA. "The modernisation of Recope will involve the establishment of a partnership between
the refinery and the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), with the aim of enlarging Costa Rica's oil-refining
capacity and possibly building a new refinery for exporting end products to other Central American countries.
Expansion of Recope's oil-refining capacity to a target of 60,000 barrels of oil per day--48,000 for domestic use and
the remainder for exporting to the rest of the region--will cost an estimated US$Ibn." "Costa Rica Politics: Co-
Operating with China," EIU ViewsWire (2008). Also see: E. Watkins, "Costa Rica Nixes Exploration; Wants
Chinese Refinery," Oil & Gas Journal 107, no. 18 (2009): 32.
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"from a bank in China."41 Large Chinese policy banks have often been required to extend such
credits to finance government-designated projects. In this way, the Chinese government is able
to exercise a good deal of control over its ability to effectively direct economic activity (like
project finance) to facilitate foreign policy objectives. Additionally, China National Petroleum
Corp. (CNPC) and Costa Rica's state-owned refinery, Recope, are planning to establish a $6
billion refinery that is to have a daily processing capacity of 200,000 barrels.42 It also appears
that a subsidiary of CNPC is engaged in negotiations to conduct oil exploration in Costa Rica's
territorial waters.43
Such government-backed economic activity is not limited to extractive industries.
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei) was chosen over Ericsson to deploy Costa Rica's first
3G network.4 4 The $235 million contract was awarded by Costa Rica's Electricity Institute
(ICE) which is a Costa Rican state-run electrical company. Generally, China's economic
engagement also entails a cultural component as well. Such activities are intended to foster
deeper understanding and closer cultural ties between China and its foreign partners. In the case
of Costa Rica, such activities have included the founding of the Confucius Institute for Chinese
language studies at the University of Costa Rica as well as an invitation to participate in the
Shanghai Expo in 2010.45 It seems that large-ticket capital projects and high profile public
4'"Costa Rica Politics: Co-Operating with China," EIU. The bank in question may be the China Development Bank,
although this could not be confirmed.
42 J. McTague, "China Makes a Mark in Trade," Barron's 88, no. 47 (2008): 26; and Watkins, "Costa Rica Nixes
Exploration; Wants Chinese Refinery."
43 In January 2008, Environment and Energy Minister Roberto Dobles announced plans by China National Oil &
Gas Exploration & Development Corp. [now known as China Southern Petroleum Exploration & Development
Corp., based in Guangzhou and a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corp.) to explore Costa Rican territorial
waters. Watkins, "Costa Rica Nixes Exploration; Wants Chinese Refinery."
44 "Huawei Chosen to Build First 3G Network in Costa Rica," SinoCast China Business Daily News, Jan 12 2009.
45 "Costa Rica Politics: Co-Operating with China," EIU.
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works are also often combined with personal benefits for key decision-makers. 46 Such activities
skate dangerously close to bribery and corruption, often exacerbating already problematic
governance conditions in smaller, developing economies.
Another aspect of China's use of economic statecraft that is particularly pronounced in its
interactions with small states is the asymmetry between the size of China's economy and market
in comparison with other states. These relative asymmetries often lay the foundations for
smaller economies to develop a dependence on China's much larger, dynamic economy.
Overtime, such dependence can generate Coercive Leverage externalities.
This case of Costa Rica is just one example of a larger trend in which China seeks to use
its economic engagement to improve ties with countries. China gradually seeks to build on these
economic links to foster greater diplomatic cooperation.4 7 Over time, as economic ties grow and
deepen, they generate Interest Transformation security externalities which China often seeks to
capitalize on to further its longer term strategic goals. China's use of economics to achieve its
foreign policy objectives is not limited to economic support. China's strategic engagement also
includes diplomatic and political support as well. 48
7.2.3 Evaluating the SAFE Case
The reporting structure for this case, like all of China's sovereign wealth funds, is direct.
SAFE is a wholly government-owned, managed, financed and operated state investment entity.
This extreme value on the Reporting Relationship IV reinforces the government's ability to direct
46 In the Costa Rica episode, there have been suggestions that "people close to the president may have benefited
from the deal." Fidler and Thomson, "Fierce Battle for Diplomatic Supremacy."
47 For more on this pattern see: William Norris, "China's 'Other' Southeast Asia Relations," paper presented at ISA,
March 2007.
48 The Costa Rican vice president noted that China promised support for Costa Rica in international forums like the
UN. From: Batson, "The Buzz: China used Reserves to Sway Costa Rica." China has also been "sending high-
ranking military delegations to many countries in Latin America." See: Luxner, "Two Chinas Battle for Influence."
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SAFE's activities. SAFE is run by managers who serve at the pleasure of the CCP. The senior
management team is approved by the central Communist Party Organization Department ($[I
_ $ iR ) ). SAFE nominally reports to the PBoC, and while it is able to enjoy some
degree of discretion in its investment decision making,50 it seems to have only limited
independent agency and, as discussed above, no real incentive in this case to resist State Council
directives (given the bureaucratic incentive to please senior leadership as part of its effort to re-
capture its exclusive position as sole asset manager of China's state capital reserves).
The Relative Resources seem to have been fairly evenly distributed between the central
government and SAFE in this episode. Since the engagement with Costa Rica was at its core a
foreign policy issue, the State Council in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were
the natural government entities leading the coordination efforts. However, in terms of the
purchasing, pricing and structuring of the actual deal to buy Costa Rica's bonds, the government
would likely have relied on SAFE's expertise. There does not seem to have been any obvious
resource asymmetry in this episode.
That said, SAFE has traditionally enjoyed a good deal of unique financial expertise,
given its history managing China's foreign exchange reserves. Prior to the existence of CIC,
SAFE enjoyed an unchallenged monopoly over the administration and investment of China's
foreign exchange reserves. This was coupled with SAFE's institutionally concentrated financial
expertise that provided SAFE with power vis a vis the less knowledgeable state. For a
considerable portion of its existence, this relative resource asymmetry coupled with an absence
of institutions competing for SAFE's mission provided SAFE with some degree of autonomy vis
49 This body also conducts the most senior appointments of 50 some managers of SASAC's largest corporations.
50 While SAFE is nominally a direct report to the PBoC, it has a reputation for operating largely independently of
much oversight. Author Interview 080623, Beijing.
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a vis the state. With the introduction of CIC, SAFE lost a good deal of this agency. The recent
emergence of CIC significantly undermined SAFE's relative resource asymmetry and
predictably increased the state's control over SAFE. SAFE's poorly timed equity investments
are an example of the competitive dynamics brought about by the creation of CIC. With the
Costa Rica episode, SAFE wanted to show its superiors that it could act as a useful policy arm
for the senior decision makers. These data points seem to suggest that, with the creation of CIC,
SAFE ha been playing institutional defense against the encroachment on its traditional sphere of
influence-namely investing the State's hard currency assets.51 The existence of CIC created
direct competition for SAFE and as a result, SAFE may have been more willing to act as a
dutiful agent of the state. This change partly explains why SAFE became more willing to do the
State's political bidding (as in the case of Costa Rica).
These dynamics suggest that SAFE is more likely to listen to the wishes of the principal
now that it knows that there is a real alternative for investing state foreign exchange reserves
located in CIC. The most conducive situation for state control is one in which there are a small
number of commercial agents who can be pitted against one another-effectively jockeying for
the good graces of the state.s2 In this case, a change in the value of the Market Fragmentation IV
(shifting from a monopoly to an oligopoly) contributed to SAFE's willingness to act as an agent
to achieve China's strategic objectives vis a vis Costa Rica.
The state in this episode does not seem to have been very divided on the strategy nor the
particular instruments used to engage Costa Rica. The timing and announcement of various
5' Bear in mind that these events were unfolding in the midst of the discussions about the creation of the CIC in
early-mid 2007.
5' For a very good study of such competitive dynamics "with Chinese characteristics" see Lin Yi-min Lin, Between
Politics and Markets : Firms, Competition, and Institutional Change in Post-Mao China (Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001). Alternative entities that could have served the purposes of the State Council
may have been the China Development Bank or any of the state-owned banks (including ICBC, Bank of China, etc.)
or possibly the Ex-Im Bank or the National Social Security Fund.
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aspects of the strategy indicate a good deal of senior level coordination. For instance, trade and
investment deals were often coordinated with a senior official's state visit. It seems that the
foreign ministry took the lead in ensuring smooth coordination across various functional lines.
There does not seem to be any evidence of cross-cutting local or provincial vested interests that
stood in opposition to closer ties with Costa Rica. Likewise, there do not seem to have been any
obvious factional politics or apparent bureaucratic turf battles over Costa Rica's recognition
policy. As a result the state exhibited a good deal of Unity in this episode.
In conclusion, this episode provides a clear case of the state using economic tools to
achieve a foreign policy goal. SAFE became an instrument of Chinese foreign policy when it
used monetary assets to purchase Costa Rican bonds on commercially unattractive terms. Hard
tests for economic statecraft include those instances when the state is able to exert enough
control over commercial actors to direct them to pursue strategic objectives even if that activity
runs against the commercial actor's own commercial interests.5 3 How did the state do this? The
state was able to provide an incentive structure to generate the desired behavior. This incentive
structure can be usefully conceptualized using the factors presented in Chapter Two. This is a
case in which every IV points to likely state control. This case provides a useful illustration of
extreme values on the IVs. As expected, we observe state control happening. Extreme value
cases are very helpful for testing internal validity of the theory. Although it is difficult to
accurately determine which of the five IVs played the most dominant role, the state ownership
and management in conjunction with the competitive threat presented by the creation of CIC
offer compelling reasons for why SAFE was able to be used so effectively to pursue China's
53 The SAFE-Costa Rica case provides a good example of such behavior. Unfortunately, in many episodes in
Chinese foreign policy, the commercial and political aspects are often intertwined, making a pure test of such
dynamics difficult. Politically expedient activities may often carry some commercial merit. Likewise,
commercially attractive behavior may often bolster political goals. Nonetheless, it is useful to specify the ideal
types even if complex realities rarely accommodate neat, clean experimental testing of theoretical abstractions.
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strategic objectives. This episode also involved a lack of transparency which seems to be a
condition that is conducive to having non-commercial factors play a larger role in influencing the
behavior of the agent. The case also indicates efforts to keep the state manipulation of
commercial activity secret (implying that other cases may not exhibit such obvious "smoking
guns").
Taken together, the values on the independent variables indicate factors that suggest a
high likelihood that the commercial actor would do what the state would like it to do in this case.
It should not come as a surprise then that the outcome in this episode is that the state was able to
control SAFE. In this episode, we can clearly observe that SAFE was directed to purchase $300
million of Costa Rican bonds at below-market rates as part of China's effort to entice Costa Rica
to switch diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan. This purchase by SAFE was part of a
larger series of diplomatic visits and economic inducements which were designed to achieve the
foreign policy goal of Costa Rica's de-recognition of Taiwan and its switch of diplomatic
recognition to the PRC. As indicated above, the empirics of this episode provide evidence of
state control. In this instance, China was able to use a state investment entity as a strategic tool
to effectively achieve a foreign policy objective.
7.3 The National Social Security Fund (NSSF)
If the SAFE-Costa Rica episode illustrates how these sovereign wealth funds can be used
to pursue Chinese strategic interests, the NSSF case demonstrates the opposite extreme of a
relatively commercially-driven state investment entity. In contrast to the SAFE case, this case
explores the factors that make the NSSF unlikely to be a source of strategic concern.
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The National Council for the Social Security Fund was established in November 2000 to
oversee a special supplementary fund (the National Social Security Fund-the NSSF) used by
the central government to help ensure adequate funds to cover its social security needs. It was
originally intended to backstop liabilities and potential investment losses of municipal and
province-level social security funds which had been investing the pension assets that workers
had paid into SOEs. In many ways, the NSSF was a pioneer for China. It was China's first
explicit sovereign wealth fund and the NSSF was the first to use third party asset managers. It
was originally set up to both act as a national resource to bailout potentially failed local and
provincial pension funds and to provide a nationally-sanctioned model of pension investment
upon which other local funds around China could pattern their management, fiduciary
responsibilities, governance, and investment operations. The management of the national social
security fund is based on the State Council's "Provisional Rules of Management for the National
Social Security Fund." The annual report that the NSSF publishes as part of its statutory duties
clearly specifies the high degree of convergence between the goals of the state, namely to
provide adequate funds to cover future social security liabilities, and the goals of the fund, which
exhibits a strongly commercial orientation in its desire to maximize investment returns while
protecting the initial capital investment. As a result, the fund operates with a good deal of
professionalism and conducts commercially-motivated investment activity. Of the entities that
invest capital on behalf of the state, the NSSF represents a case in which the agent seems to be
the least motivated by non-commercial goals.54
5 For this reason, the NSSF case makes an interesting juxtaposition with the SAFE case just examined-the two
cases lie at opposite ends of the spectrum, thus providing useful illustrations of the theory.
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The government set up the NSSF to provide funding for the projected social security
obligations that the government faced in the near future.55 As a result, there was a strong
incentive to focus the NSSF on generating respectable returns while protecting the initial capital
which was entrusted to it.56 The goals of the state (namely to ensure adequate funding for future
social security obligations) depend on the goals of the commercial actor (namely to pursue
investment returns while preserving the capital base entrusted to NSSF). Complementary goals
result in the state being able to effectively control the activities of the NSSF. However, the
NSSF's activities are oriented around largely commercial goals-thus substantially mitigating
the likelihood that the NSSF's activities will be used to generate security externalities.
The NSSF is run by a board of directors that reports to the State Council. The State
Council can appoint and dismiss the NSSF's chairman, vice-chairman and any of the 13 directors
on the board. As a "governmental agency at the ministerial level", the NSSF institutionally
reports directly to the State Council. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Labor and Social Security are mandated to "supervise the investment operations and custody"
of the NSSF. In practice MOF personnel seem to occupy the key operational positions while the
MoLSS is able to voice its preferences or concerns regarding particular investments, portfolio
allocation or practices. Although these reporting relationships evidence a significant role for the
state in monitoring and enforcing compliance with national goals, the multiple institutional
interests that have a voice in the administration of NSSF suggest the potential for a lack of state
unity.
" NSSF 2008 Annual Report (Published on May 9, 2009) available on their website www.ssf.gov.cn (in Chinese
only).
56 See Stuart Leckie & Ning Pan, "A Review of the National Social Security Fund in China," Pensions Vol. 12,
number 2, 2006, pp. 88-97.
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7.3.1 The National Social Security Fund (NSSF): Financing Sources
The NSSF has grown to about RMB 776.5 billion (or about US $113.7 billion) in assets
under management at the end of 2009. The source of these funds has largely been "fiscal
surpluses" that have been allocated to NSSF from the central government. Its other important
sources of funds are shares of publicly listed SOEs, individual worker contributions, and
investment returns. The annual funding comes from the central budget (hence an important
source of MoF's influence). The NSSF also often receives proceeds and/or stock in SOEs just
before their IPOs. 57 This has generally been seen as a government vote of confidence and
support as well as acting as a stabilizing influence for the IPOs since the NSSF traditionally does
not sell its (normally around 10% of the total number of) shares right away. The third source of
funds for the NSSF comes directly from individual worker contributions. Finally, the NSSF
retains and reinvests its returns that it has earned on previous NSSF investments.
Over time, the relative importance of these sources has shifted. Initially, almost 100% of
the NSSF's funding came from state budget allocations. However, as more and more SOEs went
public in the early to mid 2000s, a greater and greater share of the NSSF's annual funding was
coming from proceeds from these IPOs. 58 Today, investment income usually accounts for most
of the annual increase in NSSF's assets. In addition, the NSSF seems to have gotten increasingly
more and more independent and self-sustaining over time. Its purview of permitted investments
has also expanded, growing to include private equity and alternative investment classes as well
as now being able to invest a portion of its capital internationally. The NSSF operates with a
"7 See: Stuart Leckie & Ning Pan, "A Review of the National Social Security Fund in China," Pensions Vol. 12,
number 2, 2006, pp. 88-97 and Michael McCormack, "Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds: 2008-2010 Opportunities
for Foreign Asset Managers." (Shanghai: Z-Ben Advisors, 2008) pp. 21-43.
58 According to Leckie and Pan, government outlays accounted for 100% of the increase in funds in 2000, by 2005,
this source had dropped to only 25% of the increase in funds as investment returns grew.
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long term investment horizon-about 15-20 years.59 This enables it to take advantage of short-
term price fluctuations and act as a market stabilizing force.
7.3.2 The National Social Security Fund (NSSF): Financing Uses
The gradual evolution of NSSF's asset allocation provides evidence for a sustained
pattern of commercially-driven diversification and investment activities. The NSSF was
launched in 2000 with RMB 20 billion (US $2.9 billion). In its early days, the NSSF's returns
were primarily driven by the interest paid on its bank deposits. But that was soon to change. It
first ventured away from short-term, fixed income investments with a RMB 1.27 billion pre-IPO
equity investment in Sinopec and Yangtze Power when those companies listed domestically in
2001. Since these early investments, the NSSF has shown a desire to move out of fixed income
and into more equities. In 2002 a statute was passed which stipulated that SOEs would
contribute 10% of their IPO proceeds to NSSF (generally in the form of direct equity stakes).
The government's objective in having the NSSF take these stakes was mainly to provide a stable
government owner that would not sell the newly listed shares right away. It also allowed the
NSSF to scale up its assets under management and partake in the monetization of the state's
crown jewels. In June 2004, NSSF used RMB 10 billion to buy pre-IPO shares of Bank of
Communications just before it went public on the Hong Kong exchange.61 During 2005, NSSF
also bought US $2.6 billion of ICBC's pre-IPO stock and US $ 1.4 billion of BOC's stock before
59 See: "[NSSF's] Investment Concept" (42k.) Available at: http://www.ssf.gov.cn/tzln/.
60 Michael McCormack, "Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds: 2008-2010 Opportunities for Foreign Asset Managers."
(Shanghai: Z-Ben Advisors, 2008) p. 21.
61 "One of the earliest investments of this kind occurred in June 2004, when the Bank of Communications (BoCom),
one of China's smaller yet more profitable state-owned banks, restructured in preparation for a Hong Kong listing.
The NSSF invested RMB I Obn (US $ 1.2bn) in BoCom as a strategic investor, and became the third largest owner of
BoCom after the MoF and HSBC. In July 2005, BoCom shares were listed in Hong Kong at a price 42 per cent
higher than that paid by the NSSF, netting it with a handsome (although unrealised) return of over RMB4.2bn (US $
0.5bn)." Leckie and Pan, "A Review of the National Social Security Fund in China," p. 93. Leckie and Pan
reference Bank of Communications IPO prospectus and IPO Allotment Result June, 2005.
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each of their Hong Kong listings. Buying in at this time (usually at or close to book market
value-i.e. undervalued) just before the public listing allows the NSSF to ensure relatively safe,
high returns on its investments. In addition, the NSSF was receiving 10% of the shares of SOEs
that were listing in Hong Kong. As a result of the 10% pre-IPO "tax," during this time period,
NSSF acquired a portfolio of small stakes in 21 recently IPO'd SOEs. Eventually, this "IPO tax"
was limited to SOEs that were listing on foreign exchanges since it was thought that the "IPO
tax" was contributing to the cooling of China's domestic stock market in the mid-2000s.
The NSSF was also an early innovator of using third party asset managers-another
important factor favoring commercial, arms length investment strategies in which the
government has a fairly limited voice (thus further restricting its ability to use the investment
activities to realize strategic foreign policy objectives). The NSSF has continued to expand this
practice and seems poised to have third party asset managers control the majority of its assets in
the next few years. After its first two years of operation, the NSSF displayed a preference for
incrementally ramping up and expanding its use of third party asset managers. In 2003, the
NSSF first sought out local fund managers to manage assets on its behalf. It hired six Chinese
third-party asset managers to manage funds split 1:2 (stocks : bonds).62 These mandates
managed about RMB 32 billion or approximately 24% of NSSF's total assets at the end of the
year. During 2004, NSSF also increased its number of third party asset managers to 10 and
increased their share of assets under management to 36%.63 By the end of 2005, the third party
asset managers were in charge of RMB 73 billion (- US $ 9 billion, or 34% of the NSSF's total
assets). Between 2005 and 2007, NSSF also added one securities company and three fund
62 "The managers included Boshi (now re-named Bosera), Changsheng, Huaxia, Harvest, Penghua and Southern, all
considered among the best in the Chinese fund management industry." Stuart Leckie & Ning Pan, "A Review of the
National Social Security Fund in China," Pensions Vol. 12, number 2, 2006, p. 92.
63 NCSSF's 2004 annual report
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managers to its original 10 third party asset managers. With the State Council's passage of the
"Interim Measures on Overseas Investment by Social Security Fund" in the late spring of 2006,
the NSSF was authorized to begin investing abroad. Although this move into international
investing greatly enhanced the NSSF's potential to generate strategic security externalities, the
NSSF mitigated concerns by appointing ten foreign third-party professional fund managers in
late 2006. By 2007, the NSSF was investing internationally under very commercial conditions.
As the NSSF has ramped up its assets under management, it seems to be looking to
continue this commercially-driven strategy. At the end of 2008, the NSSF had about RMB 513
billion or about $74 billion in net assets. (according to its 2008 annual report). This consists of
about RMB 562 billion of assets (of this about RMB 305 billion was directly invested by the
NSSF while the other 257 billion was sourced to third party asset managers) and about RMB 49
billion in liabilities.64 In 2008, the fund had a negative return of 6.79% although since inception,
the NSSF has averaged an 8.98% annual return. Chasing returns rather than scoring diplomatic
points provides a strong incentive for the agent to pursue purely commercial (rather than
political) objectives.
The NSSF is primarily invested in domestic Chinese assets. This domestic distribution of
the NSSF's investments further mitigates the likelihood that the NSSF will be used to pursue
strategic foreign policy goals.65 At the end of 2008, NSSF held about RMB 61 billion in bank
deposits. Another RMB 133 billion was held as short term (mainly government) debt and RMB
25 billion was long term debt. The largest category of assets was "current portion of long term
debt" which stood at RMB 260 billion at year end. The value of the NSSF's largely third-party-
6 4 Figures come from "2008 Fund Annual Report" (K4f$$i 2008 $E) Available in Chinese at:
http://ww w.ssf.gov.cn/xxgk/tzveb/cwbs/200905/t2009050 7 918.html
65 From the point of view of security externalities, domestic investment flows are much less likely to generate
international security concerns than cross-border investments ceteris paribus.
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managed equity investments fell from RMB 125 billion at the beginning of the year to RMB 69
billion by year's end-reflecting the general decline in the value of equities in 2008. There
seems to be fairly little evidence of significantly sized direct foreign investments, acquisitions or
controlling interest stakes that were purchased or managed directly by the NSSF. Avoiding such
concentrated investments also reduces the potential for security externalities to result.
The NSSF's pioneering use of investment mandates issued to third-party domestic asset
managers was an important source of professionalism for the NSSF. This practice significantly
lowered the possibility that the NSSF would be used as a strategic tool for realizing China's
foreign policy objectives. By relying on third party mandates, the NSSF essentially was able to
remove a significant potential source of politicization from its investment process. Effectively,
the use of third party asset managers introduced another layer of state-commercial actor relations
into the situation. Now, the state would have to not only manage the NSSF if it wished to use the
NSSF to support non-commercial goals, but the NSSF would then also need to direct or control
these third party asset managers to get them to support non-commercial goals. Such layers of
agency seem to provide a considerable fire-break against any sort of non-commercial behavior.
Importantly, the NSSF's practice also seems to have become the template for CIC's use of third
party asset managers. To the extent that China is looking to reassure recipient nations who may
be concerned about the non-commercial orientation of China's outwardly-bound investment
flows, it may wish to consider using professional, transparent, third-party asset managers that
provide a convincing element of commercial rather than political or strategic motivation.
7.3.3 The National Social Security Fund (NSSF): Mandate & Activities
256
Chapter Seven: SAFE & the NSSF
The NSSF seeks to achieve "capital appreciation of assets on the basis of protecting
capital [principal]."66 The inherently commercial nature of this primary mission provides NSSF
with a solid commercial footing. Despite the absence of independent directors on the board, it
seems that the NSSF has been able to remain relatively free from the politicization of its
investments. This seems to be due largely to the intrinsic goal compatibility between the
government and NSSF around its explicit function: to focus on earning safe, reliable returns
while protecting its capital base as part of the state's effort to meet its outstanding social security,
retirement and pension obligations.
The net effect of the NSSF's commercial orientation is to significantly reduce the
possibility of the NSSF's investment activity being used to further China's foreign policy
objectives. There are several rationales for this. First, the NSSF seems suffused with a strong
conservative bias to protect its investment capital. This motivation also serves to reassure
investment targets of NSSF's position as a conservative long-term investor. This helps to allay
fears of the NSSF posing a destabilizing investment influence. By minimizing the NSSF's
capacity or proclivity for destabilizing recipients of its funds, this investment strategy also
reduces the possibility of using the NSSF as an instrument of Coercive Leverage, thus helping to
limit potential security externalities. Second, the NSSF is deliberately seeking to outsource the
majority of its tactical investment decision-making (acting like a "fund of funds"). This is
especially true in the area of international (non-Chinese) investments. Relying on private-sector,
third-party international asset managers introduces another layer of principal-agent coordination
challenges that the state would need to overcome if it were to effectively wield the NSSF as a
strategic instrument of economic statecraft.
66 See NSSF website: http://www.ssf gov.cn "According to the NSSF website, 'the NSSF aims to be a solution to the
problem of ageing and serves as a strategic reserve fund accumulated by central government to support future social
security needs'." From Leckie and Pan, "A Review of the National Social Security Fund in China," p. 95.
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Finally, it seems that the NSSF has been able to avoid efforts to exert non-commercial
pressure by claiming that the NSSF must operate on a strictly commercial basis to achieve its
mission to fund the pension system against China's demographic projections.67 This primary
tasking for the NSSF enjoys considerable political buy-in among China's elite leadership. The
compatibility of goals between the state and the NSSF enables the NSSF to pursue commercial
objectives and conduct its business on commercial grounds. Although this goal compatibility
makes state control more likely, the commercial nature of these mutual goals limits the security
concerns stemming from the NSSF's activity.
7.3.4 Evaluating the NSSF case
With respect to the Goals IV, the state and the NSSF are in agreement regarding the
NSSF's commercially-oriented objectives since both the state and the commercial actor seek to
maximize risk-adjusted return on the NSSF's investments. The NSSF seems to exhibit
considerable evidence of commercially-oriented goals. It does not seem to be a source of
significant security externalities as a large portion of its assets are invested domestically in
China. What foreign investment it does conduct is done through professional, third party asset
managers (like JP Morgan Chase, Invesco, LaSalle, PIMCO, Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, etc.). Such
reliance on arms-length asset managers decreases the likelihood that they will be used to support
specific foreign or strategic policy objectives. 68
67 The most likely source of political pressure would arise in the event that the NSSF needs to be tapped to bailout a
failing provincial pension fund. Such crisis circumstances calling for intervention would be likely to provoke the
sort of politicization that has been relatively absent up to this point in NSSF's history. It should be noted that even
this non-commercial activity would be limited in its strategic security ramifications since it would be a domestically-
focused effort.
68 "The international fund managers have in general been impressed (and perhaps somewhat surprised) by the level
of professionalism demonstrated in the selection process. Many commented that the process appeared fair and
without political interference. It seems that the NSSF, in its selection of overseas managers, has set a new higher
258
Chapter Seven: SAFE & the NSSF
Of course, if the NSSF's investment mandates were to constitute a significant portion of
these third-party manager's portfolio of assets, it would not be unreasonable to ask whether these
third-party managers might become beholden to the NSSF. Indeed, to the extent that a firm is
largely reliant on NSSF (or any other entity's) funding, we might expect it to defer to the
preferences of the large investor. To date, there does not seem to be any specific instances of
this having occurred. I suspect that is because most investment mandates that have been placed
with third party managers are relatively small amounts in comparison to the total assets under
management at these large, multinational investment houses. However, as placements grow in
size and as sources of capital tighten (perhaps as a result of a credit crunch) we can expect the
influence of China's outward bound capital to grow.69
The NSSF is governed by a Board of Directors whose chairman and vice-chairman are
appointed by the State Council. The state in this case is fairly divided under the State Council,
with MOF and the MoLSS providing input and guidance in their respective contexts. Although
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security play an
advisory role, the Ministry of Finance seems to be the key supervisory entity. For day-to-day
operations, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security also have a
voice at the table. As the oldest of China's sovereign wealth funds (dating back to 2000), the
NSSF has had a relatively long period to resolve matters of bureaucratic influence and establish
clear lines of authority. That said, the presence of so many interests in NSSF governance seems
to suggest that State Unity may be very fragile. These wide-ranging bureaucratic interests
represented at the NSSF would make it hard for any one interest to hijack the NSSF and direct its
standard of governance for other Chinese government agencies and for China's fund management industry
generally." [my italics]. From Leckie and Pan, "A Review of the National Social Security Fund in China," p. 94.
69 In particular, it may be instructive to watch private equity placements like CIC's placement of US $3.2 billion
with J.C. Flowers. The placement reportedly constitutes 80% of the new fund. It would be instructive to assess the
degree to which the firm coordinates with CIC on its investment activities.
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investments for narrow political goals. Thus, commercially-motivated goals provide consensus
objectives that further reinforce NSSF's commercial proclivity.
The NSSF is the only national social security fund. In this sense it operates in a
concentrated market. Of course there are other Chinese sovereign wealth funds, but only one
NSSF with a clear commercial and fiduciary mandate. 70 Therefore, the NSSF lacks the
competitive dynamic observed in the SAFE case that compelled the commercial actor in that
case to engage in non-commercially-motivated activities to please the state. Moreover, the state
has clearly signaled that it does not seek anything but commercial returns from the NSSF.
Accepting such strategic direction is made even more complicated by the NSSF's use of third
party professional asset managers. These add another layer of insulation between political forces
and the investment of state assets. The Reporting Relationship IV indicates that it would be hard
for the state to direct the NSSF to achieve strategic objectives. Being the oldest of China's
sovereign wealth funds, the NSSF has considerable institutional knowledge which also tilts the
Relative Resources IV in its favor. At CIC and NSSF, the familiarity with international
investment banking operations and world-class asset management skills endow these agents with
a significant resource advantage over the state.' Moreover, these entities have attracted a
significant share of the CCP's financial management talent. Both of these factors suggest that
these commercial actors will enjoy a degree of expertise asymmetry that would be likely to result
in the state deferring to the preferences of the agent. Interestingly, it seems that both of these
70 The National Social Security Fund is the only organization bureaucratically tasked in its mission, however, it does
face something of a commercial pressure to generate returns on its portfolio as its performance is often compared to
other long-term liability-oriented investors (e.g. life insurance companies). In addition, the NSSF was created
against an implicit comparison with provincial and municipal social security funds. In the sense that its performance
and activities can be compared against those of peers, the NSSF operates in a "Competitive" market structure. This
provides the state with some degree of supervisory benchmarking and thus leverage for controlling the NSSF but the
NSSF faces little genuine competition for its mission.
7' This dynamic is similar to what was observed among oil companies and their expertise vis a vis the state in
Chapter Five.
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entities have worked hard to place their organizations on as commercially-oriented footing as
possible. Such a disposition would play to their technical expertise and provide the commercial
actor with even greater autonomy, free from political interference.
To summarize, the NSSF's efforts to provide public transparency, regular reporting and
disclosure as well as its clear, commercially-driven goals all seem to suggest that the security
consequences of NSSF's activities will likely be minimal. The diverse interests of the state
represented in the NSSF's governance structure make it difficult to direct the NSSF to pursue
any one constituency's narrow political agenda. As a result, maintaining NSSF's commercial
orientation seems to provide a consensus mission on which all parts of the state can agree. In
addition, the NSSF enjoys an information and expertise asymmetry vis a vis the state in matters
of financial expertise. This and the lack of any alternative bureaucratic rivals strengthen the
NSSF vis a vis any state attempts to control its activities. Lastly, the extensive use of third-party
asset managers makes it much more difficult for the state to direct or even influence NSSF's
investment activities. This facet of the reporting relationship makes the use of NSSF funds to
pursue strategic state security objectives unlikely. Although the NSSF case displays some state
control (largely due to convergent goals), in this case, the goals of the state seem to be largely
commercial with very little effective pressure for anything other than commercial objectives. As
such, NSSF's commercial orientation provides a good baseline for comparison. The NSSF
stands out as an extreme case. Just as SAFE represented a set of extreme values resulting in its
effective use as an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft, so too does the NSSF case study
also stand out as a case illustrative of a commercially-oriented Chinese sovereign wealth
investment fund.
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7.4 Conclusion
These two case studies are useful from a theory building perspective in that they resulted
in extreme opposite outcomes: economic statecraft is illustrated in the case of SAFE (a result that
is explained largely by state control that is attributed to values on the Market Fragmentation IV,
Reporting Relationship IV, and Unity ofState V) and only limited state control with very little
potential for economic statecraft in the case of NSSF. Its strong commercial orientation suggests
it is significantly less likely to be used as an effective tool of economic statecraft.
In terms of the dissertation's theory, SAFE and NSSF provide useful case studies with
extreme values across the IVs. Such extreme cases facilitate checks of internal validity-in
other words, does the theory work as we would expect it to given the extreme value on the IVs?
As we observe, the extreme values in the case of SAFE suggest that the state would be able to
direct the behavior of the agent in a way that is conducive to realizing the state's foreign policy
interest. 72 Although perfect experiments are rarely possible in international relations, it seems
that the theory's causality does play out as expected in the case of SAFE. In the case of the
NSSF, the values are also extreme, but in the opposite direction. The NSSF case suggests that
the state would have a difficult time trying to use the NSSF as a tool of effective statecraft.
These specific cases of China's state investment offer an in-depth examination of how the state
can (or cannot) achieve state control. In both the cases of NSSF and SAFE, the theory operates
as we would expect it would.
72 Of course, the size of the economic interaction seems large enough to matter given China is Costa Rica's second
largest trading partner. The economic interaction was also fairly inelastic given the generous, non-commercial 2%
cost of capital extended to Costa Rica-something that was not widely available in the marketplace for sovereign
debt. Finally, the goals that China had for this episode of economic statecraft seem to have been commensurate with
the tools being used. Taiwanese diplomatic recognition did not seem to be particularly important to Costa Rica's
overall strategic interests.
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The China Investment Corporation
8.1 Introduction
The last chapter examined SAFE and NSSF, two sovereign wealth funds whose extreme
values on the IVs served to illustrate the theory in the empirical context of China's state finance.
SAFE was directed to use foreign exchange reserves as part of an integrated economic foreign
policy designed to achieve China's strategic interests whereas the NSSF was an exclusively
commercially-oriented sovereign wealth fund. This chapter examines the China Investment
Corporation-another Chinese sovereign wealth fund whose empirics suggest it lies somewhere
between the two extremes of SAFE and NSSF.
This final empirical chapter draws on the theory to address a specific contemporary
concern about Chinese economic statecraft: namely whether China's official sovereign wealth
fund will be used in a non-commercial way to advanced Chinese strategic interests. The
continuing growth of China's foreign exchange reserves raises a host of concerns. Although
China will certainly maintain some of these holdings as traditional central bank foreign exchange
reserves, some portion of this capital will be re-allocated into China's sovereign wealth funds.
The size and activities of these sovereign wealth funds spark a number of strategic concerns. In
fact, much of the recent U.S. domestic political debate surrounding China's foreign exchange-
supported sovereign wealth fund involves concerns about the security externalities that its
activities may generate.I As demonstrated by the case study of SAFE in the last chapter, such
Such worries run the gamut from strategic resources transfer as a result of equity stakes in mineral deposits and
sensitive technology transfer as a result of joint ownership in dual-use technologies to fears of coercive leverage
stemming from dependence on Chinese sources of capital and the longer term transformation of interests that results
from international investment flows. For instance, in its January 22, 2008 report to Congress on China's sovereign
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concerns are not without merit. At the same time, it would be a mistake to implement
irrationally protectionist policies that unduly restrict the international flow of capital. What is
missing from the contemporary discussion is an analytical framework for dispassionately
evaluating when such concerns are warranted. The theory of economic statecraft presented in
Chapter Two provides this sort of framework. This chapter applies the theory to determine
whether the CIC presents cause for strategic concern.
The chapter begins by briefly examining the origins, structure and leadership of the CIC.
This is followed by a detailed review of the sources and uses of CIC's financing. The final
portion of the chapter applies the theory to better understand the CIC case.
8.2 Origins of the CIC
The CIC, itself, came about as an institutional response to mounting criticism that the
PBoC (via SAFE) was not maximizing the returns on China's growing foreign exchange
reserves. The macroeconomic structural imbalances seemed to suggest that China would
continue to build up foreign exchange reserves for the foreseeable future. This problem of
managing China's foreign exchange reserves was not going to go away and critics of the PBoC
argued that China needed to proactively address how best to use its excessive reserves. Of
course, one can imagine how many institutional interests come out of the woodwork to lay claim
wealth fund (the CIC), the Congressional Research Service provided at least seven areas of concern that map
directly onto the typology: "There is concern that China may use the CIC to secure energy resources or purchase
strategic assets for geopolitical purposes. There are also market apprehensions that the CIC could seek to increase its
market share in important industries via targeted acquisitions or takeovers. Others are concerned that CIC might
make investments in particular companies in order to obtain access to sensitive technology or information. . .There
are also apprehensions about the potential for abuse or corruption created by the greater proximity SWFs create
between governments and the private sector. As the existing investments of the CIC reveal, there is a growing
network of interlinked investments between banks and other financial firms within China and overseas... These
potential economic risks are seen as including financial market instability, undesirable foreign control or influence
over key industries or companies, access to sensitive technology, and other forms of unfair competitive advantages."
Michael F. Martin, "China's Sovereign Wealth Fund," CRS Report for Congress, January 22, 2008 pp. 17-19 inter
alia. All of these concerns can be usefully conceptualized as security externalities that stem from the behavior of
these commercial entities.
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to excess national resources! Eventually, China's leadership determined that it would set up a
sovereign wealth fund primarily modeled on Singapore. 2 Thus, the idea of CIC was born.
The China Investment Corporation ($-P 1 1"{Ei i) formally commenced
operations on September 29, 2007. However, the intention to create a sovereign wealth fund was
first publicly announced as early as March, 2007.3 Apparently, there were some delays in getting
the organization stood up initially.4 In fact, the first official sovereign wealth investment
occurred in May, 2007 when China Jianyin Investment Limited (a government holding company
that was charged with managing any asset purchases until the sovereign wealth fund was stood
up) purchased a 9.9% non-voting stake in the Blackstone Group for US $3 billion. China Jianyin
(along with its Blackstone stake and other assets) would eventually be rolled into the CIC.
At the time of the Blackstone purchase, the evidence strongly suggests that there was
little central government control over the behavior of the commercial actor. The commercial
actor enjoyed considerable independence. This stemmed from a lack of a clear reporting
structure to the senior leadership of the CCP. At that time, Jianyin was part of the Ministry of
Finance (MOF). As a bureaucratic entity, MOF was actively engaged in critiquing the PBoC for
its paltry returns on China's increasing foreign exchange reserves.5 This was part of an effort to
wrest greater control over the management of China's foreign exchange reserves from the PBoC
that dates back at least four or five years prior to the launch of CIC. By mid-2007, the state was
clearly divided along bureaucratic lines. This division provided the commercial actor with
2 Li Yang, Director of the Finance Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, traveled to
Singapore on a fact-finding trip to study Temasek and the GIC (Singapore's two sovereign wealth funds) as part of
the preparation to create the CIC. Apparently Korea's sovereign wealth fund was also studied although my research
was not able to confirm this.
3 Xin Zhiming, "$200 Billion Investment Firm Starts Operation," China Daily, October, 1, 2007.
4 According to a senior analyst, there was a contest between competing bureaucratic interests over the structure,
organization, and control of the CIC. Author's interview 080620, Beijing.
5 Zhang Ming and Sarah Eaton "Dragon on a Short Leash: an Inside-out Analysis of China Investment Corporation,"
Working Paper No. 0821, CASS: Beijing, November 26, 2008.
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considerable room to maneuver. This condition was exacerbated by the relative absence of
financial expertise among senior Party leadership. 6 As such, the state had little choice but to rely
on the professional judgment of the few senior leaders in the CCP that had established financial
credentials. The result was that Jianyin bought a 9.9% stake in Blackstone Group for $3 billion
as part of Blackstone's IPO. This action would later come under fire for its lack of due diligence
and proper vetting.
So what was China Jianyin? How did it come to enjoy so much autonomy in the months
leading up to the creation of the CIC? China Jianyin Investment Limited R
{33iJ) was created out of China Construction Bank (CCB) on September 17, 2004. Its
creation was part of the CCB's re-organization in preparation for its public listing as a joint-stock
company. Because of legal limitations on what the CCB could own once it was reorganized, it
was required to spin-off its ownership of China International Capital Corporation (CICC).7
China Jianyin Investment Limited was created to own 43.35% of CICC.8 Since the CCB was
wholly owned by Central Huijin at this time, China Jianyin also became a subsidiary of Central
Huijin. China Jianyin later would become the primary recapitalization and restructuring vehicle
for the government to recapitalize and restructure China's domestic stock brokerages following
the 2004-2005 collapse in that sector. 9 As a result, China Jianyin would eventually come to
serve as a holding company for several Chinese financial companies (mainly brokerages). These
... most of these investment arms are staffed by government people, largely party cadres. Both their lack of
experience and their independence are open to question." Henny Sender, "China Turns Risk Averse as Capital
Outflows Rise," Financial Times, Jan 18 2008, p. 2 1 .
7 CICC was the first Chinese joint-venture investment bank. CICC was a joint venture between Morgan Stanley and
CCB. Because of its early entry into the China market, CICC was well-positioned to dominate the early IPO
business of China. CICC took several of the initial big Chinese SOEs public.
8 Morgan Stanley retained 34.3%, China National Investment & Garanty Company owns 7.65%, Government of
Singapore Investment Corporation owns 7.35% and Mingly Corporation owns 7.35%.
9 "During the spring and summer [of 2005], China Jianyin bailed out several of the country's largest securities firms,
including Galaxy Securities, China Southern Securities, Shenyin & Wanguo and Guotai Junan." Jamil Anderlini,
"Firm hand steers vehicle of financial reform; Banker who has handed out $60USb is the force behind
restructuring," South China Morning Post February 6, 2006.
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assets eventually came under CIC when CIC initially acquired Central Huijin. Indeed, the CIC
can trace its roots to the early recapitalization efforts of Central Huijin and China Jianyin.
To complete the picture of CIC's roots, we must go back to 2003 when the People's Bank
of China (PBoC)-China's central bank-acting through its subsidiary, the State Administration
of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), dedicated US $45 billion of China's foreign exchange reserves to
create the Central Huijin Investment Company (IL f~MfEYi). This vehicle
was designed to recapitalize China's largest domestic banks.'0 The move was a controversial
one at the time since valuable foreign currency was being used to prop up bad assets on the
books of China's domestic banks. Moreover, the move signaled a bureaucratic power shift away
from the Ministry of Finance (who had previously been the dominant government bureaucracy
with respect to China's banking entities) to the People's Bank of China (the central bank-which
managed China's foreign currency reserves). On January 6, 2004 the PBoC announced that
earlier in December 2003 it had used $45 billion of US government bonds and other foreign
currency denominated assets in its coffers (taken from what would have otherwise been an even
higher $403.3 billion foreign exchange reserve reported at year end 2003) to take an equity stake
in Central Huijin Investment Company. The newly-created Central Huijin then turned around
and made subordinated loans to the Bank of China (BOC) and China Construction Bank (CCB)
so that these banks could count the value of these loans as their own assets (equity capital) on
their 2003 year-end books. The purpose of this shell game was to help clean up the balance
sheets of these banks (i.e. lower their non-performing loans ratio) to enable them to have
successful IPOs. This operation was done in December, 2003 with a view to eventually retiring
1 The "Big Four" banks had accumulated significant amounts of bad debt as a result of loans made to failing state-
owned enterprises in the 1990s. The "Big Four" banks are all state-controlled and largely state-owned with some
publicly listed shares. They are: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of China (BOC),
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and China Construction Bank (CCB).
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the Central Huijin loans via an exchange for stock when the banks went public in two or three
years time. A similar maneuver was used to recapitalize ICBC. "
The move enabled the relatively weak commercial banks to use China's official dollar
denominated assets to support their balance sheets, thus permitting the PBoC to help them
without requiring the PBoC to issue any additional RMB-denominated bonds (i.e. "real money"
domestically in China). Issuing the banks more RMB would likely have added to the domestic
inflationary pressure, while re-allocating foreign reserves would help relieve pressure for letting
the RMB appreciate-thus making the maneuver a win-win proposition. Of course, the only
catch was that these assets could not really be spent in China (since the banks would have first
needed to convert them to RMB-which the PBoC was not going to let them do). However,
these assets could be used on dollar-denominated investments. Over next few years, Central
Huijin would come to develop some limited expertise in assisting the banks with placing some of
their capital in overseas, dollar-denominated investments (since these sorts of investments did
not require conversion to RMB).
The December 2003 operation ought to be understood in the context of the broader effort
to reform China's domestic banking sector. Previously, in 1998, the PBoC had injected RMB
270 billion (~$32.6 billion) into "The Big Four" banks to help stave off collapse. Again in 2000
and 2001, it allowed them to essentially write off RMB 1.4 trillion of bad loans by transferring
these non-performing loans to asset management companies that were designed to recover as
much of the bad debt as possible. By using the foreign exchange reserves to set up Central
Huijin, the PBoC was able to use these assets to achieve an important domestic reform priority at
"Although by the time of the ICBC recap, the MOF and Communist Party Organization Department had agitated
against the PBoC's growing bureaucratic "empire" and the ICBC recapitalization was limited to $15 billion in
exchange for 50% of the equity (MOF retained the other 50%). In contrast, Central Huijin received 85% of CCB's
equity and 100% of BOC's equity. Jamil Anderlini, "Firm hand steers vehicle of financial reform; Banker who has
handed out $60USb is the force behind restructuring," South China Morning Post February 6, 2006.
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a time when low interest rates in the US meant that the opportunity cost of using these foreign
exchange reserves was not very high.
I begin the CIC case with this brief discussion of the CIC's roots in China's domestic
bank recapitalization in order to provide context for the domestic bureaucratic competition
between the MOF and the PBoC which would color the CIC's early experience. Under the
planned economy, the MOF directed China's banks to provide credits as dictated by the plan. As
such, China's banks were national instruments of economic planning. With the advent of the
bailouts of non-performing loans, the PBoC took on a larger role in the ownership and
management of the banking sector. As the PBoC played a larger role, MOF ceded bureaucratic
territory. Frictions between MOF and PBoC have characterized a significant portion of China's
recent macroeconomic reforms. 12 The CIC grew out of a series of moves to mobilize foreign
exchange reserves to achieve the domestic political goals of recapitalizing China's banks.
Although, the CIC today seems to be trying to move toward a purely commercial footing, this
has certainly not always been the case. To understand whether the CIC can be used as an
effective instrument for furthering China's foreign policy objectives, it is important to identify
the factors that enable the state to control the activities of the CIC. To answer this, let us take a
closer look at the leadership, structure and activities of today's CIC.
8.3 The China Investment Corporation (CIC): Structure and Leadership
To understand the dynamics driving the values on the Unity ofState IV and the Reporting
Relationship IV for this case requires examining the organizational architecture and leadership of
12 See Victor C. Shih, Factions and Finance in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008).
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the CIC.'" At the top of the organization is the CIC's Board of Directors. "The CIC Board of
Directors is mandated and authorized to oversee the company's operation and overall
performance."1 4 Essentially, the Board of Directors serves as the senior leadership organization
for the CIC. As needed, the Board may notify the State Council of "major issues." These are
usually investment decisions over US $1 billion.' 5 The CIC's Articles of Association stipulate
the composition of this eleven person Board of Directors. The Chairman (Lou Jiwei Wkf-$)
and Vice Chairman (Gao Xiqing i)ifR) are both appointed directly by the State Council of the
PRC. The third and final executive director is Zhang Hongli (%%-13), who is also the Executive
Vice President and COO of CIC. The five non-executive directors (directors who do not also
concurrently hold a senior operational management position in the company) must be comprised
of one individual nominated by each of the following ministries: the National Development and
Reform Commission, The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the People's Bank of
China, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. The State Council must approve their
nominations. There are also two independent directors who cannot have any ties to the CIC "that
may influence his or her independent objective judgment." The final member is the "Employee
Director" that is supposed to "represent the employees" on the board.
13 The CIC has recently made limited efforts to improve its transparency. These include a disclosure of the
management team and CIC's internal reporting structure. In particular, its involvement in the Santiago Protocols for
sovereign wealth fund operating and reporting standards as well as its recently-launched website are both positive
steps in this direction.
14 CIC website: http ://www. china-inv.cn/cicen/governance/governing bod.htnl
15 Traditionally, the State Council has had to approve all SOE investments abroad that are over $200 million.Paul
Glasson, "Regional Focus to Global Push - The China Syndrone," The Australian, March 4 2009, sec. Finance, p.
22. However, it seems that the CIC enjoys a bit more latitude in its approval process. According to CIC sources and
analysts, decisions over $100 million up to $1 billion will go to the CIC Investment Committee for approval, while
those over $1 billion would need to have State Council approval. Decisions below $10 million were reported to be
discretionary. Presumably, investments between $10 and $100 million are handled in the normal course of internal
reporting operations. See Author Interview 080620, Beijing; Author Interview 080621, Beijing; Author Interview
080623, Beijing.
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The Board composition reflects the diverse range of institutional interests that have a
stake in the CIC, but the overall impression of the CIC's leadership is that 1.) this is clearly a
government entity with direct lines of authority to senior state leadership and 2.) former Ministry
of Finance officials occupy most of the top executive posts. The five non-director positions are
quota-allocated to the ministries that are directly concerned with the CIC to ensure that each
stakeholder gets a voice at the table. However, both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman are
appointed by the State Council (headed by Premier Wen Jiabao). Lou Jiwei, and Zhang Hongli
both came out of the Ministry of Finance and are considered to be loyal to Wen Jiabao. In
addition, the company management and the Executive Committee-responsible for the day to
day operations of the CIC-are both dominated by the Ministry of Finance. Jin Liqun (A Af)
(Chairman of the Board of Supervisors-the auditing and oversight portion of the management)
also came out of the Ministry of Finance.
While the Ministry of Finance may have strong representation at the CIC, it is certainly
not the only voice at the table. Almost every other major government institutional stakeholder in
the world of Chinese finance is represented at CIC. For example, the Chief Investment Officer,
Gao Xiqing is a graduate of Duke Law School and came to the CIC from the National Council
for the Social Security Fund.16 The former president of Central Huijin, Xie Ping (it T)-a
reformer from the PBoC, is also a member of the executive committee as is the Chief Risk
Officer, Wang Jianxi (fE )-former Chairman of China Jianyin.' 7 This diversity of
institutional allegiances throughout the governance structure of the CIC is an important factor in
light of the Unity of State IV.
16 See: Anonymous, "China's trillion-dollar kitty is ready," Asia Times Oct 2, 2007.
17 See: Xinhua, "China's forex investment company to debut next Friday: report" Xinhua News Agency Septemeber
19, 2007.
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Particularly in the early days of the CIC, there seemed to be a considerable bureaucratic
struggle between the MoF, PBoC and NDRC over CIC's mandate and how it should deploy its
capital.18 At the core of this debate was a difference over the degree to which the CIC ought to
use its resources to support national policy versus using its resources to maximize its risk-
adjusted return on investment. While this struggle was taking place, it seems that CIC's
precursor entities (China Jianyin and Central Huijin) were actively seeking out investment
opportunities abroad (Blackstone and Morgan Stanley). These investments were characterized
by their chummy characteristics and have since come under fire for their lack of due diligence
and subsequent losses. The details of the investments seem to suggest that the commercial actor
was taking the initiative and acting relatively independently of the state. Later efforts to
consolidate power over CIC were partly based on arguments claiming that this loosely-
supervised CIC of the early period needed to be reigned in with proper investment review
processes and risk management procedures. Without such mechanisms of more centralized
control, it was argued, the CIC would continue to engage in poorly timed investments that lose
half of their value in a few years.
Although the data seems to suggest that diverse institutional interests are represented at
CIC (indicative of a divided state-especially in the early, formative days of the CIC), there is
also strong evidence that the MOF has begun to consolidate its dominance of the organization,
paving the way for tighter state control today and in the future. In particular, leaders with
significant MOF experience seem to outnumber individuals from other organizational
18 These inter-bureaucratic struggles pre-dated the CIC. Central Huijin's recapitalization of ICBC was a
considerably smaller $15 billion and entitled Central Huijin to only 50% of the equity (as opposed to the $45 billion
that had been splashed out for BOC and CCB). "...[T]he smaller stake was a result of high-level opposition from
competing regulatory agencies, which criticised the 'empire-building' of the People's Bank of China (PBOC) and its
reformist governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, to whom Mr Xie and Huijin officials report." Jamil Anderlini, "Firm hand
steers vehicle of financial reform; Banker who has handed out $60USb is the force behind restructuring," South
China Morning Post February 6, 2006.
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backgrounds. Moreover, recent personnel changes in some of the top positions at CIC seem to
suggest that the MOF has been consolidating its grasp.' 9
As a result, we observe less state control (relatively unsupervised deals like Blackstone
and Morgan Stanley) during the CIC's initial formative period when the government was more
divided. To the extent that the state has become more unified, we can expect additional control
in the future.2 0 Although, the organization chart and the backgrounds of senior leadership might
provide important information on the values for the Reporting Relationship IV and the Unity of
State IV, these are only some of the factors that must be considered when determining what
drives the outcomes observed in the CIC case. Understanding the CIC case more fully requires
examining its funding sources since these play an important role in shaping CIC's commercial
interests.
8.4 The China Investment Corporation (CIC): Financing Sources
The CIC was capitalized with $200 billion using three tranches of fixed-coupon special
treasury bonds denominated in RMB. The first tranche (10 year, paying a 4.3% coupon) was
worth 600 billion yuan (about $77 billion) and was sold to the PBoC on August 28, 2007.21 The
'9 For instance, Hu Huaibang (NIff)) has been replaced as Chairman of the Board of Supervisors by Jin Liqun.
Hu was formerly Secretary of the Disciplinary Board at the CBRC and a member of the Communist Party Discipline
and Inspection Committee. He was an anti-corruption, Communist Party representative on the board. Jin was a vice
president of operations at the Asian Development Bank. Prior to that position he was Vice Minister of Finance,
Director General of the World Bank Department at MOF.
20 Additional evidence of MOF ascendancy within CIC's leadership includes the valuation and sale of Central Huijin
(discussed below)-by valuing it at near book value, the MOF received a good price while the PBoC was not given
full compensation for its valuable asset.This conforms with reports of an intense struggle between the MOF and
PBoC over the PBoC's rapidly growing influence over the banking sector-an arena that MOF had traditionally
dominated. The creation of the CIC can be interpreted as MOF's institutional effort to wrest back control over the
banking sector.
21 It ought to be noted that the PBoC cannot directly buy bonds from the Ministry of Finance, so this transaction was
conducted using the PBoC-owned Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) as an intermediary. For further details on the
CIC's financing see Rachel Ziemba's helpful post fronrDecember 5, 2007 and the update on December 14, 2007 on
RGE Analysts' Economonitor entitled, "How is China Funding the China Investment Corporation (CIC)?" available
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second tranche was actually a series of six "public" offerings of 10 and 15 year bonds with
coupon rates in the range of 4.41-4.68%. Most of these were (semi-forced) purchases by
commercial banks for a total of about 199 billion yuan (about $26 billion) between mid-
September and mid-December, 2007.22 The third tranche (15 year, paying a 4.45% coupon) was
worth 750 billion yuan (about $97 billion) and was sold to the PBoC (again via the ABC
intermediary) on December 10, 2007.23
This financing structure has three implications. First, the investment returns that the CIC
must generate to make its scheduled interest payments are considerable. Not only does it face
fixed debt payments regardless of the performance of its investment portfolio, but it is expected
to invest in international assets while its debt payments must be made in the appreciating RMB
currency.2 Even though the interest on this debt is only around 4.5% (considerably less than a
6% domestic inflation rate) by its own estimate, the CIC needs to generate aggregate returns of
about $14.6 billion per year or about 7.3% on its $200 billion asset base just to break even.25
at: http:/./www.rgiemonitor.comieconononitor-
monitor/230764/how is china finding the chinese investment corporation cic. Last accessed on April 15, 2009.
22 "The interest payments on all these bonds are below those of comparable bonds- and current inflation. The main
(only) audience for these bonds is thought to be the commercial banks who are already the major purchasers of the
frequently issued sterilization bills and longer term bonds." Ibid.
2 Ibid.
24 "In addition, China's accumulation of U.S. debt in 2007 was not very profitable given the appreciation of the
renminbi (RMB) against the U.S. dollar. The yield on 10-year U.S. treasury bills fluctuated between 4.5% and 5.0%
throughout the year. However, since the beginning of 2007, the RMB has appreciated 6.0% relative to the U.S.
dollar. As a result, the effective rate of return on U.S. treasury bills valued in Chinese currency was negative in
2007. For example, on January 1, 2007, the exchange rate was I yuan of RMB = 12.82 cents of U.S. dollars. If
China had invested 100 billion yuan in one-year U.S. treasury bills on January 2, 2007, it would have been offered a
return of 5.0%. After conversion into U.S. dollars, China would have invested $12.82 billion. At the end of the year,
China would have been paid $13.461 billion by the U.S. Treasury for its investment. However, the exchange rate at
the end of 2007 was I yuan = 13.59 cents. So, after converting the U.S. dollars back into RMB, China would have
received the equivalent of 99.051 billion yuan for its investment - a loss of 949 million yuan, or a -0.9% return on
its investment. When evaluated in its domestic currency, China lost money on its investments in U.S. government
debt in 2007." From: Michael F. Martin, "China's Sovereign Wealth Fund," Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress, January 22, 2008, p. 16.
25 According to Lou, the interest cost on the outstanding bonds is about 300 million yuan (more than $40 million)
per day. See: "China's Sovereign Wealth Fund Seeks to be a Stabilizing Presence in Global Markets," Xinhua,
November 30, 2007. Assuming a minimum return of $40 million per day, the CIC will need to earn at least $14.6
billion per year in profits (at least 7.3% return on its total capital base of $200 billion). Moreover, hopes of access to
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This financing structure suggests that the CIC has been provided with a strong commercial
incentive to focus on generating investment returns to meet its financial obligations. Second, by
seeding the CIC in this way, the PBoC was able to soak up perceived excess liquidity from the
system.26 "'Our purpose [at CIC] is to reduce the liquidity in China,' says one senior CIC
staffer."27 This seems to suggest that to the extent that the CIC will be used as an instrument for
the state to pursue policy preferences, those priorities will be largely domestically-oriented
macroeconomic priorities as opposed to expansive, foreign policy goals. Third, the PBoC seems
to have been forced to bear the brunt of the currency risk, since the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
could hold the RMB proceeds from the bonds for a period of time and collect the risk-free
returns resulting from the RMB appreciation. As the counterparty to the transaction, this
financing arrangement forces the PBoC to hold the relatively devalued foreign exchange.28 This
provides another data point indicating that MOF is in the bureaucratic driver's seat.
This examination of the financing and management structure both seem to suggest that
MOF has gained control of CIC after an initial period during which time the state was divided
across bureaucratic lines. Another implication of this data is that the CIC has been constituted in
additional foreign exchange reserves will depend on the CIC performance. Lou stated: "If I am making losses every
day, how can I face asking the government for more money?" See: "China Wealth Fund Aims for Stability,
Openness," China Daily, October 16, 2007. It is also important to note that the annual dividends from CIC's bank
ownership have been estimated to be US $7.8 billion. This would help satisfy more than half of CIC's interest
obligation. See: Katherine Ng, "CIC Dispels Fund Concerns," The Standard March 10, 2008 available online at:
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news detail.asp?sid=17984607&art id=62790&con type=l&pp cat=
26 In Chinese central banking such forced savings is a common method of directly adjusting the money supply since
interest rate mechanisms (commonly used as the primary monetary tool in the West) are not really permitted to
operate effectively. "Most of the newly-issued bonds ended up in the hands of the PBoC, effectively soaking up
some of the perceived excess liquidity in China's money markets." From: Michael F. Martin, "China's Sovereign
Wealth Fund," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 22, 2008, p. 7.
27 Henny Sender, "China Turns Risk Averse as Capital Outflows Rise."
28 "The RMB raised from these bond sales are not converted into foreign currency immediately. It seems like the
600b RMB bond was converted into foreign exchange in q3 [2007], the 200b RMB from the small bond issues in q4
[2007] and the last bond issue will be converted into foreign exchange in ql 2008... Given the RMB's ongoing
appreciation, the Ministry of Finance has every incentive to only buy foreign exchange when it actually needs the
money." From: Brad Setser, "What to do with over a half a trillion a year? Understanding the changes in the
management of China's foreign assets," Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper January 15, 2008, p. 13. This
sentiment was re-iterated in subsequent conversations with the author.
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such a way that it faces a number of incentives to perform as a commercially-viable investment
entity going forward. The holdings of CIC provide another important source of information
about the behavior and intentions of the CIC. Let us now turn to a more detailed look at the
CIC's investment activities.
8.5 The China Investment Corporation (CIC): Financing Uses and Activities
So how has this USD$200 billion capital base been put to use? By far, the majority of
the CIC's investments have been in the finance sector. Specifically, the capital raised by the
bond issuances discussed above was put to use in three ways. These allocations serve as costly
signals that reveal CIC's goals and priorities and as such, make for excellent empirical material
for analyzing whether the CIC will be used as an instrument of China's economic statecraft. The
largest allocation was used to acquire Central Huijin from the PBoC. Another large allocation
was used to continue the recapitalization of the domestic banks (in this case, Agricultural Bank
of China and China Development Bank). The final portion of the capital is designated to be used
for investing abroad. Although it seems that the CIC would have preferred to have a purely
internationally-oriented commercial investment mandate, the central government directed the
CIC to take on the mission of recapitalizing the banking sector. As the CIC began to coalesce,
the government showed more signs of asserting its control.
In November, 2007 the newly-created CIC purchased Central Huijin from the PBoC for
US $67 billion.29 This valuation of Central Huijin was approximately at book value indicating a
relative bargain for the Ministry of Finance and another bureaucratic set-back for the PBoC.
With the acquisition of Central Huijin, CIC had utilized about 1/3 of its $200 billion of
investment capital and picked up a considerable portfolio of China's domestic banking assets.
29 Keith Bradsher, "$200 Billion to Invest, But in China," The New York Times 29 November 2007.
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Central Huijin's holdings at the time included a 35.33% stake of the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC) and a 70.69% stake (this includes the 9.2 1% owned by China Jianyin) of
the China Construction Bank (CCB).
How did Central Huijin come to hold such a large stake in China's largest banks?
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, China's state-owned banks underwrote many of China's
inefficient and failing state-owned enterprises. By providing favorable loans and extending
credit to these otherwise unsustainable enterprises, the banks eventually accumulated
considerable portfolios of non-performing loans (NPLs) on their balance sheets. As these NPLs
built up on the banks' balance sheets, fears of systemic banking collapse grew. With the 1998
post-East Asian Financial Crisis creation of the CCP's Central Financial Work Commission, the
PBoC embarked on a plan to reduce the NPLs and gradually commercialize the banks. Doing
this involved a complicated (and often non-transparent) re-allocation of central bank assets and
off-balance sheet recapitalization vehicles. It seems that CIC has now inherited at least a
majority (if not the entirety) of this function. This domestic banking sector recapitalization
mission is reflected in the CIC's second large transactional allocation of its capital, to which we
now turn.
In addition to the acquisition of Central Huijin's and China Jianyin's assets, the CIC was
tasked to provide future capital injections to banks preparing to list their stock publicly as part of
the ongoing recapitalization of China's banking system.3 1 Also in November 2007, CIC
announced that it would provide US $67 billion to two of China's state-owned banks: The
30 Ownership figures are as of April, 2009 from the company websites.
3"There are indications that the State Council, the PBoC and the NDRC insisted that the CIC provide help in the
restructuring of these two state-owned banks as a condition of the CIC's establishment." See: Michael F. Martin,
"China's Sovereign Wealth Fund," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 22, 2008, p. 10.
The CRS text references Prof. Michael Pettis of Beijing University. He confirmed this sentiment in my
conversations with him.
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Agricultural Bank of China and the China Development Bank. In December of 2008, CIC (via
Central Huijin) injected US $19 billion into the Agricultural Bank of China in preparation for its
anticipated 2010 public listing. This resulted in ownership of ABC being split 50-50 between the
Ministry of Finance and the CIC.
Unlike ABC, which is the last of China's "Big Four" commercial banks to be readied for
partial public listing, China Development Bank is a "policy bank" (i&V RfY) meaning that it
functions as a legally-mandated, explicit policy arm of the central government (rather than
operate on a commercial basis). 3 At the end of 2007, Central Huijin provided US $20 billion
capital to shore up CDB's balance sheet.34 Central Huijin provided an additional $21 billion at
the end of 2008 as part of CDB's reorganization into a joint stock company (i.e. no longer a
policy bank). Today, Central Huijin owns 48.7% of the CDB with the other 51.3% residing at
the Ministry of Finance.
The acquisition of Central Huijin and the recapitalization of ABC and CDB account for
approximately $135 billion of CIC's initial $200 billion capitalization. This implies that only
approximately $65-70 billion remains for CIC use as foreign investment capital.3 s The
likelihood of this much smaller figure having a significant, sustained foreign policy effect
32 The $67 billion figure was reported in the press at the time, but in subsequent research, I have only been able to
confirm $19 billion that was used in ABC and $20 billion at CDB. "China Investment Co to Invest a Third of Its
200 Bln USD 'Cautiously' - Official," AFX News Limited, November 7, 2007. At the end of 2008, CIC provided
another RMB 146.1 billion (~$21 billion) to capitalize the newly-formed joint stock company holding vehicle for
CDB. At the same time, there were reports that the CIC now had additional funds that had originally been reserved
for recapitalizing ABC and CDB but were no longer needed. These approximately $7 billion of newly-freed up
capital were to be added to CIC's funds earmarked for foreign investment (primarily to be placed with third party
mandates).
3 For more detail on the CDB see Chapter Six, especially Section 6.3 relating to CDB.
3 See: CDB's 2007 Annual Report section entitled: "Financial Review" available at:
http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/Columin.asp'?Colunild=91 "ABC and CDB are the two largest banks still in the
process of this restructuring, which involves government recapitalisation - CDB received $20bn at the end of last
year [2007] and ABC expects even more - and eventual stock market listings." From: Anderlini, "Illegal Lending
Scandal Hits China Development Bank."
3 This figure has since been revised as less capital was needed that originally thought to recapitalize CDB and ABC.
It is now thought that CIC has between $80-90 billion earmarked for foreign investment. See the more detailed
discussion of the revision below.
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decreases considerably. Although CIC's $200 billion top-line figure and billing as "China's
Sovereign Wealth Fund" conjure up frightening possibilities of large waves of government-
directed foreign investment, the $65-70 billion figure represents considerably less international
economic gunpowder that may be used to gain influence.
So what exactly does the CIC now own and how are these assets structured? Although
China Jianyin's purchase of US $3 billion of Blackstone during Blackstone's IPO and CIC's
acquisition of $5 billion of Morgan Stanley both attracted considerable public attention, these
holdings represent a comparatively small fraction of CIC's investments. The majority of CIC's
holdings are concentrated in China's state-owned banks. 36 These fall into two groups:
"commercial banks" and "policy banks." The commercial banks are the "Big Four." As of the
December 31, 2008, CIC (via Central Huijin) now owns: 67.5% of the Bank of China, 35.4% of
ICBC (the other 35.4% is with MOF), 48.2% of China Construction Bank, and 50% of ABC
(pending public listing). These, in addition its 48.7% ownership of China Development Bank,
comprise the majority of CIC's assets. Exactly how much of CIC's asset base they make up is
more difficult to determine. These assets are difficult to value since much of the equity is locked
up in non-tradable shares, however, based on the $67 billion Central Huijin acquisition, plus the
roughly $60 billion of publicly announced capital that has been invested into the ABC and CDB
recapitalizations, these assets account for between /2 to 2/3 of CIC's assets and clearly indicate a
36 Drawing the line between CIC and state banks is not easy. See Brad Setser, "The Implications of Sovereign
Wealth Fund Investments for National Security," Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission February 7, 2007 p.9 .
37 Share ownership is sometimes difficult to keep up to date given the multiple reorganizations and historic lack of
transparency with regard to government ownership. These figures are based on company reports of the publicly-
listed firms. The government generally holds its ownership stake in the holding company, a subsidiary of which is
the publicly-listed firm. The figures have also recently been confirmed by the CIC's own 2008 Annual Report;
specifically, "Exhibit 7: Top Five portfolio holdings of Central Huijin" p. 35 available at: http://www.china-
inv.cn/cicen/i nclude/resources/CIC 2008 annualreport en.pd f The only significant point of disparity was in CIC's
share of China Construction Bank: Initially, it was reported that CIC controlled 57%, but CIC's annual report listed
its ownership as 48.2%. The difference, I assume, can be explained by the dilution stemming from CCB's stock
offering.
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domestic, banking reform focus.38 This portion of CIC's work seems unlikely to generate serious
security concerns since this capital is simply not involved in international activities.
The remaining third of CIC's assets are those assets that have been earmarked for foreign
investment. The investment of these assets seems to be the root cause of much of the trepidation
surrounding the activities of the CIC. Based on my original calculations, the total amount of
capital that CIC would be looking to deploy internationally would be between $45-70 billion. 39
However, CIC President Gao Xiqing, has since announced that "CIC will invest between $80
billion and $90 billion outside China, up from its original target of deploying $66 billion
overseas." Apparently, the additional funds stem from capital that had been ear-marked for
recapitalizing state-owned banks, but which has now been determined to no longer be
necessary.4 0 In addition, the higher figure most likely includes some portion of the CIC's early
investment profits. Analysts have predicted that this amount will likely grow as CIC
demonstrates its ability to generate returns and it is given further allocations of state capital to
manage.
3 Central Huijin also apparently recapitalized the much smaller China Everbright Bank for about $2.7 billion in
preparation for its IPO. See: "China Everbright Agrees to Capital Injection Plan," China Daily, November 28, 2007.
Also see: "SAFE Investments to Offer Bailouts to State-Owned Banks," SinoCast China Business Daily News, Dec
26 2007, p. 1.
39 In early 2010, there have been rumors that CIC is slated to receive an additional capital injection of another $200
billion. I intend to explore the details (timing, allocation, financing structure, etc.) of this tranche of funding when I
return to China for follow-up interviews in the late winter of 2010.
40 "World News: China Fund Plans to Steer More of its Money Overseas," Wall Street Journal, Apr 24 2008, p. A.8.
Although, according to my calculations (based on publicly available information), this $80-90 billion figure still
does not add up. Even if the ABC and CDB recapitalizations only required $60 billion instead of the originally
projected $67 billion that only frees up an additional $7 billion which added to the original projection of $66 billion
for foreign investment, only gets you to $73 billion. I suspect that Gao's announced figure may include some
additional capital infusion to CIC that has not been publicly announced (perhaps from CIC's bank dividends or other
return on investment in excess of its interest payments).
4' "The initial Dollars 200bn was basically the first batch and if CIC gets their investment framework right and
shows it is capable of earning decent returns there is no question they will be allowed to invest more," said Qu
Hongbin, chief China economist for HSBC." From: Jamil Anderlini, "CIC Gears Up for Dollars 30bn Drive,"
Financial Times, Feb 11 2008, p. 24. See also: Henny Sender, "China Turns Risk Averse as Capital Outflows Rise"
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Thus far, only a very small portion of this internationally-designated capital has been
publicly committed. According the CIC's 2008 annual report (which was made public in
August, 2009), the CIC holds 87.4% of its "Global Investment Portfolio" (those funds not used
for Central Huijin) in cash or cash equivalents.4 2 The largest investment stake seems to have
been the $5 billion purchase of 9.9% of Morgan Stanley on December 19, 2007.43 This
investment has since come under considerable criticism for its haphazard approach. "Before CIC
committed about $5US billion for a 9.9 per cent stake in the US bank in 2007, it did not even
bother to adhere to the international practice of hiring an independent financial adviser. Neither
did Morgan Stanley." 44 Despite the significant stake, it seems that the CIC has also forgone any
rights to a board seat or an active role in the management of the company. CIC has continued to
maintain its substantial ownership stake in Morgan Stanley.45
The next largest allocation is the April, 2008 announcement of CIC's $3.2 billion
placement with J.C. Flowers for 80% of a new private equity fund. The third largest
commitment was the May, 2007 China Jianyin purchase of a $3 billion IPO stake of Blackstone.
Recall that this stake (along with the other China Jianyin holdings, including the 43.35%
ownership of CICC) came over to CIC as part of the Central Huijin acquisition. The Blackstone
and Morgan Stanley purchases were made partly with an eye toward learning more about
international investing and internal due diligence and risk management practices. In addition,
these investments were seen as building strategic partnerships for CIC as it entered into relatively
42 See "Exhibit 6: Global Investment Portfolio Distribution" on p. 35 of the CIC's 2008 Annual Report available at:
http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/include/resources /CIC 2008 annualreport en.pdf
43 "China Fund Grabs Big Stake in Morgan Stanley," AFP, December 19, 2007.
44 Wang Xiangwei, "Fed's 'Printing Presses' Give Wen a Headache."
4s In October, 2008 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. invested equity into the struggling Morgan Stanley which
was facing pressure as a result of the credit crunch brought on by the subprime mortgage crisis. This infusion
diluted the CIC's stake down to 7.68%. On June 2, 2009, CIC bought another $1.2 billion of Morgan Stanley's
stock effectively returning the CIC to its previous ownership stake of 9.86%. See: http://www.china-
inv.cn/cicen!resources/resources news01.html
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uncharted waters for Chinese central bankers: namely large-scale asset management of foreign
exchange reserves.4 6 Because of the good deal of public and private criticism that CIC has
received about these investments, "CIC has been discouraged from taking more direct stakes, at
least for the time being." 47
In the summer of 2009, with asset prices reflecting a substantial discount as a result of the
global economic crisis, it seems that CIC went on a buying spree. In July, CIC purchased $1.5
billion of Teck Resources-Canada's largest diversified mining firm specializing in copper,
metallurgical coal and zinc.4 8 This private placement garnered CIC a 17.2% share of Teck and
6.7% of the voting rights. In September, 2009 it seems that the CIC bought $1.9 billion of PT
Bumi Resources debt. PT Bumi is Indonesia's largest thermal coal mining company. Earlier
that month, CIC bought a $850 million stake in Noble Group-a Hong Kong-based commodities
trader. There are also reports that CIC has bought $300 million of convertible bonds in a
Mongolian mining company named Lung Ming. CIC was also active in real estate, taking part in
a GBP 800 million consortium that helped bailout London's Canary Wharf and investing AUS
$200 million in Goodman Group, an Australian real estate investment trust. Apparently, CIC
also awarded $800 million to Morgan Stanley to co-invest in a projected $5 billion global
property fund. These purchases all seem timed to capitalize on the relatively low asset
valuations brought on by the financial crisis. Although too early to tell, they may be a bell-
weather of CIC's more active deployment of capital overseas.
4 One example of the type of benefits that CIC hoped to gain from these acquisitions can be seen in Blackstone's
provision of investment banking advisory services to CDB's failed $3 billion purchase of Barclays. China Foreign
Investment Spree to Continue," SinoCast China Business Daily News.
47 Henny Sender, "Sources of Needed Cash Scared Off," Financial Times, Jan 28 2009, p. 4.
48 Recent filings have shown the value of this investment to have doubled in less than a year. Teck is also "a
significant producer of gold, molybdenum and specialty metals, with interests in several oil sands development
assets." See the company description found at:
http://www.teck.com/Generic.aspx?PAGE=About+Us&portaiName=tc For more information about CIC's purchase
refer to CIC's press release that can be found at: http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/resources/resources news08.html
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The only other major purchases have been the relatively small $200 million IPO
purchases of VISA and the $100 million IPO stake in China Railroad Group (announced on
November 21, 2007).49 The Hong Kong Railroad buy seems to be a largely symbolic gesture of
support in line with what has become common practice for state-owned companies that are
listing on major exchanges.50
Even accounting for these direct investments, which together amount to a little over $16
billion in investments, CIC is still left with around $70 billion waiting to be invested overseas.
Early indications seem to suggest that the majority of this pool will be or has been competitively
awarded to third party investment managers across a range of asset types and investment
strategies. There have been indications that the majority of these funds will be quietly placed
with private foreign fund managers that meet CIC's investment criteria.51 Indeed, there are
reports that CIC has awarded Blackstone a $500 million mandate for its fund of funds asset
management business. Thus, it is likely (although not guaranteed) that such activities will
constitute a commercially-motivated capital allocation that is managed by professional asset
managers in $0.5-5 billion allotments. As was the case with NSSF's use of third-party mandates,
such an allocation would introduce another level of state-commercial actor distance which
increases the likelihood that the CIC's activities would be insulated from politics.
49 "World News: China Fund Plans to Steer More of its Money Overseas," Wall Street Journal.
50 Jamil Anderlini, "CIC to Buy Stake in HK Rail Group Float," Financial Times, November 21, 2007; "CIC Invests
in China Railway IPO," China Economic Review, November 21, 2007. I believe that China's initial investment in
Blackstone was also partly colored by an intention to signal constructive Chinese government support for the IPO.
Drawing on China's domestic IPO experience, if the government is a prominent investor/backer/supporter of an IPO
it is often taken as a mark of support and friendliness. I am not convinced that the China Jianyin leadership intended
to signal a Chinese capital invasion of US public markets-although that was in fact the response that it seemed to
generate.
s1 "Mr. Gao also said the CIC has just finished the selection of external equity managers, but he didn't provide
details. Those mandates are expected to be a major boon for the asset-management industry and span equity markets
throughout the globe, including the U.S., Western Europe and Japan. He said the process of hiring fixed- income
managers and talks with hedge funds and private-equity funds are continuing." ibid.
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If this is true, such a capital management strategy will add a significant degree of
commercialization to the CIC's activities and thereby reduce the potential for politicization. By
putting its capital with third party fund managers and essentially becoming a "fund of funds" the
CIC effectively ties its hands by adding another layer of state-commercial actor relationships in
which the international third party fund manager has the CIC as its principal. Introducing this
additional layer of commercially-oriented autonomy significantly increases the distance between
the State Council and the commercial actors ultimately responsible for deploying the state's
capital. At the same time, it will reduce the ease with which the CIC can be used as an
instrument of economic statecraft since such a move would provide another layer of agency
between the Chinese government and the commercial actors actually conducting the economic
interaction. With another layer of state-commercial actor relations folded into the current
structure of managing China's foreign exchange reserves, the ability of the central government
authorities to effectively manipulate the movement of state capital in order to realize China's
foreign policy objectives would be significantly diminished. It would become considerably more
complicated to enforce effective state control over the CIC and for the CIC, in turn, to effectively
ensure control over the third party asset manager. If China decides to use third-party fund
managers to manage the vast majority of its foreign-invested capital, this would be an important
measure in insulating such activities from the security consequences that might otherwise result
from state-sponsored investment on such a large scale. Let us now turn to a more detailed
consideration of the security externalities raised by the CIC.
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8.6 CIC's Foreign Investment: Assessing the Security Externalities
The above examination of CIC's assets seems to indicate that the majority of its capital
will be dedicated to recapitalizing China's domestic banking sector. The portion of assets that is
available for international investment is the source for most trepidation regarding possible
security externalities. Drawing on the typology presented in Chapter Two, this section will
systematically evaluate the security concerns that might result from CIC's activities. For
instance, some worry about the potential for the CIC to exercise Coercive Leverage. Although it
seems plausible that any one firm (or even an industry) can become overly-dependent on Chinese
sources of investment, it seems unlikely that the entire US economy would become dependent on
Chinese investment simply by virtue of scale. In 2008, the US economy was about $14.4 trillion
while the New York Stock Exchange had a market capitalization of around $10 trillion. Both
dwarf China's total international investment outflow of about $55 billion in 2008.52 The CIC is
simply not large enough to effectively develop Coercive Leverage externalities over the US
economy. At these levels, China's investment (if operating under state control) would be limited
to generating Coercive Leverage externalities in a strategic sector(s) or over specific companies.
Concerns over Interest Transformation security externalities seem to be better founded.
Creating concentrated domestic constituencies that have vested interests in favoring policies that
are accommodating to China's strategic interests constitutes a potentially powerful tool for
China's foreign policy. The debate over renewal of China's Most-Favored Nation trading status
in the mid-1990s is a case in point. In that debate, specific domestic U.S. business interests that
stood to gain from China's MFN status mobilized in support of extending "Permanent Normal
Trade Relations" status to China. These efforts had what would eventually become decisive
52 According to Lou Jiwei, "Judging from our investment strategy and scale, we are unlikely to present a major
impact on the international market." See: "CIC to be Stable Force in Global Financial Market," Xinhua, December
11, 2007.
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influence in Congressional deliberations over whether to renew China's MFN status.53 It is not
unreasonable to worry about similar modalities of influence with respect to China's state-
sponsored investment activities.
A general Corrosion of the US economy that might result from China's state-sponsored
investment seems unlikely as long as the investment takes place on a commercially-driven basis.
In so far as government involvement skews the commercial calculus to encourage detrimental
externalities, investment patterns may become corrosive to the general economy-although most
concerns that are voiced regarding the corrosion of the US economy are usually driven by
outsourcing (particularly in the manufacturing sector) and China's low-cost labor competitive
advantage. Neither of these factors is especially tied to China's state-sponsored investment
activities. In fact, China's state-sponsored investment may have the opposite effective. Rather
than eroding the US economic position, Bolstering may be the likely security result stemming
from bailout-like investment deals that provide much needed liquidity to credit constrained
firms. There seemed to be some evidence of this sort of behavior early on in the financial crisis
(for example, CIC's stake in Morgan Stanley, and Abu Dhabi's investment in Citigroup both
provided much-needed capital injections) although it is too early to tell just how counter-cyclical
sovereign wealth investing will be.54
There is some danger of Strategic Transfer given dual-use technologies and valuable
knowledge that might be transferred as a result of acquisitions in sensitive security areas.55 In
5 Recall the episode of Taiwan's fruit farmers in which China also effectively leveraged Interest Transformation
security externalities to good effect.
54 There have been indications that the CIC will be a "stabilizing force in the international market," as noted in:
"China Wealth Fund Aims for Stability, Openness," China Daily, October 16, 2007. Lou Jiwei noted that sovereign
wealth funds have been a useful source of stabilizing capital for financial institutions "that suffer from the subprime
crisis; they are stabilizing the market. CIC will also do the same thing." See: Xin Zhiming, "CIC Aims for
Overseas," China Daily, November 30, 2007.
s Fortunately, the US has some institutional foreign investment review mechanisms in place. Whether or not these
are adequate is outside the scope of this research.
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addition, there is evidence that China's state-sponsored investment activities are at least partly
guided by a desire to secure what the government views as strategic access to resources and
technologies. 56 Tapping Morgan Stanley's and Blackstone's institutional knowledge seemed to
be at least part of the motivation behind CIC's initial investments. In addition, CIC's recent
investments in Teck, PT Bumi, Noble Group and Lung Ming all share a resource-oriented
dimension.57 To the degree that international investments provide access to strategically
important assets, such activity would seem to warrant concerns from a Strategic Transfer
security externality perspective.
Understanding exactly what these externalities may be and specifying the conditions
under which the state is or is not able to direct the behavior of the CIC along foreign policy-as
opposed to commercial interests-lies at the heart of whether state-directed investment is likely
to be a matter of strategic concern.
8.7 CIC's Mandate & Coding the DV for the CIC Case Study
To code the DV, we first need to assess what the goals of the state are and compare those
to what the commercial actor does in practice. In this case study, factional frictions and inter-
bureaucratic battles prevented a clear, consistent set of the state's goals from being specified-
particularly in CIC's early days. 58 Particular factions and bureaucratic interests would vie with
each other for defining the goals of the "state" with respect to the CIC as a commercial agent of
the state.59 One vision of China's interests with respect to the CIC stressed the macroeconomic
56 See for example, the instances of state-sponsored financial support discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
57 For more on Strategic Transfer security externalities see Chapters Five and Six on China's resource extraction
strategies.
58 Author's Interview 080620, Beijing.
59 "Such a concentration of the country's wealth in one entity has inevitably drawn intense interest ... from powerful
forces within the state bureaucracy. Each of these groups has its own ideas on how the money can best be spent."
From: Jamil Anderlini, "China Wealth Fund's Early Coming of Age," Financial Times, December 21, 2007.
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utility of CIC. This group tended to stress the importance of a commercial orientation for the
institution. The other perspective emphasized the larger national, strategic interests of China and
wanted to see the CIC actively supporting China's stated political goals and priorities. While
this struggle was especially pitched early on in the process of creating the CIC, it now seems that
many of these power struggles have been resolved in favor of the MOF (backed by Wen Jiabao
at the level of the State Council). As a result, I code this case as exhibiting a lack of state control
in the initial period. However, since about mid-2008, it seems that MOF had increasingly been
consolidating its power. The result has been that by the end of 2008, the state seems to have
been largely unified and control is now present.
The CIC's initial mandate reflected the internecine power struggle that characterized
CIC's formation.60 This mandate had three different components. First, as is evidenced by its
asset allocation up to this point, the CIC has been tasked with completing the recapitalization,
limited privatization and ongoing management of China's state-owned banks. 61 The government
had already decided that a portion of its excess reserves would be used to re-capitalize the
domestic banking sector which was placed on unstable grounds as a result of the bad lending
policies the banks had. Interestingly, these loans were provided to otherwise insolvent and
inefficient state-owned enterprises. Since the government did not want these firms to collapse
(for fear of rising unemployment and a lack of an alternative social welfare safety net to the
danwei) it leaned on the banks to extend credit. The result was a portfolio of non-performing
60 "There clearly isn't a consensus inside China on what the CIC should be doing." From: Brad Setser, "Does the
China Investment Corporation (CIC) Have a Coherent Investment Strategy?" online blog #234551, available at
http://www.rgemonitor.comi/blog/setser/234551/ Setser is now a Treasury Department official at the National
Economic Council.
61 To the degree that these state-owned banks are motivated by policy outcomes that support the government's
objectives, they can be used as effective levers for realizing national interests. To the extent that these banks are
focused on maximizing shareholder value and risk-adjusted return, their malleability to serve commercially
questionable foreign policy goals of the state will be limited.
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loans that later required bank recapitalizations. As per the central government's wishes, the CIC
continues to play an important role in recapitalizing the domestic banks.
Second main goal of the CIC is to provide a vehicle to allow China to diversify its highly
concentrated holdings of US dollar denominated government debt. The CIC is tasked with
managing an important part of the diversification strategy for China's excess foreign reserves.
Due the relatively low-yield on US Treasuries, China sought to improve the returns on a portion
of its foreign exchange reserves. Indeed, as noted earlier, the origins of the CIC can be traced in
part to the Ministry of Finance critiquing the PBoC's management of the foreign exchange
reserves.62 Although a portion of these reserves were used to recapitalize China's domestic
banks, the rest of the capital was to be invested abroad. How these investments were to be made
(whether on a commercial or political/policy basis) became an important bone of contention.
The final (initially contested and since repudiated) mandate of the CIC was to support the
outward expansion of Chinese firms.63 Traditionally, China's state-owned banks served as
dispersing conduits for state-directed capital allocation (for example, CCB specialized in project
financing while the ABC provided credit to the agricultural sector). There have been suggestions
that the National Development and Reform Council (NDRC) and several large state owned
62 "The establishment of the China Investment Corporation was an initiative sponsored by State Council and the
Finance Ministry to redistribute the balance of power between the ministry and the central bank, the PBOC." From:
Paul Glasson, "Regional Focus to Global Push: The China Syndrome," The Australian March 4, 2009, p. 22. See
also Author's Interview 080621, Beijing; and Zhang Ming and Sarah Eaton "Dragon on a Short Leash: an Inside-out
Analysis of China Investment Corporation," Working Paper No. 0821, CASS: Beijing, November 26, 2008.
63 I note that this purpose of the CIC seems to be strongly resisted by the commercially-oriented PBoC as well as
what seems to be the public statements of the CIC's senior management itself. However, in the course of my
research in Beijing, several interlocutors confided that this vision for the CIC's mission was being championed by
the NDRC and some elements within the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce. (Author's Interview
080620, Beijing; Author's Interview 080621, Beijing) It seems that most recently, the CIC has publicly sought to
disavow itself of this goal. The trend certainly seems to be moving CIC away from such activities-reflecting, in
part, the consolidation of Lou Jiwei's power and the ascendancy of a commercially-oriented leadership. One of the
strongest pieces of evidence of CIC's move toward operating on a commercial basis was its 2008 annual report.
Publicly available as of August, 2009 at: http://www.china-
inv.cn/cicen/include/resources/CIC 2008 anntialreport en.pdf
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enterprises have pressured the CIC to continue to play such a role underwriting the international
investments, acquisitions, and projects of China's SOEs as they go abroad.
To the extent that the CIC can facilitate the economic activities that generate security
externalities in line with China's objectives, it may be a useful agent for furthering China's
strategic interests. Activities like underwriting acquisitions of strategic assets abroad, subsidizing
militarily significant firms and industries, or using CIC's investment clout to lean on holdings or
potential partners to cooperate with China's national interests are just some of the ways one
could imagine that the CIC could play a constructive role in achieving China's strategic interests.
To the extent the CIC operates as an independent, commercially-driven entity with a significant
distance between the central government and the CIC, it will be difficult to use the CIC as a tool
of China's foreign policy. Such a commercially-oriented firm would mainly consider an
investment's potential for return rather than its strategic significance.
In an effort to directly address international concerns stemming from Chinese
government involvement in international investment, CIC leaders have gone to great pains to
publicly commit themselves to a purely commercial set of goals. For instance, Wang Jianxi
(then Chairman of China Jianyin, now CIC's Chief Risk Officer) stated on September 10, 2007,
"The mission for this company is purely investment-return driven."" On the day the CIC was
created, Yang Qingwei (formerly NDRC's Director General of the Department of Investment,
now CIC's Deputy Chief Investment Officer) claimed, "The company's principal purpose is to
make profits."65 CIC Chairman and CEO Lou Jiwei has also consistently emphasized the
commercial nature of CIC's activities: "We will adopt a long-term and prudent investment
principle and a safe, professional portfolio strategy that adapts to market changes, which will put
4 Jason Dean and Andrew Batson, op. cit.
65 "China's Trillion-dollar Kitty is Ready," Asian Times, October 2, 2007.
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emphasis on a rational match of returns and risks."66 Such public statements seem designed to
both reassure nervous host nations about the CIC's investment presence in their markets as well
as reinforce Lou Jiwei's vision of CIC's commercially-driven mission (free from the interference
of non-commercial interests). Many of the CIC officials' statements have sought to explicitly
address sensitive areas of international concern. For example, Lou has indicated that the CIC
will not invest in infrastructure. 67 While the Vice Minister of Finance, Li Yong (-Lf), has
committed not to make acquisitions in foreign airlines, telecommunications or oil companies. 68
These statements signify CIC's intent to be a largely commercially-driven institution (albeit with
some consideration for the political sensitivities of its investments). Perhaps more importantly,
their public nature signifies the consolidation of CIC under a leadership that has publically
committed itself to a commercial as opposed to political agenda.
In sum, the state goals were not unified initially in this case study (owing to the factions
and bureaucratic divisions among competing domestic financial governmental institutions).
Without a coherent, unified set of goals from the state, it was difficult to exercise very effective
control over CIC. Once MOF had consolidated its power over the CIC, it seems to have been
able to shape and manage the CIC's agenda, processes and activities. The commercial actor in
this analysis seems to have had four key goals: recapitalize the banks, diversify China's foreign
exchange holdings, and support outward expansion of Chinese SOEs (though this seems to have
been since dropped as part of CIC's mission). In addition, the CIC must continuously struggle to
prove its ongoing worth and viability as a relatively new bureaucratic institution. Such new
66 "CIC to be Stable Force in Global Financial Market," Xinhua, December 11, 2007.
67 "China's Sovereign Wealth Fund Seeks to be a Stabilizing Presence in Global Markets," Xinhua, November 30,
2007.
68 See: Investment Fund Announces Strategic Plans," Xinhua, November 9, 2007 and "China Investment
Corporation Unveils Investment Plan," Xinhua, November 7, 2007.
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entities are subject to rivals' efforts to "kill the baby in the cradle." 69 This goal of institutional
survival is perhaps the most important goal for the CIC. How did these goals match up to what
the state wished to have the commercial actor do?
As evidenced by the allocation of CIC's capital, its management, and investment
activities, it seems that the CIC today has been set on a largely commercially-oriented path that
emphasizes its task of managing a portion of China's excess foreign exchange reserves. This
seems to be precisely what the (now unified) state would like this particular commercial actor to
do. An examination of the evidence on CIC's goals seems to suggest that while state control
may have been lacking in the early stages of CIC's existence, processes and institutions have
since been put into place that facilitate ongoing, fairly limited P-A control going forward. The
CIC will also likely take the political preferences of the senior leadership into consideration as
the CIC executes its capital allocation duties. This is reflected in the CIC's reporting structure
which ultimately is directly accountable to the State Council under Wen Jiabao. In addition, it
seems that much of the senior leadership of the CIC is personally loyal to Wen Jiabao, implying
that the CIC would willingly defer to his preferences. Thirdly, its investment decision process
suggests that large investments will seek direct State Council level approval before moving
forward. The CIC today seems to be largely fulfilling the interests of the State Council, namely
conducting commercially-oriented diversification of China's foreign exchange reserves.
That said, the CIC has taken a number of steps to maximize its own agency and provide it
with some room to pursue its own bureaucratic interests and to maintain its freedom of action as
much as possible. Although this is unlikely to result in an outright loss of state control, CIC's
pursuit of a more commercial orientation will make it increasingly difficult for the government to
effectively wield the CIC as a political instrument of China's foreign policy. Perhaps most
69 These dynamics were discussed in more detail in the SAFE case study of the Chapter Seven.
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importantly, commercialization (which seems to be in the CIC's own narrow bureaucratic
interests) is a route that is less likely to present security threats that may be generated by the
CIC's international investments. The next section moves beyond the question of whether the
state has been successful at controlling the CIC to a closer examination of the factors that
facilitate or hinder state Control in the case of the CIC.
8.8 Evaluating the CIC
As discussed above, evidence from the CIC case seems to suggest that in the early days
of the CIC, there was relatively little state control. As the CIC has matured, there is more
evidence of state control. What explains this variation? In this section, we examine the IVs
presented in Chapter Two in light of the CIC case. How well do changes in these IVs account
for the observed variation in control?
In the CIC case, the state was initially divided across bureaucratic and factional lines.
This division provided the commercial actor with an opportunity to play one portion of the state
off the other to maximize the commercial actor's own preferences. It is mainly because of the
divided state that we observe the lack of state control in the early days of the CIC. However, it
seems that the Ministry of Finance has since consolidated its leadership over the CIC and as a
result, the state has become more unified. CIC's early investments provide evidence of free-
wheeling deal-makers exercising considerable freedom of action. The Morgan Stanley
investment reflected an instance in which the commercial actors took initiative and acted on their
own interests. Likewise, the Blackstone purchase is also often cited as a case where state control
was absent. "The way it [CIC] made its investments was also highly dubious. It made its first
investment in Blackstone in June 2007, three months before CIC was formally established,
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making one wonder how much due diligence it conducted before throwing away $3US billion." 70
In both instances, the government was divided among competing visions for the CIC (or its
predecessor institutions).
There have been numerous reports of a bureaucratic struggle between the Ministry of
Finance, the PBOC, and the NDRC for control over the CIC. These battles seem to have been
particularly pitched during discussions regarding CIC's design and creation.71 While the PBoC
under Zhou Xiaochuan (T]) 1) had generally pushed for greater central bank independence and
a liberal economic orientation (both of which would enhance its bureaucratic stature), the NDRC
has sought to preserve its own power within the government bureaucracy by resisting moves to
limit the state-directed allocation capital and the NDRC's ability to "guide" the economy. Part
of the critique over generating a higher return on China's foreign exchange reserves that lead to
the creation of the CIC was an effort on the part of the Ministry of Finance to wrest the
management of the banking sector away from the PBoC. Before the banking recapitalizations
of the early 2000s, the MOF enjoyed unchallenged control of China's banking sector. As the
PBoC began to tap foreign exchange funds to recapitalize the banks and prepare them for
eventual public listings, the PBoC increasingly gained control over more and more of China's
financial sector. MOF resented this erosion of its influence and sought to gain control over
China's banks. Today, it seems that this strategy has largely worked and the MOF now controls,
either directly or indirectly (largely via CIC), almost all of the state's banking assets. Now that
the CIC has been functioning for over a year, most sources seem to indicate that the MOF is in
70 Wang Xiangwei, "Fed's 'Printing Presses' Give Wen a Headache."
71 Author Interview 080620, Beijing; Author Interview 080623, Beijing.
72 See Victor Shih's unpublished manuscript entitled, "Tools of Survival: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and
China," for more on how the leadership of the Ministry of Finance tends to be loyal to Wen JJabao, while the
leadership of the PBoC tends to be associated with Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji.
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the driver's seat at CIC, with a clear chain of control lead by the State Council. The unification
of the state has thus enabled the leadership to exercise more effective control over the CIC.74
The goals of CIC seem largely to reflect the goals of the factional forces within the state
leadership. In this sense, there seems to be relative compatibility on the Goals IV. However,
since the state itself was divided over its vision for the CIC, we observe that the commercial
actor had some space to emphasize and define its own interpretation of what its goals ought to
be. Initially, the divisions at the top made state control more difficult. As the CIC was
institutionally consolidated, it seems that the more commercially-oriented mission has taken on a
more dominant role. This consolidation has anchored the CIC to more explicit, commercially-
oriented goals. Although this consolidation would seem to facilitate greater state control in the
future, the commercial nature of these goals limits the instrumental usefulness of the CIC as an
agent to support the strategic foreign policy preferences of the state. The CIC was established to
help diversify China's foreign exchange reserves. This goal does not conflict with the CIC's
desire to earn a respectable rate of return on its portfolio. Although the CIC's goals of
establishing itself as a viable bureaucratic player entail less than national level priorities, these
more narrow bureaucratic interests do not generally pose a problem for China's goals. The area
with the greatest amount of goal friction revolved around the CIC using its resources to provide
additional support for national Chinese strategic interests. Although this goal seems to have
been discussed early on in CIC's bureaucratic life, it was resisted by the CIC leadership (and is
no longer a part of CIC's mandate). As discussed above, such "national" goals were largely the
7 As a point of fact, the State Council is the ultimate principal to which the CIC reports-at times this principal is
divided by factional frictions or bureaucratic/institutional preferences. However, for the time being it seems that
Wen Jiabao and the Ministry of Finance have consolidated their leadership positions over CIC thus creating a
unified State. Author Interview 090909, Washington, D.C.
74 The theory suggests that this sort of a unified state will facilitate the state's ability to control the CIC in the future.
295
Norris, Economic Statecraft
product of a divided leadership which now seems to be consolidating around commercial goals
that are more in line with the CIC's own institutional interests.
From a Relative Resources IV perspective, the CIC's financial expertise has provided it
with a considerable advantage. The state is often dependent on the CIC to source investment
opportunities, conduct due diligence, negotiate investment terms, and execute capital placements.
In all of these matters, the CIC is working with a relative information asymmetry that
undermines state control. In addition, because there was a lack of relative financial expertise at
the highest levels of government (most of that expertise was resident in the commercial actor),
the state was forced to rely on and trust the commercial actors that possessed the relevant
expertise. 75
The case of CIC is probably best categorized as an "Oligopolistic" market structure since
the only real alternative to CIC for investing China's foreign exchange reserves is SAFE.76 As
mentioned in the SAFE case study, the CIC was created partly with a view toward generating an
alternative commercial actor for managing some of China's foreign exchange reserves. 77 In this
sense, SAFE and CIC are two semi-competitive investment arms of the state and thus, the
Market Fragmentation IV has a slightly competitive value. The bureaucratic rivalry that
simmered between the PBoC and the MOF seems to have spilled over and is being continued
75 In addition, the CIC has been getting augmented by foreign subject matter experts that international private sector
partners have provided on-loan to help staff up the CIC. These resources further skew the Relative Resources IV in
the CIC's favor.
76 When there are a limited number of commercial actors available to the state, we might expect that these two
dominant commercial actors might collude to resist the will of the state (in which case the Market Fragmentation IV
would be coded as "Concentrated") however, the competitive dynamic and bureaucratic rivalry that exists between
SAFE and CIC precludes any collaboration, prompting a coding of "Oligopolistc." Thus, any freedom of action that
might be gained as a result of the concentrated market structure is overwhelmed by the existence of an alternative
commercial actor (in SAFE) that is fully capable (and more than willing) to invest China's foreign exchange
reserves.
77 Author's Interview 080620, Beijing; See also Victor Shih's unpublished manuscript entitled, "Tools of Survival:
Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and China,"
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between SAFE and CIC.78  Such bureaucratic competition facilitates effective state control.
This competitive element is significant because it provides the state with an alternative
commercial actor to execute its wishes. The result is greater state control since the existence of
an alternative commercial actor waiting in the wings that may be more willing to do the wishes
of the state lends a certain amount of discipline to the state-CIC relationship (just as it does to
the state-SAFE relationship).
In terms of the Reporting Relationship IV, the CIC, like all of the commercial actors
examined in this chapter, is a wholly owned, managed and operated government entity.79 The
CIC's organizational structure is loosely modeled on the NSSF. It, too, is governed by board of
directors which is responsible to the State Council. In turn, the State Council can nominate the
Chairman of the CIC. All of these factors favor state control over CIC. The institutional
architecture seems to suggest that yes, most likely the CIC will be subject to continued state
control. This is especially true for large, high profile investments. At the same time, the entity
also seems to want to fight for its autonomy by stressing the commercial orientation of its
activities (and thus, the need for the state to rely on CIC's professional judgment regarding its
activities). Moreover, the subject matter expertise required to be "good" at finance seems to
provide the CIC considerable weight in bureaucratic fights.
The coding of the theory's independent variables for the CIC case is summarized in the
following table:
78 Brad Setser, "The Implications of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments for National Security," Testimony before
the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission February 7, 2007 p.7. See also Victor Shih's
unpublished manuscript entitled, "Tools of Survival: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and China." and Michael
McCormack, "Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds: 2008-2010 Opportunities for Foreign Asset Managers" (Shanghai:
Z-Ben Advisors 2008).
79 For example, the CIC has been funded with its initial tranche of registered capital using the proceeds from special
bonds that were effectively sold to the PBoC. This-means CIC interest payments are directly payable to the state;
another indication of the close reporting relationship.
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Table 8.1: CIC Case Summary Table
IV Coding
Goals Compatible
Market Structure Oligopolistic
Goals are defined by state; some early divergence
over CIC independence and commercial incentive
vs. supporting foreign policy goals/firm outward
expansion-has largely been resolved in favor of
commercialization; Both Agent and Principal goals
can be achieved.
Mainly bureaucratically competitive with SAFE &
to a lesser degree SS Fund, but as state entity, CIC
faces limited real competition.
State control likely; Evidenced by State Council review and
approval procedures; though growing less likely as CIC
commercializes.
State control likely.
Unity of State
Reporting
Relationship
Relative Resources
Initially Divided
Bureaucratically &
Factionally; MOF now
seems to be dominant and
Principal is unified under
Wen Jiabao and the State
Council
Direct for large activities;
Indirect for day-to-day
Asymmetric in favor of
CIC
Competing bureaucratic interests: MOF vs. PBoC;
Competing Personal Factions: Wen Jiabao's
protdgd's vs. Zhu Rongji's; No evidence of
municipal/provincial centers of authority as CIC is a
central government organization.
Government Ownership: Direct and complete
State Management: Indirect via CIC senior
management with only limited (also governmental)
"independent" oversight; as CIC commercializes,
expect reporting relationship to become more
indirect.
Financial/investing Expertise: state almost
completely reliant on talent at CIC.
Budget Endowment and Personnel Count: Empirics
are unclear, although CIC's permanent staff and HQ
suggest advantage over State Council's overly-
taxed management resources.
State control unlikely during periods of divided state as seen
by early CIC behavior and investments; After state
consolidates, control was institutionalized as evidenced by
risk management and review procedures.
State control likely as a result of effective and clear
reporting structure that enables oversight/political
interference in high-profile cases.
Suggests state control unlikely as evidenced by early
investments in Morgan Stanley and Blackstone when
resources were almost entirely concentrated at the CIC (and
its pre-cursor, Central Huijin).
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Evidence DV Outcome
Chapter Eight: The CIC
Are there legitimate security fears surrounding the CIC's activities? The answer seems to
turn on whether the CIC operates on a commercial basis. To the extent the CIC can increase the
distance between itself and the state it will be less easily controlled or used to support the
political, foreign policy, or non-commercial objectives of Beijing. Currently, the CIC goes to
great pains to ensure that it is driven purely by commercial interests. I do not doubt that the
current senior management team would like that vision to become reality, as that orientation
would likely maximize CIC's own narrow preferences. However, the reality is that the CIC
controls a large pile of money that has been earmarked to be invested-i.e. allocated by the state.
The natural result is that there will be competing claims about how that allocation happens.
Several structural elements make politicization not an unlikely outcome in the future.
First is the mixed institutional structure of the management team-while it seems to be
increasingly MOF-dominated there are other voices inside and outside the room. Second, the
CIC must still vet its largest investments with the State Council which then has the ability to
exercise control over the CIC's behavior. There is also some danger that the CIC will be
pressured into supporting China's larger national interests. Although the increasing
professionalization is trending toward greater commercialization and away from having the CIC
act as a policy arm of the central government, China's history of such policy mechanisms and the
statutory design of the CIC both leave open the possibility of the state exercising greater control
over the CIC.
This question may very well be resolved by two key dynamics. The first is the degree to
which the CIC is able to lock-in a purely commercial orientation. To accomplish this, continuing
the recent efforts to improve transparency is critical. A lack of transparency hurts efforts to
place CIC on a purely commercial footing because secrecy allows for more effective
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politicization and organizational hijacking. The adoption of the Santiago Protocols on Sovereign
Wealth Funds and the August, 2009 publication of the CIC's first annual report are two
important steps in improving the CIC's transparency. Non-transparent operations strengthen the
hand of hard-line NDRC officials who would prefer to hold onto to the reigns of the economy in
order to direct plan-based allocations of capital. In order for the CIC to solidify its own
bureaucratic autonomy, it ought to move toward locking in transparency and commercially-
oriented independence from non-commercially motivated, political interests. If the State Council
seeks to provide international reassurance to the host nation recipients of China's outward direct
investment, it ought to provide CIC with an insulated, commercial space in which to pursue
profitable returns for the state.
The second key dynamic to watch is the factional struggle for power: in particular, the
tugging between domestic political factions that favor a plan-oriented, government-directed
approach to China's economic development and the more liberalizing, reform-oriented elements
of China's leadership. If reform-oriented, commercially-driven interests remain at the helm, it is
likely that the CIC will to continue to liberalize and effectively increase the state-commercial
actor distance (i.e. limit the ability of the state to control the agent for its non-commercial,
national interests). If statist interests are ascendant, the institutional structure and China's history
of state-directed central planning and capital allocation are very conducive to permitting the CIC
to be used to serve the foreign policy interests of the state. With roughly $90 billion in capital to
be invested abroad, the dollar figures at stake are large (though not as large as some fear) and
have the potential to generate significant impact. As this capital base grows, the stakes will go
up. Having this capital directed in a non-commercial manner could raise significant strategic
concerns for other countries. Unfortunately, there seem to be indications that reform-minded,
liberalizing elements within China's central leadership have been forced to retrench in light of
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the recent economic crisis and the subsequent discrediting of a more liberalized economic
development model. If the CIC veers from its current commercializing path, the likelihood of
the CIC being used to pursue strategic national interests will increase substantially.
8.9 CIC Case Study: Conclusion
This chapter set out to determine whether the CIC posed a strategic security threat as an
instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Answering this question required two paths of
inquiry. First, what are the security externalities that might result as a consequence of CIC's
activities? Second, to what degree is the government able to control the behavior of CIC in order
to strategically generate such security externalities?
While this chapter's analysis does suggest that CIC is capable of producing security
externalities, CIC's current development path seems to indicate a relatively commercially-
motivated orientation that should limit the strategic consequences of its activities. Interest
Transformation and Strategic Transfer seem to be the most likely security externalities that may
result. Some Coercive Leverage type of security externalities may also be possible although on a
more limited scale. A close inspection of the CIC's resource allocation shows that only a portion
of its total capitalization is dedicated to foreign investment, with the rest being used primarily to
reorganize the domestic Chinese banking system. This fundamentally limits the size of the
CIC's internationally deployed capital thus also limiting its strategic impact. Perhaps more
importantly, evidence suggests that the CIC's current development path puts it on a commercial
footing that limits the degree to which the state can control its behavior (and thus deliberately
generate security consequences) as part of an economic statecraft strategy. Improvements in
transparency, an incentive structure that supports a commitment to commercial operations, and
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increasing reliance on third-party mandates for foreign capital allocation all seem to suggest that
the CIC will not prove to be a very effective tool for achieving China's foreign policy interests.
Several characteristics of the CIC case study suggest state control may be difficult. First,
the CIC was at the epicenter of a bureaucratic struggle for control and influence over China's
finances. As a result of this divided state during the CIC's early operations, state control was
weakened and the CIC enjoyed a good deal of relatively independent agency in conducting its
affairs. Once more centralized control was consolidated, the ability of the state to direct the
behavior of the CIC was strengthened. Second, the CIC leadership has a strong incentive to
carve out a bureaucratic living space for its existence as a new financial institution charged with
investing China's assets (particularly in light of SAFE-which already had the mission of
managing China's foreign exchange reserves). This has led to a preference for professionalism,
autonomy, and a strong commercial orientation; all of which undermined tight state control.
Third, the CIC is led by a considerable coterie of senior CCP financial talent. The senior
administration of the CIC included some of the brightest financial stars of the Communist Party
leadership. This has helped skew the Relative Resources IV in favor of the CIC-affording it
additional room to avoid tight state control.
Of course, not all factors point toward weak state control. The strongest influence in
favor of close state control is along the Reporting Relationship IV. By reporting directly to the
State Council, the door remains open to direct political state control over the CIC. If ideas
favoring increased roles for the state in the management of China's economic activity gain
popularity among China's leadership, the CIC will likely come under increasing pressure to act
in support of national objectives-even if those have little commercial merit. Under these
conditions, the formal reporting structure and processes of the CIC's institutional architecture
make it difficult for CIC to avoid political interference. Second, today's CIC leadership seems to
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be effectively consolidated under the influence of the Ministry of Finance. This consolidation
seems to suggest another avenue of closer state control as the state becomes more unified. Third,
SAFE's direct investment of a small portion of its considerably larger foreign exchange reserves
provides the government with an alternative commercial actor that is capable of performing
CIC's work, should CIC prove unwilling to abide by the government's preferences. This
competitive dynamic along the Market Fragmentation IV also suggests that CIC can be more
easily brought to heel to do the state's bidding.
Despite these factors that leave open the possibility for further state control, current
trends seem to suggest that the CIC will strive to operate along largely commercial grounds.
Although it is still much too early to draw definitive conclusions, this examination of CIC seems
to suggest that it is on a path of professionalization and commercialization. By increasing the
distance between the state and the commercial actor, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the
CIC will be able to be used as an effective tool to realize Chinese foreign policy objectives. On
balance, the CIC is unlikely to constitute a threat assuming that it continues to evolve in the
direction of its current commercial orientation.
Despite a good deal of initial trepidation over the Chinese government's ability to use the
China Investment Corporation (CIC) for strategic purposes, the evidence suggests that using the
CIC as an effective instrument of economic statecraft may be more difficult than some fear. This
chapter's exploration of the empirics provides evidence for optimism regarding the CIC's future
direction and the strategic ramifications of its investment activities. At the same time, there
seem to be a number of aspects of the CIC case that suggest caution may yet be warranted. The
framework presented in Chapter Two provides a useful analytical approach to monitor and assess
developments in the evolutionary path of the CIC and other commercial actors that may be used
as tools of economic statecraft.
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9.1 Summary of the Dissertation
This study set out to develop a general, middle-range theory of economic statecraft that
gave appropriate agency to the commercial actors actually responsible for conducting
international economic interaction. This theoretical construct begins with an understanding of
economic statecraft that has its roots in the concept of security externalities. These externalities
are the security consequences that result from the commercial activity of firms or other entities
that conduct international economic transactions. When states seek to deliberately generate such
strategic effects by manipulating the activities of commercial actors, they are engaging in
economic statecraft. Such manipulation rests on the state being able to direct and control the
commercial actors. Chapter Two set out a theoretical framework of five factors that account for
when the state will be able to control commercial actors (and thus the conditions under which
economic statecraft will be likely to succeed).1 Together, this theory answers both elements of
how economic statecraft actually works in practice: the typology lays out the manner in which
economic statecraft works and the five independent variables specify the conditions under which
economic statecraft occurs.
Given the centrality of state-business relations in this account of economic statecraft and
given its growing stature in world affairs, China is an especially attractive test case. Because of
China's mixed economy and current economic transitional state, Chinese economic statecraft
Of course, as discussed in Chapter Two, success in economic statecraft also requires three other conditions in
addition to state control. First, the size of the economic interaction must be large enough to matter. Second, the
nature of the economic interaction must be inelastic enough to matter. Third, the goals that the state seeks to
achieve with the economic statecraft cannot be out of proportion to the economic means being employed.
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provides useful variation across a number of cases to illustrate the dynamics of the theory.
Specifically, I have selected three important areas of China's grand strategy that feature
economic statecraft prominently. Exploring the intricacies of the episodes across these three
areas has provided useful material for demonstrating, probing and refining the theory.
In the first area, China's strategy focused on efforts to leverage Interest Transformation
security externalities in the context of the cross-Strait relationship with Taiwan. Chapter Three
examined a case of successful Chinese economic statecraft that was designed to transform
Taiwan's desire to seek greater independence.2 The Mainland authorities worked with Taiwan's
opposition parties to provide economic concessions to the support base of Chen Shui-bian as part
of an effort to undermine regional support for the DPP. Chapter Four compared this success
with Beijing's frustrated attempts to use economic statecraft in an earlier period of the cross-
Strait relationship. Specifically, that chapter examined Beijing's efforts to use Coercive
Leverage against prominent Taiwanese corporations with Mainland operations in order to
influence the outcome of Taiwan's presidential elections. 3
Chapters Five and Six examined Chinese efforts to secure access to strategic raw
materials. Specifically, Chapter Five looked at China's search for oil and the strategic
difficulties engendered when Chinese oil companies embarked on their "Going Out" strategy.
China's difficulty controlling its commercial actors in this setting was juxtaposed with the state's
ability to successfully direct commercial actions as part of China's efforts to prevent the
concentration of iron ore supply-another strategic resource. Chapter Six focused on a case
study of China's largest overseas investment and its strategic ramifications. The area of strategic
2 Although such redefinition of national interests usually would be expected to take quite a bit of time, Chapter
Three examined one episode in which such economic statecraft generated strategic results in a relatively short
amount of time.
3 This chapter also briefly illustrated the Bolstering security externality logic that motivated early Chinese cross-
Strait engagement.
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raw materials is one that often entails Strategic Transfer types of security externalities. Oil and
iron are both critical raw materials fueling China's basic economy and war-fighting ability. By
examining cases of China's efforts to work through commercial actors to secure access to these
strategic resources, Chapters Five and Six highlighted the business-government dynamics
accounting for when the state was able to be effective and when commercial actors' activity was
counter-productive for national strategic interests.
Chapter Seven also sought to illustrate cases in yet a third empirical context: sovereign
wealth funds. As China continues to liberalize and reform its economy, traditional avenues of
direct state control seem likely to weaken. However, these massive, state-controlled finance
entities seem to provide a continuing lever for exerting state influence over the conduct of
strategic commercial activities. Chapter Seven juxtaposed two of these government financial
entities to understand the institutional dynamics enabling SAFE to be used as an effective
instrument of economic statecraft while NSSF seems to pose little potential for strategic
influence. Finally, Chapter Eight applied the theory to evaluate a case of contemporary strategic
concern: the CIC. Having explored and demonstrated specific elements of the theory in Chapters
Three through Seven, Chapter Eight applied the full theoretical framework to evaluate CIC's
potential as an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. The evidence suggests that the CIC
will function on a largely commercial basis (albeit "with Chinese characteristics").
9.2 Main Findings
Chapter One's review of the literature highlighted the absence of a theory of economic
statecraft that adequately accommodates the role of commercial actors in international relations.
This dissertation has sought to lay the groundwork for developing and demonstrating a general,
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middle-range theory of economic statecraft. This section summarizes the study's main findings
and highlights the significance of those contributions.
First and foremost, this dissertation has contributed to improving our understanding of
how economic statecraft works in practice. The nature of the relationship between economics
and security can be usefully conceptualized using a security externalities framework. Security
externalities are defined as those security effects that are not fully internalized among the parties
directly conducting any given economic interaction. This approach frames the relationship
between economics and security as one in which the international economic activities of
commercial actors generate security consequences for nation states. The study used a typology
that specifies the range and types of these security externalities. Each type of security externality
has its own causal logic that informs a particular national strategy designed to generate a specific
security externality. This framework also produced a precise definition of economic statecraft
itself: namely, the deliberate state manipulation of economic interaction to capitalize on or to
reduce the associated security externalities that are generated by commercial actors. These
insights led to a closer examination of the business-government dynamics that lay at the heart of
economic statecraft. Such dynamics play a central role in determining economic statecraft's
success.
The existing literature highlights some combination of three factors that account for
successful economic statecraft. First, the state employing economic statecraft cannot be seeking
a goal that is out of proportion to the economic means available to achieve that goal (Purpose
Commensurability). This is the first pre-requisite for successful economic statecraft. To
understand a state's potential leverage, one ought to consider the magnitude of the economic
interaction relative the target state's total economy (Size) as well as the ability of the target to
substitute alternatives and the importance of the economic interaction (Inelasticity). Lastly, this
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study demonstrates that one must also consider whether the sending state can direct its economic
interaction so as to take advantage of its potential economic power. Control over commercial
actors is the factor that enables the state to direct its economic power.
The study's empirical work examined a set of cases in which China sought to achieve
national objectives using economic tools. Since this study sought to improve our understanding
of how economic power is actually employed by states, case selection was predicated on
identifying cases of potential economic statecraft. This research design enabled the analysis to
focus on how states go about using economic power. Although all the cases met the three pre-
requisites for economic statecraft to be successful, not all of these cases exhibited successful
economic statecraft. In some instances, the state controlled the commercial actors responsible
for conducting the economic activity while in other cases, the state did not have as great a degree
of control. When the state was able to control the commercial actors, economic statecraft was
successful. When the state was not able to control the commercial actors, economic statecraft
was not successful. 4 This result demonstrates that control over commercial actors is an
important factor accounting for successful economic statecraft. On their own, the other three
criteria were insufficient to explain the conditions under which economic statecraft is likely to be
effective. States must also be able to control the commercial actors conducting that economic
activity. Although control of the commercial actors that carry out international economic
activity is not the only factor necessary for economic statecraft to succeed, it is an important
aspect of the phenomenon that has not received appropriate treatment in the existing literature on
economic statecraft. Understanding exactly how a state is able to incentivize commercial
4 This outcome was an artifact of the research design which sought out cases in which the other three conditions for
successful economic statecraft were already present. The research design was discussed in more detail in Chapter
Two.
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actor(s) to engage in particular types of behavior that generate security externalities is a critical
element of understanding how states actually exercise their economic power in practice.
States must resolve a series of business-government coordination challenges if they are to
be effective at mobilizing and directing their economic power. Drawing on the principal-agent
theory literature in economics, Chapter Two deduced five factors that can be used to predict
when states will be able to control commercial actors (and thus direct their activities to generate
the desired security externalities-that is, to engage in economic statecraft). These determinants
of whether a state will be able to mobilize and direct its economic power are: 1.) the intrinsic
compatibility of goals between the state and the commercial actors that carry on the economic
activity of the state, 2.) the commercial market structure, 3.) the unity of the state, 4.) the nature
of the reporting relationship between the commercial firm(s) and the state, and 5.) the relative
distribution of resources between the state and the commercial actor(s). Each of these factors has
a posited relationship to the ability of the state to control or direct the behavior of commercial
actors. The casework then illustrated and explored these factors across three different empirical
contexts: the cross-Strait relationship, China's efforts to secure raw materials, and China's
sovereign wealth funds.
Economic statecraft is not an easy tool for states to wield, but when they master it,
economic statecraft can have powerful strategic effects. In the case of the opposition party visits
and the lifting of the fruit tariffs, the Mainland was seeking to change the ruling party on Taiwan.
Exercising such influence should be a fairly tall order, yet in this episode, the Mainland's
economic statecraft seems to have been effective. The state was able to control the commercial
actors mainly because the state was acting in a unified manner. In contrast, the Mainland's
earlier efforts to diminish the DPP's electoral success met with less success. In this earlier
period, divisions between the central and local government authorities undermined the
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Mainland's ability to control the commercial actors. In the Taiwan example, China learned how
to get more and more from its strategic use of economics as the cross-Strait relationship has
evolved over time. That case suggests China's growing sophistication has yielded improved
results from its economic statecraft. There also seems to be some support for the state becoming
more effective at coordinating and directing commercial actors in the realm of China's "Going
Out" strategy and the efforts to secure strategic resources. When the state devotes enough senior
leadership attention to a high-profile issue, it seems that the state is able to be effective at
controlling the commercial activity (and the resultant security externalities). In the case of
China's oil companies operating in Africa, the conduct of powerful commercial actors
undermined some of the state's larger priorities. However, in the Rio Tinto episode (another
case of economic activity designed to secure strategic raw materials), the commercial actors'
behavior furthered national priorities and facilitated strategic objectives. Again, the ability of the
state to control the commercial actors featured prominently. Finally, the study found that the
degree of commercialization (including: transparency, governance, professionalization, third-
party asset managers, etc.) is a key factor in determining how easily China's sovereign wealth
vehicles can be used to pursue the state's foreign policy goals. For example, in the Costa Rica
episode, SAFE acted as willing arm of the state to achieve China's foreign policy objectives
while the NSSF provided an example of state capital being used for explicitly commercial
purposes with great pains taken to insulate the allocation of state resources from political or
strategic machinations. The following table provides a simplified overview of the cases.
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Table 9.1: Casework Summary Table
Description
of Case
Finding
Explanation
Securing Strategic
Resources
China's Oil Chinalco, CDB
Majors in and Rio Tinto
Africa
China relies on China attempts to
commercial use commercial
actors to secure actors to prevent
access to oil; upstream
national oil supplier
companies concentration in
(NOCs) expand iron ore
abroad
Economic Economic
statecraft mixed; statecraft
NOCs obtain oil, successful; State
but undermine coordinates
other strategic Chinese
priorities commercial
actors to block
BHP acquisition
of Rio Tinto
Weak State State Control
Control due to because
relative resources compatibility of
favoring NOCs, goals, reporting
bureaucratic relationships,
divisions within unity of state,
state competitive
space
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The ability of the state to control the economic behavior of the commercial actors was a
critical factor enabling economic statecraft in each case that was examined. The study found
evidence of China's strategic use of economics to achieve national objectives across all three
empirical contexts. At the same time, these three empirical contexts also provided cases in
which the activities of commercial actors did not support China's national security objectives.
Examining both types of cases provided insight into how economic statecraft works. These
types of paired comparisons held background conditions constant while allowing the key
variables of interest to fluctuate. In each case, control over commercial actors was observed to
be the determining factor of successful economic statecraft.
In short, the theory is an account of how aggregate economic actors' micro-level
incentives and consequent behavior generate national security outcomes at the level of state
grand strategy. This middle-range theory provides an integrated explanation of what economic
statecraft is, the manner in which economics effects security, the conditions under which
economic statecraft is likely to be effective, and a theoretical framework of specific challenges a
state must resolve if it is to successfully wield its economic power in pursuit of national strategic
objectives. The theory fills a significant gap in the literature by linking microeconomic, firm-
level behavior with the macro-level grand strategy of states to explain how states use firms to
pursue their strategic goals. Taken together, these elements provide an important bridge between
vague, general notions of "economic power" and the actual behavior of firms in a modern, global
context. The resulting theory illuminates the micro-foundations of economic statecraft as it is
practiced in grand strategy.
The contributions of this study are significant in three respects. First, from the empirical
perspective, China is a major rising power in the international system. Understanding how China
behaves on the international stage is important. In particular, China uses economic power to
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achieve its foreign policy objectives. Understanding exactly how China exercises economic
power helps to inform our understanding of the capabilities and limitations of economic
statecraft. In addition, the state's relationship to market forces and business actors is another
important empirical feature of contemporary international relations. The dynamic nature and
rapid development of these relations has outpaced our field's ability to understand their strategic
implications. Although certainly the case in the context of China, emerging complexities in
state-business relations and the strategic significance of these interactions are by no means
limited to the Chinese case.
In addition to improving our understanding of China's economic statecraft, this
dissertation also contributed to improving the understanding of economic statecraft as a general
theoretical phenomenon in international relations by calling attention to the importance of
commercial actors-particularly business-government dynamics. In this study's treatment of
China's economic statecraft, we observe the importance of commercial actors and the factors that
enable the state to direct the behavior of those actors in order to generate security consequences.
Understanding the importance of commercial actors enables analysts of economic statecraft to
focus on the critical business-government nexus that plays such an important role in how states
actually use their economic power in the contemporary international system.
This project has its origins in the multitude of work on economic statecraft that has been
done in international relations. This dissertation revisited a classic question in international
relations (Why does economic statecraft work?) but in a much more nuanced way than the extant
literature has asked it.7 This study's approach sought to address larger issues of state-market
relations and how the state influences business actors and the international economic interaction
they conduct. It is a work about how states exercise economic power in the international system.
7 I am indebted to Ken Oye for this observation.
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This study provides a synthesis between realist assumptions about great power interests and
economic modalities of international interaction that have generally been the purview of liberal
theories of international relations. In this respect, this work is an intellectual descendant of
Kirshner, Baldwin, Nye and Keohane, Knorr, and Gilpin, as well as Hirschman and Staley before
that. Upon these foundations, this dissertation has sought to build a theory of economic
statecraft that advances our field's treatment of the topic, specifically by deepening our
understanding of how states exercise their economic power in practice. Works on grand strategy
have recognized that states have a range of tools they can use to achieve their strategic
objectives. One of these is tools is economic power. All states possess this set of tools, but
different states seem to use this tool to varying degrees. Indeed, even within the context of the
same state, the economic instrument of national power seems to be used to varying degrees and
with varying results. Explaining what accounts for such variation helps improve our field's
understanding of why and how economic statecraft works.
Finally, in addition to the theoretical and empirical significance, this study provides a
useful contribution from a policy perspective as well. The next section examines the policy
implications of this research.
9.3 Policy Implications
This project grew out of real-world questions about how states actually exercise their
international economic power under contemporary conditions of globalization. Not surprisingly,
the work has policy implications at several levels. First, the theory suggests a set of policy
implications for the conduct of economic statecraft as a tool of national power. Second, there is
a set of policy implications concerning China's reform and liberalization, its rise and its use of
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economic power. Finally, there are a number of more narrow case-specific policy implications
that are somewhat idiosyncratic to the particular empirical contexts examined in this dissertation.
The study carries important policy implications for the conduct of economic statecraft as
a tool of national power. This study has focused on developing a better understanding of exactly
how states exercise their economic power in the international system. By examining specific
instances of economic statecraft, this study shed light on the manner in which economics can be
used to achieve strategic objectives. The theory provides policymakers with a framework for
both assessing when and how economics may entail strategic consequences. The typology of
security externalities lends clarity and precision to what are often poorly specified public policy
discussions about economics and security. It also provides indications of how to assess threats
and how to evaluate instances of potential economic statecraft more sharply. This dissertation
also investigated the conditions under which such exercises of economic power are likely to
succeed. Of course, understanding the factors that drive success in economic statecraft enables
policy makers to craft more effective strategies of economic statecraft. This, in turn, will also
enable economic power to be used to greater effect in the international system. In some cases,
states may find it attractive to rely on effective tools of economic power rather than blunt
instruments of military power to achieve their strategic objectives.
The second major area of policy implications concern China specifically. For the past
thirty years, China has been engaged in a massive reform and liberalization effort that has
fundamentally re-oriented its economy (and society). This effort has generated considerable
economic growth and unlocked Chinese potential that had lain dormant for more than one
hundred fifty years. This economic growth has also enabled a significant expansion for China's
potential to use its economic power to pursue its strategic goals. This study explored the
conditions under which China's rising economic clout will be able to be used to pursue China's
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strategic foreign policy objectives. This analysis carries important implications for the
effectiveness of such economic statecraft. Continuing economic liberalization should result in
China's commercial actors being motivated more by profit rather than governmental directive.8
If these liberalization efforts stall and China becomes locked in some partial model of state
capitalism, it may possess enough "economic gunpowder" to be dangerous while also enabling
the state to retain the capabilities to direct that economic power.9 Although, as this study has
shown, exercising that economic power effectively is not always easy.
Finally, the study's findings suggest policy implications related to the specific empirical
contexts that were examined. China's engagement with Taiwan will likely be broadened and
deepened to more effectively create vested interests in Taiwan favoring amicable cross-Strait
relations.' 0 Strategies based on Interest Transformation have proven to be much more effective
for China than those based on Coercive Leverage. These efforts offer the most efficient path
toward eventual reunification. Given Taiwan's geographic realities, Taiwan's best policy may
very well be to cooperate with Beijing at developing closer economic ties. However, Taiwan
must be keenly aware of the gradual Interest Transformation security externalities that such
8 Such commercialization will strengthen China in the long run, but as has been demonstrated by the massive
changes brought on by China's reforms of the last thirty years, continuing commercialization will also likely alter
China's own definition of its national interests. Such liberalization will hopefully (likely?) produce a China that
integrates into the international world system peacefully.
9 In an international system dominated by the U.S. that largely plays by liberal, free market rules, such a rising
power can be a significant source of concern. For this reason, US-China policy must continue to impress upon
China the importance of continuing its reform and liberalization efforts. Such efforts serve both American and
Chinese long-term interests.
10 Such dynamics have the strong potential to be self-reinforcing and expansionary. Commercial actors will not
want to give up market access, in fact the tendency would be for commercial actors to seek to expand economic
links. "Indeed, as their business stakes increase enormously over time, it becomes increasingly difficult for
politicians and officials to reverse and undermine ongoing commercial ties." Steve Chan, "The Politics of Economic
Exchange: Carrots and Sticks in Taiwan-China-U.S. Relations," Issues & Studies 42, no. 2 (2006): p. 13. The self-
reinforcing nature of the Interest Transformation security externality is that commercial actors act in their own
narrow interests to promote greater engagement and deeper ties. This trend will likely further undermine Taiwanese
desires for dejure independence.
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cooperation will be likely to produce. Proactive measures to institutionalize Taiwan's core
values might help defend against erosions of the defacto sovereignty Taiwan enjoys today.
The examination of China's "Going Out" strategy also implies that the Chinese state can
effectively coordinate its commercial actors' search for raw materials, but such coordination
often requires high-level attention from senior leadership to overcome internal divisions within
the Chinese state and information asymmetries between the state and the commercial actors
conducting the economic activity. State control is thus unlikely to be consistent enough to
adequately micro-manage China's supply of raw materials. Rather, state influence is likely to be
concentrated on the largest deals. China has embarked on a path of liberalization and
commercialization. This transition is an ongoing process and ought to continue. As the state
cedes greater and greater decision-making to the commercial actors, the state will need to grow
more comfortable with a market-based provision of goods and services to meet China's needs.
This transition will likely be most difficult for those goods and services that China considers to
be "strategic." However, failure to move toward more efficient market-based solutions will
likely result in long-term inefficiencies in exactly those areas that are most strategically sensitive
for China.
Finally, if China wishes to assuage foreign partners regarding its growing outward bound
investment flows, the work on sovereign wealth funds implies that these flows ought to be as
commercially-oriented as possible. Specific institutional measures that increase the distance
between the Chinese government and the investment decision making seem to be the most
effective way to achieve this type of reassurance. If China is intent on using its sovereign wealth
funds to pursue strategic national objectives, this study suggests that a lack of transparency and
public accountability as well as close political control over the allocation and use of state capital
are important characteristics enabling economic statecraft.
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In conclusion, three major implications stand out from this research. First,
commercialization of the actors responsible for conducting economic activity is the key to
avoiding state use of economic power. Such non-politicized orientation of commercial actors is
the strategic equivalent of "spiking the guns" of economic statecraft. This is not to say that
commercial activities will not generate security externalities, but merely that the state's ability to
direct such security externalities is difficult if the state does not control the commercial actors.
Second, economic statecraft is not an easy lever of national power for states to wield. To be
effective, many factors need to align. However, mixed, state capitalist systems like China's are
most likely to exhibit the necessary characteristics that enable the pursuit of national objectives
through economic means. Finally, China is likely to continue to use economic power to pursue
its strategic objectives going forward.
9.4 Looking Forward
The intersection of economics and security is a critical, continuously changing landscape.
This study has sought to organize and theorize one aspect of that field, namely economic
statecraft. China's use of its economic power is likely to continue to evolve and change. In the
wake of the current financial crisis, classical liberal ideas of economics in which the state plays a
minimal role in the economy have fallen out of favor. This sentiment is particularly pervasive in
China where a rapid recovery has prompted some to view the financial crisis as hastening and
affirming China's rise to great power status. China's resilience seems to have reaffirmed the
advantages of its economic model. Debunking the attractiveness of liberalization has
strengthened the case against further economic reform. If the reform effort stalls, and the
government leadership decides to maintain a heavy hand in guiding the economy, this would
carry significant implications for China's economic power. An active role for government would
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imply that the state would more easily be able to direct China's economic power. However, as
mentioned at the outset of this study, extensive state direction of the economy leads to long-run
inefficiencies that would eventually limit China's "economic gunpowder." This is a key trend to
watch going forward. Will China move forward and continue to reform and liberalize or will it
remain mired in its current hybrid model of state capitalism?
Rising states and the dynamics of great power transitions lay at the root of some of the
world's greatest wars and have historically been a source of systemic danger. The national
power of rising states fundamentally rests on economic foundations. In addition to fueling
military capabilities, that economic power can, itself, be instrumentally directed to pursue
national strategic objectives. Understanding how this happens has been the basic driver of this
study. As this project draws to a close, it is clear that economic statecraft is likely to continue to
occupy a prominent role in China's grand strategy going forward. The rising importance of
China in world affairs is unlikely to fade anytime soon and the strategic significance of
international economic relations continues to be an influential feature of international relations.
Both topics provide ample opportunities for continuing exploration.
320
Appendices
321
322
Appendix A
Taiwan's Electoral Geography
This appendix provides supplemental information concerning the DPP's electoral
dominance of the Taiwan's southern areas during the period preceding China's Interest
Transformation strategy. Counties that the Pan-Green (DPP) won are noted in green while
counties the Pan-Blue (KMT & PFP) won are noted in blue. In the very tight March 2004
Presidential Election, and the December 2004 Legislative Yuan Election, the pattern is quite
clear. The Pan-Blue alliance usually dominates in the northern and urban areas while the Pan-
Green alliance usually dominates in the southern and rural areas.
March 2004 Presidential Electioni December 2004 Legislative Yuan Election 2
T'ai-pei Ch-ilung
Tao-yuan
H sin-chu Tai-Pei
H sin-chu
Ta-chung
Tai-chung
Chang-hua
Peng-hu Hua hen
W ~chie-i
T'ai-nan
Kao-hsiung
Kao-hsiung
-f- T ai-tung
TAIWAN
December 2004
F Pa-Blue Coalition lead Legislative Elections
'l Part-Green Coalition lead
This map (entitled: "2004 AUitIid El " ) is taken from the Wikimedia Commons project.
Available at: http://connons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taiwan election 2004jp
This map (entitled: "Taiwan: December 2004 Legislative Elections") was developed by Dr. Adam Carr as part of
the electoral maps section of his world-wide election archive available at: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/
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This pattern of DPP regionalism also held true in the 2000 Presidential Election (although
the Soong-Lien split made this election a bit anomalous). In the map below of the 2000
Presidential Election, counties that voted for Soong (PFP) are colored orange and Chen (DPP)
are green.3 Once again, DPP stronghold counties are predominantly in the southern portion of
the island.
March 2000 Presidential Election 4
3 Lien captured roughly23% of he popular vote butwon nplurality iany ofthe counties, he c  noblu  n th smap.4 This map (entitled: "Taiwan_2000 E ction") is repr duced from Wikipedia. Available at:http://cn.wikipedia.orNwiki/File:Taiwan 2000 election.png324
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Finally, Lay, Yap and Chen have written a related article that examines the spatial
autocorrelation among township-level election results.5 Their research confirms the general
point made here: that pan-Green support has been concentrated in the southern portions of
Taiwan. Their maps have the added benefit of detecting the "statistical significance of spatial
association for these results."6 As is evident in their maps reproduced below, the following
counties in particular are considered pan-Green bastions: Tainan, Kaohsiung, Chiayi, and
Pingtung.7
Lay et al's electoral geography maps of the Presidential elections reproduced from their
Figure 1 on p. 779:
(D) 2004
a
Ih f
99
Aw
W
[ii Clusters 0f Pan-Blue a): Taipei City. b): Taichung City. c). Keelung City, d): Tainan City, a): Kaohsiung
Clusters di Pan-Green City. ): Taipei County. g): Yan County, h): Taoyuan County. I): Chiayi City. j):
Outer Hsinchu County, k): Misoil County, I): Taichung County, ny Nantu County. n):[ No Spatial Autocorreletion Changhua County. o): Hsinchu City, p): Yunin County, q) Chiayi County r):
Taian County, s): Kaohsiung County, t): Pingtung County u): Huaien County,
v). Taitung County, w): Penghu County.
SOURCE: By Ko-Hua Yap, based on data from the ROC CEC database, at <http://210.69.23.
l40/cec/cechead.asp>.
5 J. Lay, K. Yap, and Y. Chen, "The Transition of Taiwan's Political Geography," Asian Survey 48, no. 5 (2008):
773.
6 bid. p. 777.
7 Ibid. p. 782.
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Lay et al's electoral geography maps of the Legislative elections reproduced from their
Figure 2 on p. 784:
21,7
Ai
21
Cold Spots cf Pan-Green
Hot Spots of Pan-Green
Outliers
' ] No Spatial Autocorrelation
2Z W 0"Oew
): Taipei City, b): Talchung City, c): Keelung City, d): Tainan City, e); Kaohsiung
City. 0: TaIpei County. g): Y(an County. h): Taoyuan County, i): Chiayl City, j):
Hinchu County, k): MiaoUi County, 1): Taichung County. mi): Nantou County. n):
Changhua County, o): Hsinchu City, p): Yunlin County, q): Chiayl County r):
Tainan County, s): Kaohsiung County, t): Pingtung County, u): Hualien County,
v): Taitung County, w): Penghu County.
SOURCE: Ibid. with Figure 1.
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Overview of China's-Sovereign Wealth Funds
This appendix provides a brief introduction to each of the six entities discussed in the
case work on China's sovereign wealth funds. This appendix is designed as a supplement to
familiarize the reader with the general lay of the landscape of the entities that manage China's
state capital offering some sense for how these six entities relate to one another and to China's
outward bound investment flows.
National Social Security Fund (
The National Social Security Fund was China's first real sovereign wealth fund. It was
established in 2000 to help ensure adequate funds to cover China's social security needs by
providing a backstop against investment losses of smaller municipal and provincial social
security funds that had gotten into trouble by the late 1990s. The NSSF has a strongly
commercial orientation to maximize investment returns. Of the entities covered in this chapter,
the NSSF seems to be the least motivated by non-commercial goals.
The NSSF is run by a board of directors that reports to the State Council. The chairman,
vice-chairman and the directors of the board are all appointed by the State Council. Technically,
as a governmental agency at the ministerial level, the NSSF reports to the State Council,
however, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security
(MoLSS) "supervise the investment operations and custody" of the NSSF. The NSSF had about
US $113.7 billion in assets at the end of 2009. This has largely come from funds provided by the
central government. The NSSF also gets funds from publicly listed SOEs, individual worker
contributions, and its own investment returns. The NSSF makes significant use of third party
asset managers to invest a substantial portion of its overseas funds.
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The China Investment Corporation (@Nb"R -9- {_E:f 27)
The CIC was set up to diversify China's excess foreign exchange holdings which, by
2007 had become exceptionally large. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
had previously been exclusively responsible for managing these funds. These holdings were
concentrated in dollar-denominated debt (mainly treasuries and US government agency debt).
Given the rising value of the Chinese yuan and the relatively low interest being paid on
government debt, these dollar-denominated assets were losing real value for China. As a result,
$200 billion dollars of China's foreign exchange was allocated to capitalize the newly-formed
CIC in 2007. The CIC was charged with using a considerable portion of this funding to
complete the recapitalization of China's domestic banking sector, however, it seems to have
about $80-90 billion that it is allocating to invest abroad. This figure will likely grow as CIC
proves itself.
The CIC reports directly to the State Council and has institutional representation from a
number of major interests in China's world of state finance including the Ministry of Finance
(China's fiscal authority), the People's Bank of China (China's central bank), National
Development and Reform Commission (China's central planning bureau), etc. Although its
early development seems to suggest a good deal of factional and inter-bureaucratic jockeying,
today it appears the Ministry of Finance is the dominant force and that the CIC is set to develop
along commercially-oriented lines.
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State Administration of Foreign Exchange (X";iErtT )
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is charged with supervising and
managing China's foreign exchange reserves. As part of its duties it oversees the investment of
excess foreign exchange reserves. U.N. estimates place this figure around $300 billion. It
seems to have begun foreign exchange management functions as part of China's response to the
1997 East Asian Financial crisis. Since 1998, it has been reporting to the PBoC as a vice-
ministerial agency.
SAFE is primarily responsible for three types of open market operations. First, it
allocates foreign exchange for trade clearing. Banks must clear their foreign exchange through
SAFE. Only SAFE is allowed to convert yuan into foreign currencies. Second, SAFE is
responsible for maintaining China's sovereign liquidity. This means SAFE must decide when
and how much and in what manner to invest China's roughly $ 2 trillion of foreign exchange
reserves. Finally, SAFE buys and sells foreign currencies to maintain the RMB's designated
exchange rate range.
SAFE tends to be very opaque and there is little publicly-available information about its
activities. Despite this secrecy, there were indications that SAFE took fairly substantial positions
in publicly-traded equities listed on the London Stock Exchange in 2008. In addition, there are
some reports of private equity investments and direct investments in the energy industry.
'See: Section C of Chapter 1, "FDI by Sovereign Wealth Funds" in the UN World Investment Report 2008.
Available at: http://www.unctad.org/ en/docs/wir2008p I enjpdf
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China Export-Import Bank (@@ Ti/ Q#J) & China Development Bank (M iGF&f~fl )
China Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) and China Development Bank (CDB) are two of
China's three policy banks. "Policy banks" are distinct from "commercial banks" in that policy
banks have a statutory mandate to support China's national policy objectives as opposed to being
commercially-driven institutions. This makes them an interesting case for studying the use of
economic interaction to achieve a state's foreign policy objectives. Policy banks grew out of the
1994 reorganization of China's banking sector. At that time, the ostensibly commercial activities
of the major banks were separated out from the centrally-planned credit provisioning activities
that had been mandated by the government economic planning apparatus. Today, policy banks
continue to closely support government policy priorities.
Ex-Im reports directly to the State Council and is wholly owned, operated and managed
by the Chinese government. The Ex-Im Bank enjoys a leadership position in shipping finance-
providing the same sort of services that originally helped create the Dutch investment market in
the early Seventeenth century. Ex-Im specializes in providing export and import credits,
underwriting the finances associated with international shipping, facilitating inter-bank transfers
and "pursuing state policies in industry, foreign trade and economy, finance and foreign affairs. .
." It also invests in infrastructure development and provides loans for firms engaging in
international trading activities. In 2008, Ex-Im had approximately RMB 566 billion (about $80
billion) in assets.
CDB began in 1994 by providing the project finance for large, capital intensive domestic
infrastructure projects like the Three Gorges Dam. The CDB was an early pioneer in bond
financing in China. It continues to dominate that market. It has since spread out into funding
international projects as well as taking direct investment stakes in multinational finance
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companies like Barclays. CDB is financed by selling bonds (rather than through deposits). As a
policy bank, both CDB and Ex-Im have had to underwrite commercially questionable ventures in
order to support government policy. While providing needed capital for government priorities,
this has saddled both entities with significant legacies of bad debt.
As of the end of 2008, the CDB has been re-organized as a joint-stock corporation
(instead of a policy bank). This has traditionally been an intermediate step to a full public listing
of SOEs' shares on the stock market. If this transition continues, it suggests that CDB will be
placed on a more commercial footing and an important statutory obligation to support Chinese
state policy will have been removed. Despite this new organization, CDB has continued to
feature prominently in providing financing for Chinese SOEs to expand their international
operations and make acquisitions abroad as part of China's fiscal stimulus response to the current
economic crisis.
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China-Africa Development Fund (# A R:0 27
The China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) was stood up to provide financing to
support China's economic activities in Africa. At the China-Africa Summit held in Beijing in
November 2006, Hu Jintao announced the establishment of what was to become a $5 billion fund
designed to support China's economic activities in Africa. At $1 billion in registered capital
today, CADF is the smallest of the entities examined here. CADF has already invested about
$400 million of its initial funding in more than 20 projects in Africa and it is expected to increase
by $2 billion in 2010. CADF is owned, operated and financed by the CDB. CADF is essentially
an investment pool of the CDB that has been ear-marked for supporting Chinese investments in
Africa. Effectively, the CDB is able to direct the CADF to conduct its operations in conjunction
with the CDB's (and by extension, China's) interests.
Most CADF investments involve a Chinese partner looking to expand into Africa. CADF
provides financing, advisory services, and helps to facilitate China-Africa joint ventures in three
main areas: infrastructure development, energy and mineral extraction, and agriculture. CADF is
explicitly designed to promote China's foreign policy objectives in Africa using economic
relations. Because its mandate is explicitly to foster economic ties that are designed to improve
diplomatic relations between China and Africa, its goals, by definition, are synonymous with
China's strategic preferences vis a vis Africa. Early indications seem to suggest that CADF has
been staffed largely with CDB affiliates that have been detailed to the CADF.
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